The 30th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide*: the role of transitional justice and humanitarian assistance in the aftermath

Authors: Agostino Bono, Camilla Cormegna, Ilas Touazi, Shams Jouve, Sophie Herzog Sønju - Crime, Terrorism, Extremism Team in collaboration with the Africa Team*

*Resolution 955 (1994) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3453rd meeting, on 8 November 1994. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/198038?ln=es&v=pdf#files

Introduction

April 7, 2024, marks the 30th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, 100 days during which Tutsi and moderate Hutu were murdered by Hutu supported by government authorities. In the aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) faced significant challenges in terms of reconciliation and rebuilding the country, implementing a judicial system based on transitional justice. Transitional justice addresses widespread human rights violations in post-conflict contexts, acknowledging victims, fostering peace, reconciliation, and democracy.

In another ITSS article, the Russia Team discusses the role of transitional justice in post-conflict Ukraine. This article explores the post-genocide Rwanda’s search for justice and reconciliation through the judicial process, arguing that a holistic view of transitional justice is needed and both the objectives of peacemaking and justice, restorative and retributive tools, must be balanced to ensure a sense of sustainable peace. Rwanda also represents a turning point in the post-conflict agenda: as UN peacekeepers failed to prevent the genocide, post-conflict resolution approaches shifted from humanitarian interventions to the responsibility to protect, where the UNSC authorises military intervention in the event of ethnic cleansing and civil war. The transformation of humanitarian intervention approaches is described after presenting a historical overview of the Rwandan genocide. The article then evaluates transitional justice methods, including the ICTR, and local and gacaca courts. Lastly, it compares Rwanda and South Africa's use of traditional methods in the reconciliation process.

The roots of the Rwandan conflict: A historical overview

The Rwandan society has been always divided along ethnic lines between the Tutsi, the Hutu and the Twa. Since the 1800s, backed by the Belgian colonisers, the Tutsi were the dominant ethnic group. The concentration of power in the hands of the Tutsi exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions and led to the 1959 social revolution, which resulted in the abolition of the Tutsi monarchy and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi to neighbouring countries. The post-colonial governments of Gregoire Kayibanda (1960-1973) and Juvénal Habyarimana (1973-1994) discriminated against the Tutsi and were characterised by corruption as well as power struggles within ethnicities. Their domestic policy intensified in October 1990. During that month, the return from Uganda of the Rwandan Patriotic Force (RPF), a contingent of special forces, sparked a civil war with the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) of President Habyarimana who accused the Tutsi of the increasing Hutu’s social grievances and sufferings. Concomitantly, powerful Hutu from the Akuzu tribe, gave logistic and material support as well as training to the anti-Tutsi front.

The Arusha Peace Treaty in June 1992 put an end to two years of belligerence between the RAF and the RPF and established a power-sharing agreement between the parties in conflict. However, the instability continued throughout the country also because of the Hutu’s propaganda against the Tutsi at the national and local levels. Therefore, despite all the efforts, the civil war lasted until 1994 with a final toll of about 10,000 deaths. A significant example of the bilateral aggression took place on 6 April, 1994. Following negotiations with the RPF in Arusha, Tanzania, the aircraft carrying President Habyarimana and Burundian President Ntaryamira was shot down by unknown attackers. Their killings ignited the Rwandan genocide, which was fuelled by the Hutu political elite who accused the RPF of the murders. In their killing spree, they massacred Tutsi as well as moderate Hutu opponents.

The United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda failed to stop the genocide as well as to join efforts with the RPF. This resulted in the unilateral reaction of the RPF which spread throughout the country, finally managing to put an end to the massacre in July 1994. Overall, between 6 April and 19 July 1994, approximately 800,000 ethnic Tutsi, Twa and Hutu were killed for the sake of “cleansing the nation”.

The Rwandan genocide: between humanitarian intervention approach and post-conflict reconstruction (PCR)

The emergence of ethnic, religious, tribal, and civil wars, particularly in Rwanda, reshaped the Security Council's priorities from maintaining international peace to stopping the massacres and ensuring the free distribution of humanitarian aid, then providing armed support for the relief effort and authorising multinational military intervention to stop the genocide and crimes against humanity. However, the UN's post-Cold War activities, particularly in Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then Rwanda, have been characterised by humanitarian operations that are increasingly militarised and described as “military humanitarianism.” While contemporary international law does not grant humanitarian intervention the same exceptional status as the right to self-defence. In this vein, the acceptance of a right to judicial interference was sown with pitfalls precisely by Rwanda, which refused to adopt the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994. Yet, it is a question of interference in the service of peace and justice, constituting a leap from the right to interfere to the doctrine of the responsibility to protect (R2P) and prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

In the post-Cold War globalised world, a “post-conflict reconstruction approach” (PCR) has arisen to prevent systematic human rights violations that offers reparation to victims and strengthens conflict resolution and peacebuilding. In that respect, Rwanda stands as a major case on the emerging post-conflict agenda. Consequently, the change in the nature of humanitarian intervention from traditional approaches to new dimensions was implemented in the Rwandan theatre, which initially focused on the classic peacekeeping operation with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNAMIR, decided by resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993. Faced with the United Nations' inability to manage the Rwandan crisis through its action, described as humanitarian assistance, the French-led “Operation Turquoise”, followed by “Operation Support Hope”, was described as founding a right to interfere. That’s why the “PCR” process in Rwanda to solve genocide issues and trauma has been shaped innovatively to achieve sustainable peace recovery and promote reconciliation due to holistic planned coordination among different policy interventions and stakeholders in the context of security, political governance, socio- economic development, gender, and justice. Meanwhile, PCR was enhanced by mechanisms of coordination in the transition to peace, namely the Rwandan government (GoR), as well as the administration of justice and conflict prevention under a window of sustainable consensus reconstruction among the formal and transitional informal justice systems (IJS).

*Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Darwinek - "Flag-map of Rwanda" - This picture is an excerpt of the original /https://shorturl.at/JXZ34*

ICTR, the local courts and their limitations

The exceptionality of the genocide in Rwanda was the public mass participation, and so the retributive justice process became increasingly difficult. The need to implement an international criminal tribunal became essential for convicting those utmost accountable. The ICTR, or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, was created as of the UN Resolution 955, which stated that its aim was “prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the territory of Rwanda”. In total, 93 people were indicted by the ICTR. Of them were 62 sentenced, 14 were acquitted, 10 were referred to local courts, and the rest either died, escaped, or had their charges withdrawn. The ICTR was historical as it was the first time “an international tribunal delivered verdicts against people responsible for committing genocide”, with their sentences ranging from 2 years to life imprisonment. Those not indicted by the ICTR were indicted by the national court system. Towards the mid 2010s, around 10000 people were tried in relation to the genocide, potentially facing the death penalty. The difference in punishment, as well as the varying judicial process, came to be a large problem for the reconciliation of the Rwandan state. Although the ICTR was successful in creating some sense of fairness and victor-mentality for the remainder of functional society, the UN resolution and the tribunal itself had clear limitations through their retributive aims. Retributive justice can be defended from a logical perspective as something that can be justified in terms of utility, but not in terms of fairness. From a moral perspective, it can be justified in terms of fairness, but not utility. In Rwanda, the retributive justice process through ICTR convicted those most in charge of the genocide, without determining the morality of the crimes beyond the basis of international law, not addressing the root issue which ultimately caused neighbours to kill their neighbours. There was no need for the convicted in either court to express remorse or wish to reform, and so a retributive justice process did arguably limit the reconciliation process of the state after the genocide.

Gacaca courts: balancing accountability and reconciliation

To provide alternative solutions for dealing with the perpetrators of the genocide while promoting peace, in 2002 the Rwandan government established the gacaca courts, which combined elements of retributive and restorative justice. In 2012, gacaca came to an end, having tried more than 1.9 million suspects, involving over 170,000 judges. Gacaca were customary local courts traditionally led by elders and public figures to solve local disputes. The new gacaca retained some characteristics of the original model but now judges had the power of sentencing while the existence of a forum of community members allowed victims to voice their suffering. Significant value was also placed on the acknowledgement of guilt, shame and regret by the accused: the offender’s confession about the atrocities committed would reduce sentences in favour of community service. According to Pugh and Rwanda’s leaders, community involvement to address crimes and truth-telling succeeded in achieving accountability more efficiently compared to state-controlled mechanisms while fostering reconciliation. Not only did many perpetrators appear remorseful and apologised to their victims by giving them truth and closure about a tough past, but since gacaca was rooted in tradition, the Rwandan society managed to reclaim a cultural heritage nearly lost during colonisation. In turn, gacaca helped the healing of a country torn apart by an ethnopolitical conflict by reintegrating citizens not as Hutu or Tutsi but as Rwandan nationals.

However, numerous criticisms have been levelled against the gacaca system. Apart from a lack of due process, one of the key issues revolved around the legitimacy of judges. Many people elected as judges were later recognised as having taken part in the genocide, compromising their integrity and accountability, ultimately undermining the justice system. Thomson also contends that gacaca courts were a state-driven legal system devised to exert control by collectively assigning guilt to the Hutu population, categorising them as perpetrators, while politicising the victimhood of the Tutsi community. The RPF leadership failed to prosecute Tutsi forces who committed atrocities against Hutus, de facto failing to deliver true justice. Overall, notwithstanding these criticisms, gacaca proved to be an important restorative tool in the reconciliation process, highlighting the importance of a holistic approach to transitional justice that incorporates both retributive and restorative measures.

