by Ilas Touazi, Andrea Sau, & Mira Benucci - Africa Team

Introduction

In a highly multipolar world, Türkiye has broken with its traditional cautious, inward-looking approach to foreign policy. Indeed, a ‘Turkish model’ of post-Cold War foreign policy has been conceptualised with a view to the ‘rebirth of a great Türkiye’ in terms of ‘anti-imperialism,’ ‘regional protection,’ ‘regional leadership,’ and ‘defence of the faith.’ Thus, a long-term, multi-faceted strategy, including political, economic, military, cultural, and humanitarian aspects aimed at extending Türkiye's influence as a key and undeniable player in the court of emerging powers, is indisputably linked to its growing presence in Africa. This will promote Türkiye's emergence as a global power through proactive, multidirectional, and multidimensional diplomacy, combining hard and soft power. Accordingly, at the 2023 Türkiye-Africa Economic and Trade Forum in Istanbul, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that he would do his utmost to ensure that the African continent took its rightful place in the global system, within the framework of cooperation based on an equal and win-win partnership.

The Turkish influence in Africa: A triptych regional strategy between Anti-Westernism, neo-Ottomanism and the Erdogan Doctrine

Türkiye's Africa policy is one of the pivotal instruments of its foreign policy in its quest for status in world politics. Historical relations between African countries date back to the Ottoman Empire and have been strengthened by contemporary Türkiye, which has developed a dense network of economic, political, and military relations with Africa. Ankara has one of the densest diplomatic networks in Africa: since 1998, the number of embassies has risen from 12 to 44, while the number of African embassies in Ankara has risen from 10 in 2008 to 38 in 2024. Indeed, Türkiye's ties with the African Union (AU) were restricted between 1963 and 2002. Following the implementation of the 1998 Action Plan for the Opening Policy towards Africa, Türkiye began attending summits as a guest nation after 2002 and gained “observer status” in the AU in 2005; then it became a “strategic partner” of the continent in 2008 with “The Istanbul Declaration on Türkiye-Africa Partnership.” Since then, the “2010-2014 Turkey-Africa Partnership Joint Implementation Plan’’ was adopted by the High-Level Officials Meeting, which has paved the path to a new model of partnership under the 2015-2019 Joint Implementation Plan. Meanwhile, the third Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit, held in Istanbul in 2021, adopted a joint action plan for the period 2022-2026. Simultaneously, the Turkish-African geopolitical cooperation landscape has experienced a significant shift towards multidimensional coordination that transcends traditional partnerships, particularly with regional governance bodies such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East African Community (EAC). However, Türkiye has strengthened its institutional relations with African sub-regional organisations, namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). That is why Ankara’s many-sided approach to cooperation with Africa is underpinned by a narrative portraying Turkey as an “Afro-Eurasian” state.

Türkiye's increased commitment to the African continent as part of the new Africa policy reflects, on the one hand, Erdogan's leveraged leadership since coming to power in 2002 and, on the other hand, a new page for Africa in its foreign policy and active involvement in this strategy with the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Conversely, Türkiye is awakening its neo-Ottomanist historical heritage and its hegemonic aspirations of geostrategic repositioning as a new player and emerging power. So the pillars of Erdoğan's foreign policy doctrine towards Africa are based on a dual process of Islamisation with the affirmation of a pan-Islamic identity that is part of a worldview that incorporates a pragmatic modern model based on non-interference, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political non-conditionality. This is the other pivotal axis of the Turkish strategy in Africa: demonisation and discrediting under the guise of anti-Westernism. In this context, the absence of colonial history is a unique asset for Turkey, which presents itself as a viable alternative to the traditional powers of the Western countries under the regional and global power competitions through a balanced approach involving hard and soft mechanisms to assert its influence in the great African geostrategic chessboard.

Türkiye's military and security strategy: a new projection of domination under the yoke of “hard power

 Türkiye's growing involvement in Africa's security sector demonstrates its strategy to expand geopolitical influence and establish itself as a key global power through military means. In the last 10 years, it has marked its involvement in Africa with a multifaceted approach to security, using multilateral missions, joint training, bilateral agreements, and army bases to consolidate influence and counter rival powers in key regions. Additionally, the country has enhanced its military footprint through its weapon exports. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2016 and 2023 Türkiye increased its annual weapons exports to Africa by about 284%. This export surge highlights Türkiyes growing defence industry and its efforts to strengthen political and economic ties with African nations, emphasizing lower costs and a flexible policy as key selling points. Additionally, Türkiye's involvement is exemplified by SADAT, a Turkish private military and security contractor (PMSC). Since its establishment, SADAT has played a significant role in Türkiye's broader strategic interests - hard power - including its operations through Syrian mercenaries in countries such as Libya, Niger, and Mali. This activity aligns with Ankara’s goals of increasing its influence in the region while maintaining a degree of operational discretion. Türkiye's use of private military contractors like SADAT forms part of a broader strategy focused on expanding its presence in key African regions, namely North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa, all of which hold strategic importance for the country.

