ISIS Archives – ITSS Verona

February 12, 2025 — No Comments

Unraveling ISIS: Islamic State’s Offices across Africa

A Comparative Analysis of the Cases of ISWAP and ASWJ in Nigeria and Mozambique

By Massimiliano Dosmo and Leonardo Pesci - Africa Team

Since its inception in 2014, the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) has become a transnational Jihadist movement whose ideology and practices inform insurgents’ strategies and objectives across the world. One after another, movements pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, elevating ISIS as a structuring force for many religious-based factions in Africa. This article investigates the proliferation of ISIS-affiliated groups on the continent, comparing how the Islamic State operates in Nigeria and Mozambique. Specifically, the article seeks to understand how the strategic, operational, governance, and ideological practices of ISIS affiliates converge - or diverge - from the ones of ISIS’s core group.

Origins and formation of the groups

Starting with the origins and group formation, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) originated as a splinter faction of the Jihadist group Boko Haram, which was established in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria, in 2002 by Muhammad Yusuf. After Mohammed Yusuf was killed in an unsuccessful uprising in 2009, the movement, under the new leadership of Abubakar Shekau, began an insurgency against the Nigerian government to create a Caliphate in the Lake Chad Basin area. In 2016, Boko Haram split into two groups: Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'adati wal-Jihad (JAS), commanded by Abubakar Shekau, and ISWAP, led by Abu Musab al Barnawi. The separation was the outcome of internal disputes within Boko Haram that were brought on by some skepticism shown by ISIS's higher authority following Shekau's decision to break with Al-Qaeda and join ISIS. This skepticism was given by the fact that, although Shekau had been designated as Waly (leader) of ISWAP and had pledged his loyalty to ISIS, his leadership skills and doctrinal beliefs were a major source of worry for Al-Baghdadi. These worries were subsequently confirmed when Al-Baghdadi received grievance letters from Shekau's subordinates. Specifically, Shekau was accused of being too violent against the Muslim population, using indiscriminate violence against them, which represented an ideological clash with the ISIS view. This resulted in Al-Baghdadi's decision to not trust Shekau as the legitimate leader of ISWAP. From ISWAP’s inception, it is evident how ISIS actively influenced the group’s leadership due to an ideological clash with the previous leader.

On the other hand, Ansar al-Sunna, also known as al-Sunna wal-Jamaat’s (ASWJ), history in Mozambique can be traced to 2015, when the group started as a religious organisation in Mocimboa da Pria, one of the districts of Cabo Delgado Province in northern Mozambique. It emerged as an armed group in 2017, taking advantage of socio-economic issues such as widespread poverty, the exclusion of Muslim populations, and official indifference. In 2019, it started operating under the umbrella of the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), which also included the Islamic State’s affiliate in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and joined ISIS, having previously adhered to Salafi-jihadist theology. The primary connections between ASWJ and ISIS are the ideological foundation, based on Salafi-jihadism, and promotional backing. However, it has much autonomy compared to more disciplined ISIS branches. Despite adopting ISIS's rhetoric on the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, its operational framework and governance are representative of the local reality. While ASWJ employs ISIS-style recruitment tactics, such as appealing to local concerns, it does not adopt the organisational rigor that ISIS has previously enforced on its branches.

Territoriality, governance and engagement with the population

A crucial element of this analysis is the territoriality, governance, and engagement strategies that the two groups employ. ISWAP takes on a methodical approach to administration, drawing inspiration from the administrative framework of ISIS. The organization manages commercial activity, collects taxes, and offers a few social services, including food distribution and dispute resolution. In contrast to Boko Haram's previous indiscriminate cruelty, ISWAP has immediately tried to gain local support by presenting itself as an alternative to the Nigerian government. Its governance model, aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the local population, has allowed ISWAP to sustain its insurgency and maintain control over key territory surrounding Lake Chad. ISWAP's governance structure is one area where ISIS has a direct influence. Similar to ISIS, ISWAP uses a structured governance model, establishing a Sharia-law-based judicial hierarchy, designating governors for captured areas, and implementing financial measures to support its operations. ISWAP’s success in controlling the area demonstrates ISIS's preference for long-term administration as opposed to just gaining territory. Its capacity to offer services, including agricultural help and medical assistance, stands in stark contrast to the Nigerian government's neglect of rural communities.