Assessing cultural tools for reconciliation in Rwanda and South Africa

We observe a particularly efficient use of holistic, home-based approaches to post-conflict reconstruction in Africa from 1995. Rwanda and South Africa have both succeeded in introducing solutions grounded on traditional mechanisms for reconciliation.

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established to investigate human rights violations usually perpetrated by state institutions and the military during the apartheid. Similarly to Rwandan solutions, it aimed at strengthening peace by reestablishing trust within the South African society, while avoiding direct violence and rebuilding the country. This last point differs from Rwanda’s clear need for individual justice, each country adopted different forms of transitional justice mechanisms. The TRC emphasised on rebuilding the country politically, while Rwanda’s Gacaca courts favoured the settlement of revenge needs within the society.

Considered the ‘largest experiment in popular justice in modern history’ as well as a ‘unique [model] among judicial structures around the world’, the Gacaca allowed for faster trials and certainly eased ethnic tensions after the genocide by putting the society at the heart of reconciliation. Culturally adapted programmes focused on inclusiveness and dignity, therefore restoring a national identity. Levels of political reconciliation reached 90%, demonstrating the clear success of traditional tools for reconstructing Rwanda. In South Africa, the TRC received similar positive outcomes and particularly contributed to acknowledging abuses suffered by the victims.

However, cultural resources are not magical tools for reconciliation. Indeed, John Lederach evaluates the success of reconciliation through four constitutive elements: peace, truth, justice, and mercy. According to this model, ‘South Africa emphasised truth and mercy at the expense of justice, whereas Rwanda emphasised justice at the expense of mercy’.

The main issue raised by the gacaca courts being traditional tools is their disrespect of international legal standards. They failed to provide gender-sensitive justice or efficient reintegration means, and could definitely not accelerate the process of restitution and compensation of properties, nor erase the genocide’s psychological and physical damages.

In South Africa, the TRC was in charge of the problematic mission of ‘establishing truth’, forsaking individual reconciliation and focusing on political and national needs. The Commission did not address the many inequalities suffered by the black community following the apartheid, including increased levels of poverty, and therefore did not answer the population’s need for the whites to take responsibility and pay reparation.

Conclusion

It is clear that the tragedy of the genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda in the 1990s marked the post-Cold War period, reflecting the reality of a country strongly characterized by political violence and community and ethnic tensions. But amid of this indelible trauma, the vital role of transitional justice and informal justice systems, with the dual involvement of local justice (Gacaca), and national and international courts (ICTR), emerged as a solution to this endemic crisis. However, this was reinforced by post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) approaches in response to genocide and crimes against humanity, but it also played a pivotal role in the peacebuilding architecture and conflict prevention management. Thus, the main lessons drawn from the Rwandan experience are essentially linked to respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law, which must be at the centre of local government priorities, and post-modern internationalism above political divisions and double standards at the international level, while today there are various situations, particularly in Ukraine, where populations face risks of crimes under the responsibility to protect (R2P).

March 25, 2024 — No Comments

Africa’s Critical Minerals: Shaping the Future of the Energy Transition

Authors: Dan Ziebarth, Ingrid Heggstad, Miguel Jiménez Admetlla, Michele Mignogna - Political Economy, development & Energy Security Team

Introduction

The need for critical minerals to achieve the energy transition cannot be stressed enough. According to the International Energy Agency, demand for these minerals will increase by a factor of four to sixfold. Just as with many other trends that begin to unfold, Africa holds the key since it sits on a vast supply of these resources. Yet, the way the continent approaches this matter could determine whether its history is rewritten or if there is a perpetuation of an uneven distribution of resource gains.

Several key indicators highlight Africa's importance in this context. More than half of African countries possess green minerals essential for the energy transition. Notably, the Democratic Republic of Congo boasts half of the world's cobalt reserves, crucial for batteries and electric vehicles. To fully leverage these resources, Africa must integrate its supply chain processes, capitalizing on value addition at every stage, from extraction to transportation.

Balancing a Just Transition for Africa: Challenges and Imperatives

Mineral supply chains typically involve four stages, which can broadly be divided into extraction, refining, production, and recycling. Currently, the vast majority of African countries export critical minerals in their primary form, trapping the continent in a cycle known as the primary commodity trap.

Accordingly, Africa perceives a tiny percentage of the overall benefits, with forecasts suggesting that this situation is unlikely to improve shortly. Out of the projected $8.8 trillion market value of global batteries and the supply chain of EVs, only $55 billion is expected to flow to Africa. Thus, there is an urgent need for substantial reforms. However, this goal conflicts with the interests of countries aspiring to lead in renewable energy transitions. Indeed, to maintain sustainable growth without compromising inputs, these nations are eyeing the continent’s supply of rare earths.

While ensuring that necessary minerals reach global markets is crucial for meeting climate agreements, the pioneers in energy transition such as the EU, the US and China ought to design climate policies which hold high standards. At the same time, even though some sort of protectionism has been put in place in the continent, this may be rather ineffective if ownership along the supply chain remains foreign. If the opposite occurs, it could turn out to be a Berlin Conference of the 21st century.

Co-opetition for Resources in Africa: The EU & China

Thus far, the EU has adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRM Act) which sets ambitious targets for mineral processing, emphasizing reduced reliance on third countries. Precisely, it establishes targets for critical raw materials of meeting 10% of annual needs mined materials, 15% recycled materials, and 40% of materials processed in Europe by 2030 for minerals, while simultaneously not relying on a single third country for more than 65% for any material. Remarkably, two major roadblocks should be noted for the EU to achieve these targets.

The first involves intensifying global competition for resources in Africa, particularly about China. As the green transition progresses, states are increasingly reliant on critical minerals from Africa, fueling competition for influence over these strategic resources. Aware of the risks associated with overreliance on a single supply chain, African countries have strategically prioritised diversifying their mineral partnerships. This strategic recalibration has added another layer of complexity to the geopolitical landscape, as access to the supply chains of critical minerals becomes yet another arena for the intricate dynamics of great power rivalry to unfold.

International competition for access to critical minerals navigates through alliances and rivalry alike. Geopolitical manoeuvring by influential players such as the US, China, and the EU is intricately tied to securing and managing critical minerals' supply chains. China possesses a dominant position in producing and refining African critical minerals, giving it significant influence over supply chain dynamics and sparking concern among other key stakeholders such as the EU and the US. This influence is evident in regions like the Horn of Africa, where the evolving engagement of China and the EU reveals intersecting interests and potential for both competition and collaboration.

While China's growing economic presence in the region, driven by access to critical minerals and infrastructural projects, contrasts with the EU's emphasis on security initiatives and governance reforms, Chinese involvement has nonetheless produced benefits for infrastructural and economic development. Additionally, their security operations, including peacekeeping and anti-piracy efforts, have contributed to increased regional stability. These positive outcomes challenge prevalent negative narratives in the West regarding China's involvement in the region, offering the potential for cooperative influence and increased opportunity for strengthened stability in the region. Although it would require thorough preparation and collaborative endeavours, Chinese and European involvement in the Horn of Africa holds the potential for a mutually beneficial outcome.

Additionally, a second major consideration regarding the CRM Act is ensuring that local communities in Africa are safeguarded, while also supplying enough critical minerals to achieve targets. A common concern locally is that extractive industries, such as mining, will place several negative consequences on the environmental and social conditions in mining communities in Africa. To ensure a just transition, the mineral supply chain process must provide sufficient protection for mining communities in Africa to not harm or exploit them over the long term. Within this geopolitical context, African countries emerge not solely as suppliers of the critical minerals for the green transition but also as significant influencers in shaping global power dynamics.

As these countries strive to break free from the primary commodity trap, their choices concerning trade agreements, alliances, policies for resource extraction, and infrastructure expansion resonate throughout the entire supply chain. African countries’ involvement introduces a new dimension to international competition, where countries and blocs vie not only for access to critical minerals but also for influence over their strategic decisions.

Africa's mineral wealth forms an essential bedrock for industries worldwide, as the supply chain of strategic minerals extends across multiple facets in the development towards sustainable solutions. Therefore, countries depend on a consistent and unbroken supply of these minerals, wherein the evolution and dynamics of this supply chain can send shockwaves throughout the global economy and geopolitical landscape.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the continent, and the whole world, stands at a crossroads. The approach to African resource management will determine whether it can break free from historical patterns of exploitation. The goal, as stated in the African Green Minerals Development Strategy Approach Paper, is to guide Africa to strategically exploit the continent’s green mineral resources for industrialisation and to assert control over its destiny to create an African presence in emerging green technologies. A shift towards integrated supply chain management, sustainable extraction practices, and prioritisation of local community welfare is imperative to harness the full benefits of Africa's mineral wealth while mitigating adverse consequences.

In this context, international cooperation and strategic partnerships are essential to navigate the complexities of the evolving geopolitical landscape surrounding critical minerals and to ensure that the global shift to clean technologies does not come to the detriment of African communities.

Long story short, Africa's pivotal role in the global supply chain of critical minerals underscores the continent's potential to shape the trajectory of the energy transition and influence global power dynamics. By making informed choices and fostering cooperation, African countries can not only unlock economic opportunities but also play a significant role in shaping a more equitable and sustainable global future.

However, this potential comes with significant challenges and considerations.

