The war between Russia and Ukraine, now in its third year, continues to be intensely volatile and dynamic. Recent developments, particularly the approval of a significant US military aid package, mark a critical juncture in international support for Ukraine. This article delves into the US decision, its ripple effects across Europe, and the broader implications for all parties involved.
US Military Aid Package to Ukraine
On April 24, 2024, US President Joe Biden approved a substantial $61 billion aid package for Ukraine. This decision concluded prolonged and intense negotiations within the US Congress, characterised by a bipartisan struggle. Notably, Republican Mike Johnson, initially a staunch opponent, reversed his stance after a confidential briefing, citing the existential threat posed by an "axis of evil" comprising Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Iran. Johnson emphasised that supporting Ukraine was crucial to US national security and a testament to American leadership in defending democracy.
Strategic and Political Motivations
Analysts suggest that this aid package is not only a pragmatic political move but also a strategic necessity. The aid aims to stabilise Ukraine's frontlines, mitigating fears of a Russian breakthrough or Ukrainian collapse. This stabilisation is crucial as it sets the stage for potential Ukrainian offensives in the coming months. Furthermore, the timing of this aid is significant given the approaching US presidential elections. Prolonging the conflict could adversely affect former President Donald Trump's approval ratings, possibly benefiting Biden among undecided voters.
European Response
The US decision has resonated strongly across Europe, prompting several nations to announce their own aid packages. On April 23, 2024, during a visit to Warsaw, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak unveiled the UK's largest military aid package to date for Ukraine, worth £500 million. Sunak underscored the importance of defending Ukraine not just for regional security but for the entire European continent, warning that a victorious Putin would not halt at Poland's border.
Similarly, Sweden has committed 13 billion kronor ($1.23 billion) in military aid, marking the largest Scandinavian contribution. The Czech Republic has pledged to deliver at least 1.5 million artillery shells by year's end, part of a covert supply strategy involving unnamed countries, likely including some BRICS nations like India and South Africa.
Broader Implications and Russian Reaction
The widespread European support highlights a unified front against Russian offensive and a collective effort towards Ukraine's post-war reconstruction. However, the approval of the US aid package has not been well-received by Russia. Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov condemned the decision, suggesting it would enrich the US at Ukraine's expense and result in further Ukrainian casualties. Former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev expressed hostility, wishing for internal US turmoil, while President Putin acknowledged the increased costs of Russia's military operations and committed to record war spending of 6% of GDP in 2024.
Economic and Military Considerations
Despite current economic stability, bolstered by domestic fiscal policies and import substitution, Russia's financial sustainability remains uncertain. Continued Western support is vital for Ukraine, especially given the critical timing of arms deliveries and their deployment on the battlefield. This window of delay provides the Russian military with opportunities to target Ukrainian infrastructure, particularly its energy sector. Moscow's propaganda leverages these delays to project Western disunity and ongoing internal US discord, which Russia finds reassuring.
Future Outlook
The conflict's trajectory remains uncertain, with the upcoming US presidential elections poised to influence future dynamics and support for Ukraine. The sustained cohesion and determination of Western allies are essential for Ukraine's long-term resilience against Russian aggression. The new aid package from the US represents a pivotal moment, demonstrating substantial international support for Ukraine with profound implications for the global power balance and the conflict's future.
Conclusion
In summary, the approval of the $61 billion US military aid package signifies a crucial step in international backing for Ukraine. The response from European nations further consolidates a collective stance against Russian offensive, highlighting a significant geopolitical shift. Meanwhile, Russian reactions underscore the persistent challenges and the importance of continued, coordinated support for Ukraine. The coming months and years will be decisive in shaping the conflict's outcome and the broader geopolitical landscape.
by Joseph Moses - Military Strategy & Intelligence Team
Drone warfare has been one of the salient capabilities of the First World’s futuristic military arsenal through the conflicts of the 2000s and 2010s. The war that broke out in Ukraine in 2022, and the battlefields in Myanmar, Sudan and Gaza have since been the arena for another emerging technology that in tactical situations, proven to be decisive. These are the small drones ranging from the FPV variants, commercial hobby drones like the DJI drones.
This essay focuses on smaller systems and aerial systems because these grant a force cheap options and also grant significant stealth, mobility, equipment safety, and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection capabilities and provide economically cheap tactically offensive capabilities than ground-based or water based systems. Another reason to focus on small drones is their assignment to smaller troop formations which grants these systems a very versatile and efficient [semi]autonomous usage. Furthermore, the integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI), also potentially negates the necessity of connecting the drones to nodal points like bigger drones or nearby aircraft which gives them relative immunity from detection and electronic countermeasures. This essay also focuses on electronic countermeasures (jamming) and not on energy weapons and kinetic countermeasures because this uniquely counters the threat posed by drones while rendering them temporarily inert as opposed to kinetic and energy countermeasures which destroy these systems.
Turkish and Iranian drones had been at the forefront of remotely controlled vehicles for precision strikes, kamikaze strikes and monitoring purposes in the initial months of the Ukraine war, providing cheaper options for drone warfare. However, over the course of the war, smaller drones have not only emerged but have caused major disruptions in the battlefield, dispatching enemy tanks, and armored vehicles, coordinating artillery strikes, and targeting small and mobile targets like combatants and individual vehicles. Initially, they were improvised to carry and drop grenades and mortars over enemy combatants and for surveillance. In recent months, these drones have begun to trickle into the battlefield on an industrial scale, with manufactured “pylons” to attach munitions onto these small drones. Modified FPV drones are used as guided kamikaze weapons. These drones also have increased ranges to increase their surveilling and strike capabilities.
These smaller drones can by no means in the short term, replace the bigger fixed-winged drones that are conventional in militaries nor will they have the costly sensor arrays and range of conventional kamikaze drones and other loitering munitions, but they do provide stealth, loitering and precision strike capability and above all, are expendable. In addition, given their precise nature, these drones also contribute to reducing collateral damage to both life and material which is inevitable with protracted infantry engagements, artillery and air strikes.
In many ways, they fulfil the roles of snipers, forward observers, provide a good vantage point for observing and calculating firing solutions for artillery and conducting battle damage assessments, and one could argue, that the precision strikes by kamikaze drones and loitering drones are a form of Close Air Support (CAS). Another recent development as of the time of writing, is the emergence of AI being implemented in drone strikes in Ukraine to autonomously identify and strike targets. If developed, this would be a form of highly manoeuvrable and precise fire-and-forget missiles and would provide the drone launcher and operator significant situational awareness by relieving the targeting proces. It is yet to be seen at scale if autonomy is reliable across the ‘kill chain’ of target detection, discrimination, acquisition, and engagement.
While the improvised nature of the first iterations of loitering bomber drones carrying grenades and mortar shells was considered an asymmetrical and unconventional tactic, the new emerging technologies being integrated into these systems with the potential for these smaller and cheaper systems to replace conventional battlefield roles with the same quality of data collection, precision etc., could transform these systems into significant conventional and force multipliers.
Replacing conventional battlefield roles:
The Drone Swarm: The recent attack on Israel by Iranian kamikaze drones and the number of attacks on oil refineries in Russia by Ukrainian drones are isolated examples of the drone swarm. While these drones can be intercepted, there are yet to be incidents involving swarms of smaller drones used against frontline troops where interceptions are much more difficult and where these drones will have the effect of cluster munitions or rocket strikes. The chief difference would be that these munitions would be far more accurate, and manoeuvrable and can potentially loiter, change course, make quick decisions, change targets etc.
These drones are difficult to intercept because of how small silent and cheap they are. If expensive air defence systems are used to soak these swarms up, this leaves these expensive air defence systems vulnerable to counterstrikes and with a reduced magazine in their positions. If it is included in doctrine, to ignore smaller drones, this would prove to be catastrophic to frontline troops, isolated patrols, and vehicles. The American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), as of 2016 has already been experimenting with integrating autonomous systems into swarm drone tactics through their OFFensive Swarm-Enabled Tactics program (OFFSET). The US Department of Defense unveiled its “Replicator” program in 2023 and has planned on fielding thousands of autonomous systems across multiple domains by 2025 to counter Chinese military build-up in the Indo-Pacific. It has been confirmed that one of the systems that is a part of this program is the Switchblade loitering munition in association with the Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance (LASSO) program. The first iteration of the Replicator program aims to tackle the problem of slowing or defeating an invading force with swarms of lethal surface drones and overhead loitering munitions. This would shift the most dangerous battlefield roles of frontline repellence and area denial from manned vehicles and posts to unmanned and semi-autonomous or autonomous swarms, creating a highly fluid, dynamic and unpredictable ‘minefield’ for an advancing enemy force.
