Featured Image

November 23, 2024 — No Comments

The Kashmir Conflict: The Tip of a Dangerous Glacier- Part I

by Davide Gobbicchi - Human Security Team

The return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan has shed light on Central Asia’s geopolitics and security issues, with many analysts fearing that Afghanistan would initiate a domino effect of destabilisation and Islamic radicalisation across a particularly unstable region of the world. Kashmir has best symbolised the complexity of South Asia, given its decades of instability, ethnoreligious tensions and major great powers' interests. Assessing this region helps us understand one of the most strategic and complex areas in the world.

This article attempts to uncover the motivations behind the long-standing conflict that turned Kashmir into the world’s most militarised region, to consequently try providing policy recommendations that could bring Kashmir stability and development, much to the benefit of its people, the larger geographical area, and the international community as a whole.

This article will be divided into two parts: the first will focus on the region’s historical and sociocultural context as well as its political structure, investigating the factors behind Kashmiris’ unique identity and the developments leading Kashmir to its current state of affairs; the second part will then analyse the solutions to the conflict proposed by the recent international academic literature and try to uncover the motivations behind Indo-Pakistani inability to implement such solutions, finishing by presenting policy recommendations for the actors involved in the conflict.

Understanding Kashmir: history and cultural identity 

Kashmir’s geographical position at the crossroads of empires and its predominantly mountainous nature created throughout the centuries two conditions common to such regions across the world: a highly heterogeneous population within an isolated territory. The centuries-old melting pot resulting from the region’s location destroyed classic patterns of identity (religion and language) and generated a society with incongruous religious-linguistic divisions, thus preventing the radicalisation of social groups along ethno-religious lines and instead nurturing a culture of peaceful coexistence among different religions and ethnicities that became known as “Kashmiriyat”. Simultaneously, Kashmir’s territorial morphology provided a natural barrier- mountains-against excessive foreign influence, thereby preserving a strong regional identity based not on a unique language, culture, or religion, but rather on the unique coexistence and intermingling of many.

Map 1: Erstwhile Princely State of Jammu & Kashmir. Currently, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, UT of Jammu & Kashmir and UT of Ladakh by India, and Aksai Chin by China.
Source and link: Wikimedia Commons.

The establishment of the "Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu" in 1846 marked the beginning of a distinct political entity in the region. The Maharaja of this new kingdom retained control over most internal matters while recognising the suzerainty of the British Empire. During its century of quasi-independent rule (1846–1952), the region saw the cultivation of ideals such as tolerance, secularism, and pluralism, which had long been part of its historical identity. Challenges emerged following the partition of 1947, as ethno-religious tensions in the newly created states of India and Pakistan began to affect Kashmir. The initial neutrality and aspirations for independence within the Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu encountered opposition from both India and Pakistan, each of which viewed Kashmir as integral to their national identities.

In 1947, armed tribal forces from Pakistan entered Kashmir, citing reports of violence against Muslims in the region, and sought to integrate Kashmir with the newly established Islamic Republic of Pakistan. in response to the foreign invasion, the Maharaja of Kashmir and Jammu - being himself a Hindu - requested India to intervene and stop Pakistani incursions into Kashmir, consequently allowing for Jammu and Kashmir to become part of the country. India’s intervention marked the beginning of the First Indo-Pakistani War (1947-1948) and - upon India’s request - the intervention of the UN to settle the dispute. UN Resolutions 47 and 48 called for a ceasefire and proposed a plebiscite to allow the people of Jammu and Kashmir to determine their political future. While a ceasefire was achieved and a ceasefire line established, disagreements between India and Pakistan prevented the implementation of the plebiscite, leaving the region divided and its population in a state of uncertainty.

In the following decades, the political and territorial landscape of Kashmir underwent further changes. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 resulted in China gaining control of the eastern region of Aksai Chin. The Third Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 led to the 1972 establishment of the Line of Control (LoC), a de facto border based largely on the previous ceasefire line, separating Pakistani-administered and Indian-administered territories. Despite a fourth Indo-Pakistani war in 1999 and subsequent smaller clashes, the region remains a point of contention between the two nations.

Kashmir remains to this day under the fragile division established by the 1972 Line of Control. However, decades of Indo-Pakistani influence and conflict have changed Kashmiri identity, slowly eroding the principles of tolerance and pluralism (Kashmiriyat) on which it had been resting for the previous centuries: Islamic fundamentalism - backed by Islamabad and fueled by New Delhi’s Hindu nationalism - gradually moved away from its historical irrelevance to gain growing importance in political and societal discourses, becoming the pillar of several political and civil society movements within the region. The increasing radicalisation among segments of the Muslim Kashmiri population contributed to the eruption of violence and terrorism, leading to the displacement of several religious minorities, including the Hindu Kashmiri Pandits, who relocated to predominantly Hindu areas of the region; these migrations impoverished the society’s ethnocultural diversity and consequently led to the alignment of identity with religion, thereby allowing the flourishing of geographical and sectarian divisions within Kashmir. These newly arising divisions greatly worsened living conditions, further fomenting extremism and interreligious hatred.

The political division of Kashmir 

As of today, India controls about 55% of Kashmir, Pakistan 30%, and China roughly 15% of it. Kashmir is now divided into four areas, with two under Indian control and two under Pakistani control, excluding the mostly uninhabited Chinese-controlled part of the region.:

  • Jammu & Kashmir (now “U.T. of Jammu and Kashmir”, and “U.T. of Ladakh”): This subregion under Indian control was given the status of “State” and granted a special degree of autonomy over its internal affairs by the Indian Constitution (article 370; article 35a). In 2019 the Indian Government - after decades of debate - approved the “Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act”, which abrogated the two articles and split the state into two “Union Territories” that enjoy far less autonomy than States: “the Union Territory of Ladakh”, and the “Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir”. Such a highly contested Act (justified by the Indian Government as a way to stimulate “financial activities, transparency in administration and growth in J&K’s economy.”) de facto marked the end to what was known as “Kashmiri Exceptionalism”, and was (and still is) met by widespread protests throughout the region (now divided into two different administrative territories), since many saw New Delhi’s centralism as an attempt to colonise the region and alter its unique identity.  
  •  Gilgit-Baltistan: this territory controlled by Pakistan is administered by the “Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009”, which officially grants the region self-rule but de facto puts it under the control of “an Islamabad-based council with its Chairman being the Prime Minister of Pakistan”. The order further facilitated Islamabad’s policy of ethnic substitution in the region - given Gilgit-Baltistan’s Shia majority in direct opposition to Pakistan’s Sunni tradition - thereby fueling tensions across the territory and demands for separatism. 
  • Azad Kashmir: this second region under Pakistani rule officially enjoys a wide degree of autonomy under its Interim Constitution of 1974, though it de facto is - like the other Pakistan-controlled region - completely subject to the will of Islamabad. Major natural disasters and the resulting mass emigration rapidly changed the territory’s demographics, drawing it closer to the rest of Pakistan. 

Having explained Kashmir’s sociocultural and political context, the second part of the article will focus on the solutions to its critical state of affairs.

Featured Image

November 14, 2024 — No Comments

Barracuda-M: Could Anduril be a Game-Chnager in. Modern Warfare and Defense Agility?

By Giulio Civettini - Military & Strategy Team

Introduction about Anduril and their mission 

Founded in 2017 by Oculus co-founder Palmer Luckey, ANDURIL INDUSTRIES is a California-based defense sector company1. As stated by Luckey and reflected in their mission, ANDURIL’s products aim to enhance the ability of the United States and its allies to counter both symmetrical and asymmetrical threats, thanks to the company’s cutting-edge technology and innovative production capabilities2 3. These capabilities stem from the very way the company was founded. Differently from other major companies in the sector, such as Northrop Grumman and RTX, ANDURIL is not dependent on external funders and avoids long-term contracts with the U.S. government4 5. This approach creates a system where the company’s success relies on its ability to develop cost-efficient, cutting-edge products6. ANDURIL secures the necessary funds through private venture capital investments, providing it with more autonomy compared to companies reliant on external funders7.

The company isn’t incentivised by project delays or increased costs, which is why having an ecosystem outside the traditional defence industry giants could position it to address some of the challenges faced by the U.S. and its allies89. By conducting R&D (research and development) internally and avoiding the typical long-term contracts that often overrun schedules and budgets, ANDURIL remains highly flexible and competitive10 11.