March 18, 2024 — No Comments

Japan’s OSA: Balancing Security and Stability in the Indo-Pacific

*Authors: Southeast Asia and Oceania Team

Introduction

Amid escalating tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, exacerbated by assertive Chinese actions, in April 2023, Japan declared a new cooperation framework—Official Security Aid (OSA). Positioned as a strategic departure from its longstanding Official Development Aid (ODA) framework, the OSA marks Japan's commitment to strengthening the armed forces of like-minded nations. This move reflects Japan's response to the evolving security landscape, characterized by Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS) and other geopolitical challenges.

From ODA to OSA

For decades, Japan stood as a bastion of ODA, considered as the main reliable partner for Southeast Asian nations. Its aid is granted under a request-based system and reflects a commitment to regional stability via non-military means.In the postwar era, Japan utilized development cooperation to establish relations with neighboring countries and subsequently to support the expansion of Japanese businesses in Asia. It played a role in the transition from socialist regimes and, amid China's rise, contributed to the development of legal systems and the consolidation of democracies.

The OSA, however, underscores Japan's proactive stance in gaining a more dominant role in the region, marking its first attempt in the postwar era, in which this country seeks to directly enhance the capabilities of foreign military forces. Under the OSA, Japan aims to provide not only equipment and supplies, but also support for infrastructure development to the military forces of like-minded countries, thereby bolstering their security capabilities.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's 2022 Shangri-La Dialogue address marked a pivotal moment in this new approach, with an announcement on doubling Japan's defense spending, and on the necessity in a departure from Japan's traditional post-war foreign policy, primarily centered on economic contributions. Japan's move towards OSA fits with its long-standing role as a vital ally for Southeast Asia in maritime security, especially during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's leadership.

The realization of OSA materialized around the Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) 50th anniversary, culminating in a Joint Vision Statement and an implementation plan which emphasized maritime security cooperation. Subsequently, Japan extended its security assistance totaling $13 million to Bangladesh, Fiji, Malaysia, and the Philippines, demonstrating a commitment to fostering stability beyond its borders.

Furthermore, Japan’s International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is set to play a pivotal role in providing maritime security support to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. JICA's plan encompasses capacity-building initiatives and the provision of patrol boats, radar systems, and drones. This comprehensive support seeks to address the security needs of nations grappling with regional power dynamics. This move signifies Japan’s intent to forge a broader international coalition, marking a strategic shift in its diplomatic and security engagements.

Strategic Gains

Amid the delicate balancing acts between superpowers, the OSA offers Southeast Asian claimant states an appealing prospect. With territorial disputes and threats from China in the SCS, Japan’s commitment to enhancing defense capabilities might seem to aim to deter Chinese assertiveness .

In this context, and following the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit, Japan has elevated relations with Vietnamand Malaysia to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and a Security Assistance agreement, including maritime equipment provision, was signed with Malaysia. Additionally, although not a claimant state, Japan plans to build a patrol vessel for the Indonesian Coast Guard. Moreover, coastal surveillance radars will be granted to the Philippines, with discussions on reciprocal troop access and joint military exercises. Japan and the Philippines are also working towards a trilateral alliance involving the US. As Japan has its own territorial dispute with China over its southern islands, the OSA aligns with its ambitions to ensure a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and secure regional supply chain resilience.

*Source: AkinoriMatsui "World flags" - https://en.photoac.com/photo/3989789*

Japan also might envision the OSA as a means to reduce Southeast Asian countries' dependence on China. As the Belt and Road Initiative remains a significant diplomatic tool, the OSA introduces new areas of cooperation. For Bangladesh, for instance, which heavily relies on Chinese weaponry (70%), the OSA offers an opportunity to diversify suppliers and mitigate risks associated with the quality of Chinese-made military equipment.

Balancing security and stability

In his address at the Hiroshima G7 Summit in 2023, PM Kishida emphasized the potential parallels between the current situation in Ukraine and future challenges in East Asia. Observing global instability stemming from the Ukraine war, the rise of China, US-China tensions, and the Israel-Hamas War, Japan’s proactive foreign policy aims to foster deterrence and regional security. This change signifies a departure from its conventional stance of following US priorities by shifting towards a Japan-led multilateral security collaboration. It should be asked whether this securitization led to more, or less stability in the region.

While Japan's emphasis on maritime security and support to like-minded Indo-Pacific countries aligns with countering China's assertiveness, extending OSA to the military capabilities of developing countries introduces complexities.

The potential reactions from ASEAN nations, particularly considering their neutrality and non-alignment strive, could lead to heightened tensions and disrupt the delicate balance in the ongoing superpower competition . Moreover, concerns over an arms race in the region emerge; due to ASEAN countries' diverse capabilities and stances in the superpower competition, providing security assistance to certain members might increase tension in the region and undermine the current multilateral system.

The pursuit of a competitive armament approach, rather than creating a secure environment, may contribute to heightened tension, prompting a more assertive Chinese stance and a Chinese armament of its allies in the region. Furthermore, given China’s extensive arms sales to the region, and its lenient restrictions on arms exports, it is essential to question whether Japan's OSA will genuinely serve as an effective countermeasure to China.

Conclusion

Japan's adoption of OSA signifies a proactive response to regional challenges posed by assertive Chinese actions. While enhancing defense capabilities for like-minded developing countries brings strategic gains, potential reactions from ASEAN, fears of an arms race, divisions, and China's extensive influence, warrant cautious consideration. As Japan assumes a broader international role, the delicate balance between security and stability in the Indo-Pacific calls for careful navigation and strategic planning to mitigate potential negative repercussions of such security related initiatives.

*Views expressed in the article belong to the author and do not represent any organization or its affiliates.

March 11, 2024 — No Comments

Beijing and Washington try to talk to each other about AI

Author: Francesco Cirillo - U.S. Team

The sudden emergence of applications related to artificial intelligence, which combine different fields of work, is at the centre of international agendas and governments. The issue of the possible risks of AI has focused the debate on the need to find common ground, especially between China and the United States, the two major global economic powers and key players in AI research and development, both in the public and private Big Tech sectors, both in the US and in China.

In recent months, following the San Francisco Summit in November 2023, where a very important bilateral meeting between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping took place, China and the US have started to engage in a dialogue to create global governance on AI. For several experts, Sino-American cooperation is crucial to avoid a political-military race in the AI sector, as was also said by Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI. From Beijing's perspective, the issue remains a priority due to the delicate diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing. Between December 2023 and January 2024, two Chinese academics wrote two papers attempting to define the new China-US relationship from Beijing's perspective.

Da Wei, a professor at Tsinghua University, highlights four key concepts needed to analyse the new 'normal' in Sino-US relations after the San Francisco summit. The paper points out that relations will remain predominantly negative in the long term, but analyses the condition that neither power wants a direct confrontation on the economic level. From the point of view of Chinese academics, there seems to be the idea that both China and the US must find the need to coexist, especially to consolidate dialogue on issues of artificial intelligence.

Here too, Chinese academics and experts reiterate the need for high-level dialogue to build global governance on AI.

Even the world of independent academic research is moving to protect the impartiality of scientific research on AI.

On 5 March, a team of MIT experts published a letter, "A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming," calling on tech companies involved in generative AI research to implement independent evaluation systems for AI-related risks. The letter, signed by several experts, refers to the confidentiality and corporate security issues that many Big Techs, most notably OpenAI, have within their R&D teams, preventing an unbiased assessment of the risks associated with the sudden development of AI, accelerated from December 2022.

Artificial Intelligence issues have entered the international debate because of their potential in various sectors, but also because of the competition/cooperation that both China and the United States will have to face in the coming years on issues related to the integration of AI systems in the economic, political and military spheres.

International competition and the race to dominate AI could change the current status of global governance, but it would not change the game and the competition between the great powers, since technological innovation has always played a key role in the global hegemony of the superpower that would gain a strategic advantage over all the other great global powers.

March 6, 2024 — No Comments

The Houthis and Iran: A Complex Nexus Threatening Regional Stability

Authors: Will Kingston-Cox, Ilaria Lorusso, Margherita Ceserani, Shahin Modarres - Iran Team

The Russo-Iranian strategic military cooperation in the Red Sea unfolds against the backdrop of a multifaceted and changing geopolitical scenario. The evolving situation in the area prompts a reevaluation of the Russo-Iranian partnership, drawing parallels with their collaboration in Ukraine. While historical dynamics may inform the alliance, the Red Sea theater introduces a maritime dimension, reflecting an adaptive strategy. The interstate treaty between Tehran and Moscow further solidifies their alliance, positioning Iran strategically alongside Russia and China, as geopolitical alignments shift post-Russia's invasion of Ukraine¹.

As Iran rejects US’s accusation of its support to the Houthis’ attacks, in turn linked to the conflict unfolding in the Gaza Strip, the complexities in the Red Sea underscore the delicate nature of their partnership and the need for a nuanced analysis considering historical context and evolving geopolitical dynamics. In this context, this article will attempt at providing such a summary of the Russo-Iranian partnership so far, and what prospect for the latter the new scenario in the Red Sea holds².

On 17 January 2024, Maria Zakharova, the Kremlin’s spokeswoman, announced that Russia and Iran will sign a new comprehensive interstate cooperation agreement imminently³. This treaty, a furtherance of the Russo-Iranian strategic partnership already evident in Ukraine and before, will serve to consolidate this strategic partnership and entrench it both politically and legally. The signing, as told by Zakharova, has been expedited by the changing international context, a reference perhaps to the global discord resultant from conflicts in Ukraine and, pertinently, the Red Sea region. Such a contention is affirmed by prior comments from the Kremlin in November 2023, in which it was announced that significant work in deepening and developing “military-technical cooperation” was under way⁴.