With the battlefield potential of swarm strikes, and with the novel usage of AI in Ukraine to discriminate targets and avoid electronic warfare measures, it is only a matter of time before swarm tactics will be implemented in drone swarms of smaller UASs to react, improve and harass frontline troops and significantly attack an enemy’s tactical defensive posturing while not costing the user significantly economically and commercially. This drone could be FPV (disposable) to loitering bombing drones, to drones with attached machine guns, rockets and other anti-drone counter-measures. While these systems can be assigned at squad levels, these can also be assigned at higher levels and be used in fire missions, and joint operations across wider active theaters.
CAS and sniper/precision-strike roles: The mobility and silent nature of drones affords fighting forces in urban settings and open terrain likewise, map out, reconnoiter, stalk and even kill hiding and isolated combatants. Their manoeuvrability can be used to attack fixed encampments as we see in the conflict in Gaza between Hamas and the Israeli IDF. Similarly, we have seen videos of Israeli forcesusing small copter drones to enter houses and search for Hamas combatants room by room, after which they can either engage through squads or call in an artillery or air strike against the entrenched enemy. While these strikes can be expensive, we can soon expect to see these strikes being taken up by the same reconnoitring drone. This economically relieves artillery batteries, tanks or aircraft while it also frees up the squad can focus on other operations/activities.
A similar argument can be made for these systems being used in a CAS role. Given the precision, and payloads these drones can now carry and/or drop onto enemy positions and also strike and harass mobile enemies they can fulfill a very versatile CAS role while being assigned to smaller units like squads and platoons. In a swarm scenario or in a dynamic battlefield that is not shaped by shaping operations, while deconfliction could be a challenge for controlled and autonomous systems operated by smaller troop formations, this is already being performed in Ukraine against individual targets and to harass and survey larger formations. While these small drones may not be able to conduct large scale Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) operations, these smaller systems can be used as decoys, perform smaller precision strikes against less guarded enemy air defences, and psychologically de-motivate an infantry fighting force when used strategically.
The primary advantage of conventional CAS systems is their precision, damage dealt and psychological effect of their munitions/guns with the disadvantage of being vulnerable to enemy ground fire from small handheld systems to surface-to-air missiles. With small drone systems, the advantage primarily is a relative degree of visual and audible stealth, the expendable nature of these systems and the shock-and-awe they provide to an enemy not expecting a highly mobile and smart targeting system. These systems can also drastically reduce the time required for a CAS aircraft to get to the battlefield as these will be at the hands of the squad or platoon members.
Electronic Warfare and AI:
The primary non-energy and non-kinetic deterrence against these drones have been electronic jamming countermeasures that are used to sever the connection between the drone operator and the drone. This has led to drone confiscations and loss of battlefield information and intelligence on drones that store information offline instead of storing/recording them on the operator’s system as a redundancy measure.
With the emergence of AI being integrated into kamikaze and FPV drones, these drones do not need operator control. An improvement already being made on non-autonomous FPV systems was for the operator to target an immobile or mobile enemy and place the drone on a trajectory towards the target at maximum velocity. This tactic negates the electronic countermeasure’s effects as the severance of the connection cannot stop the momentum of the inbound kamikaze drone. Integrating AI into these smaller and faster systems is a new concept but can be seen being implemented in the Ukrainian and Russian battlefields. These drones provide the tactical advantage of identifying and discriminating targets without requiring an operator but are also beginning to prove to be immune to electronic countermeasures as they have the target and terrain information and parameters pre-loaded into them.
While the disadvantage of AI is the lack of human supervision across the entire ‘kill chain’, the real-world consequences and level of permissible and reliable autonomy are yet to be seen at scale. In the future, this would be a contentious matter, especially in a battlefield with a civilian population, in urban counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations and could cause deconfliction challenges in an active and fluid battlefield. Real-time decision-making relieves the operator while also leaving the door open for the aforementioned challenges when it comes to targeting mobile targets or operating in a highly dynamic battlefield. Active deconfliction of a changing battlefield would require a constant connection between frontline troops, the drone operator and the drone.
While the possibilities are many, it is yet to be seen how the current improvisations, augmentations to/for conventional battlefield roles with the added potential of machine autonomy, would affect the composition of smaller combat units and doctrine.
Where conventional CAS, ISR and precision strike systems and roles are expensive, require scarce expertise and are not expendable, these UAS systems are the exact opposite while also being a force multiplier. It is however yet to be seen whether they would have the same psychological effect and efficacy to either augment or replace major decisive battlefield interdiction roles.
Canada is currently facing a critical moment in its history as it grapples with the urgent need to protect its democratic processes and national security from foreign interference. The release of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions on May 3rd has prompted focus on this issue. Over the past five years, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has reported on the increasing international activity of the People's Republic of China (PRC), including efforts directed at democratic institutions, government bodies, and communities in various sectors. The interim report clarifies: "Foreign interference is not done by just one country. However, China currently stands out as the most persistent and sophisticated foreign interference threat to Canada."
Chapter four of the interim report examines China's use of foreign interference tactics, highlighting intelligence data suggesting extensive use of these methods to advance its interests. The chapter details a range of interference activities targeting various entities in Canada, including government officials, political organisations, political candidates, and diaspora communities. CSIS identifies China as a significant challenge to Canada's electoral integrity.
The report focuses on the activities of the United Front Work Department (UFWD), a key entity of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with a substantial budget. The UFWD plays a central role in China's foreign interference efforts,focusing on influencing the Chinese diaspora, shaping public opinion, and persuading politicians to support China's policies. It specifically targets individuals with status or influence, such as community leaders, academics, elected officials, and media members. The report describes the UFWD as employing a long-term strategy that utilises both overt and covert methods to cultivate and strengthen relationships over time.
The scope and scale of China's activities in the Canadian elections of 2019 and 2021 are reported to be more extensive than those of any other state, impacting not only federal but also local officials and indigenous communities. The report indicates the UFWD's activities blur the lines between foreign influence and foreign interference. It details clandestine,deceptive, and threatening activity around the world, often by leveraging influence and exerting control over some diaspora communities. Other PRC state institutions involved in foreign interference activities include the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Public Security, both of which reportedly operate covertly internationally and remotely from the PRC.
Canada's Reaction
This backdrop underscores Canada's urgency in strengthening its defences against foreign interference across all fronts. Canada recognises the evolving nature of these threats and the imperative to safeguard its sovereignty and interests. While the inquiry into foreign interference represents a significant step forward in Canada's response, whether the issue has been considered with enough timeliness and decisiveness still needs to be addressed. Conservative foreign affairs critic and MP Michael Chong stated that the report is a “damning set of conclusions and findings” and that it “contradicts much of what the government has told us over that period of time.” New Democratic Party MP Jenny Kwan said there was a “systemic failure of communications by the government to those who are targeted or impacted by foreign interference.”
The interim report provides a sobering glimpse into the extent of foreign meddling in Canadian affairs, with particular emphasis on activities surrounding recent federal elections. In response to these revelations, the Canadian government is addressing the issue through new legislation, such as Bill C-70, introduced on May 6th, which aims to update existing laws and improve Canada’s capacity to detect, disrupt, and defend against foreign interference. Additionally, the Canadian government's allocation of funds for establishing a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office underscores the seriousness with which Canada regards this issue.
China's Response
China has strongly rejectedthe allegations of foreign interference. On May 8th, the state-run Global Times published two articles on the subject.
