With Donald Trump's victory, the US Big Tech, with the second Trump administration, could significantly influence and consolidate the strong interconnection between the federal government and American technology companies.
In recent years, the relationship between the military industrial complex and the US tech companies (Amazon, Microsoft and Google in the lead) has strengthened, especially on technology renewal issues coming from the Pentagon in the political-military sphere. This connects the relationship between Silicon Valley and the military-industrial complex in national security matters.
In the context of the future Trump administration, which will take office on 20 January 2025, the latter could grant Big Tech ample room to manoeuvres in exchange for support in national security matters.
The strong concern is the partnership that could emerge in a public-private collaboration. According to a recent 2024 paper by Costs of War/Brown University's WATSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, entitled ‘How Big Tech and Silicon Valley are Transforming the Military-Industrial Complex’, the link between the Department of Defence and the tech company sector is gradually influencing and directing the Pentagon's investments and the Defence Budget ($886 billion for the year 2024). In the current context, the role of Tech companies such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft is increasing dramatically, competing with traditional US defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin.
Besides the classic Big Tech companies, other companies such as Palantir Technologies also carve out important spaces for themselves. Founded in 2003 by Peter Thiel and Alex Karp to develop software for analyzing large amounts of data, this company is one of the best known cases of start-ups backed by military and intelligence funds that have become key players in providing services and technologies to the Department of Defence (DoD) and other federal agencies.
During its early stages, Palantir received around $2 million in funding from In-Q-Tel, the CIA's venture capital fund, which enabled the start-up to grow rapidly and acquire contracts with various government agencies. This helped Palantir to be able to grow, giving it important resources to be able to strengthen its relationships with major government agencies.
For several insiders, Palantir's role, linked to its potential, would grant it the cards to transform itself into a figure similar to Raytheon or Lockheed Martin, historically dominant companies in the defense sector. Indeed, it is theorized that Palantir and other technology companies, such as Microsoft and Amazon, may soon get to acquire traditional defence contractors, blurring the distinction between the technology industry and the US defence sector.
Image Source: Generated with ChatGPT/DALL·E
The role of tech companies has started to strengthen since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine of growing tensions with China. Linked to these geopolitical tensions, several start-ups operating in the tech sector are receiving significant investments. Among these is Anduril, a company operating in the production of military systems and drones with a focus on AI integration, which recently completed a $1.5 billion funding round, bringing its valuation to $14 billion.
As a matter of fact, the role of Big Tech in the coming years could be consolidated also in view of the geopolitical competition with Beijing.
Elina Beketova discusses if Washington D.C. should support Zelensky's 'Victory Plan,’ where Trump may support the plan, and what can be expected from Biden in these last few weeks of his administration.
Ms. Beketova is a democracy fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington D.C., where she researches temporarily Russian occupied territories in Ukraine. She also has extensive experience as a journalist where she reported in Crimea, Kharkiv, and Kyiv, which included prominent international high profile interviews.
By Francesco Marchesini - UK & European Affairs Team - editing Valentina Gruarin
Rule Britannia: what remains of the Empire?
The United Kingdom once used to rule the largest Empire in human history. It was the first real superpower; ruling half of the World for a Century. Subsequently, after two World Wars and the Suez crisis of 1956, the UK lost its title of world superpower to the USA.
For decades, Great Britain has been playing the role of a medium-sized power. In fact, the military budget of HM Treasury -UK’s economic and finance Ministry- has been shrinking more and more over the years: from 8.65% of UK GDP in 1956 to 2.25% in 2018. After the Falkland War of 1982, the UK has not led a military campaign by its own initiative.
Despite this condition, the UK has some peculiarities: it is a nuclear power, with a leading role in the Commonwealth of Nations, NATO (being in command of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, which are NATO’s strike forces) and both the G7 and the G20 councils. The UK also takes part to the Five Powers Defence Arrangements -a military alliance with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore- and the Five Eyes programme -joining the intelligence agencies of UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Lastly, the UK still holds strategic positions on seas via the control of Dominions, such as. Gibilter, Bermudas and Ascension, as well as through the presence of its military bases set in several key points of international routes.
The UK is thus maintaining a privileged position in matters of diplomacy and soft power, based on its trustworthiness and reliability. This can be witnessed by a British Council’s study of 2021 showing that the UK is the most attractive G20 Nation. According to the same study, the UK's soft power seems to be strongest in the southern hemisphere, particularly in South-East Asia and the Pacific. Moreover, the Consultancy Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Index ranks the UK second, just behind the USA.
