December 10, 2021No Comments

Geopolitical Implications of Finland’s H-X Program

By: Arnaud Sobrero and Romain Gallix

Image Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/77821971@N07/48909659726/

Finland is currently seeking to replace its aging F-18 with a global competition dubbed H-X worth $11 billion. It is expected that a decision will be made public before the end of 2021. Arguably, fighter jets represent a crucial component of States’ security and a decisive hard power asset in every conflictual context. This article aims at uncovering the underlying dynamics of the Western defense industry implied by the evolution of the Finnish tender. 

As of December 2021, the Finnish Ministry of Defense has received responses for its request for information from the European Eurofighter Typhoon, the Swedish Saab Gripen, the French Dassault Rafale, and the American Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin F-35. 

Divided European contenders open the way for American offers

The Finnish request for information received answers from all major Western fighter jets producers; hence the comparison of contenders allows us to identify several factors shaping the evolutions of the industry. The very fact that Finland launched its fleet’s renewing process very close to the expected decommission date for its current Hornets, as their “structural fatigue” denounces, exemplifies how procurement programs are not at the top of policy-makers agenda (Finnish Ministry of Defense).

The cost borne by single states with limited expenditure margins is becoming increasingly untenable, especially where political pressure on taxpayers’ spending is large (e.g., the United Kingdom). Moreover, countries may not dispose of design and production capacity over the entire technological spectrum, such as Italy and Spain. The relative political frenzy generated in recent decades made transnational fighter jets’ fleets a common feature of Western air forces. However, the pan-European Eurofighter Typhoon underwent difficulties showcasing the complexity of such projects, with reluctant transfers, unclear directions, and soaring costs due to fragmented production. 

Meanwhile, the individual offers from France and Sweden do not seem greatly superior. The Dassault Rafaleand the Saab Gripen offer suffer from their limited interoperability and relatively isolated stance in the current geopolitical equilibrium. Indeed, the political logic of defense procurement programs vastly supersedes the economic aspects of the choice. Was Finland to purchase the Saab Gripen underdog from its neighbor, its strategic prospects would be very limited and centered on Russian containment. The Rafale, in turn, would signify Finland’s alignment on the French posture of European strategic autonomy from the U.S. The 1,340km-long border Helsinki shares with Russia makes this perspective impossible. Therefore, although the Rafale has recently been sold to Croatia and Greece, Dassault’s offer seems compromised.

The American bidders consequently benefit from the lack of unity of European actors and put forward the geopolitical continuity they represent as a sales’ argument. The Boeing F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet proposal would minimize the H-X program costs due to pre-existing maintenance and operating capacities while selecting the F-35 would guarantee the acquisition of new, cutting-edge capacities

A degrading security environment

In recent years, we have witnessed a degradation of the international security environment with Russia’s resurgence and the growing assertiveness of China’s behavior. Primarily concerned with Russia, Finland finds itself in a delicate position as it is the E.U. member that shares the largest border with Russia. Russia has been particularly active in recent years by bolstering its military, as demonstrated by its intervention in the Syrian front, its attempts to upset the status quo, and its destabilization of NATO from within. Growing tensions between Russia and Ukraine are fueling a sense of regional insecurity with a Russian troop buildup as well as creating some levels of uncertainty regarding Russia’s intentions. Amid a large scale rearmament program, Russia has been able to field the SU-57, a modern stealth fighter aircraft, and develop lighter fifth-generation aircraft, the Checkmate, focused on export markets and somewhat reminiscent of the F-35.

Given the growing insecurity of its regional environment, Finland may be looking to maintain its strategic relationship with the U.S. and reinforce its indirect relationships with NATO. A critical political and strategic factor to consider is the interoperability of weapon systems within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Although Finland is not a member of the Alliance, the Lockheed Martin’s F-35 and Boeing’s F-18 Super Hornet would expand the reach of NATO and its ability to share data, engage in secure communication, and increase interoperability capabilities between the U.S. and other U.S.-allied European assets. Thus, beyond the interoperability aspect of those deals, acquiring the F-35 or the F-18 does bring diplomatic benefits and strengthen relationships with the United States.