The first article criticised Canada's efforts to address foreign interference, describing it as "The so-called China's foreign interference is nothing but a lie to serve political purposes and a drama directed and performed by Canada itself." The preliminary report raises doubts about its validity, reflecting a broader trend in some Western states to attribute electoral outcomes to external influences. The article also accused Canada of interfering in China's domestic affairs. The paper also raised concerns about Canada's actions, suggesting they might hinder positive relations. It stated, "Canada's approach risks harming its relationship with China by aligning itself with US criticisms. We urge Canada to act objectively and avoid being misled by unsubstantiated reports."
The second article focused on Canada's introduction of draft legislation to counter foreign interference. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian was quoted saying, "China has never and will never have any interest in interfering in Canada's internal affairs," dismissing claims of foreign interference as politically motivated lies. A Chinese academic commented, "The introduction of the new law based on groundless accusations of Chinese interference in Canada's elections is once again the country's attempt to fuel unfriendliness and hostility toward China domestically and internationally." The article also mentioned that Canada's new draft legislation is driven by domestic political motives, with the opposition party pushing for tougher policies towards China to challenge Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's leadership.
China's Grand Strategy
Despite China’s reaction, China's growing global influence and its strategic aspirations are a subject of extensive international discussion. It manifests through a multifaceted approach to enhance its global influence and secure strategic advantages. Politically, concerns exist regarding its role in other countries' elections, particularly through the United Front Work Department (UFWD). Allegations of such interference have surfaced in Canada, the US and Australia. Militarily, China's activities in the East and South China Seas create tensions with neighbouring states. These activities are challenging established international maritime norms, and contravening international laws and norms. Economically, the Belt and Road Initiative extends its reach across continents, fostering dependencies through infrastructure while facing criticisms of potentially resembling neo-colonialism practices. This economic outreach often seems to often complement its military ambitions, as infrastructure projects can double as strategic military footholds. Domestically, China's human rights record, particularly in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang, is under international scrutiny. Issues surrounding limitations on freedoms are a source of international concern. In cyberspace, its strategic operations involve sophisticated espionage and potential disruptions of global infrastructure, raising international alarms over cyber warfare. China's cultural diplomacy and media expansion aim to shape global perceptions and address Western influence. These efforts can be seen as attempts to manage international reactions to its policies. Collectively, these strategies reinforce China's position on the global stage and intricately interlink to influence its relationships with major world powers, crafting a complex web of influence and control.
China's Strategy in Canada
China's approach in Canada shares similarities with its broader strategies internationally. Both utilise a multifaceted approach to cultivate influence and achieve strategic goals. In line with its global political ambitions, China's engagement through the UFWD with Chinese diaspora communities raises questions about potential influence on domestic politics and public opinion. This comprehensive strategy presents significant challenges to Canadian sovereignty, security, and economic interests.
In the economic and technological spheres, China's tactics include cyber espionage and strategic investments in critical sectors, raising Canada's national security concerns. Notable incidents like the Microsoft Exchange server attacks have targeted essential Canadian infrastructure, undermining data security and intellectual property. Moreover, strategic investments in sectors such as natural resources and ports might be seen as signs of China's efforts to extend its geopolitical influence within Canada, mirroring its global economic outreach.
The involvement of Chinese companies like Huawei in Canada's 5G network raised concerns about data security vulnerabilities, prompting Canada to implement restrictive measures to protect its telecommunications infrastructure. Concurrently, Chinese investments in Canadian real estate and potential political influence attempts require careful monitoring.
In the areas of soft power and cultural influence, the presence of Confucius Institutes within Canadian universities raises questions about the promotion of a selective view of Chinese culture, potentially impacting academic freedoms and shaping public perception. These institutes, alongside other UFWD activities within diaspora communities, shape Canada’s political landscape to align with China’s interests. Surveillance efforts, such as monitoring the Chinese diaspora through organisations like the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs), complement China's control operations within Canada.
In response, Canada has taken steps to address these concerns, including updates to legislation, enhanced cybersecurity measures, and the establishment of a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office.
Canada…Moving Forward
As Canada navigates this complex landscape, vigilance in defending its democratic institutions and national interests is paramount. Public Safety Canada has affirmed, "The Government of Canada takes the threat posed by foreign interference seriously and has various tools and mechanisms in place to protect individuals and Canada's interests." CSIS’s recent annual report states, "the PRC’s negative perceptions of select Canadian domestic and foreign policy initiatives may also drive more foreign interference….in 2024.” The evolving nature of these challenges demands comprehensive and multifaceted tactics, which include legislative measures, diplomatic engagement, and international cooperation. By addressing these challenges proactively, Canada will not only be upholding the integrity of its democratic processes but also asserting its sovereignty against external pressures. Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mélanie Joly stated, “As with past crises, multilateralism and diplomacy offer our best hope for maintaining peace and stability.” While Canada must take decisive actions to counter interference and protect its sovereignty, it should also engage in diplomatic efforts with other states, including China, to address the issue of interference. This balanced approach combines responses to interference with diplomatic engagement where possible. Strengthening alliances with Five Eyes and other global partners, specifically in the Indo-Pacific, is crucial for effectively confronting and mitigating these risks. As these strategies continue to evolve, transparency, accountability, and community engagement are pivotal to ensure that Canadians are protected and that the democratic framework remains resilient against the covert and disruptive tactics of foreign actors. By strengthening its defences and adopting a proactive stance, Canada safeguards its sovereignty and contributes to the broader global effort to preserve democratic values and institutions, consequently enhancing stability in the world order.
Check out another China & Asia Team article on China’s Belt and Road in the Maldives by Carlotta Rinaudo.
Author: Piero Soave and Wesley Issey Romain - AI, Cyber Security & Space Team
The year 2024 is sure to be remembered when it comes to elections: first, never before have so many people around the world been called to cast their vote; second, these elections will be the first to take place in a world of widespread Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI). The combined impact of these two elements is likely to have a lasting impact on democracy. This article looks at how GenAI can influence the outcome of elections, reviews examples of risks from recent elections, and investigates possible mitigations.
The year of high-stakes elections
In over 70 elections throughout 2024, some 800mn voters will take to the ballots in India, 400mn in Europe, 200mn in the United States of America, and many more across Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa1. In many cases, these elections will be polarized and will feature candidates from populist backgrounds. Previous electoral rounds have scarcely been an example of moderation, featuring instead accusations of foreign interference, and a deadly assault on the US Congress. Whoever wins the most votes will make decisions on topics as consequential as the US-EU relationships, the future of NATO, trade wars, the geopolitical equilibrium in the Middle East, Hindu-Muslim relationships, and more. With so much at stake, the risk of election interference warrants a closer look.
Enter GenAI
The launch of OpenAI’s ChatGPT at the end of 2022 brought GenAI to the mainstream. GenAI indicates an AI system that has the ability to create content in the form of text, audio or video. Having been popularized by ChatGPT, there are now thousands of applications readily available at minimal to no cost. These systems have been trained on billions of elements of text, sound or video, and are able to respond to a user query and create synthetic content in those formats.
The existing legal and regulatory frameworks are poorly suited to mitigate the risks deriving from GenAI. Since the launch of ChatGPT, there have already been lawsuits related to intellectual property2, sanctions to corner-cutting lawyers3, egregious reinterpretations of historical facts4, as well as general concern about the bias inherent in these systems5. One specific problem related to GenAI is that of deepfakes, i.e. audio or video files that show people saying or doing things they never in fact said or did. This content is so realistic that it is all but impossible to determine whether what is in front of us is reality, or an artificial creation. The consequences are far-ranging, from the potential increase in financial and other fraud6, to the infringement of privacy and individual rights7. But it is in the domain of politics that deepfakes are particularly troubling. They can be used for a variety of bad purposes, from misleading voters about where, when and how they can vote, to spreading fake content from well recognizable public figures, to generating inflammatory messages that lead to violence8.
GenAI and misinformation in elections
Misinformation is not a new phenomenon, and it certainly is older than artificial intelligence. However, technology can exacerbate and multiply its effects. By some accounts, “25% of tweets spread during the 2016 US presidential elections were fake or misleading”9. GenAI has the potential to turbocharge the creation of fake content, as this no longer requires sophisticated tools and expertise - anyone with an internet connection could do it.
