by Arslan Sheikh, Ido Raz, Quanita Khan, & Sabur Shah - South Asia Desk
Introduction
The countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are all located in South Asia. The sub-region holds immense geopolitical significance at a global scale, characterised by its diverse political structures, economic interdependencies, and security complexities. The region’s security architecture is shaped by traditional geopolitical concerns, including military conflicts, border disputes, and threats of nuclear deterrence, as well asnon traditional threats such as climate change, cyber vulnerabilities, terrorism, and transnational crime.
In this study, we will examine and discuss the security situation in each South Asian country within the context of existing international security frameworks and treaties from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s security landscape remains precarious following the return of the Taliban to power in August 2021, leading to international concerns over governance and regional stability. Following accusations of human rights violations of women and minorities, the new regime faces recognition issues from the international community. Due to its strategic location, Kabul’s internal security challenges are problematic for South and Central Asian countries. For instance, the expansion of the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State (ISIS-K) in Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover led to serious concerns in many capitals over cross-border terrorism leakage, either through physical attacks or through radical propaganda. In addition, the harboring of other militant groups, such as the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Al-Qaeda, increases regional tensions and international distrust of Kabul.
Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, faces a severe humanitarian crisis characterized by the systematic exclusion of 2.5 million girls from education beyond sixth grade and 1.1 million women from universities. The maternal mortality rate is alarmingly high at 622 deaths per 100,000 births, while tensions along the Durand Line with Pakistan create ongoing instability. Approximately 8 million Afghans have fled the country, with thousands perishing during migration attempts. The country continues to be a focal point for international security cooperation, mainly through the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and multilateral counterterrorism frameworks.
Afghanistan faces severe food insecurity and an economic crisis exacerbated by international sanctions and humanitarian constraints. Additionally, environmental degradation and internal displacement contribute to the region’s broader security challenges.
Bangladesh
Due to a recent change in leadership, Bangladesh is still politically vulnerable and has effectively mitigated internal security risks through counterterrorism measures in coordination with regional security frameworks. However, challenges persist in managing sporadic border tensions with Myanmar and India, requiring continued diplomatic engagement and cross-border management strategies.
From a nontraditional security perspective, Bangladesh is one of the most climate-vulnerable countries with rising sea levels threatening coastal communities and agricultural production. Additionally, the Rohingya refugee crisis continues to strain national resources, necessitating sustained international support from organizations such as UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
Bhutan
Bhutan maintains a stable security environment but remains engaged in boundary negotiations with China, which has significant implications for its economic relations with India. The country upholds a policy of strategic neutrality and actively participates in regional security initiatives under SAARC.
Bhutan faces non-traditional security concerns in its fiscal deficits, climate disasters, and food production scarcity. Due to minimal refinancing and exchange rate risks from the loans it took from India, Bhutan is facing a hydroelectric debt. The country experiences a high seismic activity as it is located in the Himalayan mountains — between the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates. As an area prone to earthquakes and floods, agricultural loss makes food production relatively hard. Bhutan has growing concerns over climate change, particularly the impact of glacial melt on hydropower generation. Bhutan’s proactive environmental policies align with global frameworks such as the Paris Agreement, yet external climate pressures remain a persistent challenge.
India
India’s security posture is shaped by its border tensions with Pakistan and China, particularly in Jammu & Kashmir, Aksai Chin, and Arunachal Pradesh, with ongoing disputes over territorial claims.
Beyond conventional threats, India faces significant non-traditional security challenges, including escalating cybersecurity risks. Additionally, climate change-induced glacier melt continues to threaten regional water security and disrupt food supply chains, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities.
Maldives
The Maldives is a key player in Indian Ocean security, balancing relations between India and China while addressing maritime security challenges such as illegal fishing and transnational crime. Its participation in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) underscores its commitment to regional stability.
Climate change represents an existential threat, with rising sea levels endangering national infrastructure and livelihoods. The Maldives seeks financial and technological support from initiatives like the Global Climate Fund (GCF) to enhance climate resilience
Nepal’s security considerations are influenced by its geographical positioning between India and China. Border disputes with India and China and economic dependencies shape its strategic outlook, necessitating a balanced foreign policy approach.
Nepal is highly vulnerable to earthquakes and glacial retreats, both of which threaten national infrastructure and water security. The rapid loss of Himalayan glaciers poses severe risks to downstream populations reliant on water reserves, emphasizing the need for sustainable disaster management policies.
Pakistan
Pakistan’s security landscape remains dominated by tensions with India over Kashmir, coupled with national security threats posed by terrorism. The exchanges of cross-border airstrikes with Iran and Afghanistan have further caused regional political instability and a degradation of diplomatic dialogue. Afghanistan, under the Taliban regime, has targeted areas in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Moreover, it is accused of allowing and supporting cross-border attacks from Afghanistan inside Pakistani soil by the TTP and various militant groups. In response to the Afghan-based attacks, Pakistan conducted several airstrikes aimed against the TTP military posts in North Waziristan, which have increased tensions between the two neighbors. Other militant groups, such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (accused of being supported byIndia—India has officially denied such allegations, and no verifiable evidence has been presented to confirm these claims)—leverage Islamabad’s security problems in an attempt to damage valuable economic projects to further increase security instability in the country. Islamabad is engaged in counterterrorism efforts under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat illicit financial networks and cooperate with South and Central Asian countries' counterterrorism institutes.
Water scarcity and economic instability further exacerbate Pakistan’s security challenges. As a low-income country, Pakistan is highly dependent on agricultural production. With growing climate vulnerabilities, the country remains dependent on external assistance and multilateral economic interventions. Pakistan remains the 5th most vulnerable country on the Global Climate Risk Index.
Sri Lanka
Despite the end of its decades-long civil war, ethnic and religious tensions continue to pose security risks. The 2019 Easter bombings highlighted the ongoing threat of Islamist extremism in the country. Political instability, coupled with post-war reconciliation challenges, remains a concern.
Sri Lanka is currently grappling with a severe financial crisis, which has led to widespread economic instability. Additionally, the country faces the impacts of climate change, with coastal erosion and shifting monsoons threatening agriculture and food security.
Conclusion
South Asia's security landscape is complex, balancing traditional threats such as geopolitical conflicts and non-traditional risks like climate change and cyber threats. Addressing these requires regional cooperation, policy innovation, and sustainable security frameworks. The new ITSS South Asia team will attempt to address the following challenges while suggesting proper solutions the international community could employ to mitigate them.