However, after Brexit, EU countries tend to perceive the UK as less willing to cooperate in terms of economy and security. The UK is not showing cohesiveness on how to implement its foreign policy and relations with the EU. Agreements for leaving the EU have been problematic, led by indecision and incoherence, and have been one of the main factors of the UK’s political instability over the last years.
Nevertheless, the UK and the European Countries are now developing new bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation. It is still too early to assess their effectiveness. A productive collaboration with the European Union might benefit the UK’s military and economic systems, consequently strengthening both its foreign policy and bargaining power with other European nations.
Per mare, per terram: how strong is the UK?
Considering the UK’s military strength, the 2024 Global Firepower Index ranks the UK at 6th place and it is composed of a total of 230.000 personnel. In 2021 PM Boris Johnson launched the Integrated Review (IR), a programmatic plan for Britain’s security and strategic policies for the following decade. It included a vision of the UK’s future as a cosmopolitan, open and flourishing country, which could lead the “competitive World” through its soft power and technological advancement; while also increasing the investments in defence. Concerning technological advancement, the IR planned to enhance scientific research around matters related to AI development, cybersecurity, quantum technology, biomechanics and semiconductors -part of the so-called CyberPower Agenda- as well as energy security and environmental protection.
In the following years, both Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak changed this strategic plan, adapting it to the aggravation and multiplication of challenges and threats that the UK had to face. The most recent version, IR23, shows that the primary threat to the security of Britain is Russia, and that the UK has been in first line since before the mass invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, training Ukraine’s personnel and furnishing military equipment more and before other Western allies (over £12 billion). These data show that the UK is still a reliable and strong ally for the European countries. The second concern is China, a rising superpower, which is both intensifying its military operations in the South Chinese Sea and the Taiwan Strait and strengthening its armed forces, as well as employing soft power skills, for instance with the Belt and Road Initiative or the financial support to sub-saharan Countries. China can be seen, by some African and Asian countries, as a valid alternative to the so-called “Western world” and the UK fears losing control over Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
In 2024 the British PM Starmer declared the commitment of the Kingdom to reform its Armed Forces and increase the defense budget to 2.5% by the end of the decade, reaching £87 billion in 2030. Despite the former Chief of General Staff Gen. Sir Patrick Sanders declaring in January 2024 that the UK could not stand a conventional war, some work has been done. The UK is financing a new class of aircraft carriers (Queen Elizabeth Class), the new nuclear submarines programme (SSNR Class, included in the AUKUS cooperatio programme with the US and Australia), the new multirole fighter jet (Tempest Class, as a result of the Global Combat Air Programme with Italy and Japan) and the new main battle tank class (Challenger 3 Class).
All these avant-garde war machines will be developed by BAE Systems -a multinational firm with the participation of HM’s Government- as well as the partnership with other leading firms in defence, such as Leonardo, Mitsubishi, Thales and Rheinmetall. Despite its firepower, the UK is relying on Donald Trump's re-election as POTUS could be a game-changing event. He will probably focus its efforts on the internal front, de-prioritising the US’ foreign policy agenda. Indeed, during the electoral campaign, he repeatedly declared his intentions to disengage the US from their current grounds of action abroad, including Ukraine. Without the military and economical support of the USA, NATO’s existence itself could be compromised.
In this scenario, the UK and EU would necessarily have to strengthen their military and economical bonds, both inside and outside of NATO’s framework. Something is already. moving: UK’s Foreign Secretary David Lammy labelled the EU as the most urgent foreign policy priority, and PM Starmer declared that the negotiations for a pact over common security will start in Spring 2025. This could be a historic occasion to build an effective European defence strategy and to reunite the UK and the EU, perhaps even to reform the European Union itself into a more fair and functional confederation, able to play a crucial role in the geopolitical arena.
We should not forget that the UK is facing an unseen economic crisis that could make it impossible for the Government to keep pursuing their programmes, that's why the future negotiations will need to include forms of economic reintegration of UK and EU economies. The United Kingdom has ambitious goals for the future, which appear to be more and more unpredictable every day; only time will tell if their new route will be successful.
by Angelo Calianno & Jaohara Hatabi - Middle East Team
Introduction
In 2016, after years of struggle and political action, the Kurdish-majority Rojava region, located in northeastern Syria, proclaimed itself an autonomous and independent state. Kurdish militias, together with an international coalition led by the United States, reconquered territories occupied by the Islamic States (ISIS) -. News agencies were showing photos of the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) fighters, and especially those of YPJ (Women's Protection Unit) troops, who were hailed as the new champions of freedom.