Examples of deepfake interference in the political process abound10, despite the relative young age of the technology. In what is perhaps the most consequential event to date, Gabon’s President Ali Bongo appeared in a 2019 video in good health, despite having recently suffered a stroke. The media started questioning the veracity of the video - which is still being debated - ultimately triggering an attempted coup11. Crucially, Schiff et al suggest that “the mere existence of deepfakes may allow for plausible claims of misinformation and lead to significant social and political harms, even when the authenticity of the content is disputed or disproved”12.
During Argentina’s 2023 presidential elections, both camps made extensive use of AI generated content. Ads featured clearly fake propaganda images of candidates as movie heroes, dystopian villains or zombies. In an actual deepfake video - labeled as AI generated - “Mr Milei explains how a market for human organs would work, something he has said philosophically fits in with his libertarian views”13. Also in 2023, synthetic content featured in mayoral elections14 in Toronto and Chicago, the Republican primaries in the US, Slovakia’s parliamentary elections - all the way to New Zealand15.
In the run-up to general elections in India, the Congress party shared a deepfake video of a Bharat Rashtra Samiti leader calling to vote for Congress. The video was shared on social media and messaging apps as voters went to the ballot, and was viewed over 500,000 times before the opposing campaign could contain the damage. AI is being widely used in India to create holograms of candidates, and translate speeches across multiple local languages - as well as for less ethical and transparent objectives16.
In an attempt to simulate bad actors’ attempt to generate misinformation, researchers tested four popular AI image generators and found that the tools “generated images constituting election disinformation in 41%” of cases. This is despite policies in place for these tools which should prevent the creation of misleading materials about elections. The same researchers looked for evidence of bad use and found that individuals “are already using the tool to generate content containing political figures, illustrating how AI image tools are already being used to produce content that could potentially be used to spread election disinformation”17.
Controls and mitigations
Regulation around AI is moving fast in response to even faster technological advancements. Perhaps the most thorough attempt at creating a regulatory framework is the EU AI Act18, approved in March 2024. In the US, a mix of federal and state initiatives seek to address several concerns related to AI, from bias to GenAI, and data privacy. These include the 2023 Presidential Executive Order and related OMB guidance; the NIST Risk Management Framework; and state legislation, from the early New York City Law 144 to the more recent California guidance and proposed bills. Other countries, from Singapore to Australia and China, have approved similar rules.
Looking at elections integrity specifically, the EU adopted in March a new regulation “on the transparency and targeting of political advertising, aimed at countering information manipulation and foreign interference in elections”. This focuses mostly on making political advertising clearly recognizable, but most of the provisions won’t enter into force before the autumn of 202519. Also in March, the European Commission leveraged the Digital Services Act - which required very large online platforms to mitigate the risks related to electoral processes - to issue guidelines aimed at protecting the June European Parliament elections. The guidelines include labeling of GenAI content. Although these are just best practices, the Commission can start formal proceedings under the Digital Services Act if it suspects a lack of compliance20. In the US, two separate bipartisan bills have been introduced in the Senate: the AI Transparency in Elections Act21 and the Protect Elections from Deceptive AI Act22.
These frameworks have yet to stand the test of time, and the proliferation of open-source models and APIs makes it an uphill struggle for regulators. Regulation around deepfakes specifically is scarce and complex, as it needs to address two separate issues: the creation of the synthetic material, and its distribution. What regulation does exist, tends to focus on sexual content23, although in some cases political content is also covered24. Existing norms around privacy, defamation or cybercrime can offer some support, but are ultimately inadequate to prevent harm25. Some tech solutions are available, such as watermarks, detection algorithms to verify authenticity, or including provenance tags into content26. Whether these techniques are able to prevent or counter the creation and spread of deepfakes at scale remains an open question - and some of them may have unintended drawbacks27. The experience of social media platforms in tackling the spread of harmful content and misinformation is mixed at best28. Platforms’ efforts to mitigate harm (from content moderation to the provision of trustworthy information), and solutions proposed by other parties (such as the removal of the reshare option) are steps in the right direction - but seem unlikely to move the needle.
It is possible that tech developments in the near future will make it easier to detect and disrupt the flow of disinformation, fake news and deepfakes that threaten to sway elections - such as the recently released OpenAI detector29. But the best tool available right now might be literacy interventions, which can make readers more alert to fake news3031. For example, news media literacy aims to provide the tools to assess information more critically and to identify false information. Hameleers found that this type of intervention is effective at reducing the perceived accuracy of false information, although importantly it does not reduce agreement with it (when the reader’s beliefs align with its message)32.
Conclusions
2024 will be a critical year for liberal democracies and election processes worldwide, from the Americas and Europe to Africa and Asia. Election outcomes will play a crucial role in shaping the orientation of the most pressing issues in world affairs.
The advent of AI tools such as Generative AI threatens electoral processes in democratic countries as it increases the risks of disinformation, potentially swaying voting outcomes. GenAI effectively gives anyone the ability to create synthetic content and deploy it in the form of robocalls, phishing emails, realistic deepfake photography or video, and more. Once this content is online, previous experience teaches that it is very difficult to moderate or eliminate, especially on social media platforms.
While continuing to support tech-based initiatives to detect or tag synthetic content, Governments and education institutions should invest in information literacy programs to equip people with the tools to critically evaluate information and make informed electoral decisions.
Bovet, Alexandre., and Hernán A. Makse. “Influence of fake news in Twitter during the 2016 US presidential election.” Nature Communications. Vol. 10(1), 7. Jan 2, 2017. <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30602729/> ↩︎
Klobuchar, Hawley, Coons, Collins Introduce Bipartisan Legislation to Ban the Use of Materially Deceptive AI-Generative Content in Elections.” Amy Klobuchar, United States Senator. September 12, 2023. ↩︎
Jones-Jang, S Mo, Tara Mortensen, and Jingjing Liu. “Does Media Literacy Help Identification of Fake News? Information Literacy Helps, but Other Literacies Don’t.” American Behavioral Scientist. Vol. 65(2). <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0002764219869406> ↩︎
Hameleers, Michael. “Separating truth from lies: comparing the effects of news media literacy interventions and fact-checkers in response to political misinformation in the US and Netherlands. Information, Communication, & Society,. Vol 25(1). 2022. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2020.1764603> ↩︎
Author: Rabiah Ryklief - Central & South America Team
Latin America's rich biodiversity and vast natural resources have unfortunately attracted a destructive force: Eco-Mafias. These highly organised transnational criminal groups engage in the illegal extraction and exploitation of natural resources for illicit profit. Their activities cause widespread ecological degradation, posing a significant threat to the region's environmental security and, consequently, global climate security.
The Rise of Eco-Mafias
Latin America’s environmental security is deeply intertwined with the exploitation of its natural resources. From the colonial plunder of precious hardwoods like mahogany to the 20th century's surge in deforestation for government-backed infrastructure and cattle ranching, exploitation has driven significant habitat loss and disrupted vital ecological processes. This ongoing struggle has entered a particularly dangerous phase with the rise of Eco-Mafias.
Fueled by the confluence of the war on drugs, insatiable global demand for resources, and environmental crime's lucrative ranking as the third most profitable illegal activity, these transnational organised criminal groups pose a grave threat. While some countries have implemented environmental legislation and protected areas, the allure of the Amazon's vast resources has proven difficult to resist.
The remote nature of the Amazon rainforest, coupled with limited enforcement and vulnerabilities to corruption within government agencies, creates fertile grounds for these illicit networks to flourish. Unlike traditionally trafficked commodities - such as drugs, arms, or humans - timber and minerals can be laundered with relative ease, entering the legal commercial market to provide a cloak of legitimacy. Further obfuscation is achieved by placing funds in jurisdictions far removed from the original crime, hindering prosecution and facilitating tax evasion. This minimises risk while maximising profits, making environmental crimes more attractive.
In this context, the establishment of Eco-Mafias in Latin America signifies an escalation in the struggle against environmental insecurity. Their focus on high-value resources like timber, gold, and minerals presents a significant threat to ecosystems in hotspots like Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Central America.