In contrast, ASWJ’s governance approach is less structured. Although it has exercised authority over certain parts of Cabo Delgado, it lacks a strong administrative framework. While they struggle to deliver basic services, the organisation enforces Sharia rule in conquered territory. Instead of using organised taxation, it engages in extortion and looting, and it frequently has coercive relationships with the local population. This lack of structured governance has hindered its ability to maintain sustained legitimacy among people. For these reasons, ASWJ’s governance is severely hampered by its excessive reliance on external funding and illicit activities, such as drugs and rubies smuggling. Consequently, unlike ASWJ, ISWAP has developed a more structured logistical network, securing a steady supply of weapons, food, and fuel directly from ISIS. It has also integrated foreign fighters into its ranks, benefiting from training provided by ISIS operatives in the region. ASWJ’s patchy and fluctuating implementation of Islamic governance initiatives, combined with its leadership’s short-term strategic objectives, has made long-term territorial control more challenging. This has prevented ISIS from fully sustaining the group’s operations, unlike in the case of ISWAP.

Funding Activities and Financial Revenues

The current analysis cannot overlook the financial and fundraising practices of ISWAP and ASWJ within their respective contexts. Despite the notorious difficulty in pinpointing direct financial connections, there are nonetheless converging similarities between ISIS, ISWAP, and ASWJ’s fundraising practices. ISIS’s core group in Syria and Iraq has largely benefitted from a different range of revenue sources. These included oil extraction and trade, taxation, lootings, robberies, kidnapping for ransom, extortion of local communities, and tariffs on import/export within their territories. Additionally, private donors and international fundraising networks generated a substantial part of ISIS's financial revenues.

While tracing direct financial links between ISIS’s core leadership and its Mozambican affiliate remains speculative due to limited evidence, the same cannot be said for ISWAP. During the first years of activities, ISIS's financial support was instrumental to the group's territorial and logistic affirmation. Evidence demonstrates ties between ISIS and ISWAP consisting of regular triangulations of money - up to USD 782.000 between 2015 and 2016. On the other hand, the closer engagement with local communities allowed the group to impose Zakat, a taxation system representing one of the primary sources of financial entrances. Leveraging the Quranic obligation, the group legitimises its authority in collecting taxes from private and business communities including farmers, traders, and fishermen. The practice avoided predatory actions characterising other Nigerian groups such as Boko Haram and JAS, creating patterns of predictability within communities. Despite this, ISWAP’s financial system is anyway reliant on the ransoms of local elites and international workers.

On the other hand, ASWJ's economic sustainment seems primarily reliant on illegal local trade and local and external donations. The region has historically represented a notorious hotspot of illicit trafficking and smuggling routes. The centrality of the port of Mocímboa da Praia elevates Cabo Delgado as a central hub for insurgents to trade and contraband goods, including timber, charcoal, rubies, and ivory. Notably, drug trafficking of heroin and methamphetamines from South Asia has become one of their main sources of income. A substantial part of ASWJ's financial entrances arises from local entrepreneurs demanding protections, as well as taxed loans borrowed to small businesses. While the above-mentioned appeared as the main financial revenues of the group, alternative fundraising activities confirm the tendency to rely on kidnapping for ransoms and the participation in human and organ trafficking routes of the Horn of Africa. Finally, although financial connections between ASWJ and ISIS are not sustained by verifiable evidence, it is nonetheless conceivable that links between the group and external funders from smaller ISIS cells in South Africa around the continent exist.

*Source: Think Tank Experts Warn of Growing Islamist Financing Network in South Africa; Photo by ZUMA Press, Inc.*

Group’s Objectives and Evolutions

Despite initial analogies, Nigerian and Mozambican territorial dynamics, logistical capacities, and counter-insurgency strategies have not only differentiated the evolutions of the groups but also their ideological and practical closeness to ISIS.