In their fight against ISIS, the Kurds in Northeastern Syria had become the bulwark against terrorism. Rojava's new democracy was laying the foundations of its constitution: an idea of a State where different religions and ethnicities coexist and most people are represented, regardless of religion, gender, or ideology. After 13 years of struggle since the first autonomy movement founded by the PYD (Democratic Union Party), the Syrian equivalent of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Syrian Kurds also had their own homeland. This democratic experiment captured the attention and interest of diplomats, journalists, researchers, and onlookers from all over the world. After the initial hype, media interest has dropped dramatically for years, with hardly any reports about this region. That changed two years ago, when Turkey's bombing brought the region back to the headlines.
Inside Rojava: present-day reality
In our analysis, we reported the current situation in Rojava, especially in relation to the continuous attacks by Turkey.
The Kurdish population in Rojava finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place. The southern part of the territory is heavily controlled by the Assad regime, which does not recognize Rojava’s autonomy. The regime maintains dozens of checkpoints that restrict the flow of essential supplies, including building materials, food, and medical equipment. As a result, many of these goods must be smuggled in from Iraq, in an attempt to avoid Damascus' screening.
Southeast of Rojava, ISIS cells still exist, especially in the rural areas of Raqqa, Kobane, and Deir ez-Zor. While these cells have lost much of their former strength and financial resources, they still pose a threat to local populations by perpetrating attacks and raids.
Conflicts in recent years have caused approximately one million Internally Displaced People (IDP), who have lost their homes and now live in semi-detention camps. The suburbs of these cities teem children working amid mountains of garbage looking for material to sell for recycling. The Al-Hol camp, one of the largest, holds around 55,000 people, the majority of whom are women and children, including many who are related to most radical ISIS terrorists. These families are not formally charged with crimes, but the Rojava authorities have adopted controversial measures, such as confining them in camps, as a preventive measure against the potential reorganization of ISIS cells. While the security rationale behind this approach is clear, it has drawn criticism for the humanitarian implications.
The conditions in the tent-city of Al-Hol are difficult, with many living in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions, surrounded by wire nets and armoured vehicles. There is limited access to basic services like water, electricity, and fuel for heating. These challenges are particularly severe for women and children, who are disproportionately affected by the harsh living conditions. The camp remains heavily guarded, with a large security presence due to concerns about radicalisation and the potential for violence. Despite the difficult circumstances, local authorities have faced pressure from international organisations and human rights groups to improve conditions and provide better support for those in the camp.
One of them told us:
“They treat us like criminals, but we have done nothing. Every morning, the military drags us out to search us. Our husbands are in jail, but we are innocent, we do not even know why we are here”. In fact, many of the women here have never committed any crime. Some of them have had no contact with their husbands for years, being in some cases a second or third wife. While they may have been married to members of a terrorist organization, they now face serious consequences for their associations, even if they themselves have not been involved in any criminal activity.
The situation in Rojava caused international responses that are varied and complex, which reflects the intricate web of alliances and conflicts in the Middle East. When Kurdish groups declared the autonomy of Rojava, they were met with a mixture of support and opposition from global and regional powers. The United States, seeking reliable partners in the fight against ISIS, formed a crucial alliance with the YPG, providing military support and training under the broader umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This partnership significantly contributed to the defeat of ISIS in Syria, garnering international recognition for the Kurdish-led forces.
However, the U.S. support for the YPG strained the former’s relations with Turkey, a NATO ally, which views the YPG as an extension of the PKK, which is designated by Turkey, the US, and the EU as a terrorist organization. Turkey has repeatedly launched military operations against the YPG, most notably Operation Olive Branch in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in 2019, aiming to create a "safe zone" along its border free of YPG presence. These actions drew international condemnation, with European countries particularly vocal in denouncing Turkey's incursions, citing humanitarian concerns and potential destabilisation of the region. The EU called Turkey to cease its military actions, while several EU member states imposed arms embargoes on Ankara.
Russia's involvement in Rojava has been pragmatic, balancing its alliance with the Syrian government and its strategic interests in the region. Initially, Russia allowed Kurdish autonomy as a counterbalance to U.S. influence, but once the Syrian government regained territory, Russia facilitated agreements between the Kurds and Damascus, aiming to reintegrate Rojava under Syrian sovereignty while ensuring Kurdish rights.
Iran, which supports the Assad regime, has opposed any form of Kurdish autonomy that could inspire Iranian Kurds. Thus, Tehran's policy towards Rojava aligns closely with that of Damascus and, to some extent, Ankara. Meanwhile, international human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have reported on human rights abuses by various actors in the conflict, urging all parties to respect international law and protect civilians.