The Devastating Impact
Eco-mafia activity in Latin America inflicts a devastating and multifaceted assault on the region's environment. The environmental crimes associated with these activities include legal transgressions, operating within protected areas and indigenous territories, unauthorised dredging, and altering natural river flows. These actions cause direct physical destruction of ecosystems and diminish the availability of vital natural resources.
Illegal logging caters to a booming international market for valuable hardwoods.Estimatessuggest that up to 80% of logging activities in Brazil and 60% in Peru are illegal. This rampant exploitation translates to land grabs, deforestation, and the decimation of vital habitats - key drivers of biodiversity loss. While Latin America is home to 40% of the world's biodiversity, populations have declined rapidly by 89% since 1970.
Illegal mining operations leave a trail of toxic waste and polluted waterways in their wake. Illegal gold mining is a major concern, accounting for 86% in Venezuela, 80% in Colombia, and 70% in Ecuador. Small-scale, illegal gold mining is the second-largest source of global mercury pollution, releasing tons of mercury into Amazonian rivers and lakes each year. This contamination reaches levels up to 34 times above safe limits, posing a severe threat to aquatic ecosystems and ultimately reaching human populations through the food chain.
Deforestation and forest degradation driven by Eco-Mafia activities surged by 25% in the first half of 2020, significantly contributing to climate change emissions. The continuing loss of vital carbon sinks like the Amazon rainforest weakens the globe’s ability to mitigate climate change impacts, exacerbating extreme weather events.
The Environmental Security Landscape
Latin America faces a complex challenge in securing its environment. Peace, development, and security – the cornerstones of any nation – are under threat from the illicit activities of Eco-Mafias. Transnational organised crime thrives on diversification, and Eco-Mafias have capitalised on this trend, exploiting weaknesses in governance, particularly during local conflicts.
Latin America's political volatility and history of conflict create fertile ground for Eco-Mafia activities. Weak governance and instability provide a haven for these criminal groups to exploit natural resources with impunity. This highlights the critical role that combatting environmental crimes plays in preventing and resolving conflicts. Conflict zones, often riddled with corruption and influenced by powerful political and military figures, offer the most lucrative opportunities for Eco-Mafias.
The environmental crimes committed by Eco-Mafias carry a heavy price tag for peace, sustainable development, and security. When these groups operate in fragile regions marked by violence and instability, it presents a critical development challenge. The destruction of ecosystems and depletion of natural resources directly undermines efforts to alleviate poverty - a key socio-political issue across much of Latin America. The cycle becomes self-perpetuating; continued or renewed conflict fuels environmental crimes, further undermining development prospects.
Illegal mining also attracts a constellation of other criminal activities. Slave labour, forced prostitution, and human trafficking become entangled with environmental crimes creating opportunities for violent clashes with local communities who resist. The overall result is a devastating erosion of peace and human security in rural areas with limited governance.
The illicit revenue generated from the exploitation of natural resources is staggering, accounting for nearly 40% of conflict and terrorism financing globally. Even more alarming is the fact that environmental crimes contribute 64% of illicit and organised crime finances. In essence, Eco-Mafias not only promote environmental insecurity, but also pave the way for the emergence of other security threats, such as non-state armed groups and terrorist organisations that exploit environmental crimes for their own nefarious ends.
Conclusion
Latin America's fight for environmental security hinges on dismantling the complex web of Eco-Mafias. Their presence exacerbates existing vulnerabilities, jeopardising the region's pursuit of durable peace, sustainable development, and long-term security. A multi-pronged approach is essential, tackling not just the environmental damage they inflict, but also the underlying social, political, and economic drivers that fuel their activities.
International cooperation, strengthened environmental law enforcement, and investment in sustainable development initiatives offer a path forward. By breaking this destructive cycle, Latin America can achieve environmental security and safeguard its irreplaceable ecosystems for generations to come.
U.S. Ukraine aid needs to be part of a larger strategic vision that aims for Russian defeat in Ukraine.
Author: Samuel Dempsey - USA Team
Four days after President Biden approved the $61 billion in military aid, on April 28, 2024, Ukraine received the first wave of anti-armor rockets, missiles, and 155-millimeter artillery shells. While Ukraine welcomed the needed U.S. aid, it came months late considering the on-the-ground requirements of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. As a result, much of this aid package is attempting to make up for lost time and reinforce the depleted defence supply chain.
In H.R.815 - Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other purposes, $23 billion of the aid supplement replenishes military stockpiles, enabling future U.S. military transfers to Ukraine; $14 billion is designated for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, which allows the DoD to buy advanced new weapon systems for Ukraine directly from U.S. defence contractors; $11 billion will fund current U.S. military operations in the region, and about $8 billion goes to non-military assistance through a loan to the Ukrainian government to cover basic operating costs.
The supplement comes at a time when Russia is increasingly exerting pressure across the 600-mile front line. Ukrainian brigades are spread thin, with little time for recuperation or new training, and much of the aid, including separate packages from the U.K. and Germany, will take months to arrive to truly bolster Ukraine’s defences on the ground.
As Jack Waltling, an expert in land warfare at RUSI, discussed inForeign Affairs, at present Russia has a “ten-to-one advantage over Ukraine in available artillery,” and with the new U.S. aid package, this is projected to shrink to “three to one in some regions.” This is a substantial improvement, but he argues that current Western support has only come in time to “stave off a Ukrainian collapse.” As Eugene Rumer at the Carnegie Endowmentobserved, the calculations vehemently demonstrate that even with support from the U.S. and allies, “the size of Russia’s population, economy, stocks of military hardware, and defense-industrial base far exceeds those of Ukraine.”
The new supplement's legislation acknowledges this reality and emphasizes the need to agree on a new multi-year support strategy "to hasten Ukrainian victory against Russia's invasion forces." This U.S. supplement is very likely the only piece of Ukraine aid that will be able to take effect before the next U.S. presidential election, and despite having aspirational goals for greater support, it has focused on buying more time. Given the possible change in U.S. administration and the confidence and firmness with which Russia is continuing this illegal invasion, even recently allegedly conducting an assassination attempt against President Zelenskyy, the question is: how does this supplement fit within a greater Ukraine strategy of the United States?
U.S. Stated Goals
The April 24 Ukraine supplement was the Biden administration'sfifty-sixth allotment of DoD inventory equipment to Ukraine since August 2021. Post-Russian invasion, the Biden administration has stood behind Ukraine, with the official Department of Stateposition being that the U.S. and allies are “united in support of Ukraine in response to Russia’s premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine.” The U.S. has demonstrated this by asserting that Kyiv will determine the war’s outcome. As Alexander Ward at Politico pointed out, this has resulted in a strategic misalignment, where the U.S. perceives its support as a means to either force Russia back or negotiate a settlement with Russia, while the Zelenskyy administration maintains that Ukraine will not relent until it reaches its pre-2014 borders, including Crimea. According to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, "only Russia's defeat and the restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity will guarantee stability and peace," and "the Black Sea must become a sea of NATO, peace, and stability."
After the recent U.S. supplement passed, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivanstated that Ukraine throughout the rest of the year will have the capacity to “hold the line” and “to ensure Ukraine withstands the Russian assault,” with the chance to enable Ukraine in 2025 “to move forward to recapture the territory that the Russians have taken from them.” Concurrently, Avril D. Haines, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence,told Congress that, in addition to the anticipated Russian offensive this month, Russia has the means to break through the Eastern Ukrainian front lines. According to Director Haines’ statements, the current U.S. strategy may now come up short, and according to Sullivan’s statements, the U.S. strategy has postponed any possible Ukrainian counteroffensive to 2025. Even then, numerous analysts, including Olga Tokariuk at Chatham House, havestressed that any future Ukrainian military offensive or even the ability to maintain a stable frontline is contingent upon a “steady flow of Western military assistance,” including withapproval from the White House.
If the U.S., regardless of administration, wants to back Ukraine’s goal of the Black Sea being "a sea of NATO peace and stability," a clear articulation of its own political goals is required to ensure a sound strategic vision.