The case of buying a strategic relationship with the U.S.

When it comes to large military hardware procurement, countries’ decisions are influenced by the prospect of a future strategic relationship with the procuring country. Buying U.S. material implies future interoperability, a valuable prospect in a world of growing tensions. In addition, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) framework is largely seen as a political instrument by Washington to deepen relationships with key allies. As such, the F-35 initially developed to replace aging F-16s, is poised to become one of America’s biggest exports. By strengthening military interoperability with U.S. allies across the globe and elevating their airpower capabilities, the F-35 is instrumental to America’s containment military strategies. Furthermore, some experts argue that the F-35 program acts as America’s Belt and Road Initiative, at least from a strategic and military standpoint. It provides a network and a platform acting as ‘a generator of wealth and peaceful co-existence on a global scale.’

Even soaring costs do not prevent countries from buying the F-35. Small players such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland have already chosen to buy the F-35 jets, notwithstanding questionable financial dispositions. This perfectly illustrates the underpinning political challenge at stake. For example, Switzerland agreed to buy 36 F-35As in July 2021 and Patriot air defense systems, even though the decision was controversial and considered overkill.

Thus, buying American-made fighter jets does bring significant commercial, industrial, and geopolitical benefits. Indeed, by buying American fighter jets, Finland would essentially strengthen its strategic relationship with the U.S.

Conclusively, given the degrading security environment Finland finds itself in and the growing importance of the U.S. strategic relationship, Finland is more likely to acquire U.S. technologies to replace its aging F-18s. Arguably, the F-35 appears better suited to meet Finland’s short and long-term requirements by strengthening its military and political relationship with the U.S. and acquiring an aircraft that could address the existing and emerging military threat as Russia deploys additional advanced stealth combat airborne platforms. 

October 12, 2021No Comments

Ethics in Military Training: Israel involvement in Operation Falcon Strike 21

Image Source: Ari Gross Judah, In first, Israeli F-35s train in Italy — with Iran in their sights, 2021, https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-first-israeli-f-35s-train-in-italy-with-iran-in-their-sights/

By: Maria Chiara Aquilino

Operation Falcon Strike 21 was initiated from the Italian Military Air Force base in Amendola (FG), Italy on 6th June 2021. It was promoted by the Stato Maggiore della Difesa (Defence Staff) in partnership with NATO, mainly with the United States of America and the United Kingdom and Israel. The involvement of Israeli Air Force (IAF) in the twelve days of aeronaval training, its consequential collaboration with the Italian, American and British military forces gathered the Italian public attention and raised questions on the role of ethics in the decisions made by the NATO powers. 

While there are not many details available on how the Operation Falcon Strike 21 originated, it facilitated the integration from airplanes between the 4th and 5th generation of fighters and increased the level of cooperation between powers in the logistic field and concerning the transfer of F-35 fighter jets. Thus, strengthening the interoperability of allied air forces and partners during joint operations. Exercises to master the use of the most advanced missile defence systems took place in between Sardinia and regions of Southern Italy (Il Manifesto, 2021). 

As the Operation was initiated, an old debate on the role of ethics in military trainings emerged, due to the public fear for how the development of knowledge in the field could be exploited by Israel in its own military operations. Indeed, the participation of this Middle-Eastern Power in exercises that are strategically designed to test the firepower of new F-35 fighter-bombers provided. The debate in fact dates back to 2016 when IAF received its first F-35 fighter jets. Initial trainings with the collaboration with the Western military forces, in particular with the Royal Air Forces and the US Marines, started in 2019. It included the Tri-Lightning exercise and continued with the Enduring Lightning ones organised by Israel and the United States (Aviation Report, 2021).