The company has pursued a vertical acquisition strategy to diversify its capabilities. This approach to vertical integration allows ANDURIL to directly adapt its core product, “LATTICE OS,” to various systems1213. By automating processes such as quality checks, ANDURIL can scale production, achieving a competitive position in the industry14. A prime example of this vertical integration is the acquisition of Area-I, a Georgia-based company specialising in small unmanned aerial systems (UAS). This acquisition not only diversifies ANDURIL’s portfolio of autonomous systems but also provides a strategic advantage by integrating AI and their software directly into drones.15 As mentioned earlier, ANDURIL’s core product is “LATTICE AI,” a software that coordinates the ecosystem the company has created, providing users with complete battlefield awareness and intelligence-gathering capabilities16.

The strategic choice of being independent for R&D and for long-lasting contracts is also reflected in how their supply chain is structured. Thanks to the control and efficiency guaranteed by the vertical integration model, ANDURIL has gained an important edge in the industry, giving them the unique ability in the sector to adapt “faster” to what are the immediate demands coming from the battlefield. The in-house production and agile nature of the company enable quick scaling up production of both small drones and more complex sensor systems17. What gives ANDURIL this ability to quickly scale production is the modular design, giving them the ability to quickly repair, substitute, and update their systems, giving the important possibility of resisting warfare “ATTRITION” to the U.S. arsenal18. This means that the weapons or systems that are being used are sufficiently autonomous and relatively cheap, and so the problem that could present with the loss of said system would not impact so much on a country’s arsenal19. The supply chain is built in such a way that the most important components on which the production relies are directly produced in the U.S. or in-house, minimizing third-party dependencies in case of an all-out war20.

So, what emerges from this analysis is that ANDURIL is a uniquely structured company in the defense sector. Its approach to funding, marketing strategies and, more importantly, its engineering capabilities give it an edge in the agility to which the company adapts to emerging scenarios21.

How do Cruise missiles and loitering munitions/UAVs play into American theater level strategy?

One of the most recent additions to ANDURIL’s portfolio is the BARRACUDA AAV (autonomous air vehicle) (6). Before exploring how such a system could really change the current power competition happening over the South China Sea, it’s important to understand the role of cruise missiles and loitering munitions/UAVs. For decades, the U.S. has maintained uncontested air dominance wherever it has operated, giving it the possibility to deploy ground forces where needed. This has changed in the last decade; the new power competition that has emerged in the South Pacific is threatening the U.S.’s ability to maintain such a role. With the constant threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty, the United States is concerned about how, in an all-out conflict to protect the island, air superiority could be guaranteed22.

In this sense, the ability to counter China’s A2/AD strategy (Anti-Access/Area Denial)—which includes advanced missile defense systems, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and long-range radar systems capable of detecting and neutralising U.S. forces in the area—is crucial23. In this scenario, the role played by cruise missiles such as the “Tomahawk” or the JASSM is pivotal, as they could target the intricate defense systems of China’s A2/AD network24. Another important feature of these cruise missiles is their ability to perform low-altitude missions; being hard to detect, U.S. forces could potentially overwhelm defenses, penetrate hypothetical defensive shield, and enable amphibious landings or aerial assaults.

In contrast, loitering munitions offer the ability to conduct surveillance and real-time targeting acquisitions while loitering in the air. The strategic advantage of these weapon systems lies in their relative affordability and ease of replacement compared to larger, more expensive cruise missiles. In a potential conflict, it is key not only to have superior hardware, such as the F-35s or cruise missiles, but also to deploy systems that can provide targeting and surveillance in large numbers and at a low cost25. These factors explain ANDURIL’s recent efforts to develop the BARRACUDA AAV. This weapon system, supported by the production, acquisition, and supply chain strategies outlined above, is designed to be cost-effective and easily replaceable26.

The features of the BARRACUDA, in its three possible iterations, combine elements of both a standard cruise missile and a loitering munition. The advanced LATTICE AI, integrated with the BARRACUDA, enables the system to operate autonomously, reducing the human workload and enhancing operational speed. Advanced sensors, machine vision, and AI-guided targeting allow the BARRACUDA to alter its target mid-course and remain airborne for extended periods27.

There are several variants of the BARRACUDA. The first iteration, the BARRACUDA 100, is the smallest and lightest version, with an estimated payload of around 35 lbs and an 85-mile range when air-launched. This version is deployable from AH-Z1 helicopters, AH-64, and C-130 variants. The second version, the BARRACUDA 250, has an estimated payload of 85 lbs and a much longer range of 200 miles when air-launched. This iteration can be deployed from a variety of platforms, such as the F-35 (for internal carriage in bombers) or the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 (for external carriage)28.

Barracuda’s technical role and how it stands out from existing systems

We rapidly talked in the last paragraph about the BARRACUDA-M family, but how does it really compare to the current family of cruise missiles? In the U.S. arsenal now, there are two types of similar systems, which are the TOMAHAWK and the JASSM. Both the JASSM and the TOMAHAWK feature a larger payload and a longer range (both with a payload of 1,000 lbs and a range of 200 miles vs 1,000-1,500 miles). The JASSM is primarily designed for air-launch from bombers and tactical aircraft, specialised in striking high-value targets from a stand-off distance. In contrast, the Tomahawk is a naval cruise missile, primarily launched from ships and submarines, and designed for precision strikes against land targets. Often used in maritime operations, it can engage various targets, including enemy ships and infrastructure.

After this summary of the current U.S. arsenal, it’s time to analyse where the actual competitive edge of the BARRACUDA family lies. With an estimated cost per unit of approximately $1.4 million for the JASSM (the newer JASSM-ER can cost around $2 million per unit) and from $1.5 to $2 million per unit for the Tomahawk, these systems are more expensive than the BARRACUDA in its larger iteration, the -500, which is estimated to be about 30% cheaper29. Another issue with the current U.S. stockpile of both the Tomahawk and JASSM systems is that, during various “war games” simulating an all-out conflict with China, this stockpile could be exhausted in just over a week of sustained combat operations. Given that the current production timeline for some munitions is around 20 months, concerns are raised about the U.S.’s ability to withstand a protracted conflict. This is one of the main reasons why the BARRACUDA-M family, if its premises hold true, could be a real game-changer, acting as a force multiplier and providing much-needed attrition capabilities in the potential conflict30.

Photo by Michael Wambangco: https://www.pexels.com/photo/us-navy-airplane-in-sky-20186687/

Export capability

The U.S. are not the only countries in the NATO alliance to have this kind of cruise missiles. In fact, France, Germany, Spain, and the UK have developed such systems. The UK and France use the “Storm Shadow/SCALP EG,” while Germany and Spain deploy the “Taurus KEPD 350”. The current stockpiles of these systems, along with production timelines and cost per unit, suggest that the advent of the BARRACUDA could be an interesting addition to these countries’ arsenals, providing a valid, cheaper alternative to more expensive and harder-to-produce systems31.

Conclusion

Anduril’s innovative contributions to the defense industry have the potential to significantly reshape global power dynamics in the years to come. With emerging threats like UAVs, loitering munitions, and the broader proliferation of drones, NATO countries such as the United States must recognize that preparing solely for symmetrical warfare is no longer sufficient32. Anduril’s approach becomes crucial in this evolving landscape. Its scalable production capabilities, combined with agility in research and development, position it to meet the rapidly changing demands of modern warfare. By integrating its core product, “LATTICE AI,” Anduril provides real-time, all-domain awareness and coordination, offering operators a comprehensive view of the battlefield. This adaptive technology bridges the gap between traditional military frameworks and the newer, faster-moving technological threats, such as autonomous systems and artificial intelligence. Anduril’s strength lies in its ability to complement the slower, more bureaucratic defense apparatus of conventional forces with its ability to react quickly and at a scale. By leveraging automation, modular systems, and software-driven innovation, Anduril ensures that NATO forces, especially the U.S., are better equipped to handle both large-scale conventional conflicts and smaller, asymmetric engagements.

The flexibility of Anduril’s ecosystem, characterized by fast-paced R&D cycles and a domestic supply chain, allows for rapid deployment of crucial assets and weapons systems33. This ability to respond to emerging threats efficiently, through innovations like the Barracuda family of AAVs or scalable drone production, highlights the significance of Anduril’s role in shaping the modern defence industry. As global power competition intensifies, particularly with rivals like China, companies like Anduril will be essential in maintaining military superiority, ensuring that NATO forces are not only prepared for current challenges but also those of the future. The defense industry, traditionally slow to adapt, is now being pushed to evolve by Anduril’s pioneering model, which balances autonomy, scalability, and technological innovation.