A U.S. Strategy for Ukrainian Victory and Russian Defeat
“Russia can lose. And it should lose, for the sake of the world — and for its own sake,”wrote Timothy Snyder, a Levin Professor of History at Yale. Snyder, in his CNN opinion piece and whilelecturing at the University Club of New York, articulated the four principal reasons for which a Russian defeat is necessary in Ukraine: (1) For an imperial power to restrain its imperial ambitions, defeat is necessary. Snyder argued that the European project itself is only the result of lost imperial wars around the world after WWII. (2) If Russia wins, it not only affirms its imperial ambitions but also demonstrates to the rest of the world that imperial conquest is an option. (3) Historically, the most effective Western policy towards Russia is an effective U.S. policy towards Ukraine, i.e., supporting their self-determination and strategic objectives that align with Western values and systems has positive indirect impacts on developments in Russia. (4) Russia's history is replete with defeats; the Crimean War in 1856, the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, World War I in 1917, the Soviet Union's defeat by Poland in 1920, by Nazi Germany in 1945, and Afghanistan's decade-long invasion in 1979 are just a few examples.Snyder argues that in each case, Russia lost without existential risk.
In addition, Snyder emphasizes that Russia’s greatest successes in its invasion of Ukraine (still minor in total scale)occurred in the last six months when the U.S. “was delaying Ukraine aid rather than supplying it.” As Jack Waltling alsoemphasized, a Ukrainian defeat would also signal to Russia that it has and can defeat the West through prolonged exhaustion.
To develop a cognizant and successful strategy towards Russia, the U.S. must first articulate the requirement of a Russian defeat in Ukraine.
Strategic Steps to Russian Defeat
As Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program,wrote over X, Ukraine’s three primary hurdles are: ammunition, manpower, and fortifications. Lee, alongside colleagues Michael Kofman and Dara Massicot, propose a strategy “premised on three central elements: hold, build, and strike.” The strategy and commentary do an excellent job of articulating how the Ukrainian Armed Forces can, in the face of Russia’s growing manpower, distribute and train current brigades, absorb Russian offensives, and create challenges for Russia “far behind the front lines.”
Creating threats and challenges deeper behind the front lines is an immediate way in which the U.S. can support Ukraine’s ability to hold the front and fortify further. As Mark T. Kimmitt, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs,wrote, the U.S. and allies must loosen restrictions on military aid that inhibit cross-border attacks and prevent Ukraine from targeting Russia in the Black Sea. Loosening these restrictions will immediately add a new dimension to Russian risk, giving Ukrainians more space and time to develop a successful counter-offensive. Any alleviation of pressure from the front will provide the currently stagnant and exhausted Ukrainian brigades with the necessary resources for recuperation and training.
A key area of support could be a financing strategy that enhances Ukraine's ability to acquire munitions. Recent Ukraine aid legislation allows for the potential use of frozen Russian central bank assets for reconstruction efforts. Building on the Council of Europe proposal that references U.S. initiatives, the international community could explore the establishment of a multilateral legal mechanism to manage these assets. This mechanism could potentially provide compensation for reconstruction costs and free up Ukrainian resources for munitions procurement. Allies and partners hold approximately $300 billion in frozen Russian assets, with the U.S. holding at least $38 billion. Additionally, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has proposed a $100 billion fund for Ukraine's defenses, although this proposal faces internal opposition within the Alliance. Such a fund could facilitate greater coordination of security aid for Ukraine.
After the signing of Ukraine aid and in the lead-up to a challenging election, the Biden administration may be inclined to place Ukraine on the back burner of political communication. Yet, the discussion and growth of a larger Ukraine strategy must be articulated not only on the international stage but also communicated to the general American public. “It’s the president’s responsibility to make the case to the American people why Ukraine and our support matter. While he has done this a few times, the narrative has not been clear enough to most Americans,” said Alina Polyakova toPolitico, president and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis. At the NATO Washington Summit this July, the U.S. has the opportunity to hone its strategic vision and make these initiatives a primary agenda while presenting its case to the American people as to why the United States should support Ukraine and ensure Russian defeat. Whether it's Trump or Biden in the Oval Office come January 2025, Ukraine will need assistance, and the American people will need to know why.
Authors: Eline Stensen Gulliksen & Leif Niendorf - UK & European Affairs Team
Security in the Arctic
In recent years, the topic of Arctic security has gained significant attention in both scholarly and empirical circles. The Arctic's strategic value is derived from its geography, natural resources, shipping lanes, scientific research potential, and geopolitical influence. However, managing the Arctic is a complex task, as illustrated by conflicting territorial claims made by several countries. As a result, cooperation between multiple states is essential to safeguard and develop the region. The Arctic Council, composed of eight sovereign nations – Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, Russia, the USA, and Canada – has been established to promote such collaboration. A shift has been seen in how Arctic security is perceived, as it has putatively moved from Arctic Exceptionalism to a more geopolitically induced fragile situation. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia influenced this shift, pushing Sweden and Finish into NATO membership due to increased security concerns. This could potentially strengthen the alliance’s presence in the High North and alter the power balance in the Arctic creating increasing tension in the Arctic Council and beyond.
The notion of "Arctic exceptionalism" delineates the distinct characteristics of politics in the Arctic Council and, more broadly, in the region. This concept aligns with the constructivist approach to international relations, which prioritizes mutual ideas, customs, and values. Essentially, the notion maintains that cooperation trumps competition in the Arctic, where a zero-sum game prevails. Nevertheless, the idea of Arctic exceptionalism has elicited scepticism among scholars who believe it isolates the Arctic from global security discussions.
The Arctic Council experienced a notable shift in dynamics in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea, marking a significant departure from the formerly shared ideals, standards, and identities towards a more practical and geopolitical perspective on global affairs. This shift underscores how the Arctic, once viewed as a unique region, is now impacted by contemporary international security issues and how any disputes beyond the area could affect collaboration within it. Hence, the applicability of the notion of Arctic exceptionalism can be increasingly questioned.
Recent developments in the European High North
In March 2024 and April 2023 respectively, Finland and Sweden as two Arctic states joined NATO in direct response to Russia’s unprovoked full-scale war in Ukraine.It lucidly displays the interconnectedness of regional and global security dynamics, since the abatement of Arctic exceptionalism can be analyzed holistically, but also twofold, namely in terms of inherently regional security challenges and in the shadows of overall geopolitical competition in which China too,amid a race for raw materials, plays a role.
However, in the Northern European and Arctic regions themselves their accession might considerably change security dynamics and strategic proportions since not only the Baltic Sea is now a “NATO inlet“, but also out of the eight Arctic riparian states seven — all except Russia — are now NATO members, rendering Arctic security on this analytical level increasingly bipolar. This is all the more true for the continental European subsection of the Arctic.
Beyond that, Sweden and Finland discontinue being buffer states between Russia and NATO for the largest part in the European High North whilst their strategic value is not to be underestimated. Although they don’t border the Arctic Ocean, there is now a broad and direct linkage between it and the Baltic Sea. Possibilities of regional reinforcements and deterrence are strengthened hereby. It is not to forget that the Kola Peninsula a key location of Russian strategic assets borders the North-Eastern corner of Europe. As there is talk about a “Militarisation of Russian Polar Politics“, Finland and Sweden could prove immensely helpful for NATO to counter such developments and A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) abilities of Russia in the region through own deterrence by denial.
Both countries bring remarkable capabilities with them into the alliance — Finland primarily on land and Sweden in the air — enhancing NATO’s capabilities to operate in the High North. Since, for the first time in history, all Nordic countries are now formally gathered under one collective defence structure, these can now also be further increased with a lower threshold in compound with their neighbours and long-standing NATO members Denmark and Norway. Already existing cooperation, for example within NORDEFCO, could now be substantially extended with positive effects on NATO’s posture in the High North.
The Swedish supreme commander moreover called for the establishment of a permanent military presence in the Arctic by his country. In the same vein, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg demanded to boost the alliance’s presence in the Arctic. With Sweden and Finland in, this experiences facilitation, also concerning exercises in hostile and cold environments. Russia’s confrontational behaviour in the meanwhile doesn’t suggest that it will simply swallow intensified NATO activity in the North European Arctic.