Since the IAF received its first F-35 fighter jets, it has strived to obtain more of them to be added to its fleet in groups of twos and threes throughout the past years, reaching the current level of 27 planes in total. Additionally, by 2024 23 F-35 jets will be owned by Israel to meet the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) purpose of acquiring a total of 50 aircraft. The Israeli officials have also confirmed that they are planning to purchase more of these aircrafts (The Times of Israel, 2021). 

Undoubtedly, the possibility of Israel deploying the acquired assets to fight its own wars within the Middle East generates an evident threat, which has indeed awakened concerns among the public. In particular, strikes have been organised in the areas close to the military air force base in Amendola, from where the operation was launched as pro-Palestine organisations have mobilized to show their disapproval for the partnership with Israel (Rete Italiana Pace e Disarmo, 2021). The exhibited disagreement with practices strengthening Western powers relationship with Israel was further emphasised since a statement released by one of IAF senior officials claimed that the extensive training conducted in Italy would be a historic chance to train its pilots to future wars in the Middle-Eastern area, particularly in Iran (Il Manifesto, 2021). 

Hence, the rise of concerns among pro-Palestine groups regarding the consequences of including Israel in the trainings is inevitable. Yet, this only seem to strike the attention of worried civilians, as indeed even after the IAF statement, the Operation was successfully carried out. 

Operation Falcon 21 was arguably an implicit declaration that it is ultimately ethical to include powers such as Israel in advanced military training conducted by NATO powers, regardless of the knowledge that the former might use the abilities and means gained to fight its own wars. The United States, United Kingdom and Italy have inevitably provided Israel with an outstanding opportunity to improve its military capabilities by supplying it with arms and helping in the development of knowledge about their use. This comes as a direct contradiction of the values of human rights and peace-keeping that these Western Powers claim to uphold. It appears though that for the Western powers, the role of ethics in strategic military decisions is overshadowed where there is a need to build partnerships with key powers such as Israel. 

July 12, 2021No Comments

If Russia attacks the Baltics

By: Igor Shchebetun

NATO exercise Defenders of Europe 20 was to be the largest U.S. troop deployment to Europe in more than 25 years. The main purpose of the exercise was to demonstrate the Alliance's ability to come to the aid of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which joined NATO in 2004. Despite the strongly pronounced pro-Western course of these countries, energy ties, trade flows and geographical realities make the three former Soviet republics the arena of an unspoken struggle for influence between Washington and Moscow.  What will happen to the Baltic states if tensions rise sharply and relations between Russia and NATO reach the phase of armed conflict? For centuries, the three small countries around the Baltic Sea have been the battleground for influence between the great powers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of the Baltic region strengthened their economic integration with the West, resulting in the economic prosperity of all three states, but the success of the Baltics also exposes the vulnerability of NATO in this region. 

Latvia and Estonia share a border with Russia, and the presence of large Russian-speaking communities in both countries inevitably leads to disagreements and conflicts over linguistic citizenship rights and historical memory. The focus here is on hybrid threats, where technically savvy Estonians seek to repel cyberattacks while Latvia focuses on strategic communications for information warfare. The two Baltic states are more susceptible to direct military pressure from Russia than their neighbour to the south Lithuania has the largest population among the three countries and is located in the most strategically important territory in the Baltic. It is here in the southernmost Baltic state that the tactical confrontation between Russia and NATO will take place. The Baltic states have no chance to withstand the onslaught of the Russian army. The question is whether it will be able to strengthen its allies before the Russian invasion.

Exercise Defender of Europe 20, scheduled for late March 2020, was supposed to be an attempt to answer this question. It was supposed to mobilize more than 20,000 U.S. soldiers and move more than 13,000 pieces of military equipment across the continent to demonstrate the Alliance's ability to defend the southern Baltic region, but was canceled due to movement restrictions due to COVID-19 pandemic. Although the exercises were not carried out as planned, the current military situation in the Baltic is worth exploring. The key to understanding the specifics of the region is its geography. Most importantly the presence of Russia here and the Kaliningrad region is a Russian enclave about the size of Northern Ireland located on the Baltic Sea coast southwest of Lithuania. 