As of now, there are no formal high-profile peace negotiations taking place. Although efforts have been made by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) to engage in dialogue with the Syrian government and other regional powers, they have not resulted in any comprehensive peace agreement.
Arguably, the presence of external powers with their own interests such as Turkey, the US, Russia and Iran, further complicates the situation. However, the US continues to engage diplomatically, balancing its support for the SDF with its broader regional interests, including its relationship with Turkey. European countries have also been involved in providing diplomatic channels and humanitarian aid, advocating for a peaceful resolution and respect for human rights in the region.
Picture by Angelo Calianno, Rojava, Northeastern Syria
Final Considerations
In conclusion, the situation in Rojava remains a complex and multifaceted challenge. The region's pursuit of autonomy has led to a diverse set of responses from international actors, highlighting the intricate balance of power and interests at play. The humanitarian crisis, particularly the plight of displaced persons and those in camps like Al-Hol, underscores the urgency of a coordinated international response that prioritises human rights and humanitarian principles. While the Kurdish forces have been instrumental in the fight against ISIS, the geopolitical realities involving major powers such as the United States, Turkey, Russia, and Iran complicate the pathway to a stable and peaceful resolution. Moving forward, it is crucial for the international community to support dialogue and negotiations, respecting the rights and aspirations of all parties involved while ensuring the protection of civilians and the adherence to international law. The future of Rojava will depend significantly on the ability of these various actors to navigate the delicate political landscape and work toward a sustainable and inclusive solution.
* This article was written before the events of December 8, 2024.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an initiative adopted by China in 2013 to strengthen connectivity and cooperation among Asia, Europe, and Africa – and even extending to some regions in Latin America and Oceania – making its influence felt as the reinvigorated and wider Silk Road. The BRI establishes an extensive network of infrastructure projects to facilitate international trade and accelerate economic growth. Ranging from railways, highways, ports, and electricity power plants, the initiative is committed to rendering the movement of goods, services or resources more efficient.
The BRI stands upon two fundamental pillars, namely the Silk Road Economic Belt, which uses railways, roads, and pipelines to connect China to Europe via Central Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, a maritime route that links China to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe via strategic ports and shipping lanes.
Notably, under the BRI, China allocates funding to the countries participating in infrastructure projects, mostly in the form of loans. Accordingly, notwithstanding the general interest in the BRI initiative, the project has attracted considerable criticism. Although proponents of the BRI assert that it boosts development, employment, and trade within participating countries, critics counter that BRI projects may elevate some countries into high debt levels, thus increasing their economic dependence on China and raising issues of sovereignty and environmental impact and sustainability. Indeed, the BRI is often viewed as a double-edged sword, both filling gaps in infrastructure and improving trade routes, but also positioning China as a leading financier in the global arena.
BRI Economic Benefits in Southeast Asia and Oceania
The BRI has provided a forum for investing in improving infrastructure, which, in turn, enhances connectivity and the interchange of goods among Southeast Asia and Oceania. For example, the China-Laos Railway—completed in 2021 and spanning 1000 km—facilitates the cheaper export of goods by connecting Laos to China’s southern Yunnan province, helping to spur economic growth in Laos by improving its access to international markets. In addition, the deep-water port in Gwadar, which is part of the much-discussed BRI despite being located in Pakistan, is relevant for Southeast Asian and Oceania trade as it significantly boosts maritime linkages with the Indian Ocean.
In addition, BRI investments have provided employment and stimulated sectors such as construction and manufacturing in developing regions. For instance, BRI projects such as the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway, in Indonesia not only bring new transportation possibilities but also foster job creation and knowledge transfer that advances and reinforces local industries while expanding economic capabilities.
Financial Challenges and Debt Risks
The biggest challenges faced by the BRI are debt vulnerabilities. Most of the projects involved are financed by loans, imposing significant burdens to smaller economies. Indeed, massive Chinese loans used to fund contemporary megaprojects have landed entire countries in a debt trap—Laos today stands burdened by a substantial debt relative to the country’s GDP. Similarly, in Malaysia, the East Coast Rail Link raised doubts about the viability of Chinese loans, causing the Malaysian government to renegotiate project terms amidst worries they would not be able to pay back such large loans, thus reducing the country’s financial strain.