Italy occupies a pivotal yet precarious position in today’s global landscape, straddling its deep-rooted commitments to the European Union (EU) and its long-standing transatlantic partnership with the United States (US). Under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who has led the country since October 2022, Italy faces a confluence of geopolitical risks, security challenges, and strategic opportunities. As a Mediterranean nation, Italy serves as a bridge between Europe and Africa, a role that amplifies both its vulnerabilities and its potential. Meloni’s leadership, marked by a blend of pragmatism and ambiguity, is central to navigating this complex terrain. This article examines Italy’s geopolitical risks, security issues, and opportunities within the EU and in relation to its transatlantic ties, spotlighting Meloni’s role in shaping the nation’s path forward.
Italy’s Geopolitical Risks: NATO, Ukraine, and Economic Strain
Italy’s geopolitical risks stem from its position within a fracturing NATO alliance, economic pressures exacerbated by global shifts, and domestic political instability. The ongoing war in Ukraine has strained NATO’s cohesion, with differing views among members on how to respond to Russia’s aggression. Italy, a founding member of the alliance, has aligned itself with the Western effort to support Ukraine through military aid and sanctions. However, this stance places it at odds with internal coalition dynamics and economic realities. The conflict has driven up energy costs and disrupted trade, hitting Italy’s export-driven economy hard. Reports indicate a significant GDP decline, with the burden of supporting Ukraine adding to fiscal woes at a time when Italy’s public debt remains among the highest in Europe.
Economic challenges are further intensified by external pressures. The EU’s push for rearmament, aimed at bolstering defenses against potential Russian threats, demands increased military spending from member states. Italy, currently spending below NATO’s 2% GDP target, faces calls to ramp up its defense budget. This comes as the country grapples with the fallout from potential US tariffs, which could target Italian exports like machinery and luxury goods, vital to its economic stability. These economic strains test Meloni’s ability to maintain national unity while meeting international obligations, a task complicated by the fragile coalition she leads.
Domestically, political instability poses a significant risk. Meloni heads a right-wing coalition that includes parties with divergent views on foreign policy. Her deputy, Matteo Salvini, has often leaned toward populist and nationalist rhetoric, occasionally clashing with EU directives and NATO’s unified stance. This internal discord threatens to undermine Italy’s ability to project a coherent foreign policy, weakening its influence in Brussels and Washington. Meloni must tread carefully to hold her government together, balancing coalition demands with the need to assert Italy’s role on the global stage.
Security Issues: Mediterranean Vulnerabilities and EU Dependence
Italy’s security challenges are most pronounced in the Mediterranean, a region that encapsulates its strategic importance and its vulnerabilities. The sea serves as a conduit for migration from North Africa, a persistent issue that has fueled domestic political debates and strained Italy’s resources. Alongside migration, the Mediterranean is a hotspot for terrorism and a critical artery for energy supplies, with Italy heavily reliant on gas pipelines and maritime routes. These threats demand a robust security framework, yet Italy often finds itself shouldering the burden with limited support from its EU partners.
The EU’s fragmented approach to Mediterranean security exacerbates Italy’s challenges. Northern member states tend to prioritize eastern threats, like Russia, over southern concerns, leaving Italy to advocate alone for greater focus on migration and regional stability. Meloni has sought to elevate Italy’s role as a Mediterranean power, pushing for EU- wide policies to address these issues, but progress remains slow. This north-south divide within the EU underscores a broader problem: the bloc’s lack of strategic autonomy. Dependent on the US for defense through NATO, the EU struggles to act independently, a dynamic that leaves Italy exposed to shifts in American priorities.
The transatlantic relationship, while a cornerstone of Italy’s security, introduces its own risks. The US has long provided the backbone of NATO’s military might, but potential changes in American leadership — particularly a return to a more isolationist or transactional stance — could disrupt this arrangement. Such a shift would force Italy and other European nations to increase defense spending, a daunting prospect given Italy’s economic constraints. Moreover, a reduced US presence in Europe could embolden adversaries, heightening security risks in the Mediterranean and testing Italy’s ability to respond effectively.
Opportunities: The Piano Mattei and Transatlantic Leverage
Amid these challenges, Italy has opportunities to strengthen its geopolitical standing, notably through the Piano Mattei, a strategic initiative spearheaded by Meloni’s government. This plan seeks to deepen ties with Africa and the Indo-Pacific, positioning Italy as a key player in fostering economic and security partnerships. Unlike traditional aid models, the Piano Mattei emphasises mutual benefit, aiming to address migration and energy security at their roots while opening markets for Italian firms. By leveraging its geographic proximity and historical connections to Africa, Italy could secure alternative energy sources and reduce dependence on volatile suppliers, all while enhancing its influence in a region of growing global importance.
Source: President of the Council of Ministers Giorgia Meloni at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council -licence
The success of this initiative, however, depends on international backing, particularly from the US. As a superpower with interests in countering China’s expansion in Africa, the US could view the Piano Mattei as a complementary strategy, offering political and economic support to amplify Italy’s efforts. Meloni has worked to strengthen Italy’s transatlantic ties, recognising that American endorsement could unlock resources and credibility for her ambitious plan. This alignment also positions Italy to benefit from US priorities within NATO, such as maintaining stability in the Mediterranean and supporting broader Western interests.
Italy’s transatlantic relationship offers additional leverage within the EU. By aligning closely with the US, Italy can enhance its stature as a reliable partner, potentially gaining greater sway in shaping NATO and EU policies. This is particularly valuable in the Mediterranean, where Italy’s security concerns align with American strategic goals, such as countering terrorism and securing energy routes. Meloni’s government could use this partnership to push for a more balanced EU security agenda, one that addresses southern challenges as seriously as eastern ones, thereby reinforcing Italy’s role as a bridge between continents.
Meloni’s Role: A Balancing Act Amidst Complexity
Giorgia Meloni’s leadership is defined by her ability to navigate this intricate web of risks and opportunities. Her approach often hinges on strategic ambiguity, a tactic that allows her to adapt to shifting dynamics without fully committing to any single path. Within the EU, she balances Italy’s obligations — such as supporting Ukraine and increasing defense spending — with domestic calls for economic relief and sovereignty. In the transatlantic sphere, she cultivates a strong relationship with the US while preparing for potential changes in American policy that could alter Italy’s security calculus. This balancing act is not without its challenges. Meloni’s coalition remains a weak link, with internal tensions threatening to derail her agenda. Salvini’s influence, for instance, pulls the government toward a more Euroskeptic stance, complicating efforts to deepen EU integration or meet NATO commitments. Economically, Meloni faces the daunting task of reviving Italy’s growth while contending with external pressures like US tariffs and EU rearmament costs. Her ability to implement the Piano Mattei hinges on maintaining domestic stability and securing foreign support, a tall order given these constraints.