Because of the stationing of the Russian-Baltic Fleet headquarters, the small subject of the Federation is well protected and considered the most militarized region in Europe. In February 2018, Kaliningrad became home to Iskander operational-tactical missile systems with nuclear capabilities and a range that covered all of the Baltic states and beyond. In addition, the province has the resources to limit and deny access and maneuvers at sea through long-range missiles, anti-ship missiles, missile defense systems, air, land and naval forces. 

Needless to say, Kaliningrad will play a decisive role in any confrontation with Russia. Today, the U.S. military leadership believes that the firepower present in Kaliningrad is enough to block U.S. naval forces from entering the Baltic Sea. This means that military action in the Baltics will take place on land, which completely changes the picture. After the events of 2014, NATO deployed a significantly deterrent force to its Eastern European countries. Expanded Forward Presence. This is a program to deploy troops consisting of combat units from the armies of various NATO members, equipped with relatively light weapons and ready to resist aggression under allied command. According to NATO statements, four multinational battlegroups deployed in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the United States. Canada and Germany and the United States, respectively, would increase Russian losses in the event of Russian intervention in the Baltics. The Kremlin argues that this increased presence raises security concerns and will only increase tensions in the future. Such escalation has already begun over the past few years, Russia has strengthened its air and anti-aircraft missile capabilities with equipment such as the Kalibr ship-based missile system with a range of up to 2,000 km, the S-400 Triumf long-range air defense system and the advanced Su-30cm fighter-bombers. 

In 2017, the Kremlin tested this equipment in a large-scale exercise by the West envisioning a worsening of relations with the West and highlighting the conflict on the territory of the Baltic states. During the exercise, Coastal Defense systems in Kaliningrad hit surface targets and Russian strategic targets near the Lithuanian border. Bombers attacked ground targets for the first time since the Cold War. Tensions are clearly high and further escalation does not look favorable to NATO in terms of military prospects. The stretch of land located between northeastern Poland and southern Lithuania between Kaliningrad and Belarus at its narrowest point is only 66 kilometers wide and is called the Suwalki Corridor. This strategically important area is one of NATO's most vulnerable geostrategic points because it serves as the only land corridor between the alliance and the Baltic states. Whoever controls the Suvalki corridor will dominate the entire battlefield, so NATO should do everything possible to maintain land access to the Baltics, while Russia will do everything possible to block this passage. For Lithuania the Suvalki corridor is also crucial because this area provides access to the second largest city in the country, Kaunas, located at the confluence of two major rivers dividing the country into two parts. Historically, both Napoleon and Hitler conducted offensives through the Suvalki Corridor. During the First World War, the Russian troops conducted counterattacks here. This region became the main battlefield of the Polish-Lithuanian War. The hilly terrain in Suwalki makes it difficult to regain control of the area should it be lost, and reinforcing NATO defenses face diplomatic difficulties in view of the transport routes from Russia to Kaliningrad that pass through here. More specifically, Russia has a legal right of passage through the Suvalki corridor to connect with Kaliningrad, and this freedom of access is a red line for Moscow. The Zapad 2017 exercise involving Belarus demonstrated how easily Russia can gain an advantage on the eastern flank of the Suvalki Corridor through which it can ferry its units. Meanwhile, it is assumed that three brigades of about 15,000 soldiers can be mobilized on the western flank in Kaliningrad alone for comparison, the regular Lithuanian army has 18,000 soldiers and it is not as well equipped as the Russian army and the number of forward multinational NATO units is just over 4 and a half thousand soldiers in fact the Russian troops located in the region outnumber the NATO troops by a ratio of about eight to one.