This transformation might ultimately drive a shift in how conflicts are approached, moving from rigid, high-cost systems to more agile, lower-cost, and rapidly deployable alternatives. In this context, Anduril’s innovations could serve as a cornerstone of a new era in global defense strategy, one where agility, warfare-attrition capability, and adaptability become the pillars of power projection34.

  1. Aitoro, Jill. “As Tech Startups Catch Dod’s Eye, Big Investors Are Watching.” Defense News, August 19, 2022. https://www.defensenews.com/smr/cultural-clash/2020/01/30/as-tech-startups-catch-dods-eye-big-investors-are-watching/.  ↩︎
  2. Ibidem ↩︎
  3. Tamir Eshel, By, Tamir Eshel, Tamir Eshel, News Desk, and Tamir Eshel - Oct 13. “Anduril’s Lattice AI - Defense Update:” Defense Update: - Military Technology & Defense News, January 6, 2024. https://defense-update.com/20231222_lattice-ai.html#google_vignette.  ↩︎
  4. Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.” CSIS. Accessed October 27, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan ↩︎
  5. Gould, Joe. “US Defense Industry Unprepared for a China Fight, Says Report.” Defense News, January 24, 2023. https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2023/01/23/us-defense-industry-unprepared-for-a-china-fight-says-report/.  ↩︎
  6. Losey, Stephen. “Anduril Unveils Modular, High-Production Barracuda Cruise Missiles.” Defense News, September 16, 2024. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2024/09/12/anduril-unveils-modular-high-production-barracuda-cruise-missiles/.  ↩︎
  7. See 3. ↩︎
  8. See 4-5. ↩︎
  9. See 5.  ↩︎
  10. Oberman, Justin P. “Redefining Disruption: A Plan to Upgrade Defense Innovation.” Defense News, August 18, 2022. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/09/09/redefining-disruption-a-plan-to-upgrade-defense-innovation/.  ↩︎
  11. See 1-4 ↩︎
  12. “Anduril Acquires Air-Launched Effects Company Area-I.” Inside Defense. Accessed October 27, 2024. https://insidedefense.com/insider/anduril-acquires-air-launched-effects-company-area-i ↩︎
  13. See 3 ↩︎
  14. See 6. ↩︎
  15. See 2-3 ↩︎
  16. Tirpak, John. “Anduril Unveils New Low-Cost ‘Barracuda’ Cruise Missiles.” Air & Space Forces Magazine, September 12, 2024. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/anduril-unveils-new-low-cost-cruise-missiles/. ↩︎
  17. See 6. ↩︎
  18. Schogol, Jeff. “The Pentagon Seeks to Stock up on Tomahawks and Other Tactical Missiles in $842 Billion Budget.” Task & Purpose, March 13, 2023. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/pentagon-2024-budget-missiles/.  ↩︎
  19. Shelbourne, Mallory. “Raytheon Awarded $217M Tomahawk Missiles Contract for Navy, Marines, Army.” USNI News, May 25, 2022. https://news.usni.org/2022/05/25/raytheon-awarded-217m-tomahawk-missiles-contract-for-navy-marines-army.  ↩︎
  20. See 1-4-5. ↩︎
  21. See 4-10-16. ↩︎
  22. See 4. ↩︎
  23. See18 ↩︎
  24. See 19 ↩︎
  25. See 6 ↩︎
  26. See 16 ↩︎
  27. See 6-1 ↩︎
  28. See 16 ↩︎
  29. See 18-19. ↩︎
  30. See 4-5-16. ↩︎
  31. See 18-19. ↩︎
  32. See 4-6-10. ↩︎
  33. See 3-5-16. ↩︎
  34. See 10- 5. ↩︎
Featured Image

November 13, 2024 — No Comments

Iran’s Hostility Towards Israel: Three Influential Reasons

by Margherita Ceserani, Shahin Modarres, Shir Mor, William Kingston-Cox - Iran Team

The Islamic Republic’s recent choice to directly confront Israel, avoiding its usual reliance on proxy groups, marks a significant shift in its Middle East strategy. Long dependent on groups like Hezbollah and Hamas for regional influence, the weakening of these proxies—amid Israeli retaliation and Iran’s internal crises—has led Tehran to reconsider its approach. This article explores the internal and external factors driving the Islamic Republic’s move toward a more direct confrontation.

Its proxies weakening 

The Islamic Republic's decision to attack Israel directly, bypassing its traditional reliance on proxy groups - also called the "Axis of Resistance" - marks a significant shift in its strategic approach. This uncharacteristic behaviour is largely driven by the weakening of its proxies, particularly in the aftermath of the events following October 7th.

For decades, the Islamic Republic has built, supported, and relied on external groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis to exert influence, especially in the Middle East, and keep Israel engaged. However, recent Israeli military retaliation has severely weakened these proxies, diminished their operational capabilities, and reduced their effectiveness in countering Israeli threats and holding power positions in the Middle East and the whole world.

The Islamic Republic maintains a network of allied groups across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. The IRGC Quds Force, responsible for operations beyond Iran's borders, coordinates with these groups in line with Iranian directives. This network supports Iran’s strategy to extend its influence throughout the region and beyond. For example, the Houthis have impacted maritime security in the Red Sea, prompting responses from U.S. and U.K. military coalitions in Yemen. Iran also provides funding and weaponry to groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, facilitating their actions against Israel despite Hamas' Sunni background. In Syria, Iran has established a direct influence on the Assad regime and deploys allied militias to strengthen its presence, using the country as a base for potential actions against Israel. By supporting these groups, Iran seeks to counter its adversaries, extend its ideological influence, and maintain leverage in key areas, which affects both regional and global security.

The targeted killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah by Israel, coupled with the assassination of Hamas figure Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, signifies a pivotal moment in the collapse of the "Axis of Resistance." These significant blows not only weaken Iran's most powerful regional proxies but also destabilise Tehran's long-standing influence in the Middle East. Established in the 1980s, Hezbollah evolved under Iranian support into a formidable political and military force; Nasrallah's death highlights how Israel's recent military operations have fractured Iran's strategic foothold, jeopardising its long-term plans. Similarly, Haniyeh's assassination, attributed to Israel despite no official claim of responsibility, directly challenges Iran's authority, especially given that he was in Tehran to coordinate efforts with Iranian leaders. The operation's occurrence within Iran sends a powerful message about Tehran's vulnerability and reflects a broader Israeli strategy to undermine Iran’s network of proxies which consistently threaten Israel’s security and complicates Iran’s ability to project power.

The Islamic Republic's long-term strategic plans have been significantly disrupted, prompting a notable shift toward a direct approach to its conflict with Israel. Historically reliant on proxy forces to advance its agenda, the recent weakening of these groups has forced Iran to reevaluate its strategy. The decision to directly confront Israel reflects not only an immediate tactical shift but also an acknowledgement that its traditional methods may no longer achieve its regional objectives. This transformation is underscored by the diminishing effectiveness of the "Axis of Resistance" and signifies a recalibration of tactics amid a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. These developments carry profound implications for both Iran's future strategies and broader regional stability and global security.

Domestic dissatisfaction 

Tehran’s decision to escalate tensions with Israel can be understood by its multifaceted internal crises, which challenge the regime economically, politically, and socially. The economic decline of the Iranian economy has been worsened for years by international sanctions, global fluctuations and instability in oil prices, and rising inflation, fueling widespread discontent among an already-beleaguered Iranian population. Tehran has been unable to quell the resultant dissatisfaction, particularly following the protests after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. Amini’s death fuelled a popular challenge of cleric authority and demands for greater civil liberties. 

The society of the Islamic Republic is becoming increasingly secularised, eroding the clerical influence of the regime. Its reliance upon the continued legitimacy of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which is increasingly contested as Iranian society, particularly its younger elements, becomes increasingly disillusioned with religious politicisation, and, in turn, becoming increasingly secularised. Many young Iranians are showing disdain for traditional practices, a consequence of exposure to Western media. This particular challenge for the regime is existential - its entire raison d’etre rests upon religious foundations. 