Meloni’s leadership is also shaped by the broader transatlantic context. The US remains Italy’s most critical ally, but its future direction introduces uncertainty. A potential return to a more pragmatic, America-first policy could align with Meloni’s conservative platform — particularly on issues like migration and energy — but it might also reduce US engagement in Europe, forcing Italy to shoulder more responsibility. Meloni must position Italy to benefit from American support while preparing for scenarios where that support wanes, a delicate dance that requires foresight and flexibility.
Conclusion: Navigating Uncertainty with Strategic Foresight
Italy stands at a crossroads, its geopolitical risks and security challenges matched by significant opportunities. The war in Ukraine, economic strains, and Mediterranean vulnerabilities test the nation’s resilience, while the Piano Mattei and its transatlantic ties offer paths to greater influence. Giorgia Meloni’s leadership is pivotal in this equation, her ability to balance domestic pressures with international demands determining Italy’s trajectory.
To secure Italy’s future, Meloni must harness strategic foresight, leveraging the country’s unique assets — its Mediterranean position, historical ties, and EU membership — to carve out a stronger role in a multipolar world. The Piano Mattei could redefine Italy’s relationship with Africa and beyond, while a robust transatlantic partnership could bolster its security and economic prospects. Yet, success requires adaptability, as Italy navigates the uncertainties of EU cohesion, US policy shifts, and coalition politics. With careful stewardship, Italy can transform its challenges into strengths, ensuring its place as a key player in an evolving global landscape.
By Clémence Van Damme & Pedro Mendes - The US Desk
Introduction
According to John Ruggie, multilateralism refers to coordinating relations between three or more states by certain principles. He argues that NATO was predicated on two multilateralist principles, the indivisibility of threats to the collective (response irrespective of the attacker) and “diffuse reciprocity” (members expecting a rough equivalence of benefits over time). The same NATO now doubts the American commitment to respond.
These shared principles appear to be changing with the Trump administration. The signing of an executive order on February 4th, to review all current multilateral organisations, and determine whether American support should be withdrawn, marks the “America First” rhetoric, which saw a withdrawal of the Paris Climate Agreement, the World Health Organization, concurrently with USAid’s large cut in funding. Ultimately, are we witnessing a shift in foreign policy or a schism in American multilateralism?
The Erosion of Multilateralism Under Trump
The signing of this executive order, originated from an alleged drift from the agency's original mission, contrary to the interests of the US and its allies. In light of the broader political context, this change in stance gives rise to an increased criticism of multilateral agreements.
Trump’s criticism of multilateralism concerns three aspects; international organisations infringing on American sovereignty (regardless of its voluntary involvement and consistent with the Constitution), the restriction of the US’s freedom of action (in contrast with the predictability and trade-offs of the collective effort), and the cost of this multilateral involvement, which is the subject of much debate.
Policy-wise, the once-held belief of Ukraine’s Victory being vital, is being shattered by sharp criticism of Ukrainian leadership, the demands for a swift end to hostilities, and a semblance of peace. The possibility of a narrative that grants Russia a chance to turn the context into a political victory, undermines the “Western” model and denotes its failures. However, the latest diplomatic developments with Ukrainian leadership might even prompt Russia to escalate the conflict and risk paving the way for revisionist adversaries to challenge American primacy with renewed vigour.
What this means to the LIO (liberal international order) is a constant challenge to some of its core characteristics, namely, free trade and open markets being contested by tariffs, a US-led “Western” perspective permeating institutions, and organisations, being opposed by an aggressive pursuit of “vital interests”, and the political exceptionalism of the US, “the city atop a hill”, contrasting with a more unilateralist, nationalist, realist pursuit of political goals, albeit, far from isolationist.
Case Study: US Withdrawal from the World Health Organisation
On January 20, 2025, the White House issued anexecutive order announcing the US withdrawal from the World Health Organisation (WHO). Donald Trump announced his intent to leave in July 2020 based on several concerns: the WHO’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, its failure to implement crucial reforms, and its lack of independence from political influence. He also cited what he called « unfairly onerous and out of proportion » financial demands.
As the largest financial contributor, providing34% of the WHO’s $6.8 billion budget for 2024-2025, the US’s departure threatens critical operations, including the WHO’s health emergencies program. US funding accounts for up to 40% of its operations, forming a critical « backbone » for emergency health responses in conflict zones. Additionally, specialised initiatives such as polio eradication and tuberculosis treatment faceuncertain future.
Moreover, Washington’s move will undermine US diplomatic influence. It will limit its ability to engage with nations, especially those withstrained political relations, through health initiatives, ultimately risking to harm long-term security, economic interests, and geopolitical stability. This power vacuum paves the way for nations to expand their influence in global health governance. By shaping international norms in its favour and leveraging health diplomacy, countries like China can strengthenbilateral partnerships.
In addition, Trump’s withdrawal has strained transatlantic relations, asEuropean nations, like Germany, view this decision as a retreat from multilateral cooperation, prompting European leaders to reconsider US leadership in global health. Furthermore, this decision sets a precedent for other right-wing governments, such as those inArgentina andItaly, which have also cited their intent to leave.
The implications of Trump’s exit exacerbate the broader decline of multilateral cooperation, reinforcing a pattern of disengagement from international agreements such as theParis Climate Accord and theUN human rights body. This has been viewed by several observers as indicative of the US’s shift toward unilateral policies, reducing its participation in global health efforts, and further isolating it on the international stage.
Washington has however pursued alternative bilateral agreements, such as its recent health cooperation initiative with India. This signals an effort to maintain strategic influence in global health while shifting away from multilateral frameworks.
Conclusion: What Comes Next?
The change in American foreign policy within the Trump administration poses a great challenge to the multilateral order established after WWII. The US withdrawal from multilateral organisations represents a profound shift towards focused bilateral relations and transactional diplomacy, where national interests are given precedence over the principles set for cooperation. Such drastic changes, however, have deep repercussions, ranging from the global impact on health security to diplomatic soft power, and international relations as a whole.
All these considerations beg the question of how likely a return to multilateralism in future administrations is, and why would that approach be justified, given the damage caused by withdrawing from treaties and organisations. Trust in US commitment to these frameworks has been eroded, and other challengers have taken America’s leading role in the international arena. Such policies may change, but the amount of time China and other countries have had to set normative behaviour and relationships to fill the gap left by America’s absence makes the need to reconsider how the objectives of multilateral policies have shifted.
