Hezbollah Archives – ITSS Verona

November 13, 2024 — No Comments

Iran’s Hostility Towards Israel: Three Influential Reasons

by Margherita Ceserani, Shahin Modarres, Shir Mor, William Kingston-Cox - Iran Team

The Islamic Republic’s recent choice to directly confront Israel, avoiding its usual reliance on proxy groups, marks a significant shift in its Middle East strategy. Long dependent on groups like Hezbollah and Hamas for regional influence, the weakening of these proxies—amid Israeli retaliation and Iran’s internal crises—has led Tehran to reconsider its approach. This article explores the internal and external factors driving the Islamic Republic’s move toward a more direct confrontation.

Its proxies weakening

The Islamic Republic's decision to attack Israel directly, bypassing its traditional reliance on proxy groups - also called the "Axis of Resistance" - marks a significant shift in its strategic approach. This uncharacteristic behaviour is largely driven by the weakening of its proxies, particularly in the aftermath of the events following October 7th.

For decades, the Islamic Republic has built, supported, and relied on external groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis to exert influence, especially in the Middle East, and keep Israel engaged. However, recent Israeli military retaliation has severely weakened these proxies, diminished their operational capabilities, and reduced their effectiveness in countering Israeli threats and holding power positions in the Middle East and the whole world.

The Islamic Republic maintains a network of allied groups across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. The IRGC Quds Force, responsible for operations beyond Iran's borders, coordinates with these groups in line with Iranian directives. This network supports Iran’s strategy to extend its influence throughout the region and beyond. For example, the Houthis have impacted maritime security in the Red Sea, prompting responses from U.S. and U.K. military coalitions in Yemen. Iran also provides funding and weaponry to groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, facilitating their actions against Israel despite Hamas' Sunni background. In Syria, Iran has established a direct influence on the Assad regime and deploys allied militias to strengthen its presence, using the country as a base for potential actions against Israel. By supporting these groups, Iran seeks to counter its adversaries, extend its ideological influence, and maintain leverage in key areas, which affects both regional and global security.

The targeted killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah by Israel, coupled with the assassination of Hamas figure Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, signifies a pivotal moment in the collapse of the "Axis of Resistance." These significant blows not only weaken Iran's most powerful regional proxies but also destabilise Tehran's long-standing influence in the Middle East. Established in the 1980s, Hezbollah evolved under Iranian support into a formidable political and military force; Nasrallah's death highlights how Israel's recent military operations have fractured Iran's strategic foothold, jeopardising its long-term plans. Similarly, Haniyeh's assassination, attributed to Israel despite no official claim of responsibility, directly challenges Iran's authority, especially given that he was in Tehran to coordinate efforts with Iranian leaders. The operation's occurrence within Iran sends a powerful message about Tehran's vulnerability and reflects a broader Israeli strategy to undermine Iran’s network of proxies which consistently threaten Israel’s security and complicates Iran’s ability to project power.

The Islamic Republic's long-term strategic plans have been significantly disrupted, prompting a notable shift toward a direct approach to its conflict with Israel. Historically reliant on proxy forces to advance its agenda, the recent weakening of these groups has forced Iran to reevaluate its strategy. The decision to directly confront Israel reflects not only an immediate tactical shift but also an acknowledgement that its traditional methods may no longer achieve its regional objectives. This transformation is underscored by the diminishing effectiveness of the "Axis of Resistance" and signifies a recalibration of tactics amid a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. These developments carry profound implications for both Iran's future strategies and broader regional stability and global security.

Domestic dissatisfaction

Tehran’s decision to escalate tensions with Israel can be understood by its multifaceted internal crises, which challenge the regime economically, politically, and socially. The economic decline of the Iranian economy has been worsened for years by international sanctions, global fluctuations and instability in oil prices, and rising inflation, fueling widespread discontent among an already-beleaguered Iranian population. Tehran has been unable to quell the resultant dissatisfaction, particularly following the protests after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. Amini’s death fuelled a popular challenge of cleric authority and demands for greater civil liberties.