Besides, the reliance on Chinese financing for BRI projects has created economic dependence of some Southeast Asian and Oceanian countries. Such dependence threatens to undermine the countries’ political and economic independence and sovereign control over their infrastructure and natural resources, as they become more and more beholden to Beijing. Fears emerge that these nations may become even more entangled with Chinese interests, thus helping China to gain more control over their policy decisions. For instance, Papua New Guinea faces akin challenges, since reliance on Chinese-funded ports and mining ventures, could make the country highly vulnerable, if revenues generated from these investments are not as expected.
Picture by Joe Shlabotnik, "Cargo Ship" - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/
Strategic and Geopolitical Implications
The establishment of Chinese capital is remaking strategic and geopolitical realities in Southeast Asia and Oceania, as countries increasingly align their economic policies with Chinese interests. Nowhere has this been truer than in countries that rely on BRI investments as the primary conduit for infrastructure financing. Among the more prominent beneficiaries are Indonesia, home to some of China's most considerable BRI investments—as well as Pakistan, a key player in the initiative through its participation in CPEC and various infrastructure projects spanning energy and transportation. Laos, Kenya, and Sri Lanka are other countries that have raised substantial amounts via BRI-financing, which has supported necessary development in areas such as transport and energy, but this has come at the cost of taking on sizable levels of debt to the Chinese government.
The newly emerging Chinese presence is therefore regarded as a counterbalance to the US’ traditional influence, subsequently shifting the scale of power in an area usually perceived as fostering and perpetuating the conventional paradigm of the status quo. Indeed, several local communities have objected to BRI-related projects owing to the fear of ceding sovereignty over resources and strategic assets.
For example, the East Coast Rail Link in Malaysia has raised serious alarm about the possible adverse impact on the habitats along the coastline, as well as the control exerted by China over sensitive infrastructure. In Indonesia, critics have condemned Chinese-funded mining projects in Sulawesi due to environmental degradation, illegal logging, and displacement of locals. Sri Lanka’s leasing of Hambantota Port to a Chinese firm as a way of repaying a debt has likewise fuelled such fears that China could gain strategic leverage in the region. These cases show a hidden conflict between the general benefits that some countries get from infrastructure investments and threats to national sovereignty concerns.
Although BRI has also led to closer collaboration between Southeast Asian nations and China on shared infrastructure projects, promoting regional integration, it can also create tensions, as countries compete for Chinese investments or respond to public pressure to resist perceived Chinese overreach. For instance, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand are negotiating BRI projects cautiously, trying to strike a reasonable balance between economic benefits and potential national security risks.
Conclusion
Evidently, the impact of the BRI has been substantially felt across Southeast Asia and Oceania, with the participating countries witnessing critical improvements in connectivity and infrastructure. Indeed, BRI projects have presented unique economic advantages, especially in the fields of transportation and employment in developing areas. That said, financial and geopolitical difficulties stemming from funding such BRI projects cannot be dismissed. Heavy economic reliance on Chinese investments poses a significant challenge to national sovereignty and long-term fiscal sustainability for several countries such as Malaysia, Laos, or Papua New Guinea, whose dependence on the Chinese Government has been conducive to burdensome debt-induced obligations and foreign interference with local affairs. What is more, China’s ever-growing presence on the global scene has remodelled the geopolitical landscape, challenging the conventional Western influence in the region.
This intricate relationship between the sought-after economic development in the region and the associated sovereignty risks has often led to local resistance to some BRI projects. However, such nuanced navigation of interstate relationships, particularly with China, is the only way forward to ensure sustainable, independent growth in today’s rapidly globalising, interconnected world. Indeed, should these economic and geopolitical challenges not be effectively addressed, then the BRI’s success cannot be guaranteed.
On the 15th of November 2024, Colombian officials announced the capture of Jeison Alexander Lorca Salazar, the second-in-command of the Venezuelan criminal organisation Tren de Aragua.
Long considered the most pre-eminent and prolific Venezuelan criminal enterprise, Lorca Salazar’s arrest is representative of the increasing transnationalisation of Tren de Aragua, and crime in Latin America more broadly.
Although the organisation began to grow its cross-border network in 2018, it has been internationalising at an increasingly rapid pace in recent years.
In October 2023, early reports from the Cook County Sheriff's Office indicated members of Tren de Aragua were present in Chicago, Illinois. Further activity from the organisation in the US in the following months prompted the US Department of the Treasury to designate Tren de Aragua a “Significant Transnational Criminal Organization,” and the US Department of State to officially call for members’ arrests.
Rise of Tren de Aragua in Chile
This year, reports of the group’s presence in Chile have been growing in particular, with Venezuela’s political and economic turmoil pinpointed as a driver of this trend. Instability in Venezuela has not only created a humanitarian crisis but also created an opening for organisations like Tren de Aragua to engage in human trafficking in and around Chile.