This draws attention to one of the most important problems which is: Can effective global governance exist without consistent American leadership, or are we witnessing the emergence of a new multipolar system with competing spheres of influence?
In 2024, elections took place in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania, but the process was far from smooth. Russian disinformation flooded social media. Bots and influencers were mobilised to manipulate public opinion. Protests erupted. Election results were challenged. And in Georgia, unrest hasn't stopped.
Our special guests, led by Carlotta Rinaudo, our researcher and Webinar Series leader, will try to break it all down and figure out what's happening in Georgia, Moldova and Romania by answering the following questions:
So, what really happened? Why Georgian citizens are still protesting? How did Russia interfere, and can its influence be countered? Ultimately, what does this mean for the European Union and its future?
Agenda:
00:00 -05:04 Opening remarks and Presentation by Carlotta Rinaudo (Lead of the ITSS Webinar Series)
05:04 - 13:00 How did Russia interfere, and can its influence be countered?
13:06: 23:28 The Case of Moldova
23:30-32:07 The Case of Romania
32:08 - 45:51 The Case of Georgia
45:52 - 54:20 What are the tangible risks for the European Union and its institutions?
54:21 - 1:02:40 Open Discussion
1:02:40 - 1:24:08 Q&A session
1:24:08 - 1:25:18 Closing Remarks by Carlotta Rinaudo
Mat Youkee speaks about the role of the US and China in shaping Panama’s current security situation. He is a freelance journalist and independent consultant based in Panama.
In this session, Mat Youkee discusses how Panama’s security situation has been affected by recent statements by US President Donald Trump. He looks at what is currently shaping Panama’s strategic decision making in the international arena, including US and Chinese political and business interests. He also considers what is next for the nation in light of these competing geopolitical interests.
Interviewers: Sarah Toubman & Dr. Rabiah Ryklief - Central & South America Desk
Increased geopolitical tensions caused by a war on the European continent and the re-election of Donald Trump, a NATO sceptic, as president of the United States have brought the question of the EU's military capabilities back to the agenda. America has been a well-recognised backbone of European security through NATO; however, recent discussions concerning the need for a “stronger Europe” with more capabilities have arisen. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the umbrella that covers EU defence matters, and the European Defence Agency (EDA) is a body under the CSDP aiming to improve the defence capabilities of the EU by coordinating efforts with member states. This blog article will examine some structural bottlenecks that the EU needs to face on their way to the strategic autonomy it has longed for.
Challenges and opportunities for further EU defence cooperation.
The EDA's work coordinating efforts between member states has numerous positive effects for member states and the EU. Firstly, this joint procurement will make spending more effective and, hence, more targeted, enabling member states to spend better. This can further lead to more specialised military equipment and innovation. Initiatives the EDA has launched, such as permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the new project on hybrid drive trains for military vehicles launched on December 11th 2024, show a positive trend towards cooperation on EDA projects with positive outcomes.
The EDA assists member states' militaries in collaborating effectively, maintaining “open doors” for cooperation among two or more states. This can help prevent the emergence of different systems that create bottlenecks for efficient collaboration in areas such as information sharing and the ability to manage one another's weapon systems when it is necessary to coordinate actions, either through CSDP or NATO missions where EU states are to take the lead.Although efforts and initiatives through the EDA, such as PESCO, have been launched to help EU member states coordinate efforts more effectively to increase the capabilities of the CSDP, some structural bottlenecks need to be addressed. Integrating defence projects and industries can be tricky due to the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP in the EDA. Projects depend on member states’ initiatives and willingness to cooperate on these matters, as defence and military are core interests to sovereign states due to the anarchic nature of the international system. States may be cautious about further integrating within these areas because of security implications.
Building on the above, the diverging national interests of member states based on various aspects such as geography, resources, threat perception and strategic culture create differences among states' willingness to enter EDA projects. Another aspect that needs to be considered is the EU’s reliance on the United States. As long as many EU states see the US as a security guarantor, it does not incentivise member states to increase the military capabilities of the EU. However, with Donald Trump's recent election as President of the United States, the EU should re-evaluate this idea and strive for more autonomy, especially after the Munich security conference where tensions with the US developed further, and now, as discussions arise about negotiating a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, and the EU does not have a seat at the table.
The EDA has numerous opportunities if member states align and integrate properly and effectively through joint projects. The EU has a strong political will, and increasing its capabilities through the EDA will make it a more credible actor in the international system and make it more autonomous in its neighbourhood, which is precisely what the EU needs in these critical times. With a more “capable” CSDP through EDA projects, the EU could finally get the strategic autonomy it has longed for and cut reliance on the US as a security guarantor while balancing them, which would reverse the security implications of the US threatening to leave NATO. Improving the EU´s crisis response could be a massive opportunity for the EU, further building on the credibility of the EU in the international system. Looking at when EU states, France and the UK (the UK left the EU in 2020) were to take the lead in the 2011 NATO-led operation in Libya, it clearly showed the weaknesses of the EU to act autonomously in its neighbourhood due to a divergence in systems and a lack of capabilities. If EU member states coordinate efforts through EDA initiatives, this could provide great opportunities for the EU’s actorness.
Potential threats that successful EDA cooperations could face include friction with NATO. Further defence integration between EU states and increasing the capabilities of the EU could be seen as undermining NATO, which could further affect the EU’s relationship with the US. Therefore, the EU needs to have close dialogues with the US as they are improving its capabilities. Divergence in member states' economies in the EU could lead to budgetary constraints and inequitable burden-sharing between member states. This could create fragmentation between EU member states since the EDA projects are “volunteer” and create inefficiency and potential new problems for the EU to face internally.
Conclusion
Concluding this blog article, a recommendation is for the EU to cooperate closely with NATO, especially the US, through the processes of EDA projects. Keeping NATO and the US in the loop could prevent friction with crucial powers and security guarantors on Europe´s way to gaining more autonomy. As mentioned earlier in this article, a structural bottleneck for successful projects is the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP and the EDA. A recommendation is, therefore, to make more projects mandatory for all EU member states and have a set percentage of GDP that each country should contribute to prevent friction over burden-sharing internally.
Over the past century, the Gulf states have built their economy through the exploitation of their natural resources, mainly oil and gas. As a result, their GDP per capita has been second-to-none: Qatar $119K, the UAE $82K, Bahrain $67K, and Saudi Arabia $66K. However, in the future, their economies could be jeopardised by factors such as the reduction of crude oil prices (due to the development of fracking and shale gas), the global shift toward renewable energy (as concerns over climate change increase), and, ultimately, the depletion of their natural resources. Although powerful relative to their size and population, the Gulf states are rentier states, and represent the most oil-dependent countries in the world. Their investment in the space sector is an important part of their ongoing economic transition to address these factors.