All this is overtly not too compatible with the informal agreement about Arctic exceptionalism that this pristine region shall exclusively be used for unwarlike purposes. This is not to say that Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO solely and already had been the death blow to it, but new layers of security have been added that in tendency complicate the preservation of Arctic exceptionalism.
Conclusion
To summarize, Arctic exceptionalism is under threat. Both geopolitical and regional security dynamics could prove as challenging the notion of it. Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO realistically impact the latter, especially in the European Arctic where NATO and Russia as adversaries are now drawn significantly closer to one another. The years we are in are possibly decisive for its endurance, which will be largely dependent on how NATO and Russia mutually evaluate their actions and their willingness to not sacrifice this unique part of the world to power games.
Nevertheless, to separate the European High North and wider Arctic and geopolitical discourses runs the risk of drawing an incomplete picture. Although regional analysis can be meaningfully carried out, it shall never be forgotten that it is an excerpt of broader security dynamics. The Arctic is nothing different in that, posing thus also a conceptual challenge to the idea of Arctic exceptionalism.
Author: Dejvi Dedaj - South East Asia and Oceania team
Introduction
AANZFTA - the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement - is proof of the dedication of its member countries to achieving more integrated and interconnected economies. Indeed, there still is a dialogue on the expansion of the AANZFTA to include new member countries or additional agreements with other regional blocs and individual nations in AANZFTA’s pursuit of broader economic benefits and regional stability. However, what are the consequences of extending AANZFTA’s coverage, particularly concerning trade and investment possibilities and the promotion of sustainable development for participating countries?
Paving the Way for Regional Economic Advancement
Bringing new member states under the AANZFTA umbrella can generate new opportunities for growth and development in the region. The region becomes more dynamic as the trade and investment levels are maximised. Such market expansion allows businesses to extend their market and thus increases market demand, entrepreneurial spirit, and innovation. Accordingly, AANZFTA can benefit from each economy's strengths by admitting new members with varying potentials and resources. This would, in turn, create a more robust economic environment.
Additionally, AANZFTA could deepen its ties with other regional blocs and individual countries by entering into more bilateral or multilateral agreements, further strengthening its connection to global value chains. The expansion of AANZFTA could help the community members become more competitive in the world market by opening up their inputs, technologies, and distribution mechanisms.
Fostering Economic Dynamism
AANZFTA enlargement would be the key to the advancement of trade, investment, and economic growth in the member countries. AANZFTA not only puts an end to tariffs and other non-tariff barriers but also reforms the regulations that are in place, which makes trade across borders more efficient. This results in increased exports and imports, as well as increased capital inflows, boosting in turn the whole region's economy as well as creating more jobs in the region.
Besides, through the widening scope of AANZFTA, member states can decrease their dependence on long-term partners by trading within new markets and diversifying their trade and investment portfolios. This diversification, on the other hand, not only shields the economy from external shocks but also leads to a more competitive and dynamic nature of business. Thus, AANZFTA, by providing broader market access and trade diversification, enables member countries to discover new options and handle global economic turbulence with greater confidence and agility.
Strengthening Regional Integration
The expansion of AANZFTA can also facilitate the regional integration of the participating countries. Through the harmonisation of trade and investment policies, the member states can gradually unify their economic relations, which in turn can strengthen cooperation and collaboration among them. Such an alignment boosts the collective bargaining power of member countries in international negotiations; hence, they can conclude better trade deals and investment agreements to the advantage of their economy.
Moreover, AANZFTA contributes to the creation of regional supply chains and the establishment of value-added production networks. This sets the ground for the most efficient allocation of resources and the transfer of technology and know-how across borders. Hence, industries can combine their strong suits and use complementary resources, culminating in further innovation and productivity growth. Accordingly, the promotion of a collaborative platform for knowledge sharing and joint technology transfer is conducive to the stimulation of economic growth and development in the region, ultimately resulting in the joint prosperity of all member countries.
Empowering SMEs
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a crucial role in economic growth and job creation across many economic systems. Nevertheless, SMEs, despite their centrality, frequently face severe difficulties that limit their ability to grow. Indeed, financial access barriers, market opportunity limitations and technical expertise shortage are some of the problems faced by SMEs on a regular basis. However, if the member countries rely on the various provisions within the AANZFTA framework to support the growth of SMEs, they will be creating a productive environment for such enterprises to thrive.
In particular, SMEs can be empowered by AANZFTA as it undertakes various administrative procedures, decreasing the level of red tape and simplifying legal requirements. These strategies, in return, save SMEs valuable time and resources which can then be directed to the SMEs’ core business activities, as well as to investments in innovation and expansion. Additionally, AANZFTA can be a vehicle for financial aid, such as credit facilities and venture capital, which are aimed at resolving financial constraints potentially encountered by SMEs. Financial aid constitutes another important source towards further investments in technology, infrastructure and human capital development.
Navigating Challenges
Despite the numerous benefits that AANZFTA may bring about for the economic development and integration of the region, it also poses a set of challenges and considerations that require careful handling. Mainly, AANZFTA’s expansion may result in conflicting positions on issues that are sensitive and even vital to the member countries due to their differing interests and priorities. Indeed, every member state has unique economic goals, manufacturing needs or social issues that it will bring to the table. The desire to meet the needs of all these players will inevitably result in a lot of dialogue, compromises and consensus-building among the countries involved.
Furthermore, the process of accession of prospective new countries is not an easy feat. For instance, one of the most time-consuming and challenging tasks of the EU is concluding new agreements with the new member countries or the other regional blocs as negotiations necessarily pass through different legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks. The task of bridging the gaps between different legal systems, regulatory standards and administrative procedures can be overwhelming and thus involves a high level of precision and efficient cooperation among all stakeholders. What is more, the condition that negotiations must adhere to AANZFTA’s international commitments and obligations whilst providing a platform for new participants to have their say renders the negotiation process even more complicated.
The expansion of AANZFTA may also pose problems for the less competitive sectors. The intensified market liberalisation and the increased competition from foreign firms in some circumstances may challenge local businesses, leading to possible job losses and disruptions in certain industries. Therefore, policymakers should take targeted measures that aim at lessening the potential negative impacts of trade liberalisation, such as providing financial assistance to the affected industries, workforce retraining programs, and social safety nets.
Lastly, the diverse regulatory regimes across member countries may create barriers to trade and investment, impeding the effective and successful compliance and enforcement of regulations. Accordingly, the institution of regulatory coherence through robust information exchange, capacity-building, and dispute-resolution mechanisms should be a key priority for existing AANZFTA members. Strengthening institutional frameworks and enhancing regulatory transparency could also address these challenges and facilitate smoother integration processes.
Conclusion
Overall, the enhancement of AANZFTA entails a great potential to make trade and investment flow easily, create regional integration and encourage inclusive development across the area. Through a wider scope of membership or the negotiation of more agreements with other regional blocs or individual countries, AANZFTA can establish a more vigorous and resilient economy which benefits all involved stakeholders. Accordingly, the challenges and opportunities that accompany the enlargement of AANZFTA should be jointly addressed to serve the region's well-being.
The humanitarian crisis unfolding in the Middle East, in the Palestinian Territories, is among the most serious in the history of the Mediterranean.
The coexistence of different peoples with different cultures, customs and religious beliefs has accompanied the history of all civilisations that have settled along the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, yet the conflict between the State of Israel and Palestine seems far from seeing a resolution, due to the diplomatic inability of the Western and Eastern blocs to intervene decisively and put an end to a suffering far from the standards of the contemporary world.
United Nations Charter and Universal Declaration of Human Rights
It is worth reiterating that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) sets out fundamental rights that should serve as a beacon for action by any individual and State. Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 lay down principles specific to the human being, understood as an equal and free subject, whose identity must not be a reason for discrimination of any kind; and whose person must not be subjected to inhuman treatment.
For the purposes of this discussion, it seems natural to follow the benchmarks of international law and the commitment made by States. For these reasons, reference should also be made to the UN Charter, which should be read in conjunction with the UDHR in order to get a full understanding of the premises.
Article 1(1) of the UN Charter states that “[The purpose of the United Nations is] to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”.