Coupled with the endemic internal challenges and the pressures from its proxies, Tehran’s decision to strike Israel reveals itself as a tool of diversion; an attempt to rally patriotic fervour and unity in return for relative political stability. By framing a new national, external enemy, the Iranian regime can distract and obfuscate from its internal dissent, all whilst performatively asserting itself as a regional power. This approach undertaken by the Iranian government does, of course, risk exacerbating economic downfall as an overreliance on oil revenues could be manipulated to Tehran’s detriment. Whilst the Iranian leadership will no doubt conceive these external manoeuvres to be a part of a ‘survival strategy’, it cannot be overstated how further economic strife will precipitate deepening and widening domestic disillusionment and, ultimately, unrest, prompting new calls for regime change. 

Source: photo-generated with the support of artificial intelligence.

Nuclear Advancements 

Tehran’s approach to foreign policy in the Middle East is influenced by a combination of geopolitical, ideological, and military considerations, with its nuclear program playing a significant role. Since the United States' withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018, the Islamic Republic has advanced its nuclear developments, positioning these capabilities as a potential deterrent against perceived external threats, particularly from Israel. A notable development occurred in 2023, when the IAEA reported finding uranium particles enriched to 83.7% in a declared facility — a level approaching weapons-grade material.

These advancements have significantly strengthened the Islamic Republic’s strategic position, as the prospect of developing nuclear weapons reduces the likelihood of direct military intervention by its adversaries. With this deterrent in place, though not the sole factor, the Shiite regime feels emboldened to act more assertively, pushing the limits of its regional influence and responding more aggressively to external provocations. For instance, the Israeli strike on the Islamic Republic’s consulate in Damascus in April 2024 has been met with an increased likelihood of retaliation. Tehran’s nuclear capability serves as a protective shield, allowing it to project power and influence more aggressively, while its ideological goals and regional ambitions drive its assertiveness in confronting rivals like Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Despite arguments by some experts that nuclear weapons would undermine its security and diplomatic relations, Iranian officials view nuclear capabilities as a strategic asset that could grant superiority over regional adversaries. Engaging in a nuclear arms race could be economically unsustainable and diplomatically harmful for Tehran, however, nuclear capability is tied not only to military deterrence but also to a pursuit of prestige, both domestically and internationally. This aligns with its broader goal of establishing regional hegemony, while also reflecting its revolutionary ideology rooted in values like independence, anti-imperialism, and resistance to foreign domination since 1979.

Conclusion

The Islamic Republic’s shift to direct action against Israel reflects a new phase in its foreign policy. Weakened proxies and rising domestic discontent are challenging Tehran’s traditional strategies. As nuclear developments bolster its assertiveness, this new approach risks further regional instability and could have global security implications, underscoring a significant turning point in Middle Eastern dynamics.

  • Board of Governors (2023). NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General. Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2023-58.pdf.
  • Mirza, M.N., Abbas, H. and Qaisrani, Irfan Hasnain (2022). The Iranian Nuclear Programme: Dynamics of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), American Unisolationism and European Apprehensions. Journal of European Studies, 38(1), pp.14-32. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4002492.
  • Maleki, A. (2010). Iran’s nuclear file: recommendations for the future. Daedalus, 139(1), pp.105–116. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40544048 [Accessed 2024].
Featured Image

November 1, 2024 — No Comments

The Harris-Walz Ticket and the Future of the Democratic Party

by Anurag Mishra - USA Team

As the world’s most awaited political battle commences, the ideological schism in American politics appears to be wider than ever. The two major parties remain divergent on almost every issue concerning contemporary American politics. While the Red Ticket packs an emboldened, fiercer (but older) Donald Trump with a very conservative up-and-coming senator from Ohio, J.D. Vance, the Blue Ticket offers the first woman Veep in American history with a dubbed-radical governor from Minnesota, Tim Walz. Both tickets stretch the rope further towards the right and left, and even four years hence, no American unity is in sight.

The Harris-Walz ticket is arguably the most progressive presidential ticket in America’s recent history. While Kamala was a natural choice to succeed President Biden on top of the Democratic ticket, Tim Walz’s naming was a bit of a surprise. While several pundits expected an attempt at ideological ticket balancing, given Harris’s liberal credentials, Tim Walz’s inclusion is presumably an attempt to encash Walz’s midwestern cool-dad image and muster the votes of the pro-choice women and young/first-time voters.

The Harris-Walz Ticket – Democratic Unity or Compromise?

Kamala Harris secured her nomination without contesting the primaries. A public mandate on her work as VP is yet to be duly recorded. The last time she contested for an elected position was the 2020 democratic primaries, where she put up a dismal show, failing to gather even a solitary delegate’s support. All of that together does not help her democratic vita. Amid Republican accusations that Kamala Harris is a handpicked candidate and lacks popular support, Kamala’s choice of a liberal governor with a midwestern appeal to accompany her on the ticket is, at best, a very curious political move. The pairing raises questions about the internal compromises or divisions within the Democratic party and if the pair carries a broad national appeal.

Recently at a press briefing, President Biden remarked that Kamala has been vital in everything his presidency has achieved and worked for and that Kamala is “singing from the same song sheet.” This, again, falters Kamala’s “call for change.” On the other hand, Tim Walz’s perception has been amorphous. The Minnesota governor started as a very bipartisan, moderate congressman but has steadily turned left over the years. The abortion bill that he signed into law removed “all restrictions to abortion,” and the following “shield law” makes it easier for women from other states to get abortions in Minnesota with no legal repercussions. All of this has played out in favor of President Trump and the GOP.

On Policy Front

The Biden White House registered strong numbers in post-Covid job creation and economic growth but has grappled with soaring gas prices and general inflation. Ms. Harris, while inheriting this troubled legacy, is promising to build an “opportunity economy” stilted on promises of mortgage assistance for first-time homebuyers, a tax credit for parents of newborns, and bans on price gouging at the grocery store. Harris has repeatedly said that her presidency will not be a continuation of Biden’s presidency but has remained unconvincing and unclear on what she would do differently. Her stance on abortion access (Tim Walz’s inclusion on the ticket is the biggest stressor) is expected to be fiercer compared to President Biden as she has been the most vocal critic of Roe v. Wade’s reversal. On gun safety laws, Kamala Harris, as president, is almost certain to undertake stricter measures, as she has been steadfast in support of a stricter gun law regime throughout her career. 

The issue where she might take a leap ahead of President Biden is her policy on crime; Ms. Harris has lately been non-committal on her personal stances on all three. Kamala Harris, then a senator, had supported the First Step Act of 2018, which provided for a lesser sentence for offenders and early releases, and hailed it as a step in the direction of “righting the wrong” in the criminal justice system. Ms. Harris also supports legalizing marijuana, although she has a disconcerting record of procuring more than 2,000 convictions for marijuana possession when she ran the justice department in the state of California. Ms. Harris will find it difficult to maneuver while being accused by the Republicans of being “soft on crime”. Her unrestrained praise for the “Defund the Police” movement is a veritable question mark on her crime policies. On Climate issues, Kamala Harris, both as a senator and as Vice President was averse to fracking and dependence on fossil fuel. However, close to the elections, she has taken a more moderate stance on fracking by replacing dependence on fossil fuels with dependence on foreign oil. However, once elected to office, Kamala Harris as president is likely to introduce aggressive measures to minimize fracking and reduce the country’s dependence on fossil fuels while opening the doors for a bigger Green New Deal.

Source: by Gage Skidmore - flickr.com

The handling of the southern border was one of the most burning election issues in 2016 as well as in 2020 and has continued to remain one even in 2024. While Ms. Harris has maintained a more humane approach to dealing with immigration, she seems to have toughened her stance on the same with elections approaching close. Her claims of tapering border immigration and a kinder yet terse appeal of “Don’t” (Don’t Come) have seemingly made her stance on border immigration difficult to predict. Amidst the policy uncertainty, Republican accusations against Harris (dubbed the Border Czar) for the mishandling of the southern border, the narrative against Haitian immigrants being pet-eaters, etc., are already proving to be a difficult punch to dodge.

The Future of the Harris-Walz Democratic Party

Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez are arguably the most progressive faces of the Democratic Party. While both of them never rallied behind President Biden except for the sake of partisan unity, they have both thrown their weight behind the Harris-Walz ticket and celebrated the Minnesota former teacher’s inclusion as Harris’s running mate. Tim Walz,  also known as the champion of progressivism (and given the unkind moniker Tampon Tim by his rivals), has suggested, through his works at the Minnesota gubernatorial office, his appetite for socialistic and progressive policy changes. On most issues of national importance, Walz either matches pace with Harris or is a step ahead. Walz supports gender-affirming care, calls abortion healthcare, and is in favor of creating a pathway to citizenship for illegal immigrants, as opposed to Trump’s call for the “biggest deportation operation.” A conclusive public mandate in favor of the Harris-Walz duo is almost certain of changing the Democratic Party’s character and making its entry into an entirely new world of politics. Is this another George McGovern moment for the Democratic Party? We will find out soon.