It is important to emphasise the importance of such an agreement’s final draft being catalysed by events in the Red Sea, pertinently those relating to the Yemeni Houthis and the Red Sea shipping route. British and American strikes, described as “defensive” by NATO, on Yemeni Houthis on 11th January were condemned by Moscow, with Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov denouncing them as “illegitimate” and that the Western coalition were seeking to manipulate the international legal order. Tehran’s stance, too, was resolute. Nasser Kanaani, the spokesperson for the Iranian foreign ministry, derided the coalition strikes as “arbitrary” and “[in clear breach of Yemeni’s] sovereignty and territorial integrity…against international law.”

The level to which Iran involves itself, be it politically, diplomatically, or militarily, will undoubtedly concern the actions of policymakers in Moscow. The degree to which the Russo-Iranian politically-military strategic partnership will be seen in the Red Sea will depend on the extent to which the current Houthi conflict embroils Tehran.

Since the 1979 revolution, the Houthis have been intricately tied to the Islamic Republic of Iran, functioning as one of its proxy groups. This relationship unfolds against the backdrop of international sanctions, shaping Iran's defense strategy. Unable to engage in research development or scientific collaboration in defense due to sanctions, Iran has devised a defense doctrine grounded in two key pillars: proxy groups and a ballistic program.

The first pillar, involving proxy groups, has seen Iran establish and support various entities across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Israel, and neighboring countries. The primary objective seems to be destabilizing regional and international security, and strategically deploying conflicts as leverage during negotiations.

The turning point emerged after the October 7th attack, prompting the Islamic Republic to perceive a threat to what it terms the "axis of resistance." In response to diminishing Hamas influence within the Gaza Strip and an effort to alleviate pressure on the group, Iran allegedly directed the Houthis in Yemen to escalate security destabilisation in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait region.

*Source: An armed Yemeni sits on a boat in front of the Galaxy Leader cargo ship* - *EPA/via BBC News* *- Keystone archivio*

Backed and provided by Iran, the Houthis pose a multifaceted threat against maritime security and Israel in the region. The first dimension involves the use of missiles sourced from Iran, followed by the deployment of drones also supplied by the Islamic Republic. Lastly, the Houthis reportedly possess and have been strategically placing sea mines since 2021 in the Red Sea, adding another layer of complexity to the threat.

Considering that a substantial 12% of international trade traverses the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the ongoing situation becomes increasingly untenable⁵. The intersection of geopolitical interests, proxy dynamics, and strategic maneuvers underscores the urgent need for international attention and diplomatic resolution to avert potential catastrophe in this crucial maritime passage.

While the Houthis, threaten commercial shipping in the Red Sea, oil has so far continued flowing. According to one Houthis political leader, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, maritime routes around Yemen are safe for Chinese and Russian vessels, as long as they are not associated with Israel. Moscow, while publicly indicating support for Washington's efforts to maintain order in the Red Sea, has only a small amount of its trade passing through the Suez Canal. Moreover, Russian officials suggest that the Red Sea crisis could potentially redirect shipping to the Northern Sea Route or the North-South Transport Corridor via Iran to the Indian Ocean.

All in all, the renewed Russo-Iranian strategic partnership, in the Middle East space on this occasion, represents an adaptive response to the changing geopolitical landscape. The intricacies of the Red Sea, added to the Iranian grip on the Houthis, brings another dimension to the relationship between the two states. In this article, we have demonstrated how the partnership's strategic implications and the evolving nature of conflicts in the region underscore the need for a multilevel approach while addressing today’s complexities and potential risks in the Red Sea.

https://www.itssverona.it/what-is-the-future-of-russo-iranian-military-relations ↩︎
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/07/us/politics/iran-us-israel-conflict.html;
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/23/us-accuses-iran-of-being-deeply-involved-in-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea
https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/walking-a-tightrope-what-is-irans-current-strategy-161592 ↩︎
https://www.reuters.com/world/putin-irans-raisi-sign-new-interstate-treaty-soon-russia-2024-01-17/ ↩︎
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/11/22/ukraine-claims-downing-barrage-from-russia-rare-iranian-made-drone ↩︎
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20240119-red-sea-crisis-how-global-shipping-is-being-rerouted-out-of-danger ↩︎

March 4, 2024 — No Comments

The current war in Sudan as an aftermath of inaction for the Human Crisis in Darfur

Author: Esther Brito - Human Security Team

Darfur is once again experiencing a terrible crisis that, according to many international experts and organisations, has all the characteristics to be considered as genocide - or perhaps, it has always been.

The country of Sudan has faced multiple severe episodes of war and what can be classified as genocide in its recent history; including the First Sudanese Civil War (1955 to 1972), the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983 to 2005), the 1990’s genocide in the Nuba Mountains, and the 2000’s escalation risk of genocide in Darfur – which has, arguably, seen a continuation at a lower intensity over the last two decades. More recently, in April 2023, violence erupted in the capital, Khartoum, and soon expanded throughout the country as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) clashed with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group.

The current escalation of violence can be directly traced to the impacts of the Second Sudanese Civil War and the subsequent non-resolution of the Darfur genocide. During the second civil war, while the central government in Khartoum was engaged in armed conflict with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – a clash which would give way to the creation of the world’s newest state – a combined breakdown of fundamental aspects of human security and the cumulative displeasure with structural inequality would precipitate the war in Darfur. Mainly, the onset of violence in Darfur was triggered by: 1) disputes regarding land and resource use that became identified with ethnicity, further exacerbated by climate change; 2) perceptions of unequal political power and preferential access, and 3) the uncertainties driven by the nation’s ongoing civil war.

The Genocide in Darfur

As noted, the social cleavages affecting the conflict in Darfur are related to a complex opposition based on decaying access to vital resources and unequal power representation in the state. Indeed, tensions rose in tandem with national policies seen as supporting Arab dominance in the region, at the cost of agency and representation for black Africans. With the presence of Chadian rebels in Darfur throughout the 1970s and 1980s facilitating access to weapons for both local Arab and African groups, and the embracing of these rebels of Arab supremacist ideology, perceptions of mutual risk increased progressively. This social suspicion was both often the result of and reinforced by local resource competition and tensions derived from scarcity. In fact, Darfur has been referred to as the “first climate change conflict”.

These points of contention exploded in 2003, when two Darfuri rebel groups – the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – accused the central government of the marginalization and dispossession of non-Arab groups in Darfur; launching an attack against a government post in the region. Contending with the threat of a massive territorial secession in the South and fearing similar claims in the West, the Sudanese government funded and armed Arab local militia groups, known as the Janjaweed, as proxy forces to push back against the rebels and deter any further social support through the targeting of African groups in mass atrocities – including mass killings, torture, sexual violence, and mass displacement – as part of a scorched earth campaign. Estimates suggest that between 140,000 and 400,000 people were killed as a result. This instance would lead the International Criminal Court to sign an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir in 2009 for crimes including genocide – a controversial response at the time as the first indictment of a sitting president.

Past the genocide’s peak, the dynamics and actors built up during the initial war in Darfur have served to drive significant political developments in Sudan – such as the 2019 coup that deposed al-Bashir, the 2021 coup that ended civilian governance, and notably the renewed violence in 2023. This situates both the 2003 and 2023 conflicts as inherently interrelated, demanding aligned analysis and responses.

Source: *Wikimedia Commons* - *https://www.securityoutlines.cz/wp-content/uploads/cHJpdmF0ZS9sci9pbWFnZXMvd2Vic2l0ZS8yMDIyLTA0L2ZsODA0OTk3MTUxNi1pbWFnZS1rcHFvaDZuby5qcGc.jpg-1.webp*

The role of non-resolution and what might follow

While the intensity of the violence in Darfur lessened under international pressure in 2005 and with the entry of UNMIS until 2011, the genocide did not truly end – with continued forms of both direct and structural targeting, and the maintenance of a situation of ethnically defined mass displacement for two decades. This semi-permanent mass displacement not only endures today, but has continued to worsen as a result of the recent escalation.

It is the lack of comprehensive accountability for the genocide, as well as the non-transformation of power structures and drivers of conflict, that has led directly into the current war. In fact, the RSF formally emerged in 2013 from the consolidation and reorganization of Janjaweed militias, for the purpose of more effectively continuing repression operations and mass violence in Darfur. The 2023 eruption of violence in the capital was triggered due to disagreements between the SAF and the RSF, which had priorly been aligned in their operations in Darfur, and further orchestrated both the 2019 and 2021 coups. As such, the actors, power relationships, and immunity that defined the genocide in Darfur have become the core triggers of the current war, which has not only affected the capital and its surrounding areas, but heightened the intensity of genocide in Darfur as well.

At the moment, a number of potential scenarios can lead to the further escalation of the Sudanese conflict. Among them, perhaps the most prominent are the following: 1) the entry of international backers into the conflict, either directly or indirectly; 2) the establishment of only partial negotiations with a focus on Khartoum – thus excluding Darfur –; and 3) the further regression of international aid and attention, favoring further atrocities or another iteration of unresolved stalemates – which leave those displaced in a state of extreme vulnerability, enabling further cycles of communal violence. Given that Sudan shares borders with South Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the potential for spillover risks exacerbating or even precipitating a number of regional conflicts cannot be overstated.