Both groups started with low-profile activities. Between 2015 and 2017, ASWJ was mainly composed of religious leaders, managing religious spaces and spreading Salafist doctrines, delegitimising secular institutions and state law. Similarly, ISWAP’s first steps in 2016-2018 are defined as the “consolidation” phase, characterised by a few activities and attempts of the group to define themselves from Boko Haram.

Between 2019 and 2021, both groups pledged allegiance and received formal recognition from the Islamic State’s core group, simultaneously intensifying the violence and frequency of attacks. ASWJ expanded its territorial presence to the four main coastal districts of Cabo Delgado. Approximately 16–20 monthly attacks targeted cargo transports, contractors, and security forces, spreading in neighboring Tanzania. ISWAP structured its internal composition, expanded its territorial control, and improved its engagement with the population acquiring notable legitimacy. The incursions remained targeted towards Nigerian security forces and military bases expanding to international workers and organisations in rural areas around the Lake Chad Basin.

With opposed outcomes, 2021 represented a turning tide for two groups, directly reflected in their relation and closeness to ISIS. Mozambican counter-insurgency strategy included contractors and international interventions to recapture major urban centers. Militants were forced to change their strategies, the number of attacks decreased, and tactics shifted to guerrilla actions, targeting civilians in smaller and rural villages. Meanwhile, ISWAP reinforced its bureaucratic organisation, and expanded its numerical basis, and territorial control, benefitting from the Sambisa offensive and the killing of JAS leader Shekau. Its territorial presence spilled over the Lake Chad Region, and at least 10 other Nigerian states.

Therefore, while pledging allegiance to ISIS brought both groups under the broader Islamic State umbrella, they did not necessarily adopt ISIS’s ideological and strategic framework. While ISWAP followed ISIS’s structured governance and military strategy, ASWJ opted for a more localised approach adapted to the Mozambican context. Its affiliation with ISIS provided it with branding, logistical, and financial support, but it did not transform ASWJ into a fully ISIS-controlled entity.

Conclusion

All in all, the overall structure and actions of the two ASWJ and SWAP reflect a varying degree of convergence from ISIS's core ideology. While the closer relationship between ISIS and ISWAP has informed the evolution of the latter, the looser approach toward ASWJ is enshrined in the group's relatively independent actions. However, it is important to notice how in both cases the groups still showed, even if in a different manner, a high degree of independence in the choice of their local strategy due to the different nature of the socio-political context of their territories, toward the application of ISIS core ideology.

December 9, 2024 — No Comments

Security Challenges in Rojava

by Angelo Calianno & Jaohara Hatabi - Middle East Team

Introduction

In 2016, after years of struggle and political action, the Kurdish-majority Rojava region, located in northeastern Syria, proclaimed itself an autonomous and independent state. Kurdish militias, together with an international coalition led by the United States, reconquered territories occupied by the Islamic States (ISIS) -. News agencies were showing photos of the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) fighters, and especially those of YPJ (Women's Protection Unit) troops, who were hailed as the new champions of freedom.

In their fight against ISIS, the Kurds in Northeastern Syria had become the bulwark against terrorism. Rojava's new democracy was laying the foundations of its constitution: an idea of a State where different religions and ethnicities coexist and most people are represented, regardless of religion, gender, or ideology. After 13 years of struggle since the first autonomy movement founded by the PYD (Democratic Union Party), the Syrian equivalent of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Syrian Kurds also had their own homeland. This democratic experiment captured the attention and interest of diplomats, journalists, researchers, and onlookers from all over the world. After the initial hype, media interest has dropped dramatically for years, with hardly any reports about this region. That changed two years ago, when Turkey's bombing brought the region back to the headlines.

Inside Rojava: present-day reality

In our analysis, we reported the current situation in Rojava, especially in relation to the continuous attacks by Turkey.

The Kurdish population in Rojava finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place. The southern part of the territory is heavily controlled by the Assad regime, which does not recognize Rojava’s autonomy. The regime maintains dozens of checkpoints that restrict the flow of essential supplies, including building materials, food, and medical equipment. As a result, many of these goods must be smuggled in from Iraq, in an attempt to avoid Damascus' screening.