Featured Image

October 14, 2024 — No Comments

Mpox Crisis in the DRC: Healthcare Challenges Admist Conflict 

By Michela Mansoldo - Human Rights Team

Introduction

On August 14, 2024, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the Mpox crisis a public health emergency of international concern. This declaration comes as the outbreak spreads broadly across the overall Western and Central African region, with two-thirds of the cases recorded in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This situation exacerbates the already existing challenges within the country’s internal political system and deteriorates the ongoing human rights crisis. The Congolese population faces enormous aggravations due to ongoing armed conflict, high food insecurity, and continuous human rights abuses, particularly in the mining sector. This article will examine how the Mpox outbreak in the DRC highlights broader social challenges in the country, including the impact of the mining industry on the already burdened healthcare system.

What is Mpox?

Mpox is an infectious disease that spreads through close and/or sexual contact, and it poses a significant risk to individuals with weakened immune systems, especially pregnant women and children, whose contractions can be fatal. While the initial outbreak was identified in 2022, Mpox has been reported in the DRC for over a decade. The situation worsened in 2024 with the emergence of a new strain, resulting in over 26,000 cases and 833 deaths to date.

In response to the outbreak, vaccination campaigns commenced in September 2024, but the rollout faced delays, making it challenging to keep up with the rapidly increasing case numbers. This situation raises critical questions on equitable access to healthcare in the country, where over 7 million people are internally displaced and around 25 million face food insecurity. Among the most vulnerable populations are children, especially those who are undernourished and live in refugee camps, where sanitation and access to clean water are limited.

According to the Global Director of Health and Nutrition at Save the Children, the DRC records some of the highest levels of child insecurity globally and in 2023, violence, displacement, and killings reached alarming peaks, as reported by UNICEF. Furthermore, issues such as lack of sanitation, sexual abuse and child labour, significantly affect the contraction rate of Mpox amongst another vulnerable group in the DRC: miners.

Cobalt Mines and Human Rights Issues

Owning approximately 70% of the world's cobalt resources, eastern DRC has become a hotspot for conflict and exploitation. The mining industry has caused significant human rights violations in the country, triggering numerous interventions and peacekeeping efforts. The exploitation of Congolese labour dates back to the Belgian colonial period, and both internal and international actors have profited from it ever since.

The demand for cobalt has intensified with advancements in technology and the production of batteries, yet this surge has not been accompanied by a secure and sustainable approach to extraction. In fact, cobalt is highly toxic to inhale and leads to a number of healthcare complications for artisanal workers. Although mining may appear to be one of the better-paid jobs for locals, it comes with significant social and medical obstacles.

In mining areas, the risk of injuries is high due to the constant collapse of pits, often burying workers alive, including children. Reports indicate that tens of thousands of children are involved in the cobalt industry, which often leads them to abandon their education. Moreover, their prolonged exposure to toxic substances can severely damage internal organs, further aggravating immune responses to infections, which are very common in mining communities. Besides the rare access to sanitation facilities in mines, another issue is related to sexual abuses, which often results in the contraction of sexually transmitted and debilitating diseases. 

This situation underscores the vulnerability of individuals with already compromised health, further exacerbating the spread of mpox in Eastern DRC, where most mines are located.

Challenges for Healthcare

Despite ongoing efforts to deliver vaccines, the WHO remains optimistic about eradicating Mpox. However, the situation in mining areas poses significant challenges to this vision. Key obstacles include the remote locations of some communities and a lack of awareness about Mpox among local populations. Many individuals lack basic knowledge about the diseases they may contract and the preventive measures necessary to limit their spread. In fact, with the fourth-largest population in Africa and a substantial number of displaced people, the DRC faces an even more complex health burden. Many diseases affect the population - including malaria, HIV, and tuberculosis - and only a portion of these are transmittable. Apart from Mpox, vaccination efforts against other infectious diseases remain insufficient, with geographical coverage remaining low. According to the WHO, the lack of childhood immunisation in the DRC has reached alarming levels, with nearly 2 million children classified as zero-dose or under-immunised.

In times of emergencies, it is important to not only highlight the challenges in ensuring timely responses but also to examine the underlying causes of these issues. In the DRC, limited access to healthcare is influenced not only by geographical barriers or population density but also by the ongoing conflict. Insecurity, high population mobility, and resource exploitation are contributing factors to the spread of Mpox in the country, and they point to gaps in both governmental efforts and regional cooperation.

Source: Russell Watkins/Department for International Development'. (https://shorturl.at/C142R)

Root Causes and Systemic Failures

The underlying causes of conflict in the DRC contribute to various challenges affecting healthcare stability. For instance, displacement, food insecurity, and economic uncertainty can lead to behaviors such as transactional sex, which may increase the spread of diseases. Additionally, difficulties in establishing accountability among political actors can hinder efforts to strengthen community resilience. The country's high level of militarization has also contributed to local distrust of both internal and external actors, which may extend to healthcare and humanitarian personnel.

Effectively addressing the Mpox crisis requires a multifaceted approach. Beyond implementing measures to control the spread of the disease, integrating conflict resolution strategies into healthcare efforts is essential. To restore a system facing significant challenges and improve human rights protections in the DRC, a comprehensive reevaluation of societal issues is needed.

Although finding definitive solutions is highly complicated, there is a large space for improvement. For instance, involving the local population in the management and participation of health programs is essential. As proposed by Bashwira, Mihigo and Duclos from the Social Science in Humanitarian Action Platform (SSHAP), initiatives such as mapping conflicts and assessing organisational patterns could prove beneficial for larger-scale responsiveness.

Conclusions

Access to healthcare is a fundamental human right, and global accountability plays an important role in advocating for those with limited means to voice their needs. Promoting equitable healthcare access, while also addressing the socioeconomic factors that contribute to health disparities, is essential. Implementing community-led programs can help create sustainable solutions to the challenges faced by vulnerable populations. Collaborative efforts between local actors and international NGOs can support the delivery of essential services and resources.

In conclusion, the Mpox emergency is not solely a medical issue but is closely connected to broader societal challenges. Addressing it from a wider perspective can provide not only immediate health interventions but also contribute to reducing the underlying factors that increase population vulnerability. Through comprehensive efforts, there is potential to improve health outcomes for the Congolese people and uphold their fundamental rights.

Featured Image

October 10, 2024 — No Comments

Antifa: Evaluating Claims of Democratic Threat and the Debate over Terrorist Classification

By Agostino Bono, Rodney Ekow Buah, Isabelle Despicht, Sophie Herzog Sønju - Crime, Extremism and Terrorism Team

Introduction

The name Antifa was first used in Nazi Germany by a coalition of far-left parties which were created to oppose the growing power of Nazism. The term Antifa is a shortened form of antifaschistisch (anti-fascist). Its members were driven and are still driven by beliefs which combat fascist, racist and right-wing ideologies, through any means both legal and illegal.

Antifa, a decentralised movement, follows both anarchist and communist ideologies. This is reflected in the group's symbols, which incorporate the red flag of the 1917 Russian Revolution and the black flag of 19th-century anarchists.

Conservative pundits and politicians, including former President Donald Trump, have repeatedly accused Antifa of participating in left-wing protests against police brutality and racism in the United States, particularly from the mid-2010s and during the 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.

This article will explore whether Antifa poses a threat to democracy and whether it can be defined as a terrorist group. Much of the relevant literature suggests that Antifa is not a threat to democracy and lacks the characteristics of a terrorist group. The origins of Antifa are rooted in anti-authoritarianism and anti-fascism, which some argue align it more closely with democratic principles. However, others believe that Antifa's violent and occasionally illegal tactics pose a threat to democracy, emphasizing that such methods may undermine free expression, a fundamental aspect of democratic society.

Historical Background

The Antifa movement emerged in Germany and Italy in opposition to the rising Nazi and fascist ideologies. This is exemplified by groups such as the Antifaschistische Aktion in Germany and the Arditi del Popolo in Italy. The anti-fascist ideology gained momentum and spread its influence beyond Germany and Italy. In October 1936, tens of thousands of anti-fascists reacted to a march of British Union fascists on Cable Street and Whitechapel by throwing rocks and homemade bombs.