However, there are also windows of opportunity for conflict mitigation. The death of RSF leader Mohamad Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo could lead to an organizational breakdown within the group, making it more likely to put down its weapons in favor of amnesty and a renewed integration process into the SAF. Another possible avenue can come from the involvement of regional institutions, such as the African Union (AU). While AU engagement has not traditionally been well received by the government of Sudan, there is a potential for entry in helping to manage the growing refugee crisis that can then be expanded into a role in negotiation and DDR across the country. This is of course dependent on a significant level of international aid and institutional commitment from the AU, as well as a change in positioning from the SAF, which would need to be motivated by the inability of the government to navigate the mass displacement that has followed the violence both nationally and in Darfur. Given that this latest episode has led 3.8 million people to flee, with around 7.1 million people now being internally displaced, this may be a necessary concession from the SAF – particularly as humanitarian needs continue to rise exponentially, with 24.7 million people currently in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and protection. However, this will not be an easy endeavor, as there has been a cessation of relief operations in parts of the country – including areas in West Darfur – as a result of targeted attacks on humanitarian aid workers and property.

The cost of avoidance

The current conflict in Sudan is a result in great part of the lack of attention and resolution afforded to the war and genocide in Darfur. The RSF is a direct consequence of the Janjaweed’s impunity, and as the situation deteriorates, we are at risk of once again seeing the international community settle for only a cosmetic resolution of the hostilities in Khartoum and a continuation of the attritional genocide in Darfur. The genocide convention explicitly notes that in the absence of prevention and prosecution of genocidal violence, further war will follow. What we see in Sudan is the physical manifestation of that warning; where international response waned as atrocities became more low-intensity and institutionalized in nature, failing to address the continued targeting of Darfuri civilians and the parallel strengthening of the RSF into what it is now. Currently, as atrocities increase in intensity again – to a scale comparable to the beginnings of the last-high intensity campaign in Darfur – it is important that patterns of conflict resolution follow a different trajectory.

The views and opinions expressed are exclusively those of the author or authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the association.

March 1, 2024 — No Comments

Turbulent Waters: Assessing the Red Sea Crisis

Authors: Idriss El Alaoui Talibi and Michele Mignona (Edited by Iris Raith) - Defense & Procurement Team

Introduction

Since October 2023, tensions in the Red Sea have reached unprecedented levels, largely due to a series of aggressive manoeuvres by Houthi forces stationed in Yemen. These actions have included multiple drone and missile assaults targeting both Israeli territories and various vessels—both commercial and military—operating in the region. The Houthi attacks are interpreted as direct responses to Israel's military campaign in Gaza.

To address the escalating threat, the U.S. began Operation Prosperity Guardian in December, a multinational military initiative aimed at safeguarding the Red Sea against further Houthi incursions. Subsequently, beginning on January 12, the U.S. and UK have jointly executed targeted strikes against Houthi installations within Yemen in the aftermath of the beginning of Operation Poseidon Archer. This consists of a coalition of states willing to conduct offensive operations in the region to deteriorate Houti’s military infrastructure.

Both President Biden and Prime Minister Sunak emphasized that the military strikes were a direct response to the attacks on ships in the Red Sea, which endangered trade and threatened freedom of navigation. This is especially pertinent given that approximately 15% of global seaborne trade typically passes through the Suez Canal. Consequently, this shift is causing substantial global economic losses.

Who are the Houthis?

The Houthis are an armed political and religious group supporting Yemen's Shia Muslim minority. Aligned with Iran's "axis of resistance", they emerged in the 1990s under Hussein al-Houthi's leadership, now led by his brother Abdul Malik. Since 2000, they have battled the Yemeni government for autonomy in northern Yemen, expanding influence during the 2011 Arab Revolt. By 2016, they had seized significant territories in Yemen’s West.

Concerned about potential Houthi-Iran alignment, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition to intervene but has been unable to dislodge Houthi control despite years of airstrikes and battles. Although Iran denies supplying the Houthis weapons, instead claiming political support, there is widespread recognition of a tangible Iran-Houthi relationship. In this context, Houthi attacks may pose a greater threat to global security than Gaza's conflict. Indeed, based on pragmatic security and economic calculations, the Houthis' actions could disrupt the delicate regional equilibrium, carrying significant escalation risks despite their relatively small size.

Regional and International Responses

In response to the Houthis’ attacks and their impacts on international trade and freedom of navigation, Operation Prosperity Guardian was launched to safeguard the security of the southern part of the Red Sea. This operation includes over 20 countries, including the UK, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, with Bahrain being the only Arab country in the coalition.

This initiative announced the beginning of a series of attempts, outside of the umbrella of Operation Prosperity Guardian, to repel the Houthis’ attacks, as more than a dozen separate attacks have been conducted, 11 of which have been conducted by the U.S. only. Indeed, since the beginning of the Houthis’ attacks on various vessels, the U.S. has seen its involvement in the region increase with intensified efforts to put a stop to the Houthis’ attacks. A month ago, the U.S. Department of State officially announced the designation of Ansarallah (Houthis) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group. Moreover, both the UK and the EU are expected to launch separate initiatives to counter the Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea.

*Source: Image by Jack Moreh from StockVault*

Economic Implications

As mentioned, these assaults against commercial vessels have caused deep economic losses, as it pushed shipping companies to steer clear of this vital trade route. Thus, shipping vessels are now constrained to change itineraries and take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, situated at the southern tip of Africa. This alternative corridor extends the journey by over 3,500 nautical miles (6,500 km) and nearly two weeks of sailing time for each voyage, thereby substantially inflating shipping expenses.

According to statistics, more than 20,000 vessels navigate the Red Sea yearly. As such, this crisis creates a serious challenge to both international maritime security and international trade. Although the Houthis are said only to be targeting vessels linked to Israeli interests, the risk of security incidents in this vital shipping lane is seriously affecting the carriage of commodities between major world economies, including the oil-exporting countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the European Union, the U.S. and China.

Alongside these countries, India also ranks high among the most affected countries by the ongoing Red Sea crisis. Indeed, India is heavily dependent on the Red Sea route through the Suez Canal for its trade with Europe, North America, North Africa and the Middle East, as these regions represent more than 50% of India’s exports ($217bn), according to CRISIL Ratings. This showcases the extent of this crisis’ implications.

Looking forward

The current Red Sea crisis has highlighted the unequivocal importance of this location for geopolitics. With both commercial and strategic implications, the Houthi’s actions have pushed the international community to cooperate to counter these attacks and safeguard freedom of navigation. While the U.S. was eager to engage a military coalition with the initiation of Operation Prosperity Guardian, the EU also began to step out of its shadow by introducing Operation Aspides, if so, with a delay due to its still reactive strategy. It remains to be seen if and how this crisis will de-escalate in the future, as this will be influenced by the war in Gaza and the destabilization of the region. Nevertheless, next to military cooperation, it will certainly be vital to engage in diplomatic efforts aiming to de-escalate the enduring Yemeni conflict by including all parties involved and affected.

February 8, 2024 — No Comments

African narco-jihadism among al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates: waging a halal war by haram means

Author: Ilas Touazi - Africa Team

Introduction

The interlinkages between international phenomena such as the illicit drug economy, transnational organised crime, conflict, and terrorism have become the absolute reality of globalisation and the complex interdependence that reflects its savage side. The spread of Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their regional affiliates as key predatory actors in global governance through paradoxical guerrilla warfare using theological justifications and political fabrications to promote “narco-jihadism,” exploiting Haram money for a Halal cause, makes Africa the new epicentre of the nexus between organised crime, narcotics, and terrorism's nebulae.

A triptych of terrorism, religion and organized crime: a marriage of carp and rabbit between haram and halal

In Islam, the main source of prohibitions and permissions comes from the Qurʾān. Thus, “Halal” means anything that is permitted or conforms to Islamic law with a set of rules concerning the adherents' principles of life and “Muslim morality.” It includes, among other things, nutritional standards that comply with Sharia law. Conversely, the concept of “haram” refers to matters that are unacceptable or illegal under Islamic law, i.e., all harmful chemical substances (toxins) that are dangerous to human life and health, as well as the consumption of narcotics and drugs are considered prohibited (Haram). While the involvement of al-Qaeda and Daesh in the dirty narcotics business is a heady cocktail under a triangle that combines politics, religion, and jihadist crusades, narcotics and terrorism have no religious hue.

Islamist terrorist groups have justified jihad as halal and part of the acts of “ijtihad” or martyrdom as a necessary religious duty carried out by the “muharribun” against the “kuffar” (infidels), thus constituting a halal and legitimate cause. Although the Qurʾān explicitly forbids the outbreak of war and authorises combat only against real aggressors, jihadist thinking has adapted to political realism, authorising wars of expansion, even using illegitimate means, i.e., Haram. Indeed, with the internationalisation of the jihad, previously focused on the “near enemy,” then towards the “far enemy,” described in the Islamic vision as the “home of war” (dar al-ḥarb), thus making it possible to wage an offensive jihad, using narcotics to spoil Western society with drugs and the ongoing use of mass production and distribution of illicit drugs, intrinsically contrary to Islam, as a pretext to advance religious and ideological objectives and justify the “holy” war against the West.African Jihadist terror-crime nexus spectrum: A cross-trigger-incubator cycle

African Jihadist terror-crime nexus spectrum: A cross-trigger-incubator cycle

“Narco-jihad” is the contradictory and absurd justification of acts of violence in the name of religion, fuelled by the revenues of the illegal drug trade, which consists of spoiling “infidel” Western forces with drugs and consolidating Islamic rule, not by faith but with a well-calculated guerrilla strategy, since the drug economy remains one of the main sources of funding for jihadist-matrix terrorism in Africa. The practice of narco money for jihad dates from the Islamist “mujahideen” groups against the Soviet Union. As for post-modern jihad, the use of cryptocurrencies and bitcoin has overtaken traditional methods of transferring funds as part of “crypto-jihad.” Meanwhile, with globalisation, the end of the Cold War, and the “global war on terror,” the “terrorism-crime continuum” became a growing threat, forming an adaptive alliance to changing circumstances. On others, terrorist and organised crime groups used a dual “modus operandi” nexus, including logistics and material support, and protections under geographical “safe havens” deeply intertwined over “hybrid groups.”