The kidnap and murder of Venezuelan political dissident Ronald Ojeda in Santiago by Tren de Aragua in February 2024 was one of the most prominent incidents over the course of the past year, and a clear signifier of the organisation’s increased criminal activities in the country.
In a May 2024 BBC article, Venezuelan investigative journalist Ronna Rísquez named the rise of Tren de Aragua in Chile as the first instance of a transnational organised crime group operating in the country.
“It was easy for them to take over territories. They took over nearly unpopulated areas to establish their dealings, [and] began to offer services, such as getting migrants across one border to another, providing security to businesses or falsifying identity documents,” he said.
One such example of Tren de Aragua exploiting a less populated region of Chile includes the installation of Los Gallegos—a local Tren de Aragua cell—in Arica, a coastal region in the north of the country bordering Peru.
Some experts see the increasing internationalisation of organised crime across Latin America as a paradigm shift in the field, with Will Freeman, a fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign, dubbing the change the rise of “reorganised crime.”
While the exportation of Tren de Aragua abroad is only one of several significant security ramifications of Venezuelan political instability, increasing levels of transnational crime in Latin America will be crucial to monitor moving forward. With the shape of organised crime in Latin America changing more and more by the day, it is yet to be seen whether authorities can tackle the growing challenges of “reorganised crime,” or whether it will be here to stay.
In this session, Dr. Baldaro discusses the root causes of jihadism in the Sahel, focusing on how civil wars, local grievances, poor governance, and corruption have been inadequately addressed by the European Union’s counter-terrorism strategy in the region, which was heavily securitised. He then expands on Russia’s current counter-insurgency strategy—an even more hardline and militarised approach—that not only fails to address local grievances but also contributes to increased chaos and violence.
Dr. Baldaro concludes by expressing scepticism about the possibility of a future return of European aid, noting that the military juntas governing the various Sahelian states have adopted a strictly repressive approach to tackling the issue. However, he highlights some exceptions, such as Italy’s presence in Niger and the growing involvement of new actors like Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf monarchies.
Dr. Edoardo Baldaro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Palermo. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Scuola Normale Superiore, Institute of Human and Social Sciences. He is a leading expert on the Sahel region and themes such as state fragility, jihadism and regional conflict management.
Interviewers: Axelle Bougouma, Angelo Saad Hintermayer and Camilla Cormegna - Africa Team
by Miguel Jiménez, Ingrid Heggstad, & Dan Ziebarth - Political Economy, Development, & Energy Security Team
Introduction
It was announced on Tuesday, November 5th that Donald Trump, the candidate for the right-wing Republican Party, had won the 2024 Presidential Election in the United States of America and would officially become the President-Elect. Kamala Harris, the left-wing Democratic Party candidate, conceded defeat in a speech on Wednesday, December 6th, urging voters to accept the election results. While Harris and her vice presidential running mate, Time Walz, received significant party support ahead of the election and were seen as a new phase for the Democratic Party, the party will be weakened following the election results. Even though during the campaign she lacked a compelling economic narrative and often avoided answering how to fund any proposal she brought to the table, in terms of global economic relations, a Harris presidency was expected to maintain continuity with the current Biden administration's approach largely.
The second Trump presidency is expected to have major ramifications for global politics, particularly global economic relations, particularly as Trump has been a vocal proponent of protectionist trade policies. The Republican Party, led by Trump, will also control both chambers of the legislature, while conservative justices make up 6 of the 9 seats on the Supreme Court of the United States. These conditions could give Trump a strong mandate for policy change. In particular, economic relations with China, the European Union, and Russia are expected to be affected by a second Trump presidency.
China
Trump has announced that, if re-elected, he will impose a 10–20 per cent across-the-board tariff on imports into the United States, with an additional 60 per cent tariff on all imports from China. Trump has also pledged to terminate the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) passed by the Biden administration, which would be expected to increase domestic production and reduce Chinese imports. This is in contrast to what would have been expected under a Kamala Harris administration, where the usage of tools to inhibit the arrival of Chinese goods would have come from domestic policies with the continuation of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the single largest climate investment in American history. Based on building domestic champions in the field of energy transition, which is currently dominated by China, being the world’s leader in clean energy production and the refinement of the majority of mineral inputs.