While anti-fascism decreased worldwide due to the fall of Nazi Germany, it reemerged in the 1970s to counter an increase in Neo-Nazi activity in Europe, Asia and the United States.

Since the 1980s, the United States has witnessed the highest level of anti-fascist protests. For example, the Anti-Racist Action Network, which operated between 1987 and 2013, and the Puget Sound John Brown Gun Club are examples of active anti-fascist and anti-racist movements.

In 2016, the election of Donald Trump strengthened the activity of anti-fascist groups. Furthermore, following the death of George Floyd in 2020, there was evidence of increased anti-fascist activism as a reaction to police brutality. However, the FBI later stated that ordinary criminals were responsible for the acts of violence and looting and not groups like Antifa.

Antifa groups are also operating in Europe in countries such as Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Ukraine. In Germany, for example, in October 2016, far-left groups in Dresden led a peaceful protest on the occasion of the anniversary of the German reunification on 3 October, for "turning Unity celebrations into a disaster". Furthermore, Antifa sympathizers took to the streets in Hamburg during the 2017 G20 summit, some say, in reaction to Donald Trump’s accusatory rhetoric.

Tactics & Activities of Antifa

The Antifa movement employs a variety of tactics aimed at countering far-right and authoritarian ideologies. Central to its approach is the belief that direct action is necessary to confront these threats. Protest demonstrations are a common method, where participants gather to voice their opposition to fascism and xenophobia. These protests often escalate into clashes with far-right extremists, particularly during significant events like the Charlottesville rally and protests in Portland. Antifa’s militant tactics can include physical altercations, raising concerns about public safety and the ethical implications of violence in political activism.

In addition to street confrontations, Antifa groups engage in community organising and outreach to raise awareness about far-right extremism. They frequently utilise social media to mobilise supporters, disseminate information, and document the activities of far-right organisations. Authorities in various countries have increased scrutiny of Antifa due to concerns about violence and public safety. The EU's TE-SAT report has highlighted the rise in violent actions linked to left-wing extremism, prompting law enforcement to strengthen their responses.

In this context, some Antifa members in Austria took part in 2022 in training camps designed to equip activists with skills for protest, self-defense, and community organisation. These camps serve as spaces for learning techniques related to civil disobedience and strategic communication, but they also raise concerns about radicalisation and the potential for increased violence. While Antifa’s actions are rooted in a commitment to antifascism, they face ongoing scrutiny regarding their methods. Critics argue that violent tactics can undermine broader anti-fascist goals, complicating the movement's public image and effectiveness. As Antifa continues to navigate these challenges, its capacity to adapt its activities in response to the evolving political landscape will be pivotal in determining its long-term impact.

Source: Gregor Fischer - https://www.flickr.com/photos/gonzo_photo/406787012

Global Presence and Influence

Antifa’s global presence has expanded significantly in recent years. Its influence is remarkably evident in countries like the United States, where it engages in direct action against far-right extremism. As a decentralised movement, Antifa lacks a formal structure, allowing it to spread and operate independently across the world. The movement is viewed as “a reaction to the extreme right by concerned left-wing activists”. As far-right extremist politics gain momentum globally, anti-fascist movements have risen in response. According to the European Parliament, Antifa is not a single organisation, but a “collective name” used by various informal, autonomous groups claiming to be anti-fascist”. This broad, open identity allows anyone opposing fascism to align themselves with the movement. 

With the growing influence of the far-right political party Alternative für Deutschland there has been a significant increase in the presence and potential threat of the anti-fascist movement in Germany. Modern militant German Antifa groups  have been involved in violent confrontations, notably between 2018 and 2020, attacking and singling out German neo-nazis. The same applies to Sweden, where the far right political party Sverigedemokraterna(SD) has had a surge in popularity, with an increase of around 20% in the polls in the past 20 years. Consequently, Swedish Anti-fascist Aktion (AFA) and Swedish Revolutionary Front have carried out acts of political violence, including an attack on former SD politician Vávra Suk.

In the US, Antifa grew in popularity and presence during Donald Trump’s presidency in 2016-2020. This was partly due to his reported alignment with far-right groups such as the Proud Boys, but also due to the increased engagement regarding far-right politics in general in the US. Trump’s rhetoric, including his refusal to condemn white supremacist groups, shifted political discourse and drew attention to Antifa’s opposition. Antifa protesters frequently countered far-right demonstrations, sometimes engaging in violent confrontations. This led to the movement being labeled by critics as rioters and looters, with Trump at one instance saying “Somebody’s got to do something about antifa and the left because this is not a right wing problem.”

Conclusion

Antifa's history, decentralised structure, and focus on anti-fascism have shaped its role as a modern movement. While often associated with far-left ideologies such as anarchism and communism, its primary goal is to resist fascism, racism, and authoritarianism. Although its use of violence and militant tactics has sparked debate, many studies suggest that Antifa is neither a terrorist group nor a direct threat to democracy. Its anti-authoritarian stance is sometimes seen as aligned with democratic values, opposing what it considers oppressive forces. However, critics argue that its violent methods may undermine democracy by limiting free speech and opposing viewpoints.

Looking ahead, Antifa's relevance may depend on the political landscape. As far-right extremism grows in some areas, Antifa could continue to serve as a counterbalance. Its decentralized structure allows for flexibility and adaptability. Nevertheless, reliance on violence could harm its cause in the long term, as public support may decline if it is viewed as more destructive than constructive. Increased scrutiny from authorities is also anticipated if violent incidents continue to be associated with Antifa.

The question of whether Antifa qualifies as an extremist group remains debated. While it employs militant tactics and occasionally breaks the law, its goals are centered on protecting marginalized groups rather than advocating for authoritarian control. This places Antifa in a complex position; despite operating outside mainstream activism, it is not typically regarded as an extremist movement.

Featured Image

August 27, 2024 — No Comments

The Italian Military export and its possible implications in the light of the Israel-Hamas conflict

By Alberto Trame, Aline Blanchard, Christian Gaole, Giacomo Bortolazzi - Italy Team

The Military Industry in Italy as a Leading Global Actor

It is widely acknowledged that Italy has a leading role in the European production and export of weapons, a trend that will probably continue to grow in the next years: at the end of March, the annual report to the Parliament on operations authorised and carried out for the control of exports, imports and transit of armament materials estimated that export licenses for a total value of 6.31 billion euros have been issued during the year 2023, causing an increase in Italian military exports from the sum of 5,289 million euros in 2022 to 6,311 million in 2023. The document also included a list of the States with the highest share in the total export of Italian weapons: the list includes countries such as France, the United States, Ukraine (whose ongoing conflict against Russia has resulted in a steep rise in military contributions), several Middle Eastern countries such as Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Kuwait, and Israel as the main beneficiaries.

Has Anything Changed After Al-Aqsa Flood?

The report also highlighted Israel's situation following the attacks conducted by Hamas on 7 October 2023. Although the volume of Italian military exports to Israel increased to a total value of 31.5 million euros, placing the country seventh among the largest importers, the annual report noted the consideration given to the issuing of new authorisations in light of the ongoing conflict. This cautious approach regarding military exports was also confirmed by the Italian Defence Minister, who responded to a Parliamentary interrogation on the issue by stating that no new authorisations have been granted since the attacks of 7 October 2023. The media observed that this statement seemed to differ from those made by other representatives of the Italian Government, including the Italian Prime Minister and, notably, the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who stated on 20 February 2024 that the dispatch of any kind of weapons to Israel had been suspended since the beginning of the conflict. The distinction between a “total” and a “partial” suspension has been at the center of an intense political debate and several journalistic inquiries conducted in recent months.

The Italian Military Export to Israel Analyzed in Light of Law 185/1990

The ongoing discussion related to the Italian military exportations to Israel, which has not been uniformly addressed by the national political establishment, assumes further importance when considering the potential implications under the Italian legal system, which regulates the import, export, trade, and transit of arms and ammunition through Law 185/1990. Article 1, paragraph 6, of this law prohibits the export and transit of military material towards countries engaged in armed conflict in violation of the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,” as per Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (subject to any exception made through the Council of Ministers’ decision after the approval of the Parliament). The law also prohibits export to countries with policies that conflict with the rejection of “war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes,” as per Article 11 of the Constitution, or whose governments have breached international conventions on human rights. Allegations of such violations have been raised in the context of the Israel-Hamas conflict, with concerns expressed about the actions of both belligerent parties.