The society of the Islamic Republic is becoming increasingly secularised, eroding the clerical influence of the regime. Its reliance upon the continued legitimacy of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which is increasingly contested as Iranian society, particularly its younger elements, becomes increasingly disillusioned with religious politicisation, and, in turn, becoming increasingly secularised. Many young Iranians are showing disdain for traditional practices, a consequence of exposure to Western media. This particular challenge for the regime is existential - its entire raison d’etre rests upon religious foundations.

Coupled with the endemic internal challenges and the pressures from its proxies, Tehran’s decision to strike Israel reveals itself as a tool of diversion; an attempt to rally patriotic fervour and unity in return for relative political stability. By framing a new national, external enemy, the Iranian regime can distract and obfuscate from its internal dissent, all whilst performatively asserting itself as a regional power. This approach undertaken by the Iranian government does, of course, risk exacerbating economic downfall as an overreliance on oil revenues could be manipulated to Tehran’s detriment. Whilst the Iranian leadership will no doubt conceive these external manoeuvres to be a part of a ‘survival strategy’, it cannot be overstated how further economic strife will precipitate deepening and widening domestic disillusionment and, ultimately, unrest, prompting new calls for regime change.

*Source: photo-generated with the support of artificial intelligence.*

Nuclear Advancements

Tehran’s approach to foreign policy in the Middle East is influenced by a combination of geopolitical, ideological, and military considerations, with its nuclear program playing a significant role. Since the United States' withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018, the Islamic Republic has advanced its nuclear developments, positioning these capabilities as a potential deterrent against perceived external threats, particularly from Israel. A notable development occurred in 2023, when the IAEA reported finding uranium particles enriched to 83.7% in a declared facility — a level approaching weapons-grade material.

These advancements have significantly strengthened the Islamic Republic’s strategic position, as the prospect of developing nuclear weapons reduces the likelihood of direct military intervention by its adversaries. With this deterrent in place, though not the sole factor, the Shiite regime feels emboldened to act more assertively, pushing the limits of its regional influence and responding more aggressively to external provocations. For instance, the Israeli strike on the Islamic Republic’s consulate in Damascus in April 2024 has been met with an increased likelihood of retaliation. Tehran’s nuclear capability serves as a protective shield, allowing it to project power and influence more aggressively, while its ideological goals and regional ambitions drive its assertiveness in confronting rivals like Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Despite arguments by some experts that nuclear weapons would undermine its security and diplomatic relations, Iranian officials view nuclear capabilities as a strategic asset that could grant superiority over regional adversaries. Engaging in a nuclear arms race could be economically unsustainable and diplomatically harmful for Tehran, however, nuclear capability is tied not only to military deterrence but also to a pursuit of prestige, both domestically and internationally. This aligns with its broader goal of establishing regional hegemony, while also reflecting its revolutionary ideology rooted in values like independence, anti-imperialism, and resistance to foreign domination since 1979.

Conclusion

The Islamic Republic’s shift to direct action against Israel reflects a new phase in its foreign policy. Weakened proxies and rising domestic discontent are challenging Tehran’s traditional strategies. As nuclear developments bolster its assertiveness, this new approach risks further regional instability and could have global security implications, underscoring a significant turning point in Middle Eastern dynamics.

Board of Governors (2023). NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General. Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2023-58.pdf.
Mirza, M.N., Abbas, H. and Qaisrani, Irfan Hasnain (2022). The Iranian Nuclear Programme: Dynamics of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), American Unisolationism and European Apprehensions. Journal of European Studies, 38(1), pp.14-32. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4002492.
Maleki, A. (2010). Iran’s nuclear file: recommendations for the future. Daedalus, 139(1), pp.105–116. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40544048 [Accessed 2024].

August 31, 2024 — No Comments

Dr. Michael Barak on Iran Recent Developments

In this episode, Dr. Michael Barak talks about recent developments and policy changes in Iran, their impact on Israel, and the role of proxy actors following October 7th. Specifically, Dr Barak discusses the multifaceted dynamics involving Iran and its regional influence. He covers Iran’s relationships with various proxies, including Hezbollah and the Houthi’s, as well as its strategic partnerships with Russia. Additionally, Dr Barak examines Iran`s ongoing tensions with Israel and the corresponding Israeli responses.