European Union
The second Trump presidency could challenge Europe through an “America First” trade policy, focused on reducing the U.S. trade deficit, with tariffs as high as 20 per cent on imports and even more on Chinese goods. These tariffs would increase costs for European exporters and consumers, impacting the EU’s economy. Ongoing disputes from the Biden era, such as steel and aluminium tariffs and green subsidies, may also escalate, while the expiration of paused EU retaliatory tariffs in 2025 and the Airbus-Boeing subsidy conflict in 2026 could further strain EU-U.S. trade relations, adding to Europe’s economic uncertainty. It is noteworthy that during his tenure as president, Donald Trump's imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the European Union and China resulted in the implementation of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products.
Russia
A renewed Trump presidency could also impact global economic relations with Russia. In his 2024 campaign, Trump promised to swiftly resolve the Ukraine conflict, asserting he could achieve peace within 24 hours through negotiation. However, if Russia resists a settlement, Trump has signalled he would impose tougher economic sanctions, potentially targeting Russia’s central bank and curtailing energy exports to key markets like India and China. This intensified economic pressure, coupled with increased US energy production to lower global prices, would squeeze Russia’s vital oil revenue.
Additionally, Trump’s scepticism toward ongoing US aid to Ukraine, which has amounted to $92.7 billion since 2022, raises concerns over a potential reduction in support, which could compromise Ukraine’s defence and shift the regional balance in Russia’s favour. Trump has also suggested that Europe should shoulder more responsibility for its security, which may lead to a reevaluation of US commitments to NATO. It is possible that a reduction in the US role in NATO could have the effect of weakening collective defenses, which might in turn expose Europe to greater tensions with Russia. This approach indicates a shift toward a more isolationist US foreign policy, with strategic economic measures as leverage to influence Russia's actions.
Additionally, Trump’s expected policies in oil and gas could intensify competition with Russia and reshape global energy markets. Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska has predicted that Trump’s support for US oil production might drive global prices down to around $50 per barrel by 2025, creating pressure on Russia’s oil-dependent economy. Trump’s approach would likely include promoting US LNG exports, reviving paused projects, and further challenging Russia’s position in Europe’s energy market.
His stance on projects like the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which he previously sanctioned to limit Russia’s influence, suggests he might continue efforts to curb Russia’s global LNG ambitions while supporting policies to maintain affordable oil prices for US consumers. By influencing OPEC+ to stabilise prices favourable to the US, Trump could further impact Russia’s revenue, potentially reducing its leverage in Europe and heightening competition in the global energy sector.
Conclusion
Taken together, based upon a previous presidency led by Donald Trump and his recent claims on the campaign trail, global economic relations could become increasingly tense between the United States and other nations and political unions.
In particular, trade relations between China and the United States are expected to worsen, with major increases in tariffs on Chinese goods entering into the United States possibly leading to retaliatory tariffs and an intensification of trade competition between the two countries. The European Union could also be affected by the competition between the United States and China, as well as the possibility of increased tariffs on goods from the EU going into the United States. The conflict in Ukraine also casts a shadow over Trump’s second term and whether the Trump administration continues to provide funding to Ukraine and keep sanctions on Russia in place will affect both the war in Ukraine, as well as economic relations between the United States and Russia.
These considerations will all have ripple effects across the entire world, meaning it is important for policymakers, scholars, and citizens alike to continue watching the effects of the second Trump presidency on global economic relations.
by Giacomo Bortolazzi (Italy Team) & Marco Verrocchio (Military Strategy & Intelligence Team)
Despite the relative overcoming of the crisis sparked in early 2020, the global shortage of semiconductor chips has precipitated countries and companies into fierce competition on a global scale. This paper examines the potential response of Italy and its strategic initiatives in one of the most strategic issues in the near future. Nonetheless, Italian initiatives are propelled and integrated into the European framework of the Chips Act. By analysing Italy's alignment with the EU's objective, the article provides insights into the nation's efforts in the complex global semiconductor landscape.
Semiconductors' crisis: Europe's role in the global Chip shortages
The world is not newto the fierce competition among countries on semiconductors. However, the demand for cutting-edge technologies and the massive need for semiconductors in everyday life smart devices are determining insecurities on the endurance of the GVCs. The global chip shortage during the Covid-19 pandemic has drawn the attention of industries and states on the strategic value of semiconductors. While supplies of chips began to improve in 2022, the already high demand for advanced chips, such as those for the automotive and military sector, is continuing to intensify: the global market of semiconductors is projected to scale from $573.44 billion in 2022 to $1,380.79 billion by 2029 at a compound annual growth rate of 12.2%. However, chips are not so easy to make: While building factories and clean laboratories requires years, transforming a single silicon wafer into semiconductors takes months. Based on said high demand and the complexity of making semiconductors, the latter’s GVCs are highly amenable to geopolitical tensions such as the US-China trade competition. For these reasons, governments are investing to boost domestic production, attract foreign investment, and discourage the export of semiconductor technologies.