Southeast of Rojava, ISIS cells still exist, especially in the rural areas of Raqqa, Kobane, and Deir ez-Zor. While these cells have lost much of their former strength and financial resources, they still pose a threat to local populations by perpetrating attacks and raids.

Conflicts in recent years have caused approximately one million Internally Displaced People (IDP), who have lost their homes and now live in semi-detention camps. The suburbs of these cities teem children working amid mountains of garbage looking for material to sell for recycling. The Al-Hol camp, one of the largest, holds around 55,000 people, the majority of whom are women and children, including many who are related to most radical ISIS terrorists. These families are not formally charged with crimes, but the Rojava authorities have adopted controversial measures, such as confining them in camps, as a preventive measure against the potential reorganization of ISIS cells. While the security rationale behind this approach is clear, it has drawn criticism for the humanitarian implications.

The conditions in the tent-city of Al-Hol are difficult, with many living in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions, surrounded by wire nets and armoured vehicles. There is limited access to basic services like water, electricity, and fuel for heating. These challenges are particularly severe for women and children, who are disproportionately affected by the harsh living conditions. The camp remains heavily guarded, with a large security presence due to concerns about radicalisation and the potential for violence. Despite the difficult circumstances, local authorities have faced pressure from international organisations and human rights groups to improve conditions and provide better support for those in the camp.

One of them told us:

“They treat us like criminals, but we have done nothing. Every morning, the military drags us out to search us. Our husbands are in jail, but we are innocent, we do not even know why we are here”. In fact, many of the women here have never committed any crime. Some of them have had no contact with their husbands for years, being in some cases a second or third wife. While they may have been married to members of a terrorist organization, they now face serious consequences for their associations, even if they themselves have not been involved in any criminal activity.

The situation in Rojava caused international responses that are varied and complex, which reflects the intricate web of alliances and conflicts in the Middle East. When Kurdish groups declared the autonomy of Rojava, they were met with a mixture of support and opposition from global and regional powers. The United States, seeking reliable partners in the fight against ISIS, formed a crucial alliance with the YPG, providing military support and training under the broader umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This partnership significantly contributed to the defeat of ISIS in Syria, garnering international recognition for the Kurdish-led forces.

However, the U.S. support for the YPG strained the former’s relations with Turkey, a NATO ally, which views the YPG as an extension of the PKK, which is designated by Turkey, the US, and the EU as a terrorist organization. Turkey has repeatedly launched military operations against the YPG, most notably Operation Olive Branch in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in 2019, aiming to create a "safe zone" along its border free of YPG presence. These actions drew international condemnation, with European countries particularly vocal in denouncing Turkey's incursions, citing humanitarian concerns and potential destabilisation of the region. The EU called Turkey to cease its military actions, while several EU member states imposed arms embargoes on Ankara.

Russia's involvement in Rojava has been pragmatic, balancing its alliance with the Syrian government and its strategic interests in the region. Initially, Russia allowed Kurdish autonomy as a counterbalance to U.S. influence, but once the Syrian government regained territory, Russia facilitated agreements between the Kurds and Damascus, aiming to reintegrate Rojava under Syrian sovereignty while ensuring Kurdish rights.

Iran, which supports the Assad regime, has opposed any form of Kurdish autonomy that could inspire Iranian Kurds. Thus, Tehran's policy towards Rojava aligns closely with that of Damascus and, to some extent, Ankara. Meanwhile, international human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have reported on human rights abuses by various actors in the conflict, urging all parties to respect international law and protect civilians.

As of now, there are no formal high-profile peace negotiations taking place. Although efforts have been made by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) to engage in dialogue with the Syrian government and other regional powers, they have not resulted in any comprehensive peace agreement.

Arguably, the presence of external powers with their own interests such as Turkey, the US, Russia and Iran, further complicates the situation. However, the US continues to engage diplomatically, balancing its support for the SDF with its broader regional interests, including its relationship with Turkey. European countries have also been involved in providing diplomatic channels and humanitarian aid, advocating for a peaceful resolution and respect for human rights in the region.