State recognition and peoples’ rights
At first reading, it is plausible to think that this is a principle that applies to States only, as legal subjects, and in particular to contracting states, (i.e. those that are members of the United Nations). However, not only it applies to contracting States, which have agreed to follow the dictates of the signed papers in the broader context of international relations, but it also serves as a general principle of conduct of peoples and States towards peoples and social groups. After all, International Law is based upon customary law, which also benefits from the signature of documents such as the UDHR or the UN Charter.
This detail is crucial to observe with the right lens the dynamics of any case to be analysed, such as that of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian Territories are recognised as a state in fact by a limited number of States, be it for political or legal reasons. According to international law, in fact, recognition is not a necessary and determining factor for a State to be considered as such; however, it is a very important factor on a political level, as it lays the foundations for diplomatic relations between states. Such a point has been long discussed in doctrine, having jurists and scholars debating whether recognition is required (Constitutive Theory) or not (Declaratory Theory). Notably, the latter argument is supported by the Montevideo Convention (1933), which Article 3 establishes that:
“The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition, the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states according to international law”.
A State is then considered as such if it has control over an inhabited territory and is endowed with autonomous governing institutions, so that it can effectively exercise its sovereignty over the territory. It also means that the State is enabled to exploit the natural resources of its territory, and to provide services to the citizenry, as the population obtains the citizenship of the State to which it belongs.
Conclusion
One therefore gets the impression that the persecution to the detriment of minority populations may be primarily of a political nature. There is no valid reason for differences between peoples to lead to a sharp division between ethnic groups, and States, which enjoy a strong position concerning minorities, should be reminded of the principles of fundamental human rights. Diplomatic action must be incisive in this regard, because a clear-cut Western and Eastern stance on such issues can change the fate of peoples who are suffering countless casualties and seeing their rights denied.
For years, people could only travel between the two islands by ferry. On one side of the shore stood Malé, the capital of the Maldives, a bustling urban hub and a sensory feast in itself, with its markets bursting with colors, exotic fragrances, and the lively chatter of fishermen displaying their daily catch. On the opposite shore lay Hulhumale, an artificial island hosting modern residential facilities and the Maldives’ international airport. Connecting these two islands was vital for daily life, yet the ferry system often proved inadequate to its task – especially during peak hours, when tourists and locals alike had to endure endless queues under the tropical sun.
Things were to change when Abdulla Yameen was elected President in 2013. The half-brother of Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, often referred to as the “dictator” of the Maldives, Yameen had ambitious plans for his island nation. Through a development initiative known as “Greater Male” he aimed to elevate Malé, Hulhumale, and other neighboring islands into a modern hub with upgraded infrastructure, housing, and public services. But this grand vision faced a major obstacle. In 2011 the Maldives had lost its Least Developed Country (LDC) status, which meant that the island could no longer attract funds through international aid. With this avenue closed, Yameen had no other choice but to seek an alternative source of investment. Enter China.
Those were the times President Xi Jinping had started to promote the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), whose goals largely aligned with Yameen’s vision. It did not take long for Yameen to travel to Beijing, praise China as one of the Maldives’ “closest friends” and join the BRI. Nor did it take long for Chinese companies to establish their presence in the atolls: through Chinese loans, they built 11,000 high-rise buildings in Hulhumale, expanded the Velana International Airport, and extended the local electricity grid. Then came the Friendship Bridge. Built by China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC), it crossed over 2km of turquoise waters to connect Malé and Hulhumale, facilitating the flow of people and resources at a rapid pace. Commuters no longer needed to endure endless queues during peak times.
The conversation around these megaprojects, like any debate surrounding the BRI, quickly became sharply polarized. While some glorified the megaprojects as examples of “win-win cooperation”, many others disagreed. Given Malé’s significant debt to China, they argued that this scenario represented yet another example of debt trap diplomacy, where Beijing strategically pushes recipient countries into debt to then seize control over their assets. Similar claims have emerged in neighboring Sri Lanka, where Chinese-funded projects led to repayment challenges, eventually culminating in the transfer of the Hambantota port to China. However, simplifying the BRI’s presence in the Maldives to a dichotomy of “win-win cooperation” versus “debt trap diplomacy” is problematic. One only has to explore the urban center of Malé to discover a more nuanced reality. Here, the discontent among the local population towards their ruling élite highlights another crucial yet neglected actor in the BRI: the political leadership of the recipient country. That is, Chinese investors do not operate in a vacuum, but within a context where local politicians are active players rather than passive recipients of debt. In the case of the Maldives, the ruling class functions more like a cabal of corrupt politicians feeding a patronage-based system, and taking every megaproject as an opportunity for personal gain. “It is not really about China pushing the country into debt. It is more about our political class using foreign investors to satisfy their own thirst for cash”, says a local resident who spoke under the condition of anonymity. Take the above-mentioned Friendship Bridge. Initially proposed as a six-lane bridge connecting Hulhumale and Malé at a cost of around $100 million, it was later downsized to four lanes under Yameen’s administration. Despite the reduction in size, the cost of the project was doubled to almost $200 million. “The government initially promised a bigger bridge but later built a smaller one. They then inflated the contract value, pocketed the excess funds, and eventually left our Chinese creditors unpaid” explains the local resident.
Parallels can be drawn with the Hambantota Port. Here, a consultancy group estimated that constructing a bunkering facility would cost around $33 million, yet the Ports Minister demanded a $100 million loan. In both cases, the contracts were significantly inflated, allowing surplus cash to clandestinely find its way into the pockets of the ruling élite – Yameen’s inner circle in the Maldives, and the Rajapaksa family in Sri Lanka. Presently, Maldivian officials struggle to ascertain the exact amount of debt owed to China and are actively seeking to renegotiate interest rates and repayment plans. Meanwhile, President Yameen was arrested on corruption charges. This only highlights the importance of not overemphasizing China’s control over its projects abroad - it is equally vital to scrutinize the role of the host country’s political leaders, as they too significantly influence the nature of the BRI.
China is not alone in funding a construction boom in this small yet strategically positioned island nation. India, viewing the Maldives as part of its traditional sphere of influence, is also funding various megaprojects to steer the island away from the Chinese orbit – and back to its own: hospitals, cricket stadiums, ports and airports, and even a sea bridge connecting Malé to other islands in the West, surpassing the Friendship Bridge in both length and scale. Caught in between this geopolitical rivalry, the Maldivian political élite has attempted to capitalize on both Chinese and Indian investments to amass even more personal wealth, leading to rampant and unprecedented construction activity. Airports are being built on islands where only 800 people live, making people question if these developments are really necessary. Needless to say, this is a game with few winners and many losers. “The problem is that this construction boom simply does not fit the Maldivian reality” explains another local resident. “All this dredging activity is damaging our coral reef, which is our primary defense from rising sea levels. Yet we continue to destroy it with unnecessary construction projects. Meanwhile, our leadership gains illegal money, while greater powers fight their own geopolitical game on our sovereign territory”. Today, ordinary Maldivian citizens are burdened with debt and environmental devastation. Their nation owes at least $1.4 billions to Beijing – yet unofficially this figure might go as high as $3.5 billions, which accounts for 70% of their GDP. In addition, being the lowest-lying country in the world, many parts of the Maldives could sink by the end of this century, posing an existential threat to its inhabitants.
During the Third Belt and Road Forum in October 2023, President Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of fighting corruption associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. Premier Li Qiang echoed this commitment, stating that Beijing was committed to achieve a “clean Silk Road” devoid of graft. Yet ensuring a corruption-free Silk Road also necessitates more oversight over recipient countries, as they play a crucial yet underestimated role in determining the inclusivity and sustainability of BRI projects. Beyond simplistic notions of “win-win cooperation” versus “debt trap diplomacy”, the reality of the BRI is characterized by top-down decision-making, secretive negotiations, and limited public involvement. This only perpetuates a cycle of patronage, profit-seeking, and personal interests – all at the expense of human needs. Similar to the Sri Lankan experience, for the Maldivian population the true trap might not be that of Chinese investments - but the rule of a dysfunctional political leadership.