While Japan and the US dominated semiconductor manufacturing in the 90s, today Taiwan and South Korea are leading the market both in terms of volume and of production of the smallestnanometer chips. The eruption of the US-China trade competition and the shortage of chips during the Pandemic, on the other hand, led the US and Japan to adopt policies against the exports of chips-related technologies, encouraging the establishment of factories in the homeland. In this scenario, in July 2023 the EU adopted the European Chips Act, a regulation aimed at strengthening the European semiconductor market through more than €43 billionof investments. Based on the premises of the Chips Act, in the same year the regulation was implemented by the Chips JointUndertaking (Chips JU), a call for funding based on public-private partnership to bridge the gap between R&D and the market.
The Italian implementation of the Chips Ju
Among the several European countries that became an active implementer of the Chips Joint Undertaking, Italy certainly represents an actor with an important burden on its shoulders. The first active participation of the country in the JU was in November 2023, when Chips.IT, the new Italian Centre for the Design of Semiconductor Integrated Circuits, and the Italian strategy for microelectronics were presented in Pavia. The two novelties are strongly intertwined: Chips.IT was born as part of the strategy to coordinate and strengthen the microchip design sector with state-of-the-art equipment, all in order to foster an overall development of the sector. The role of public and private entities was also stressed, with €225 millionbeing allocated and big firms such as Intel, Sony, Infineon and the Italian STMicroelectronics willing to collaborate.
The national efforts in the field of the JU will also foster the birth of further projects that will have a positive impact on the national landscape: after the approval of the Governing Board of the JU, a new advanced microelectronics infrastructure was set up in the middle of the Etna Valleywith the main task to build prototype devices for the development of innovative applications in the field of electric mobility and telecommunications. The initiative was strongly supported by the Italian Ministries of Enterprise and Made in Italy, the University and Research Ministry and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and received an allocation of €360 million to be divided between the European Union and the participating states (namely Finland, Poland, Sweden, Austria, France and Germany). This investment will certainly have a positive impact on the area by fostering employment, newly established activities and a general blooming of the industrial sector directly related to microelectronics.
Another important presence in the Italian landscape will be that of Silicon Box, a Singaporean tech giant has planned to invest €3.2 billion in the Italian microelectronics industry with a new plant located in Novara. The role of this company is certainly not to be underestimated, as it could contribute to the Italian role in the market of the so-called “chiplets”. Sehat Sutardja, one of the founders of Silicon Box, introduced this concept in 2015 as an innovative and performance-enhancing technology. A chiplet is in fact a processor with multiple cores that is printed on the same layer with other chiplets: this would consent a more efficient communication, thus erasing the issue of hardware-software data transfer.
Photo by Dan Williams via Pixabay
Italian expectations in the EU scenario
In a nutshell, Italy does not dispose of forgeries equiparable to those of countries such as China, which can hold entire GVCs inside their territory. Even though small enterprises are common in the Italian tech sector, many new important initiatives such as those started in the Etna Valley and in
Novara can be considered as holding a great potential. At the same time, the European Union has realised the importance and the scarcity of semiconductors and of the materials needed to produce it. Due to the important influx of investments received by Member States, Italy has experienced positive spillover effects, resulting in the transfer of valuable know-how and the creation of more job opportunities. In light of these novelties, the future possibility for Italy to start a “solo project” and to become itself a global actor is not to be excluded. Still, it’s important to bear in mind that key global actors such as South Korea, China or Taiwan are still a long way ahead and that multiple efforts will be required to launch Italy among the stars. Still, Italian efforts to be imprinted in the global semiconductor market are slowly revealing their “dual use”: they’re helping the European Union to reduce its dependency on external actors while securing the country’s competitiveness in the field of semiconductors.
In this episode, Marco Volpe talks about China's current and future role in the Arctic region, China's polar strategy including Antarctica, and academic bridge building between the Arctic and the Third Pole. Marco Volpe is a visiting researcher at the Arctic Centre in Rovaniemi.
In this session, Mr. Volpe lays out the scientific, economic, and geopolitical spheres of China's engagement in the Arctic region. He highlights China's long-term planning capabilities and looks at China's overall polar strategy, including Antarctica, through the lens of investments in polar climate science. Mr. Volpe also discusses the efforts of building bridges between Arctic and Third Pole (Himalaya) research, focusing on indigenous peoples and indigenous knowledge.
Interviewers: Irene Senfter and Max Giordano - Arctic Team