Henceforth, African jihadi narcotics rely on religion, local conflicts, anti-western rhetoric, corruption of government officials, and the general feeling of injustice to gather support. However, the “black hole syndrome,” in which the convergence between terrorist nebulas and transnational organised crime groups is mainly occurring within Sahel’s “ungoverned space,” where a weak or failed state has created conditions ripe for jihadist actors connections, including Niger’s narco-networks to gain economic and political power. In so doing, a complex “glocal jihad” is emerging, linking local, national, regional, transnational, and global levels in a dialectical, blurred, and intertwined process that goes beyond local spatial realities, as applied by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in its strategy of geographical expansion in the Sahel with complex interconnections between smuggling networks and illegal arms and drug trafficking. In this respect, jihadist groups operating in West Africa have maintained their actions and even expanded, opportunistically and pragmatically resorting to various sources of funding, with the smuggling of drugs and narcotics, particularly cocaine and cannabis resin, playing a key role in the entrenchment of “narco-jihadist” activities in the Sahel region. Notably, Al-Mourabitoun and the Gourma Katiba focus on kidnapping for ransom and trafficking in drugs, arms, and transnational criminal activities.

Africa’s narco-jihadism landscape and trends: dual dynamics between hybridization and trans-nationalisation

The African threat landscape has consistently changed, and the narcotics routes are varied, with Guinea-Bissau as a key “narco-state” facilitating the flow of illegal narcotics, with drugs transiting through the Sahara, passing Jihadist zones, North Africa, and then on to Southern Europe. As a result, the east coast of Africa is becoming a hub for the international heroin trade networks and forms an integrated regional criminal economy with its long coastline providing landing sites and safe routes for Afghan heroin destined for markets in Europe and North America. Simultaneously, according to the UNODC World Drug Report 2023, Africa remains a key region for cocaine trafficking, mainly in West Africa, while North Africa is a central axis for the inter-regional smuggling of cannabis resin and cannabis. However, half of the pharmaceutical opioids seized worldwide between 2017 and 2021 were in Africa, largely due to the non-medical use of tramadol. This is why, more recently, tramadol has been a main aspect of “narco-jihadism” under an era of “low-cost terror”, including Captagon, which has become the “drug of Jihad” used initially by Islamic state fighters and militants of narco-terror groups in the Middle East region, also known as the “cocaine of the poor,” “ISIS’s drug,” and then spread through African jihadist operatives as war drugs and money laundering business.

*Credit:* https://greydynamics.com/cocaine-cashew-status-quo-in-africas-first-narco-state/

AfricaIndeed, the 2023 Global Terrorism Index report has heightened the relationship between terrorism and ecological threats under a vicious cycle of progressively greater asymmetrical challenges, mainly clustered in African regions. As such, the 2022 Ecological Threat Report (ETR) identified that most African countries have emerged as “hotspots” affected by climate change, terrorism, conflict, and crime, with the highest risk in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). However, African jihadist groups are moving more towards environmental terrorism, which encompasses not only wildlife crime but also smuggling and all kinds of activities, including the illegal taxation of natural resources, which accounts for 38% of conflict financing, drugs (28%), seizures and looting (26%), and money extorted from kidnappings for ransom (3%).While a study conducted in 2023 by UNODC has demonstrated that illicit financial flows (IFFs), including smuggling of migrants (SOM) and trafficking in persons (TIP), especially women and children, with the involvement of non-state armed groups and terrorist and violent extremist groups (VEGs), have cross-border implications through the west African region with Islamic state local affiliates,.

The African franchises of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: Narco-jihadism, a necessity that allows prohibitions

Some areas of the African continent, have become a new global hotspot for narco-jihadist activities. Local VEGs, claiming inspiration from ideologies espoused by Al-Qaida or Daesh, reflect a “proto-state” version of governance that operates within a wider political economy characterised by “business models” with “Big Man” patron-client organisations or “warlords,” as Mokhtar Belmokhtar's nicknamed “Mister Marlboro,” using cigarette smuggling to finance AQIM and affiliated groups such as Ansar Al-Sharia. However, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin has engaged with illicit economies and tactical use of economic warfare through its involvement in post-modern razzias (or rezzous), which replaced the ancient caravan trade in the Sahel-Saharan belt with a criminal economy based on cannabis resin (hashish), then cocaine. Indeed, the narco-jihadism networks spread across ethnicities and tribes, namely with “black jihad,”exploited by Ansaroul Islam, building alliances with criminal gangs such as Lahmar and Tuareg traffickers and TilemsiArabs. In West Africa, the drug trade has fuelled the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) with illicit trade networks, particularly synthetic opioids, and charges “transit taxes” to narcotics trafficking. However, Al-Shabaab militants have financial or operational links with the pirates. These close ties are referred to as the “sea jihad.” In fact, in December 2023, a new alliance was formed with Somali pirates operating off the coast, receiving 30% of all ransom proceeds.

Certainly, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State African affiliates have used the religious tax known in Islam as zakat as a source of legitimacy and religious authority, imposed on herders in the Sahel with the demand for cattle as payment for zakat, on the one hand in exchange for protection and on the other for financing jihadism. Although zakat in Islam is not explicitly given in exchange for services, it has been usurped by JNIM and the Islamic State-Sahel Province (ISSP) in the name of religion, becoming a coercive measure and a source of illegitimacy under the new guise of “cow jihad.”Meanwhile, Boko Haram has normalised gender-based violence as a strategy of terror with the commodification and militarization of women as sex slaves; this is built around some theological justifications that permit submission to men and the exploitation of women, including forms of slavery or human trafficking for sexual purposes. Whereas Islamic law considers human trafficking, including violence against women and children, drug trafficking, and smuggling, to be crimes of ta'zir.

Conclusions

The process of terrorist groups using religion to promote narcotics causes, particularly in the African continent, has become part of the postmodern jihadist landscape. That’s why counter-terrorism must be based first and foremost on an understanding of the patterns and modes of jihadist thought, as well as on a solid grasp of the intellectual matrices and theological foundations that represent an effective, preventive tool for building resilience in the face of violent extremism and mitigating the factors behind this globalized phenomenon. Hence, education and academic work in favour of the new moderate discourse are constants to expose their shortcomings and contradictions in the form of a soft approach that must accompany hard structural and operational counter-terrorism.

January 29, 2024 — No Comments

Lebanon: a story of crisis upon crisis

Authors: Sonia Martínez Girón (ITSS Executive Director) and Anna Lorenzini (Middle East Team)

(Photo by Christelle Hayek on Unsplash)

_Introduction

Once known for its cultural richness and economic resilience, Lebanon is located in the Eastern Mediterranean Levant region with over five million inhabitants and no Head of State. The complex interplay of economic and political mismanagement, multiple corruption cases, lack of accountability, instability, unrest and poor freedom of expression do not bolster any sociopolitical or economic positive change to thwart the spiralling crises affecting the Lebanese people. Currently, around 80% of Lebanon’s population lives under the poverty threshold.

_Politics

Lebanon has been in a profound economic and political crisis since the banking system collapsed in 2019, damaging the currency, increasing poverty, and paralysing most of the country. Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation in October 2019 triggered a series of unsuccessful attempts to form a new government. The ensuing political vacuum left Lebanon without a coherent leadership to address pressing economic challenges. External factors, including regional conflicts, have further complicated the political situation, hindering the formation of a government capable of steering the country out of crisis.

Lebanon's political landscape, characterised by a delicate sectarian balance, has been a source of strength and weakness. The confessional system, designed to distribute power among various religious communities, has often resulted in political gridlock, impeding effective governance. The parliament extended army commander Joseph Aoun's tenure last December to prevent a leadership vacuum. The army, which was rebuilt during the civil war, is viewed as essential to keep the country stable in the face of emergencies (e.g. an imminent border clash with Israel). Besides, the parliament prolonged the term of Lebanon's Internal Security Chief, a Sunni Muslim. Hence, the absence of a stable government capable of implementing crucial reforms has exacerbated the economic crisis.

Uncertainty in its governance structure persists, with rising vacancies in key governance positions. While Lebanon's economic and institutional crisis weakens its international standing, numerous players remain involved in the Lebanese geopolitical scenario. The prolonged delay in electing a new president and increasing polarisation are not easing this knot. Despite reaching an agreement on maritime borders, tensions persist. In addition to the traditional tensions with Israel, the presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the south of the country has become contentious.