It is believed that to achieve parity with the Russian NATO forces, 18 more brigades will have to be deployed in the Baltics. However, reinforcing the Baltic allies is a politically risky and logistically complex undertaking. Even in the air NATO will not find it easy to gain military superiority. It is worth stressing that NATO has the technical capability to destroy Russian missile systems in the region. However, such a strike would increase tensions to the point of no return, which is a dangerous gamble in a conflict with a nuclear power.

All this means that at the moment Russia can easily suppress NATO forces in the Suvali corridor and isolate the Baltic states. This could be realized quite unexpectedly given Russia's freedom of movement in this region and the close proximity of its forces in Belarus and long-range missiles in Kaliningrad. Even with the rapid deployment of NATO forces, as suggested by the Defender of Europe 22 exercise, there is great doubt that they will be able to defend this territory until reinforcements arrive. Retaking the Suvalki Corridor by military means will require significant efforts from every NATO member state. By and large, NATO's vulnerability in the Baltics is well known to its military leadership. However, the general public in NATO member states is less familiar with it. Increased awareness of military realities could prevent possible miscalculations, because in any situation on the brink of war, NATO democracies would have to enlist the support of the people. Article 5 of NATO declares that an attack on one member of the Alliance is an attack on all members. This is the Cornerstone of the entire organization. If the Kremlin's ultimate goal is the destruction of NATO, one way of doing so is to demonstrate that the Alliance cannot defend its allies and the Baltics is the best place to test this theory.

July 1, 2021No Comments

European Security Challenges II: Russia

By: Alessandro Spada

Picture via West vs Russia: the Clash of Narratives | Madan

The tensions between the European Union (EU) and Russia have considerably increased over the last years. In this context, Ukraine has become a crucial geopolitical flashpoint. Ever since the annexation of Crimea and Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, the relations between Russia and the EU have deteriorated progressively with the adoption of severe sanctions by the latter.

In addition to the Ukrainian crisis, both the Russian intervention in the Syrian war and the attempted poisoning of the former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skipral and his daughter by Kremlin agents in 2018 are worth recollecting. Besides, the use of targeted actions to influence and to destabilise European countries such as disinformation, cyber-attacks and support for pro-Kremlin political parties and NGOs, and in the end, the attempted murder by poisoning of Alexei Navalny, one of the most fearsome opposition leaders of Vladimir Putin, have imposed EU to take further countermeasures.

The Russian threat can be subdivided into the following three categories: 

  1. Military threat: The high-risk level of Baltic States to be invaded by Russian troops in just a few days and short-range Iskander missiles stationed in “the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad” with high capacity to deliver nuclear warheads attack and to reach Poland and Eastern Germany in 2013. In this regard, it is worth highlighting that the repeated NATO airspace and sea space violations have often provoked several skirmishes between the Russian and NATO planes and warships in the Black and the Baltic Seas. In addition, more than 100,000 Russian troops have been deployed to the border between Russia and Ukraine and Russia’s navy presence around the whole Crimean Peninsula, including also the Sea of Azov, are not absolutely less alarming for Ukraine, NATO and European allies.
  2. Hybrid threat: This is meant as financial and political support for pro-Kremlin parties and NGOs, also spreading disinformation. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the cyber-attacks to influence and cause instability within European Countries and borders. For example, Moscow was able to build strong ties with populist and mostly far-right political parties such as Rassemblement National (RN) in France, Lega in Italy, Alternative für Deutschland(AfD) in Germany, Vlaams Belang (VB) in Belgium and Catalan independence movement in Spain. Among Russian hybrid tools, the state-owned RT news channel and Sputnik news agency, are considered propaganda instruments, which disseminate anti-establishment conspiracy theories, aim at creating divisions on sensitive issues such as migration and Islamic terrorism. At last, it is worth recalling the Internet Research Agency (IRA), the St. Petersburg-based “troll factory”, specialized in fake social media profiles on Facebook and Twitter.
  3. Energy threat: Russia supplies a third or more of EU oil and gas demand and “a large share of this is delivered via pipelines crossing Ukraine, a country whose relations with Moscow are even more problematic than the EU's, raising the possibility that Europe's gas supplies could be held hostage to geopolitical tensions”. Indeed, the energy crisis in 2006 and 2009 created serious warnings for gas supplies.