A Comparative Analysis of the Cases of ISWAP and ASWJ in Nigeria and Mozambique
By Massimiliano Dosmo and Leonardo Pesci - Africa Team
Since its inception in 2014, the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) has become a transnational Jihadist movement whose ideology and practices inform insurgents’ strategies and objectives across the world. One after another, movements pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, elevating ISIS as a structuring force for many religious-based factions in Africa. This article investigates the proliferation of ISIS-affiliated groups on the continent, comparing how the Islamic State operates in Nigeria and Mozambique. Specifically, the article seeks to understand how the strategic, operational, governance, and ideological practices of ISIS affiliates converge - or diverge - from the ones of ISIS’s core group.
Origins and formation of the groups
Starting with the origins and group formation, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) originated as a splinter faction of the Jihadist group Boko Haram, which was established in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria, in 2002 by Muhammad Yusuf. AfterMohammed Yusuf was killed in an unsuccessful uprising in 2009, the movement, under the new leadership of Abubakar Shekau, began an insurgency against the Nigerian government to create a Caliphate in the Lake Chad Basin area. In 2016, Boko Haram split intotwo groups: Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'adati wal-Jihad (JAS), commanded by Abubakar Shekau, and ISWAP, led by Abu Musab al Barnawi. The separation was the outcome of internal disputes within Boko Haram that were brought on by some skepticism shown by ISIS's higher authority following Shekau's decision to break with Al-Qaeda and joinISIS. This skepticism was given by the fact that, although Shekau had been designated as Waly (leader) of ISWAP and had pledged his loyalty to ISIS, his leadership skills and doctrinal beliefs were amajor source of worry for Al-Baghdadi. These worries were subsequently confirmed when Al-Baghdadi received grievance letters from Shekau's subordinates. Specifically, Shekau was accused of being too violent against the Muslim population, using indiscriminate violence against them, which represented an ideological clash with the ISIS view. This resulted in Al-Baghdadi's decision to not trust Shekau as the legitimate leader of ISWAP. From ISWAP’s inception, it is evident how ISIS actively influenced the group’s leadership due to an ideological clash with the previous leader.
On the other hand, Ansar al-Sunna, also known as al-Sunna wal-Jamaat’s (ASWJ), history in Mozambique can be traced to 2015, when the group started as areligious organisation in Mocimboa da Pria, one of the districts of Cabo Delgado Province in northern Mozambique. It emerged as an armed group in 2017, taking advantage of socio-economic issues such as widespread poverty, the exclusion of Muslim populations, and official indifference. In 2019, it started operating under the umbrella of theIslamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), which also included the Islamic State’s affiliate in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and joined ISIS, having previously adhered to Salafi-jihadist theology. The primary connections between ASWJ and ISIS are the ideological foundation, based on Salafi-jihadism, and promotional backing. However, it has much autonomy compared to more disciplined ISIS branches. Despite adopting ISIS's rhetoric on the establishment of anIslamic caliphate, its operational framework and governance are representative of the local reality. While ASWJ employs ISIS-style recruitment tactics, such as appealing to local concerns, it does not adopt the organisational rigor that ISIS has previously enforced on its branches.
Territoriality, governance and engagement with the population
A crucial element of this analysis is the territoriality, governance, and engagement strategies that the two groups employ. ISWAP takes on a methodical approach to administration, drawing inspiration from the administrative framework of ISIS. The organization manages commercial activity, collects taxes, and offers a few social services, including food distribution and disputeresolution. In contrast to Boko Haram's previous indiscriminate cruelty, ISWAP has immediately tried to gain local support by presenting itself as an alternative to the Nigerian government. Its governance model, aimed at winning thehearts and minds of the local population, has allowed ISWAP to sustain its insurgency and maintain control over key territory surrounding Lake Chad. ISWAP'sgovernance structure is one area where ISIS has a direct influence. Similar to ISIS, ISWAP uses a structured governance model, establishing a Sharia-law-based judicial hierarchy, designating governors for captured areas, and implementingfinancial measures to support its operations. ISWAP’s success in controlling the area demonstrates ISIS's preference for long-term administration as opposed to just gaining territory. Its capacity to offer services, including agricultural help and medical assistance, stands in stark contrast to the Nigerian government's neglect ofrural communities.
In contrast, ASWJ’s governance approach is less structured. Although it has exercisedauthority over certain parts of Cabo Delgado, it lacks a strong administrative framework. While they struggle to deliver basic services, the organisation enforces Sharia rule in conquered territory. Instead of using organised taxation, it engages in extortion and looting, and it frequently has coercive relationships with thelocal population. This lack of structured governance has hindered its ability to maintain sustained legitimacy among people. For these reasons, ASWJ’s governance is severely hampered by its excessive reliance on external funding and illicit activities, such as drugs and rubies smuggling. Consequently, unlike ASWJ, ISWAP has developed a more structured logistical network, securing a steady supply of weapons, food, and fuel directly from ISIS. It has also integrated foreign fighters into its ranks, benefiting from training provided by ISIS operatives in the region. ASWJ’s patchy and fluctuating implementation of Islamic governance initiatives, combined with its leadership’s short-term strategic objectives, has made long-term territorial control more challenging. This has prevented ISIS from fully sustaining the group’s operations, unlike in the case of ISWAP.
Funding Activities and Financial Revenues
The current analysis cannot overlook the financial and fundraising practices of ISWAP and ASWJ within their respective contexts. Despite the notorious difficulty in pinpointing direct financial connections, there are nonetheless converging similarities between ISIS, ISWAP, and ASWJ’s fundraising practices. ISIS’s core group in Syria and Iraq has largely benefitted from a different range of revenue sources. These included oil extraction and trade, taxation, lootings, robberies, kidnapping for ransom, extortion of local communities, and tariffs on import/export within their territories. Additionally, private donors and international fundraising networks generated a substantial part of ISIS's financial revenues.
While tracing direct financial links between ISIS’s core leadership and its Mozambican affiliate remains speculative due to limited evidence, the same cannot be said for ISWAP. During the first years of activities, ISIS's financial support was instrumental to the group's territorial and logistic affirmation. Evidence demonstrates ties between ISIS and ISWAP consisting of regular triangulations of money - up to USD 782.000 between 2015 and 2016. On the other hand, the closer engagement with local communities allowed the group to impose Zakat, a taxation system representing one of the primary sources of financial entrances. Leveraging the Quranic obligation, the group legitimises its authority in collecting taxes from private and business communities including farmers, traders, and fishermen. The practice avoided predatory actions characterising other Nigerian groups such as Boko Haram and JAS, creating patterns of predictability within communities. Despite this, ISWAP’s financial system is anyway reliant on the ransoms of local elites and international workers.