*Picture by Angelo Calianno, Rojava, Northeastern Syria*

Final Considerations

In conclusion, the situation in Rojava remains a complex and multifaceted challenge. The region's pursuit of autonomy has led to a diverse set of responses from international actors, highlighting the intricate balance of power and interests at play. The humanitarian crisis, particularly the plight of displaced persons and those in camps like Al-Hol, underscores the urgency of a coordinated international response that prioritises human rights and humanitarian principles. While the Kurdish forces have been instrumental in the fight against ISIS, the geopolitical realities involving major powers such as the United States, Turkey, Russia, and Iran complicate the pathway to a stable and peaceful resolution. Moving forward, it is crucial for the international community to support dialogue and negotiations, respecting the rights and aspirations of all parties involved while ensuring the protection of civilians and the adherence to international law. The future of Rojava will depend significantly on the ability of these various actors to navigate the delicate political landscape and work toward a sustainable and inclusive solution.

* This article was written before the events of December 8, 2024.

October 24, 2022 — No Comments

Ido Levy on ISIS vs Al Qaeda

Interviewers: Anna Lorenzini and John Devine.

Ido Levy talks about the deep conflict between ISIS and Al-Qaeda and its possible implications from a strategic point of view, the significance that they believe the West has within this scenario, and whether some recent events such as the war in Ukraine or the upcoming Israeli elections may affect terrorist activities.

Ido Levy is an associate fellow working with the Washington Institute’s Military and Security Studies Program and a PhD student at American University’s School of International Service. His work focuses especially on Near East Policy on counterterrorism and military operations, particularly relating to jihadist groups.

March 8, 2022 — No Comments

Maria Zuppello on Tropical Jihad in Latin America

Maria Zuppello talks about Jihad in Central and Latin America, with a particular focus on her book “Tropical Jihad. The crime-terror nexus in Latin America”. Maria Zuppello is a freelancer video journalist who has worked with The Guardian, AFP, AP, The Economist, RSI.

In this session, Maria Zuppello shows the results of her research on tropical jihadism and presents the main arguments of her book “Tropical Jihad. The crime-terror nexus in Latin America”, foreword by Emanuele Ottolenghi. She investigates on the links between jihadist groups and narcotraffickers, as well as on the presence of al-Qaeda and Isis at the Triple Frontier shared by Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina.

Interviewers: Giovanni Giacalone, Marta Pace, Beatrice Tommasi

This is ITSS Verona Member Series Video Podcast by the Central and South America Team.

ITSS Verona - The International Team for the Study of Security Verona is a not-for-profit, apolitical, international cultural association dedicated to the study of international security, ranging from terrorism to climate change, from artificial intelligence to pandemics, from great power competition to energy security.

February 21, 2022 — No Comments

A Conversation with Giovanni Giacalone on Al Qaeda and Islamic State

Giovanni Giacalone has an MA in Islamic Studies from Trinity Saint David University of Wales and a further specialization in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism from the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism-IICT. He is currently a senior analyst at the Europe desk for the UK-based think-tank Islamic Theology of Counter-Terrorism and for the Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues and Managing Emergencies-Itstime at the Catholic University of Milan. He was country-coordinator for the Globsec European project “From criminals to terrorists and back”, with the objective of analyzing the crime-terror nexus among jihadist foreign fighters. He is the author of several books and chapters on jihadism. He has lectured security managers, and law enforcers on Italian soil, and has testified in audition on security to the Italian parliament.

In this interview, Giovanni talks about the death of Al-Baghdadi, whether and how the death of Al-Qurayshi will affect ISIS operational capabilities, possibilities of defeating terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, the ISIS and Taliban threat on Europe.

Interviewers: Adelaide Martelli and Francesco Bruno.

July 5, 2021 — No Comments

A Comparative Perspective of women and children under ISIS and Al-Qaeda: A Conversation with Cecilia Polizzi.

ITSS Verona's Extremism, Crime and Terrorism group interviews Cecilia Polizzi, President, Founder & Executive Director of the CRTG Working Group, the only existing I/NGO dedicated to protect children affected by terrorism and member of the ITSS Verona Scientific Expert Committee. Ms. Polizzi talks about the plight of women and children under ISIS and Al-Qaeda.