While Türkiye’s ties to North Africa are rooted in history, its modern focus is driven by maritime security concerns and its Western Mediterranean strategy. During the Libyan civil war, from 2014 to 2020, Turkey supported the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA). This alliance aimed to gather support for Turkish policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. Assistance to the GNA included the provision of weapons, drones, and military coordination on the field. The Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia, is a critical region for Türkiye’s strategy. Mogadishu has a fundamental geo-strategical role as one of the countries facing the Gulf of Aden, a key point in the juncture of world trade. Türkiye-Somalia cooperation highlights Africa’s role in the Turkish grand strategy, showcasing its focus on both military partnerships and geopolitical objectives. In 2011, Erdogan was the first non-African leader to visit Somalia since the beginning of the civil war. The partnership expanded to military cooperation on the 13^th of April 2012, when Turkey and the Somali government signed an army training cooperation agreement. The agreement was considered by the parties a sizeable success, and as a result, in 2017, Türkiye opened its largest military base outside its territory, TURKSOM. The principal objective of the cooperation has been to fight the Islamist group Al-Shabab, aligning with Türkiye’s broader goal of stabilizing key regions to enhance its influence. However, the officers trained by Turkey, in Turkish, and with the Turkish army philosophy are increasingly meddling with internal affairs and with the equilibrium of the Somali army.

The Turkish-African cooperation: prioritizing “soft power” approach 

After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Türkiye emerged as an increasingly prominent actor on the international stage, leveraging an array of soft power instruments to bolster its influence. This is particularly evident in Africa, where Ankara’s multifaceted engagement includes economic partnerships, cultural and religious diplomacy, and humanitarian initiatives. Economic cooperation is a key feature of Türkiye’s African policy, with bilateral trade surging from $5.4 billion in 2003 to over $40 billion in 2022, highlighting Ankara’s strategic priority on deepening economic ties. Turkish companies have undertaken significant infrastructure projects, such as the Awash-Woldia railway project, part of the Djibouti-Ethiopia railway, and the Blaise Diagne International Airport in Senegal. Additionally, Türkiye’s ambition to become a primary energy hub is observable in its cooperation agreement signed in 2024, which grants Türkiye the right to explore and develop offshore hydrocarbons in Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the 2022 Memorandum of Understanding Between Türkiye and Libya on Cooperation in the Field of Hydrocarbons. Through the Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum, Türkiye seeks to promote bilateral partnerships, encourage investments, and facilitate technology transfer. These initiatives underscore Ankara’s long-term commitment to Africa’s development and signal its intent to establish mutually beneficial partnerships. 

Equally important to Türkiye's African strategy is its focus on cultural and religious diplomacy alongside its well-orchestrated humanitarian efforts. The shared Sunni Muslim identity between Ankara and many African nations represents a valuable foundation for building trust and enhancing the perception of Ankara’s projects as legitimate, authentic, and mutually beneficial. Institutions such as the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and the Yunus Emre Institute have promoted cultural exchanges and religious services, further strengthening religious relations with African countries. The Diyanet, for example, has supported mosque-building initiatives in Djibouti, Ghana, and Sudan. Similarly, the Yunus Emre Institute has established a Turkish language and culture centre and facilitated cultural exchange in Senegal. Meanwhile, humanitarian diplomacy remains central to Türkiye’s engagement in Africa. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has been active in over 30 African countries, implementing initiatives tailored to local needs in healthcare, education, and capacity-building. For example, the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Training and Research Hospital in Somalia serves as a vital healthcare facility and a training centre for Somali medical professionals, while TIKA’s efforts in Mozambique focus on Sustainable Agricultural Development. Through these efforts, Türkiye aims to consolidate its geopolitical footprint, elevate its international reputation, and cultivate partnerships rooted in solidarity, pragmatism, and mutual benefit. By emphasizing a historical and religious proximity narrative, Ankara aims to present itself as a dynamic and trusted actor, presenting an alternative to Western powers, often associated with political conditionality or perceived paternalism. 

Conclusion

Since the end of EU accession negotiations and the rise of the AKP, Türkiye has shifted to a more multidimensional and assertive global strategy, with Africa as a key symbol of this transformation. Ankara's approach combines neo-Ottomanism and non-interference, positioning Turkey as a third way between Western powers and Russia-China. Türkiye’s support for the GNA in Libya and its multifaceted engagement in Somalia—combining military training and facilities with economic, cultural, and religious initiatives—highlights its interest in two points of geostrategic juncture, the eastern Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa along with their strategic maritime and trade routes. 

Türkiye’s African strategy demonstrates how the country aspires to operate on the international arena. On the one hand, through the pragmatic use of hard and soft power, building a narrative, and, on the other, by positioning itself as a non-Western alternative. In this way, Türkiye has extended its influence effectively, slowly but surely. However, this strategy faces major challenges. Türkiye's limited resources risk exaggerating its ambitions and the use of tools such as SADAT or unbalanced alliances can damage its credibility. These factors highlight the delicate balance between Ankara's aspirations and its capabilities.