On the other hand, ASWJ's economic sustainment seems primarily reliant on illegal local trade and local and external donations. The region has historically represented a notorious hotspot of illicit trafficking and smuggling routes. The centrality of the port of Mocímboa da Praia elevates Cabo Delgado as a central hub for insurgents to trade and contraband goods, including timber, charcoal, rubies, and ivory. Notably, drug trafficking of heroin and methamphetamines from South Asia has become one of their main sources of income. A substantial part of ASWJ's financial entrances arises from local entrepreneurs demanding protections, as well as taxed loans borrowed to small businesses. While the above-mentioned appeared as the main financial revenues of the group, alternative fundraising activities confirm the tendency to rely on kidnapping for ransoms and the participation in human and organ trafficking routes of the Horn of Africa. Finally, although financial connections between ASWJ and ISIS are not sustained by verifiable evidence, it is nonetheless conceivable that links between the group and external funders from smaller ISIS cells in South Africa around the continent exist.
Source: Think Tank Experts Warn of Growing Islamist Financing Network in South Africa; Photo by ZUMA Press, Inc.
Group’s Objectives and Evolutions
Despite initial analogies, Nigerian and Mozambican territorial dynamics, logistical capacities, and counter-insurgency strategies have not only differentiated the evolutions of the groups but also their ideological and practical closeness to ISIS.
Both groups started with low-profile activities. Between 2015 and 2017, ASWJ was mainly composed of religious leaders, managing religious spaces and spreading Salafist doctrines, delegitimising secular institutions and state law. Similarly, ISWAP’s first steps in 2016-2018 are defined as the “consolidation” phase, characterised by a few activities and attempts of the group to define themselves from Boko Haram.
Between 2019 and 2021, both groups pledged allegiance and received formal recognition from the Islamic State’s core group, simultaneously intensifying the violence and frequency of attacks. ASWJ expanded its territorial presence to the four main coastal districts of Cabo Delgado. Approximately 16–20 monthly attacks targeted cargo transports, contractors, and security forces, spreading in neighboring Tanzania. ISWAP structured its internal composition, expanded its territorial control, and improved its engagement with the population acquiring notable legitimacy. The incursions remained targeted towards Nigerian security forces and military bases expanding to international workers and organisations in rural areas around the Lake Chad Basin.
With opposed outcomes, 2021 represented a turning tide for two groups, directly reflected in their relation and closeness to ISIS. Mozambican counter-insurgency strategy included contractors and international interventions to recapture major urban centers. Militants were forced to change their strategies, the number of attacks decreased, and tactics shifted to guerrilla actions, targeting civilians in smaller and rural villages. Meanwhile, ISWAP reinforced its bureaucratic organisation, and expanded its numerical basis, and territorial control, benefitting from the Sambisa offensive and the killing of JAS leader Shekau. Its territorial presence spilled over the Lake Chad Region, and at least 10 other Nigerian states.
Therefore, while pledging allegiance to ISIS brought both groups under the broader Islamic State umbrella, they did not necessarily adopt ISIS’s ideological and strategic framework. While ISWAP followed ISIS’s structured governance and military strategy, ASWJ opted for a more localised approach adapted to the Mozambican context. Its affiliation with ISIS provided it with branding, logistical, and financial support, but it did not transform ASWJ into a fully ISIS-controlled entity.
Conclusion
All in all, the overall structure and actions of the two ASWJ and SWAP reflect a varying degree of convergence from ISIS's core ideology. While the closer relationship between ISIS and ISWAP has informed the evolution of the latter, the looser approach toward ASWJ is enshrined in the group's relatively independent actions. However, it is important to notice how in both cases the groups still showed, even if in a different manner, a high degree of independence in the choice of their local strategy due to the different nature of the socio-political context of their territories, toward the application of ISIS core ideology.
In this session, Dr. Teodorescu delves into the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, exploring approaches to advancing women’s rights in international conflict and the critical role of women’s integration in achieving sustainable solutions. She highlights the importance of holding countries accountable through international frameworks like the WPS agenda and shares insights on how empowering women is essential for building long-term peace and security.
Dr. Teodorescu is a distinguished expert in European policies, migration, and gender issues. She serves as the Head of European and International Affairs at Istituto Luigi Sturzo in Rome and is the President of the Italian chapter of Women in International Security. She also leads the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network, focusing on women's roles in peace and security.
Interviewers: Hanorah Hardy and Sofia Sutera - Human Rights Team
by Wesley Issey Romain & Giulia Saccone - AI, Cyber Security & Space Team
Introduction
The emergence of the “smart city” as a concept in the 1980s and a reality in the mid-2000s coincided with the rapid development of technology and internet worldwide. Two decades later, in 2024, growing urbanisation, environmental concerns, social and governance issues, shifting lifestyles, and economic and residential attractiveness contribute to deeper reliance on digital tools and emergent technologies, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and artificial intelligence (AI). Consequently, protecting smart cities’ infrastructures, networks and IoT devices against data theft, sabotage, surveillance, ransomware, terrorism, and other cybercrimes – whether from state-sponsored hacker groups or non-state actors – is crucial for government, private businesses, and civil society stakeholders.
This paper argues that despite the constant and multifaceted cybersecurity threats smart cities encounter, holistic and long-term solutions exist to maintain and enhance the security of their infrastructures and prevent any potential massive disruption. Our article mainly uses qualitative and quantitative data from secondary sources. It will be organised into five parts in the subsequent order:
Firstly, it will provide a brief understanding of the concept of a “smart city” and a presentation of its interpretations, strengths, opportunities, and primary stakeholders. The second part (II) will discuss the leading cyber security challenges smart cities face and demonstrate how the advent of emerging technologies and new threat actors will continue to impact smart cities’ overall safety and integrity. Finally, the third, fourth, and last parts (III, IV, and V) will each present an existing and potential solution to strengthen the security of intelligent cities’ IT infrastructures against cyber threats and disruptions.