Interviewing Team: Adelaide Martelli & Francesco Bruno.

June 7, 2021 — 10 Comments

How lonely are the “Lone wolves”?

By: Adelaide Martelli, Francesco Bruno and Shahin Modarres.

Regardless of how violent, inhuman, and detestable terrorism is, it is a social phenomenon. Hence, like other social phenomena, it is a dynamic body that undergoes changes and transforms to adapt to the constantly changing socio-political sphere in different parts of the world. After the major paradigm shift of terrorist organizations from vertical structures to horizontal ones, the third wave of terror attacks was formed based on individuals carrying out terrorist attacks. These individuals are known by the colloquial "lone wolf" and they represent a growing concern due to the complexity of detecting them.

The term "lone wolf" has opened the stage for controversy in defining it. The basis of this controversy mostly manoeuvres on either if the individual radicalized and carried out the event like the famous case of Ted Kaczynski, or he/she has radicalized as the result of an agent-based mechanism of socialization. According to Prof. Mark Hamm, the distinction that differentiates the "lone wolf" phenomenon is based on the executive phase of a terrorist attack. "lone wolf" is the individual who might have been radicalized as the result of group socialization or self-indoctrination but acts alone. Prof. Peter Neumann adds: "a lone wolf is not necessarily a member of a terrorist organization but an individual who has an affinity with them".

In this article, we will discuss two cases of "lone wolf" terrorism to show both the executive phase of "lone actor" and pre-attack radicalization. It is important to recognize that even though the final act in lone wolf terrorism is performed as a solo, it is not an individual effort that has led to that moment. Many lone actors have received logistic and material support from terrorist cells, including explosives and instructions to build devices, safe passes, and even safe homes for the post-op phase (Schuurman, 2017).

Besides the operational level in the case of Younes Tsouli, we will see the importance of "lone actor" radicalization and recruitment on online platforms. And in the case of Mohammed Bouyeri, we will discuss how the term "Lone wolf" can overstate the degree of isolation these individuals go through.

Case of Younes Tsouli

It has sparked a controversial debate on the nature of the “Lone Wolf” as an individual with a focus on both psychological and personality factors, and external in terms of environment, friendships, and family ties. This part of the paper in relation to “Lone Wolves” will be using a different theoretical approach argued by Marc Sageman in Leaderless Jihad and characterized by the development of a new environment and processes of radicalization primarily based on the Internet. The importance here is the interaction between members on online portals and forums accessible exclusively by invitation, where complete anonymized strangers interact expressing their views on their hopes for Islam. What is interesting in this case is the fact that such forums provide a community for these individuals to interact with each other “this mutual sharing makes them feel even closer to each other in a virtual process similar to the one previously described as in-group love with face-to-face interactions. This provides them with a sense of belonging to a greater community on the basis of what they have in common, Islam” (Sageman, 2008). This perspective provides an alternative view on Lone Wolf, as this article argues, it is possible to define as “Lone Wolf” someone who acts are characterized by “lone” actions, but in reality, there is a variety of social interactions which made such cases less “lonely”.

The example that will be used to shed some light on the action of a Lone Wolf is the case of Younes Tsouli, also called Terrorist 007, and the “most wanted cyber-jihadist” according to the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). He began by appearing on websites such as “Islamic Terrorists” where he came across as an agitator, following that in 2004, he began to reach popularity as an expert cyber-jihadists providing not only terrorist material to online forums where he could directly radicalize youths, but he also was able to provide inside of US military bases in Iraq. More importantly, Younes was able to become a pillar for Al-Qaeda’s propaganda in Britain, despite, as the judge at his trial pointed out that he never himself came close to a firearm or committed a crime physically according to ACPO. His role alone had indirectly created a space for jihadist propaganda gaining support by the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Musab Al-Zarqawi facilitating the contacts across thousands of “lone wolves” across the globe (Jacobson, 2010). Therefore, to answer the question, are “Lone” wolves really lonely? They are not as demonstrated by the case of Younis Tsouli.