In reaction to these threats, 4500 troops have been stationed on a rotational basis in Poland and Baltic countries by NATO since 2017 and Lithuania approved the reintroduction of compulsory military service in 2015. The three Baltic countries have significantly raised their defence budget and two neutral countries as Finland and Sweden strengthened partnership with NATO. Furthermore, this year, many European countries took part in DEFENDER-Europe 21, “an annual large-scale U.S. Army-led, multinational, joint exercise designed to build readiness and interoperability between U.S., NATO and partner militaries”. Last May, 600 NATO and non-NATO forces, including troops from Ukraine and Georgia, were involved in the "Trojan Footprint" military exercise across five Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Georgia, and Romania). The drill took place “alongside much larger Defender-Europe 21 NATO joint exercises”, mentioned before, which had “some 28,000 forces participating from 26 different countries”. 

Numerous countermeasures have been taken by EU countries to counter Russian disinformation. For example, media literacy training has been introduced in school curricula by several countries and “regulators have clamped down on pro-Kremlin outlets such as RT for failing to comply with media standards”. In 2015, EU created a special task force as East StratCom Task Force for a weekly publication of Disinformation Review identifying and unmasking disinformation from pro-Russia sources. Moreover, it has the purpose to cooperate with Eastern Partnership countries for building resilience to pro-Kremlin disinformation, for example explaining EU policies to audiences from the region by producing Russian-language materials and training journalists. In 2018, the disinformation Code of Practice and the Action Plan were both adopted by the European Union. Several media companies signed the Code of Practice, committing to remove fake profiles and allowing users to see who pays for online political adverts.

The EU has taken meaningful measures to mitigate energy shortage. For example, it has started to build new energy infrastructures - such as interconnecting pipelines enabling EU Member States to share gas, building terminals to import LNG from USA and Qatar and storage facilities to keep gas in reserve. In this context, NATO plays a fundamental role as well, establishing “three main priorities regarding energy security. The first is to enhance allies’ strategic awareness of the security implications of energy developments. The second goal is to support the protection of critical energy infrastructure, including tankers and offshore energy installations. Third, NATO has prioritized enhancing energy efficiency in the military”.       

The EU will have to support Eastern European member countries politically, military and economically to counter Russian threats. It will have to promote major policies of economic development, social inclusions fighting inequalities created by pandemic, more cooperation and investments in counter-intelligence and cybersecurity technologies. Additionally, it will have to invest more financial resources to rebuild the economy based on renewable energies, being less hostage by the Russian oil and gas. In the end, it will need to be more independent from the American influence and speaking with a common and single voice. If Europe does not follow this path, it would put at risk the foundations of European democratic institutions, causing their disintegration, paving the way to antidemocratic and populist political parties and lastly it would continue to be subject to energy blackmail of the Kremlin.

What is sure for now is that Russia is still perceived as a real threat to the whole Western world, as also demonstrated by the UK and USA. Indeed, concerning this last one, in spite of the constructive U.S.-Russia Summit in Geneva on 16th June 2021, the deep underlying tension between the superpowers seems less than solved.

Here you can read the first part of this article.

April 4, 2021No Comments

Dr Tracey German on Russia and Related Security Concerns

Dr Tracey German (KCL, Defence Studies Department) discusses the relevance of Putin's Russia in international affairs, potential security concerns related to Russian aspirations and capabilities, NATO and post-Brexit UK approaches, and implications of COVID-19 on Russia.