Tensions arose from a UN Security Council resolution in August 2022, allowing UNIFIL to act independently of local authorities, consequently altering the relations between UNIFIL and the Lebanese army. The Group of Five (formed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, Qatar, and the United States) was created to facilitate the resolution of Lebanon's political crisis. Unluckily, in July 2023, the shortfall of results from their second meeting worsened the state of affairs.

_Economy

Lebanon’s fifteen-year-long civil war (1975–90) severely damaged this country’s economy. Due to its heavy dependence on banking and financial services since the conclusion of the civil war in 1990, along with the neglect of the agricultural and industrial sectors, Lebanon heavily relied on imports to fulfil the needs of its citizens. The Lebanese Central Bank subsidised wheat and fuel to make these commodities affordable, leading to significant challenges in the face of mounting public debt, a lack of economic reforms, and an increasing current account deficit.

In the early 2010s, Lebanon's economic issues worsened, and in 2019, widespread protests erupted against economic inequality, corruption, and poor public services, reaching a breaking point. A series of intertwined crises, starting with an economic downturn, followed by the impact of COVID-19, and culminating in the Beirut Port explosion, have severely impacted Lebanon. Besides, after the 2020 Port explosions, the lack of accountability has bolstered poverty in the country. Among these, the economic crisis has had the most substantial negative effect, with the Lebanese currency, the lira, experiencing a drastic depreciation of over 90% against the US dollar on the parallel market.

This configuration has resulted in hyperinflation, soaring prices of essential goods, and a sharp decline in the purchasing power of citizens, contributing to widespread business struggles, surging unemployment, and increased poverty rates. Indeed, the Lebanese currency's value has plummeted by over 95%. With the Central Bank depleting foreign reserves, discontinuing subsidies on crucial imports, and simultaneously witnessing a surge in electricity, water, and gas prices, essential utilities have become a luxury for many. A Human Rights Watch survey from November 2021 to January 2022 revealed that the median household income was only US$122, with 70% of households struggling to meet basic expenses. While the crisis affects the entire population, vulnerable groups such as women, children, migrant workers, refugees, and individuals with disabilities bear a disproportionate burden.

The population sector that appears to be most vulnerable to unemployment includes the migrants from Syria and Palestine, the inhabitants of North Lebanon, the youth and the women. Unemployment numbers have more than doubled since 2019. The unemployment level reached 29.6% in 2022. The Italian government estimated that 27.5% of people would be unemployed in 2023.

The younger generation in Lebanon faces a dilemma, resulting in many choosing to either leave the nation or feel closed in. High rates of youth unemployment and the burden of debts incurred for university education in a system controlled by the corporate sector further discourage young people from envisioning a future within Lebanon. The youth is also experiencing significant challenges in pursuing their education degrees, as the country's universities have raised tuition costs to an unprecedented rate, prompting many students to abandon their studies. Youth unemployment rocketed to 47.8% in 2022. Current data on out-migration could look better for the economy. In a recent survey, 77% of Lebanese youth between 18 and 24 years indicated their wish to leave the country to find better opportunities elsewhere. Even those youngsters with jobs who are paid in dollars report feeling insecure.

*Source: D.Khamissy / UNHCR, 2012 (https://www.flickr.com/photos/eu_echo/7942068204)*

_{Food Insecurity}

Around 2 million people face food insecurity in Lebanon. Alas, the situation is expected to get worse in the upcoming months. According to the IPC predictions, it is expected to reach 2.26 million people by April. Specifically, the refugees are the most affected. Vis-à-vis the nearly thirteen-year conflict in Syria, Lebanon has hosted over 1.5 million refugees, maintaining one of the largest refugee populations. This was the first time that the IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis included Palestine refugees in Lebanon and Palestine refugees from Syria. Currently, many people are dependent on food assistance in Lebanon. While aid keeps flowing into Lebanon, people's needs still escalate due to local and global turbulences.

As we have seen, the food crisis in this country is linked to several other critical topics. It is necessary to talk about the water crisis. Regarding water use in the Middle East, agriculture uses 85 per cent of the total fresh water. The poor water governance and the inefficient irrigation systems augment this country's water shortages. As if this was not enough, water pollution affects the quality of drinking water, agricultural production, and food safety.

Needless to say, water shortages have affected agriculture. Water scarcity resulted in poorer agricultural yields, making it more difficult for farmers to sustain their livelihoods. A recent study discovered that significant rural areas are experiencing decreased production, particularly in coastal locations where citrus fruits and olives are cultivated and at higher elevations where deciduous fruit trees are. Areas depending on irrigation systems in the Beqaa Valley, the country's primary agricultural region, are being harmed by increased groundwater stress and loss of water resources. Farming communities in these areas have already seen severe consequences, such as unreliable household food supply.

The ongoing agricultural crisis is a source of concern. Lebanon's prolonged neglect of the agriculture sector resulted in direct import reliance, which Lebanon still suffers today. Mainly, almost 80% of the food consumed in Lebanon is imported. First, agricultural labour has traditionally been precarious in Lebanon. Second, the high dependence on the agricultural labour of refugees has exacerbated the devaluation of farm workers. Third, more than 20 per cent of heads of households engaged in farming are highly vulnerable. Women farmers, marked by increased poverty, account for 9 per cent of the total farmers.

Over and above that, Lebanon's food resources are squandered due to several drivers. On the one hand, the multiple crises that have affected Lebanon since 2019 have damaged the food security status of its inhabitants. The national and local crises have a direct impact on food security. Referring back to the port incident, grain silos that were stored in the port were turned into rubble during the port blast in 2020, consequently boosting food insecurity in the region.

On the other hand, other global turmoils are impacting food security in Lebanon. To name a paradigmatic example, the Russo-Ukrainian War has added further pressure to the already exhausted Lebanese economy with rising food costs. In fact, 96% of the wheat consumed in Lebanon is imported from Ukraine and Russia. This configuration leads to considerable direct and indirect food price increases. Besides, due to the devaluation of the lira, food prices are currently increasing further. Indeed, food prices have surged by 332% since June 2021. Additionally, the WFP food aid cuts will not help this crisis. Unfortunately, poor water management and corruption add to this list.

So far, there have been several responses to the food crisis. The first is the provision of aid to vulnerable groups. Since 2012, the World Food Programme has assisted Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Actually, 90% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon now find themselves living in conditions of extreme poverty. Since the crisis began in October 2019, food costs have increased 19 times. The Wheat Supply Emergency Response Project was the second response to this food crisis. Lebanon received a USD150 million loan from the World Bank, effectively sustaining wheat subsidies despite a rise in the exchange rate from USD/LBP 15,000 to 30,000 in October 2023. In May 2023, more availability and access to USD, more job possibilities, and a continuous supply of subsidised wheat helped ease access to food and other vital resources.

Additionally, the World Food Programme's Country Strategic Plan for 2023-2025 is a strategic contingency mechanism against financial system shocks. Since the situation has escalated along the Blue Line in the South of Lebanon, 462 Hectares of agricultural land have been burnt, and 300k animals have been killed, aggravating the food insecurity in this area. Furthermore, OCHA’s Humanitarian Country Team has provided water, meals and food parcels, nutritional supplements, cash assistance and health services.

_Conclusion

Lebanon is witnessing an unprecedented crisis, intertwining economic challenges, political instability, and social upheaval. This has led to a severe economic downturn marked by currency depreciation, hyperinflation, and growing unemployment. Vulnerable populations bear a disproportionate burden, while political instability undermines effective governance and exacerbates economic issues. Lebanon's weakened international standing and the recent violence pose additional threats to recovery. Despite initial hopes for 2024, the outlook could be better. Lebanon stands at a critical juncture, requiring collaborative efforts for a sustainable and prosperous future. The increasingly tumultuous political scene that started escalating last Autumn does not contribute to improving the country's economic and food security. Although there was a glimpse of hope last year prompted by the responses to the food crisis, food insecurity persists in Lebanon.

The country's food security status is weak and in danger of worsening over time. Continuous work is needed to combat food insecurity and protect vulnerable groups (e.g. refugees). Violence, political and economic uncertainty, inflation, and discontinuing food aid do not hamper this crisis. These factors indicate that food insecurity will likely worsen in the upcoming months.

January 18, 2024 — No Comments

AI Regulatory Landscape in the US and the EU: Regulating the Unknown – AI, Cybersecurity, Space Group

Author: Oleg Abdurashitov and Caterina Panzetti - AI, Cyber Security & Space Team

Among other things 2023 was a year of AI regulation in the EU, US and well beyond. The fundamental challenge that policymakers face in the case of AI is that, in essence, they are often dealing with the unknowns resulting from the complexity of the technology itself and the break-neck speed of its development and adoption. Given the incessant debate on whether AI poses an existential risk to humanity that needs to be addressed at the earlier stages or if such existential risks are merely a smoke screen to the far more urgent and practical implications of widespread AI deployment on privacy, copyright, human rights, labor market, setting the regulatory priorities appears to be challenging. Analyzing what the regulators in the US and Europe chose to focus on and how they framed AI regulatory doctrine may help to better understand not just their priorities but the differences in respective institutional, political and economic environments and approaches to dealing with the emerging technologies.

United States

Despite the existential threat narrative peddled by the largest industry players, including at the Senate hearings, thePresidential Order Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence seems to be more grounded in the current reality when assessing AI's potential risks. While the act attempts to address several critical security issues - from AI-enabled cyber operations to the threat of WMD (Weapon of Mass Destruction) development - it can nonetheless be viewed as an effort to prepare the American economy and society for the age of AI use across the numerous (if not all) sectors.