In this regard, the recent public call by the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for the arrest warrant of Hamas’ Leader and Commander-In-Chief and of the Israeli Prime and Defence Ministers was issued in response to a series of alleged violations of the Rome Statute, such as “starvation of civilians as a method of warfare,” “intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population,” and “persecution.” The further call by the Prosecutor for adherence to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) gains relevance in light of the most recent report by the International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and Israel, which suggested that both Hamas and Israel may have committed several “violations of IHL and IHRL” during the conflict. These legal implications remain an open issue, meaning that if the allegations are found to be true, there could be significant legal consequences regarding Italy’s contribution to this conflict, all in light of the requirement to prohibit the export of arms to countries in violation of international human rights conventions as per Law 185/1990.

Foto di Eve Woodhouse su Unsplash

Concluding Remarks: The Importance of Being Earnest

In light of multifaceted debates and of the serious consequences that serious accusations such as those of violating international conventions might imply, the importance of transparent and complete information cannot be questioned. Even though occupying such a self-evident pivotal role, the concern expressed by many is that it may still be jeopardised: the new Parliamentary Bill modifying Law 185/90 could in fact result in the reduction of the kind and quantity of data to be included in the annual report to the Parliament if approved. Given this possibility, it is important to remember the importance of free information.

Featured Image

August 10, 2024 — No Comments

Iran, the new “progressive” presidency and LGBTQ+ rights

by Ilaria Lorusso (Iran Team) in collaboration with the Human Rights Team

Introduction

Iranian elections following former president Raisi’s death in May 2024 were called rather abruptly for this July and resulted in the appointment of Massoud Pezeshkian. Considered a moderate candidate, he campaigned for his election maintaining progressive stances both in internal and external politics, promising more liberties and equal rights – especially with regards to women’s issues, animating the Women, Life, Freedom movement – on one hand, and advocating for a renewed nuclear deal and relations with Western countries, particularly the US, aimed at relieving the sanctions that have weakened the Islamic Republic to this day. His political positions fuel refurbished hope for social justice in Iran. However, the fact that he does not seem to want to openly disrupt the system in place after 1979 revolution, and the persistence of a conservative parliament and the absolute authority of Supreme Leader Khamenei dilute the expectations of most human rights advocates vis-à-vis the efforts possible to mitigate the oppression of traditionally marginalised groups. The LGBTQ+ community is notoriously part of the latter. Even if the new president has not exposed himself explicitly on this topic yet, this piece aims at retracing the treatment of LGBTQ+ rights in Iran, making evident above all the risks queer citizens undergo in the country in the current status quo.

Sharia and LGBTIQ+ rights 

As an Islamic Republic after the 1979 revolution, Iran abides by the Shari'a system, following a strict interpretation of Islamic religious texts as a base for law norms1. As such, already when it comes to heterosexual relationships, the 2013 Iranian Penal Code2 condemns any form of sexual activity outside of a lawful marriage. Any extra-marital sexual relations, identified as zina, are illegal and subject to criminal sanctions. 

Zooming in, homosexuality – particularly among men – is forbidden (haram) and considered a moral, physical, and psychological disorder, comparable to the heterosexual zina. Article 234-239 of the Penal Code shows that the death penalty is imposed on citizens accused of homosexual acts, particularly for those performing a “passive” role in the relationship. This, combined with the relative indulgence with which homosexuality between women is treated, reveals particularly the will to preserve a certain type of masculinity that Iranian men are supposed to perform3. Lashing, prison and fines are the alternative and almost always applied punishments associated with acts that fall into the interpretation of “sexual deviancy” – lesbian relationships and cross-dressing being among these. Besides legislation, then, the LGBTQ+ community is subject to state violence and police prosecution, with reported mass arrests and torture under custody, and queer activists imprisoned for threatening national security and production of “immoral content”. 

LGBTQ+ community and the Iranian society

More importantly, because homotransphobia is widespread in Iranian society – up to 90% according to Equaldex’s 2022 findings4, discrimination then extends in every aspect of one’s personal and professional life, with limited access to housing, education, employment, judicial system and healthcare. Interestingly, The Islamic Republic of Iran offers limited subsidised support for gender confirmation surgery, hormone replacement therapy, and psychosocial counselling for trans people. This is due to the fact that the latter views are seen through the lens of gender identity disorders. This medicalisation has provided some legal recognition for trans individuals but has also reinforced the stigma that they suffer from psychological and sexual disorders and need treatment to become "normal"5. In a way, gender reaffirmation therapy is also perceived as a way to “correct” deviances related to non-heterosexual sexual orientations. Accordingly, trans individuals in Iran, whether recognised by the state, seeking recognition, or living without it, frequently face discrimination and abuse due to their gender identity, including hostile public attitudes, extreme violence, and the risk of arrest, detention, and prosecution.

Photo by Sima Ghaffarzadeh: https://www.pexels.com/photo/crowd-of-people-protesting-on-street-holding-flags-and-posters-14136859/

Queer activism, Mahsa Amini’s protests and the way forward

The 2022 national unrest related to the death of Mahsa Amini re-fueled not only women’s rights activists but also those belonging to the queer community.  in custody for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly sparked nationwide protests in Iran, met with deadly force by the government. During the protests, young LGBTQ citizens openly defied the regime by removing their hijabs and displaying same-sex affection publicly6. Activists have also used pro-LGBTQ slogans and symbols, increasing visibility but also facing backlash, as the later overturned death sentence to queer activist Sareh Sedighi-Hamadani in that period exemplifies7. Clearly, this shows that queer liberation is to this day a pressing issue in Iranian civil society, and links back to the general discontent that especially younger generation has towards the post-revolution religious élite. Whether the new presidency will be able to appropriately take up the demands of these movements, remains an open question. 

  1. Rehman, J., & Polymenopoulou, E. (2013). Is green part of the rainbow: sharia, homosexuality, and LGBT rights in the Muslim world. Fordham International Law Journal, 37(1), 1-52. ↩︎
  2. Center for Human Rights in Iran (2021, August). Fact Sheet: LGBTQ rights in Iran. https://iranhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/LGBTQ-Iran-Fact-Sheet.pdf  ↩︎
  3. Karimi, A., & Bayatrizi, Z. (2019). Dangerous positions: Male homosexuality in the new penal code of Iran. Punishment & Society, 21(4), 417-434. https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474518787465  ↩︎
  4. https://www.equaldex.com/region/iran  ↩︎
  5. OutRight Action International (2016). Human Rights Report: Being Transgender in Iran. https://outrightinternational.org/our-work/human-rights-research/human-rights-report-being-transgender-iran  ↩︎
  6. Iran protests: LGBTQ community rises up (2023). BBC Website, April 19th. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-64864132  ↩︎
  7. Good news: Sareh Sedighi-Hamadani’s death sentence overturned (2023). Amnesty International Australia Website, May 16th.
     https://www.amnesty.org.au/good-news-sareh-sedighi-hamadanis-death-sentence-overturned/  ↩︎
Featured Image

August 9, 2024 — No Comments

Iran in Transition: The Implications of the Raisi’s Death and the presidential election

by Shahin Modarres, Ilaria Lorusso, Margherita Ceserani, and Will Kingston-Cox - Iran Team

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in northwest Iran on May 19, as announced by the government on May 20, with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and seven other passengers. The crash occurred as he was returning from the inauguration of a dam on the border with Azerbaijan, in adverse weather conditions while the aircraft was flying over a rugged, forested region. The death of Raisi, 63, ushers in a period of political uncertainty in Iran, already shaken by the war between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. 

Raisi, elected in 2021, was considered an ultraconservative and a favorite to succeed the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. According to political analysts, Raisi lacked personal charisma and popular support. During his presidency, Raisi intensified the crackdown on dissent, particularly after the protests following the death of Mahsa Amini, and revived Iran's military nuclear program, after US withdrawal from the historic 2015 agreement. Raisi also strengthened ties with Russia and China and reestablished diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. As such, his death prompted sympathetic reactions from various Arab leaders, such as those of Iraq and Qatar, and Iranian-backed militias, such as Hamas and the Houthis, as part of the "axis of resistance" against U.S. and Israeli influence. At the same time, in some parts of Iran his death was celebrated by the population. 