Dr. Michael Barak is a Senior researcher at the International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT) where he serves as the head of the global jihad & Palestinian terrorism research desks. Additionally, Dr. Barak is a lecturer at the lauder school of government diplomacy and strategy at Reichman university.

Interviewers: Shahin Modarres & Shir Mor - Iran Team

November 6, 2023 — No Comments

Israel’s Possible War Scenarios: From a Temporarily Restrained Conflict to a Prolonged All-out War

Author: Omri Brinner - Middle East Team

With the beginning of its ground invasion into the Gaza Strip, Israel is at a crossroads it hoped it wouldn’t be in. It can be argued that any route Israel would take in this historic intersection would lead to regional escalation, even if only in the long-run. It is safe to assume, then, that even if there is no immediate backlash to the Israeli ground invasion, another front, sooner or later, will follow.

The most popular Israeli approach in responding to the October 7 Hamas attack is that the IDF’s infantry and armored brigades would invade the Gaza Strip, backed by heavy artillery, actionable intelligence, and preceded by intense aerial bombardment (as is happening). Israel, it has been argued, must respond forcefully, or else it would project to its enemies that it would refrain from war at all costs.

The ground invasion itself is meant to root out Hamas from the Gaza Strip and to disable its military capabilities. The other objective is the release of the 239 Israeli and foreign hostages, most of whom are civilians. Ideally – from Israel's point of view – the IDF would achieve its goals in the Gaza Strip without having to fight on another front simultaneously, as its capabilities in fighting multiple fronts at the same time are limited, and such a scenario will necessitate Israel to change its objectives. However, this is the least likely scenario. Total victory against Hamas is not guaranteed – and even unlikely within the limits of military power – and the ground operation can last for months. What is more likely is that Israel would embark on a limited ground incursion (due to American pressure and the possibility of another front elsewhere), achieve some tactical victories against Hamas, and will force a ceasefire on better conditions – which would lead to the release of some hostages (most likely women, children, and the elderly). However, the restrained war efforts in Gaza will surely be followed by war and terror on other fronts, and possibly simultaneously.

One ongoing front is in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, where Hamas, armed militias, and lone-wolf terrorists take arms against Israeli civilians and security personnel. At the time of the Hamas attack on October 7, most of the IDF was stationed in the West Bank, demonstrating its symbolic and strategic importance to Israel. The latter would have to react forcefully to any significant development there. It is in Hamas’ interest to start a new intifada in the West Bank, and possibly in Israeli cities, in order to destabilize and weaken Israel.

The other ongoing front, where Israel might face a full-scale war, is from the north. Hezbollah, with its arsenal of 150,000 projectiles (of close, medium, and long range) and army of approximately 100,000 soldiers, most of whom are well-trained and with some battle experience, pose a strategic threat – even bigger than the one Hamas poses.

Thus far, Hezbollah – which is backed by Iran and serves as its most strategic proxy in the region – has been reacting to Israel’s limited ground invasion, albeit with restraint. While Hezbollah needs to show it is committed to the Palestinian cause, it aims to avoid an all-out war with Israel.

*Source: https://twitter.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1721014635623522767/photo/4*

According to Israeli calculation, an all-out war is not fully in Hezbollah’s interests, nor is it in Iran’s. According to this theory, both Iran and Hezbollah would rather open an all-out war with Israel only once Iran guarantees applicable nuclear military capabilities, which, in the long run, seems inevitable. This means that from Israel’s point of view – and contrary to the best-case scenario described above – it would be better for Israel to engage with Hezbollah and Iran before the latter becomes a nuclear power.

Israel, then, might choose to attack Hezbollah and either drag it into the war – and by so eliminating the surprise element of Hezbollah’s reaction – or, if Hezbollah chooses not to retaliate, to reestablish its deterrence up north. While it may seem like an act of self harm, the Israeli public would view a Hezbollah surprise attack as another failure of the government, IDF, Shin Bet and Mossad. In a way, then, these institutions hope to project to the public that Israel is on the front foot, and that if a war with Hezbollah and Iran is inevitable in the long run, then better now than later. It is important to note that while Israel calculates that the two Shia powers would rather avoid an all-out war prior to Iran’s nuclearization, Israel’s working assumption that Hamas was deterred and would have opted to avoid an armed conflict fell apart with the October 7 attack. Therefore, there are no guarantees that any theory that existed before the attack is still relevant.