The Order’s approach is based on the unique strength of the US economy and governance model that heavily relies on the enormous capacity of the US tech sector, as well as on the diverse environment of the nation’s civil society, where educational institutions, think tanks, and the legal system all play a role in shaping and implementing regulations. Probably, the most critical aspect of the AI regulatory environment is that in the US the recent AI breakthroughs are funded by private capital as opposed to the state budgets like in China^[1] or, largely, the EU^[2]. This, on the one hand, allows the US to retain the competitive edge in the AI race, with the so-called MAGMA^[3] companies bearing a large share of the R&D costs in developing breakthrough commercial AI products. On the other, this puts the US government in a position where the sectoral regulation shall be balanced against the interests of the commercial players and enable, rather than control, the technology development and adoption.

The Order implicitly acknowledges this complex interplay between the commercial interests, the interests of the state, and American society’s demands. Section 2 (Policy and Principles) in particular broadly outlines the many aspects of AI development - from safety to impact on the workforce - that need to be balanced against each other. Again, given the enormity of such a task, the Order is short on specific details - and when such details are given they often leave the question of whether it will be able to address the long-term security implications of AI development open.

For instance, in Section 4 the Order puts the “dual-use foundation models” that may pose “a serious risk to security, national economic security, national public health or safety” under increased regulatory and technical scrutiny. The definition of such a model as the one containing “at least tens of billions of parameters” covers the leading large language models (LLMs) behind ChatGPT and Google Bard, with each having more than 100 billion parameters. The Order’s approach to regulating such powerful models relies largely on industry guidelines (such as the NIST AI Risk Management Framework^[4]) developed in collaboration with the private sector players themselves complemented by a series of government-funded testbeds for risk assessment.

It is important to note, that while the commonly agreed approach to AI model training can be described as “greater is better”, there is evidence that the output of models with a far smaller number of parameters (1.5B to 2.7B) can be somewhat comparable to that of larger models^[5]. Additionally, while larger models are generally controlled by specific entities, the open-source models (such as Meta’s Llama available in packages of 7B, 13B, and 70B parameters^[6]) may be used by a far wider number of actors developing their own powerful models, potentially falling outside the regulatory scrutiny and export control measures.

More so, the Order explicitly focuses on very large models as subject to regulatory restrictions, like “[a] model that was trained using a quantity of computing power greater than 10²⁶ integer or floating-point operations”. That number, for instance, is significantly higher than the rumoured estimates for the most advanced model in the market today - OpenAI’s GPT-4 - which currently stands around 2.15 x 10²⁵ FLOPs (floating point operations)^[7]. If the field will sustain the current pace of innovation, this threshold may well be crossed shortly. However, there is so far little evidence that such models would indeed represent “potential capabilities that could be used in malicious cyber-enabled activity” since malicious cyber operations of today require far less computing power and the “cyber-enabled” definition may simply be too broad to have meaning in regulatory context.

Of course, the proposed control regime for the large ‘dual-use models’ need not necessarily fully address the issue of AI-powered malicious activity as of today. Instead, the Order directs federal agencies to study the best practices and guidelines of the critical infrastructure sectors to manage “AI-specific cybersecurity risks” and “develop tools to evaluate AI capabilities to generate outputs that may represent nuclear, nonproliferation, biological, chemical, critical infrastructure, and energy-security threats or hazards” as well as assess the risks of AI usage in the critical infrastructure and government systems. From this point of view, the Order implicitly acknowledges the fact that AI models are already largely deployed both in the private and public sectors and calls for measures to discover and reduce the risks of such use.

Notably, the US DoD’s Data, Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence Adoption Strategy^[8], released months earlier in June 2023 prioritizes speed of deployment over careful risk assessment that the Presidential Order entails. To the military, the “[AI deployment] risks will be managed not by flawless forecasting, but by continuous deployment powered by campaigns of learning”. More so, the DoD calls for mitigation of policy barriers through consensus building and closer relations with vendors, as well as the AI community at large. Despite the risks of AI deployment being no less profound in the military sector than in civilian affairs, the US Government as a customer may well choose the speed of decision-making - and many other benefits that AI can potentially bring to warfighting - to a more careful and balanced approach.

*Source: https://www.pexels.com/photo/blue-bright-lights-373543/*

EU AI Act

2021 has been marked by a race towards gaining normative authority in the field of Artificial Intelligence-enabled services. The European Union has been leading this chase by engaging in an omni comprehensive risk-oriented approach to AI regulation, providing for a broad regulatory framework to ensure securitization and protection of fundamental rights.

The Commission has indeed proposed a model founded on a decreasing scale of risk-based obligations to which providers will have to adhere to be able to continue conducting their business in the European Union, irrespective of their place of establishment[1]. Regarding the service providers which surpass the threshold of what the legislator has referred to as “high risk”, the AI Act imposes a ban upon them, and thus will not be allowed to distribute their services in the Union, as they are deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to the livelihood and safety of the users of such service. Just a tire under the said forbidden services, the providers which have been labelled as “high risk” will have to comply with the most burdensome obligations. Notably, the proposed regulation will not have any impact on AI systems implemented for military purposes.

The high-risk providers are identified with critical infrastructures which deeply affect the users’ daily lives, and which could potentially implement discriminatory or harmful practices. The non-exhaustive list comprises providers that supply technologies applied for transportation or employment purposes, migration management, administration of justice and law enforcement processes[2]. Providers of such services will be asked to supply, among other requirements, adequate risk assessments, and a high level of robustness and security to make sure that “AI systems are resilient against attempts to alter their use, behaviour, performance or compromise their security properties by malicious third parties exploiting the system’s vulnerabilities”[3], and detailed documentation providing all information necessary on the system and its purpose for authorities to assess its compliance[4]. Although the Parliament has included all biometric identification systems as high risk, Italy, Hungary and France have been pushing to implement a more lenient regime for the employment of biometric identification instruments for surveillance purposes. The result of this debate is to be seen at the moment of ratification of the Act.

Despite the praiseworthy effort of the European legislator in setting up standards which prioritize fundamental rights and security for its citizens, endorsed also by the setup of clear enforcement measures and fines directed to the misbehaving providers; it is pivotal to highlight some challenges that regulating AI will pose on future legislative attempts.

Firstly, the main area of concern regards the tug of war between maintaining a firm hold over high-risk service providers and, on the other hand, ensuring the smooth progress of AI innovation in the EU. We will likely be witnessing a certain degree of lobbying practices from what arguably represent the top-tier AI companies based in the US (mainly, META, OpenAI, Google, Deepmind etc.); hence watering down the original scope of the Act. This concern rapidly escalated to a concrete debate over the regulation of foundation models. “The foundation models, such as GPT-3.5 - the large language model that powers OpenAI’s ChatGPT-, are trained on vast amounts of data and are able to carry out a wide range of tasks in a number of use cases. They are some of the most powerful, valuable and potentially risky AI systems in existence”[5]. While the proposed Act was keen on firmly regulating foundation models, a trialogue was initiated between the German, Italian and French governments to loosen the grip over these providers by proposing a self-regulation system, and strongly criticising Brussels for over-regulating service providers’ conduct and hindering innovation in the Union[6]. The leaders of said countries also expressed deep concern about the possibility that smaller European-based companies will not be able to keep up with the obligations raised by the Act[7]. While the Parliament maintains a firm formal position over the impossibility of excluding the foundation models, it is apparent that this opposition could furthermore potentially trigger the stalemate of the legislative iter.

A second criticality was identified by the exclusion from the scope of the Act of AI instruments applied for military, national security and national defence purposes. Civil society organizations have indeed expressed major concern towards the possibility that technologies which would be theoretically labelled as posing an unacceptable risk could be implemented if they fall under the umbrella of the scope of defending national security, but, additionally, that dual-use technology could be employed without any regulatory restriction[8].

Finally, the Act faces issues regarding its coordination with the US Order. Albeit both legislative instruments are based on a risk-based approach, the Senate has been more hesitant to espouse the European hard line. As Alex Engler - associate in governance studies at The Brookings Institution- wrote for Stanford University: “There’s a growing disparity between the U.S. and the EU approach in regulating AI. The EU has moved forward on laws around data privacy, online platforms, and online e-commerce regulation, and more, while similar legislation is absent in the U.S”[9]. Furthermore, the US Order struggles to draw clear-cut enforcement measures against companies which happen to be in breach of their obligations, therefore it is clear that the priority of the American legislator lies mostly in maintaining international competitiveness[10]. Needless to say, the lack of homogeneous standards hinders physical and legal persons, the latter being obliged to change their operativity depending on the country of distribution of services.

Despite the said shortcomings, the Act will hopefully be the Kickstarter of a broader strategy able to compensate for the strict approach adopted in the regulation, thus attracting investments and levelling the competition with the US.

[1] https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/a-comparative-perspective-on-ai-regulation

[2] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai

[3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0206

[4] Ibid.

[5] https://time.com/6338602/eu-ai-regulation-foundation-models/

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/news/what-are-the-ai-act-and-the-council-of-europe-convention/

[9] https://hai.stanford.edu/news/analyzing-european-union-ai-act-what-works-what-needs-improvement

[10] https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/news-events/the-eu-and-the-us-two-different-approaches-to-ai-governance/

^[1] https://cset.georgetown.edu/article/in-out-of-china-financial-support-for-ai-development/

^[2] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/european-approach-artificial-intelligence