A brief presentation of the concept of the smart city
The concept of “smart city” started appearing in academia around the 1990s; however, the notion has been popularised through IBM’s Smart Cities Challenges. Although nowadays there is not a univocal definition of a smart city, for this article, we may define them as an urban area where ICT and IoT occupy a pivotal role in data collection, anonymisation and analysis for the improvement of citizens’ quality of life, addressing contemporary challenges on a multi-stakeholder partnership. It is hence characterised by the use of diverse IoT-based systems (from smart grids to garments with sensors), which change from city to city–which implies the diverse definition of smart cities. Therefore, connectivity is the indispensable trait that every IoT device should have to join the smart city’s network, and scalability is what ensures that every project can be initially implemented on a small scale and then expanded in the wide urban landscape. Furthermore, users’ participation is vital for concretising the effects of a smart city and spotting new challenges1.
The main sectors involved are the ones of mobility, where IoT devices, AI and 5G optimise citizens’ transportation both on private vehicles and public transportation; energy, where smart grids allocate energy efficiently based on demand; and health, where IoT timely communicates through 5G the physiological state of individuals to provide timely responses and targeted therapies. IoT implementation in housing is important not only for this latter aim but also for improving lifestyle, with a house capable of responding to our daily necessities in a timely manner. IoT paired with AI can be functional for improving surveillance and predicting crime. Recently, smart cities’ R&D has also focused on public administration and citizenship participation, boosting the efficiency of public administration and creating smart communities for boosting citizens' engagement in local politics2.
Smart cities aim to improve citizens’ quality of life by addressing urbanisation challenges through energy efficiency and responsive systems enabled by IoT devices. However, only 16% of cities can independently afford these projects due to high costs and diverse program requirements. To attract investors and drive innovation, cities use their smart city mission as a branding strategy, fostering advancements in underdeveloped but essential areas and consequentially creating long-term investments and competitiveness on the international stage. Partnerships with international bodies, research institutions, and other smart cities have proven effective for acquiring cutting-edge technology and best practices, mainly through city-to-city collaborations that bypass traditional bureaucratic channels.
The success of a project in a smart city resides in the coordination of the multiple stakeholders, which play simultaneous roles as planners, developers, implementation agents and follow-up responsible. The main actors involved are public stakeholders - namely national and local governments, administration and political institutions – that enable the coordination, monitoring and compliance of other players through policy formulation. Following, we have the private sector – composed of companies and start-ups primarily focused on the ICT field, investors, and in specific contexts, energy suppliers and property developers – that, in the case of cybersecurity, provide ICT infrastructures and investments in cutting-edge technology to boost the system readiness for cyberattacks. The Academic group has emerged as knowledge brokers, concurring with private counterparts in offering solutions in the implementation stage. Civil stakeholders – namely press, NGOs, and private citizens - play a dual role as recipients and contributors of projects, dispensing continuous feedback to the abovementioned categories thanks to advocacy and data sharing.
The digital challenges of smart cities with emerging technologies.
Due to its incorporation of mixed technologies, software, and hardware, a smart city would inevitably be exposed to multiple cyber attacks by various threat actors. Experts have suggested that smart cities necessitate novel and inventive approaches to safeguard devices and applications, taking into account factors such as resource limitations, the nature of distributed architecture and geographic dispersion while confronting issues such as unreliable communication, insufficient data, and privilege safeguarding. Regardless of whether the cyber attack is conducted on the perception layer (sensor, actuators, RFID or GPS), on the network layer (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and LAN), or on the application layer (Smart Home, Health, and Grid), most common cybersecurity risks associated with smart cities can be summarised into four types.
First, the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is perhaps the most documented practice of cyber attacks against a service or a network. DDoS is a malicious attack restricting digital traffic by inundating a target with excessive internet traffic, utilising compromised computer systems and IoT devices as sources. A cybercriminal could, for example, launch a DDoS attack to gain a smart city’s charging station, traffic light, or public transportation network, which could become a component of a botnet employed to disable another system. In 2018, CISCO indicated that the number of DDoS attacks worldwide was 7.9 million and had forecasted a substantial rise to 15.4 million in 2023. Additionally, most recent statistics data showed that DDoS attacks increased by 46% in the first half of 2024 in comparison to 2023, with peak attack power jumping from 1.6 Tbps to 1.7 Tbps, in which online gaming, technology, financial services, and telecommunications were the most targeted industries with 49%, 15%, 12%, and 10% respectively.
Secondly, data exfiltration from devices such as traffic lights, CCTV cameras, parking meters, or public services servers is another significant challenge for smart cities as they gather extensive data from citizens. Public data theft violates the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of public data, as cybercriminals can use compromised information to perpetrate ransomware or other fraudulent transactions with third parties on the dark web. Privacy violations, financial loss, legal problems, and loss of trust from citizens are just a few of the damaging effects of data leaks from a city’s IoT devices. Such incidents have happened and are more frequent than one may think. For example, in July 2024, a large-scale data theft conducted by a cybercriminal group was reported in the United States in Columbus, Ohio. After the breach of private data stolen from over a hundred thousand ordinary people stored in public IT infrastructures and municipal agencies, a ransomware operation was launched, and sensitive information was divulged on the dark web. This type of incident will likely occur again as cities rely more and more on technology.
Thirdly, device hijacking is another threat associated with smart cities. Hacker groups often seek to control a device to influence the myriad of technological equipment constituting a smart city infrastructure and network. IT experts argue that IoT devices frequently possess default credentials that malicious actors can use, and weak data encryption, absence of periodic software updates, and interconnectedness render them easily compromised by hackers.
Fourth, Permanent Denial of Service (PDoS) is documented as a devastating cyber risk to any technologically advanced and dynamic city. IT experts have noted that, in contrast to sporadic DDoS, which results in ephemeral cyber disruptions, PDoS causes permanent hardware damage and substantial economic consequences, potentially endangering human life in healthcare and critical infrastructure sectors.
Urban areas are projected to accommodate 68% of the global population by 2050, propelled by urbanisation and demographic expansion. Consequently, such prevision, coupled with the advancement and availability of devices and digital tools, the participation of state-sponsored and non-state actors groups in malign cyber-attacks is undoubtedly a source of concern for developed and emerging countries, global cities and their inhabitants. At the same time, it should be observed thatcities worldwide do not share the same level of cyber threat. As Cesar Cerrudo mentioned, while most cities possess technology, the effectiveness of smart cities varies based on the extent of technological advancements implemented. Some cities have implemented more technology while others have less.
Smart cities are expected to face several digital challenges with the availability and advent of new technologies; nevertheless, solutions and measures exist to enhance security and prevent disruptions.