Would Iran and Hezbollah wait peacefully for an Israeli strike, or for it to finish its fighting in Gaza? Unlikely. From their point of view, Iran and Hezbollah are happy to let Israel keep guessing whether they would join the war or not. From Israel’s standpoint, it cannot afford to be surprised again. While it is less likely that there would be a ground invasion from the north following the one from the Gaza Strip on October 7, an extensive missile attack on central Israel would be just as bad.

But initiating war with Hezbollah – and Iran – would force the US into the conflict, as it would be extremely challenging – on the verge of impossible – for Israel to conduct an all-out war with Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran simultaneously. At the same time, if US forces end up fighting alongside Israel, then it is likely that other Iranian allies would occupy the US forces elsewhere in the region (such as in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria). While a recent poll shows that the vast majority of Americans are against US military involvement in the Middle East, the US would feel it has to protect its allies and interests in the region.

It seems, then, that the region is ahead of a long period – whether months or years – of an armed conflict.

May 17, 2022 — 1 Comment

How innovation in terrorism financing explains Hezbollah’s financial success

Author: Camilla Cormegna.

Introduction

Terrorism financing is vital for a terrorist organisation to operate and carry out terrorist activities, but resources are also spent to provide community services such as welfare, education, public and protection service replacing governments as the main providers. An example of this is demonstrated by Hezbollah, the focus of this analysis, whose social services offered to the Lebanese Shiite population allows it to secure political supports while acquiring a sacred and untouchable status in Lebanon. To sustain its organisational establishment while pursuing ideological and political objectives, Hezbollah is estimated to earn $1 billion annually through various sources.

Hezbollah depends on an array of revenue resources, although the bulk of its funding comes from Iran’s state-sponsorship, which provides around $800 million annually. This external funding comes with drawbacks, as sponsorship undermines group’s autonomy and pressures and sanctions on Iran negatively affect the state’s financing of Hezbollah. Therefore, Hezbollah is forced to innovate and diversify the sources of income to ensure financial sustainability. The group now leverages drug and human trafficking, diamonds smuggling, money laundering, propaganda television, local exactions, and diverting charitable contributions.

The article argues that Hezbollah owes its success to innovation in terrorism financing, making it one the most proficient and technically skilled terrorist groups in the world. Innovation refers to ability of terrorist groups to develop and adopt new financial techniques when pressured by countering terrorist financing strategies. This process can entail different phenomena such as the introduction of new tradeable commodities, new methods of production, new supply sources, and new market opportunities. The article presents Hezbollah’s success by exploring three profitable ventures that demonstrate the group’s ability to exploit lucrative opportunities: their sophisticated money-laundering scheme, the terror-crime nexus and the group’s ties with Venezuela, and the role of the Lebanese diaspora.

A sophisticated money laundering scheme

Hezbollah runs an extensive network of illicit trade involving cars and drugs to launder money. In 2015 it was reported that Hezbollah purchased used cars in the United States which were then shipped and sold in West Africa while at the same time, drugs were shipped from Colombia to Europe. Both proceeds were sent to Lebanon through Hezbollah controlled money laundering channels and then deposited into the financial system. It is estimated that between 2007 and 2011, Hezbollah, with the help of the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) and exchange houses, laundered $300 million. The LCB case shows the innovative adaption of Hezbollah, as after the 2011 scandal which detected and closed LBC’s money service businesses (MSBs), the terrorist organisation soon replaced MSBs resuming with the money laundering. This caseillustrates how Hezbollah’s facilitators are leveraging global trade and financial institutions to carry out illegal activities and how complex and sophisticated their system is, but it also demonstrates how facilitators among the Lebanese diaspora community are vital in supporting the organisation. Moreover, counterterrorism financing (CTF) deficiencies and constraints allow Hezbollah to thrive and exploit the cross-border movement of funds. Financial intelligence units’ effectiveness is achieved through information sharing which is geographically circumscribed, and compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) legislative and regulatory standards is lacking in the Middle East.