Case of Mohammed Bouyeri

The case of Mohammed Bouyeri, the 2006 Amsterdam attacker who killed Theo Van Gogh, is peculiar to analyze lone wolves’ networks during their radicalization and plotting process. He is considered as the first European Islamic lone wolf (Zogno, 2018), and, contrarily to what is generally thought, he was not so detached from social interactions. Bouyeri was born in Holland to Moroccan parents, and reportedly both he and his family were well integrated into the Dutch Community (Nesser, 2005).

Thanks to the documents retrieved from his computer after his arrest we have information regarding his radicalization and indoctrination processes (Sageman, 2008). In 2001 he went to prison, and there he started reading the Quran, which may be suggested by other prisoners, faith became his light during this dark period (Peters, 2016). The second event that influenced him towards a stricter interpretation of Islam was the death of his sick mother, since then he appeared increasingly isolated from the larger society (Cottee, 2014).

However, the biggest turning point was in 2003 as a consequence of two major events: Firstly, Dutch authorities refused Bouyeri’s proposal to open a youth club for immigrants; secondly, he entrenched a tight relationship with the fundamentalist Imam Abou Khaled (Nesser, 2012). Bouyeri started attending the meeting held by Abou Khaled, where he learned how to conduct his life following Sharia law so that he completely changed his previous lifestyle (Peters, 2016). Not only, but he also met several like-minded people with whom he established the Dutch Islamist group called the Hofstadgroup (Adjiembaks, 2016). Except for the people inside his network, he was very isolated from the larger society and he used to spend his time writing and disseminating extremist beliefs online (Kaplan et al., 2017;De Koning, 2013). In this period, he changed his name to Abu Zubair, in memory of the homonymous Al-Qaeda commander.

The triggering event before the attack was the documentary “Submission” produced by Theo Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali in 2004, perceived by him and many other Muslims as offensive to Islam (Peters, 2016). Simultaneously, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) promoted a campaign in favor of kidnapping and decapitation, that apparently influenced Bouyeri’s attack plan (Nesser, 2012) . In fact, on the 2nd of November 2004 Mohammed Bouyeri, alias Abu Zubair, shot Theo Van Gogh eight times, tried to behead him, and then pinned on him with a knife an Open letter against Hirsi Ali (Nesser, 2012; De Koning, 2013) . Shortly after the attack, Bouyeri was arrested and sentenced to life in prison (Finseraas et al., 2011).

Both mentioned cases show an inpatient process of labeling these terrorist actors as with the term "Lone wolf". Mostly these actors have interpersonal, ideological, and operational ties to larger groups. (Gartenstein-Ross, 2017) Thinking of them as isolated individuals can develop conceptual confusion. The reason behind their solo act in some cases usually roots from a sense of secrecy and fear of being trapped into leakage behavior. A considerable number of these actors have expressed violent intention across the border of human norms, long before executing their plans. Their posts and socialization have been a clear cry for attention months and even years before the planning phase. (Gill, Horgan, and Deckert, 2020) This behavior, known as the "leakage behavior" has been a tremendous help for intelligence agencies and counter-terrorism professionals to detect them and surveil their activities. (Meloy and O'Toole, 2011) In some cases, the main reason behind acting alone has been their incapability of recruiting other members to the potential terrorist cell that they had in mind.As the result of a cost-benefit estimation, certain actors during recent years showed more tendency to cut their ties and communication from their niche in order to secure the required secrecy needed for the optimization of their plans. These actors preferred to reduce their vulnerability towards detection and infiltration by cutting ties with other members and their cells before executing their plans. (Bakker and De Graaf, 2012) Both elements of detection and infiltration have successfully neutralized many terrorist plots in advance and this has become a warning for more skill-developed actors to isolate themselves from their peers while planning a terrorist plot and later during the execution phase. This of course does not mean that all these actors were originally isolated individuals with anti-social behavior by their choice of acting alone was indeed the result of a strategic decision-making process.

This article has been rectified on June 9th, 2021. Younes Tsouli has already served his sentence.