Source: Illustration generated by AI
Threat detection and investments in advanced technology
Existing measures are primarily concerned with ensuring data and privacy protection based on trust, integrity, and confidentiality to prevent leaks from sensors, cameras, other IoT devices, and critical infrastructures. To support them and address the main concerns raised by industry and academia on privacy and data protection, the cybersecurity sector has focused on the mitigation of breaches in IoT for privacy protection, improving device authentication, access control, and firmware updates to provide better data anonymisation, secure data sharing and analytics for safe decision-making. A smart city is a goldmine of personal data due to its pivotal role in enhancing the quality of life of citizens and the interconnectedness through IoT. This provides criminals with a myriad of access points on devices with limited.
Blockchain technology has demonstrated a high potential solution thanks to its capacity to transmit information securely and directly. Specifically, this technology can be applied to cybersecurity to protect personal data. In the case of e-governance, it enables individuals to manage their credentials independently, bypassing centralised controlling authorities. Seoul is a fitting example: in 2018, the city started applying blockchain in its public administration, and during the same year, it developed a metaverse secured by blockchain for document issuance and citizen participation.
AI application is another game-changing technology that can boost smart cities’ cybersecurity thanks to their high computational and predictive qualities, which, applied to the fog computing layer, could protect them from cyberattacks despite their resource constraints – i.e. limited storage and RAM3. In particular, the fog layer managing the data transfer between the IoT devices and the Cloud layer provides a higher amount of computing load than those two extremes, lower latency in the communications between the IDS and the IoT, and lower energy consumption. This enables the operators to isolate the attack, repel it, and avoid its spread throughout the network, allowing an interrupted flow of smart city services. In particular, ML can be applied to both SDIS and AIDS. On the other hand, it can ease the time-consuming characteristics of updating the signature database. Regarding the latter, it can enhance the precision of attack detection, lowering the rate of false positives.
Biometrics is already used to facilitate authentication thanks to the uniqueness of individual features, addressing the constant concern for privacy and security. They have already found wide applications in the smart economy field, like the fingerprint and face recognition used by Apple Pay, face recognition for video surveillance devices of Amazon Web Services, and voice recognition employed by Amazon Alexa for telemedicine in the UK.
Strengthening and facilitating public-private partnerships
It is already visible from these few examples how private and public sectors coexist in the development of smart cities’ security, acting in synergy for optimising the outcomes of their projects thanks to risk and resource sharing and the relative reduction of costs; access to the private’s technical and management skills and the innovation enhancement for effective, creative and real-time solutions. An example is the collaboration between Barcelona’s Municipal Institute of Informatics and CISCO to implement a communication protocol for CERT and CSIRT to detect, share, respond and recover from cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities in IoT devices.
Indeed, Barcelona is a perfect example of a smart city where public and private partnerships (PPP) can thrive thanks to companies with a sound knowledge of the local market, the involvement of all the stakeholders – citizenship included – to commit them towards the same type of projects and ease the tensions through transparency and responsibility, and trust-building practices, which are paramount in the initial phases. The cruciality of trust building is visible in the failure of the PPP of Sidewalk Labs and Waterfront Toronto, where the lack of involvement of the citizens led to tensions that resulted in boycott protests of the project.
However, it must be pointed out that this factor is crucial in democracies, where citizenship plays an active role in shaping smart cities. Nevertheless, transparency is a value that benefits all smart cities regardless of the ongoing regime since it communicates the reliability of the projects and the worth of investing in this transformation.
Strengthening and facilitating regional and international cooperation, information sharing and dialogue among experts
PPPs are not the only method to transform and strengthen the security of smart cities; international fora, capacity-building projects, and collaboration among cities play fundamental roles. At the international level, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the UN-HABITAT coordinate the global platform "United for Smart Sustainable Cities" (U4SSC) to encourage the transition from traditional to smart cities, which has also developed a set of key performance indicators (KPIs) for sustainable cities, a valuable instrument for agenda setting and performance evaluation adopted by more than 50 cities worldwide.
The ITU, thanks to the Smart Sustainable Cities program, supports the development of stable, secure, reliable and interoperable ICT devices for sustainable cities. The Smart Cities Council is a network of experts providing capacity building and investment programs, which, among all the objectives, aim to ensure cyber, privacy, and data protection. At the regional level, for instance, the EU provides the Smart Cities Marketplace: a platform for the various stakeholders involved in the field to improve citizens’ quality of life and increase the competitiveness of European cities and industry with respect to EU climate targets.
While at the level of bilateral agreements, Singapore has exploited its expertise to catalyse agreements from distant poles, such as China and the US, for mutual cyber capacity-building projects. Those multilevel initiatives have a common effect that addresses one of the biggest challenges of smart cities intra and interoperability: the normative and standard differences between cities, which makes PPP challenging and prevents effective data protection, the biggest concern in the research field.
Conclusion
In conclusion, despite the persistent, increasing, and diverse cybersecurity risks faced by smart cities, comprehensive and sustainable solutions are available to safeguard their infrastructures and avert significant disruptions. Firstly, it has been shown that the notion of a smart city originated in academic circles throughout the nineties. The concept emphasises mobility, energy, and health, with research and development concentrating on public administration and citizen participation. It was argued that successful projects necessitate the collaboration of several stakeholders, including planners, developers, implementation agents, and follow-up measures, to enhance the quality of life for citizens.
The second part of the article sought to demonstrate that smart cities incorporate various technologies, including software and hardware, making them vulnerable to multiple cyber-attacks from a wide range of threat actors. DDoS and PDoS attacks, data exfiltration, and device hijacking attacks are common cybersecurity dangers. The involvement of both state-sponsored and non-state actors in malicious cyber-attacks is a cause for concern for both developed and emerging nations, as well as capital cities around the globe and their populations.
Thirdly, it has been observed that investments in cutting-edge technologies to prevent cyber threats are deemed pertinent and practical. For instance, tools such as blockchain technology provide a safe and direct method for information transmission, positioning it as a viable option for cybersecurity. Besides, artificial intelligence applications can improve cybersecurity in smart cities through their computational and predictive abilities. Lastly, biometrics, characterised by its distinctive attributes, is employed for authentication, mitigating privacy and security issues.
The successful example of the city of Barcelona, introduced in the fourth part of the paper, confirmed that public-private collaborations improve security and optimise project results via risk and resource sharing, cost reduction, access to private technical and managerial expertise, and innovation. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that transparency is essential for smart cities.
Lastly, multilateral forums are part of the solution. International forums and initiatives to increase capacity building are essential to strengthening the safety of smart cities. Developing reliable, secure, and stable information and communication technology devices must be encouraged within forums such as the ITU’s Smart Sustainable Cities. Only through the listed solutions can government, public, and private stakeholders ensure that smart cities remain safe.
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