The terror-crime nexus with FARC and Venezuela’s role

As the money laundering scheme briefly introduced, Hezbollah has developed its own criminal activities such as the drug trade and it has done so by developing a strategic cooperation with FARC. Although their relationship is not political neither revolutionary but done to guarantee funds and financial independence through the diversification of income sources, the coupling of these organisations allows them to share operational knowledge, making them a “hybrid narc-terrorist network”. Hezbollah’s involvement with FARC and the drug trade was revealed in 2008 through the US and Colombian Operation Titan which dismantled a cocaine smuggling and money laundering ring which profited both organisations.

Hezbollah is also tangled up with the Venezuelan government, which guarantees a safe haven to carry out their operations. Hezbollah’s involvement with Venezuela started in the 1980s, when the organisation started to deepen its association with many Lebanese immigrants in Latin America who fled the civil war. In 2005, the then Iranian and Venezuelan presidents Ahmadinejad and Chavez came together in a series of commercial ties, laying the foundations of their relationship. There is evidence that the Venezuelan government launder Hezbollah’s money while providing them with material support for their activities, but it also employs Hezbollah sympathisers as Ministers generating revenue through the distribution of narcotics. It is the case of the current Minister of Industries and National Production El Aissami of Iraqi-Lebanese descent, involved in the drug trafficking and in the issue of diplomatic passports for Hezbollah facilitators. In this environment characterised by corruption and bribery, Hezbollah continues to thrive because Latin American countries do not recognise Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation, thus failing to enforce CFT frameworks while facilitating illicit financial flows. Moreover, Venezuela is noncompliant with 31 out of the 40 FATF recommendations, demonstrating how the regime has no intention in addressing terrorism concerns.

The role of the Lebanese diaspora

Hezbollah’s presence in international diaspora communities provides the organisation with access to criminal ventures and funds. The diaspora is comprised of Lebanese emigrated mainly to Europe, Latin America, North America, and West Africa between 1975 and 1990. Hezbollah acquired financial support from the diaspora through its commitment to the fight against Israel and the West and it translated the support into an array of financial sources as well as financiers and facilitators. A cultural practice embedded within the diaspora is the sending of remittances to Lebanon and to Hezbollah, considering its legitimate status among Shia at home, as a method of support. However, third-party funding is risky for terrorist organisations, as donors may lose interest in the cause or law enforcement activity can lead to a decline in donations. In West Africa, the Lebanese diaspora is heavily involved in the diamond trade, as diamonds are a source of donation and as an informal tax to support the organisation back home. In Venezuela, Hezbollah-tied family clansparticipate in the local drug trade and money laundering, operating with protection from the regime. In Europe, Hezbollah raises money through charities which is legal in European countries because Hezbollah is not listed as a terrorist organisation, only its military wing is banned, allowing the group to raise money and collect donations for Hezbollah-tied associations. A terrorism designation would freeze al funds, financial assets, and economic resources of the group and would be a powerful CTF approach given the group’s vast network.

Conclusion

The case of Hezbollah is emblematic of innovation in terrorist financing because to achieve financial independence and to anticipate CTF approaches the group has evolved and diversified its sources of funding. This, in turn, has allowed the organisation to become one of the most technically capable and proficient terrorist groups in the world. With the advancement of technology, will the group continue to innovate its income sources by developing fund-raising schemes using cryptocurrencies? Maybe. Hezbollah has already received some cryptocurrency funding through the Iranian government, and in 2018 it was reported to have used crypto to fund part of its operations. Cryptocurrencies offer anonymity and may be used to diversify even more its portfolio, but because their supply is not flexible and their price can be controlled, terrorist organisations have so far shown reluctance to use them. Moreover, as long as the traditional financing methods are stable and not hampered by CTF efforts, the possibility of financing through cryptocurrency will not increase.