Following the incident, Vice President Mohammad Mokhber was appointed interim president, with presidential elections scheduled for June 28. Though Ebrahim Raisi was one of the most well-known figures in the Iranian regime, his death is not expected to cause major upheaval in the Iranian system. Despite this, elections for a new president will be held at a time of great instability for Iran, both internally and externally. This article therefore aims to present the profiles of the candidates for the presidential election, and the possible effects of Iran's new political leadership on current international relations. 

Following the passing of President Raisi, the urgent task of arranging snap elections has become the foremost concern in Iran's domestic affairs, prompting the election date to be rescheduled to June 28, 2024, as mandated by the constitution. With only 50 days allowed for elections following a president's demise, the need to fill the vacancy promptly is evident. However, the process is not devoid of controversies. 

The Guardian Council, recognized for its conservative stance, has greenlit only six out of 80 candidates, setting the stage for a pivotal political moment. The 12 members of the Guardian Council — six clerics named by the supreme leader, and six jurists named by the Majlis — have consummate veto power and their decisions on disqualification cannot be appealed. The pool of approved candidates include the mayor of Tehran, Alireza Zakani; member of parliament, Masoud Pezeshkian; former interior and justice minister, Mostafa Pourmohammadi; and head of Iran’s Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs, Amir-Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi. However, the clear frontrunners for victory are Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliamentary speaker with ties to the influential Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and Saeed Jalili, a hardliner and former chief nuclear negotiator. Ghalibaf, despite his technocratic approach and connections to the IRGC, faces scrutiny from ultra-conservatives due to his moderate positions and past electoral failures. Meanwhile, Jalili, strongly backed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC, represents a continuation of Raisi's policies, particularly in opposition to any dialogue with the US.

The Iranian elections carry significance for the country's future direction, especially amid escalating domestic unrest and regional challenges. Low voter turnout in previous elections, coupled with concerns about the regime's legitimacy, represent the broader issues at stake. The regime must find a delicate balance between control and legitimacy, particularly as many Iranians have been disheartened by years of political upheaval and repression. Despite this, ultimate authority rests with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who can still wield influence over policy, making the choice of Raisi's successor critical. 

The current Iranian tense relations with the West, exemplified by Tehran's support for proxy militias targeting Israel in response to the Gaza conflict, emphasise the need for a leader who can manage Iran's foreign policy challenges effectively. Khamenei's speeches frequently indicate satisfaction rather than concern about sanctions and other issues, suggesting a preference for Jalili’s continuity over compromise. Yet, there remains a possibility that Khamenei could astonish observers by supporting a candidate open to dialogue with the West, though such a move would deviate from his usual stance advocating "resistance”. The impending election thus holds significant implications for Iran's domestic landscape and also for its international relations. The chosen successor will likely be expected to continue Raisi's legacy, maintaining Iran's current trajectory and policies. However, the regime faces a critical dilemma in ensuring voter participation and maintaining its legitimacy, given widespread disillusionment among the population. While Iran's electoral process includes democratic elements, key policies and candidate selections are significantly influenced by the clerical leadership, leading to discussions about the extent of democratic choice in the system. The selection of Raisi's successor will shape Iran's path, further impacting its interactions on the world stage. With tensions simmering both at home and abroad, the election outcome will reverberate far beyond Iran's borders, influencing regional dynamics and international relations.

The upcoming Iranian elections will also have significant geopolitical implications. These implications can be seen through two lenses: the international and the regional. Globally, the outcome of the election could see Iran seek to strengthen bilateral relations with China and Russia, in order to compensate for increased Western pressure. Such a solidification of relations could be both geopolitically and economically detrimental, as energy markets and international alliances react. Iran natural resource reserves are pivotal to global energy markets, and an election result that favours continued conservatism could lead to further fluctuations, disruptions, and conflict in and over the energy sector. 

Furthermore, if the conservative faction, as is predicted, remains in power, we can expect to see again, yet another solidification - this time, over nuclear negotiations. It would be likely to see tensions with the West escalate over increased uranium enrichment, rendering attempts to revive the JCPOA redundant and futile continuation of hardline sanctions policies.

Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hamas_leader_Ismail_Haniyeh_meeting_Iranian_Supreme_Leader_Ali_Khamenei.jpg

Regionally, a continuation of conservative dominance could see an increase in support for Iranian proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon would be expected to continue or intensify if conservative hardliners are re-elected. With Hezbollah increasingly active on the northern Israeli border, this could further entrench Hezbollah’s position within Lebanese politics and bolster its military capacity. 

For Yemen, Iranian support for the Houthis is likely to continue, if conservatives are re-elected. It is plausible that a hardline government in Tehran would provide increased aid, both military and financially, to the Houthis, prolonging the Yemen conflict. This scenario would likely intensify tensions between Saudi Arabia, which would threaten regional security all over the Middle East. 

For the conflict between Israel and Gaza, if the current projections materialise, hardliner governance could see increased support for Hamas. It would not be wrong to assume that hardliners would incite more aggression towards Israel through the proxy network, perpetuating military pressure on Israel without the need for direct Iranian military involvement. Iran does not want an all out war with Israel. To do so would threaten the very existence of Iran’s military, economy, and society. The election is likely to see an intensification of Israel-Iran relations through the proxy network, to both pressurise Israel but defend Iran’s interests, whilst avoiding direct military conflict. 

The sudden death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash has plunged Iran into a period of political uncertainty. Snap elections, scheduled for June 28, 2024, highlight the conservative dominance within the Guardian Council, which approved only six out of 80 candidates. Key contenders include Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Saeed Jalili, with Jalili likely to continue Raisi's hardline policies, particularly in opposing dialogue with the West and strengthening ties with Russia and China.

Domestically, the election underscores the regime's struggle for legitimacy amid widespread voter disillusionment. The conservative grip on the political process raises questions about the authenticity of Iran's electoral system. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's influence remains pivotal, ensuring that key policies and candidate selections align with his vision.

Regionally, a conservative victory would likely intensify Iran's support for proxy militias in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, escalating tensions, particularly with Israel. Increased aid to groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis could exacerbate conflicts, affecting regional security.

Globally, Iran's potential strengthening of alliances with China and Russia in response to Western pressures could reshape economic and geopolitical landscapes, particularly in energy markets. The international community remains watchful of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, with the election’s outcome crucial in determining the future of the JCPOA and broader diplomatic engagements.

In conclusion, the election following Raisi’s death is a critical juncture for Iran, influencing its domestic stability and regional dynamics. The regime's ability to manage internal discontent and external pressures will shape Iran's path in the coming years, with significant implications for global geopolitics.

Featured Image

July 22, 2024 — No Comments

Navigating Norway’s Arctic Frontier: Energy expansion vs. Environmental concerns

by Max Giordano - Arctic Team

Norway has awarded a record number of new petroleum exploration licences despite questions over the environmental risks and Oslo's commitments under the 2016 Paris Agreement. Of the 62 new permits, 29 are located in the North Sea, 25 in the Norwegian Sea and 8 in the environmentally sensitive Barents Sea region. Norway's Ministry of Energy issued grants on the Norwegian Continental Shelf to 24 energy companies, with Equinor ASA and Aker BP ASA holding the majority stake. This marks a 30% increase in total licences from the previous auction 2022. 

Understanding the broader consequences of expanded drilling activities in the Arctic is essential. Looking at the Barents Sea area will highlight how this affects the economy, the environment, and politics. This paper offers a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted factors surrounding Arctic drilling. 

Understanding Oslo's Arctic Policy:

Interpreting Norway's decision to award new exploration licences within the High North framework offers a deeper understanding of its connection and relevance to Norwegian Arctic policy. So perhaps it is in the fitness of things to recall the significance of this concept. High North, integral to Norwegian Arctic policy since the 80s, delineates the expansive Arctic territories Norway seeks to influence, spanning the southern boundary of Nordland County to the Barents and Pechora Seas. Politically, it reflects Norway's efforts to shape Arctic governance, engaging in collaborations through the Arctic Council, Barents Cooperation, and partnerships with the European Union under the Northern Dimension.

High North was fully implemented in 2003 when Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a department called nordområdene, followed by a strategy in 2006. It represents a concerted effort to position the region as a high-ranking priority, emphasising the significance of the Arctic to Norway. 

Norway's Arctic Energy Strategy: Balancing Resources, Demands, and Environmental Considerations.

Norwegian gas meets the annual household needs of 800 million people. It has become Europe's largest supplier, surpassing Russia in 2022 after the Ukraine invasion. This milestone is critical in discussing new exploration licences, underscoring Oslo's push to boost hydrocarbon access amid energy transitions. Securing low-carbon supplies could advance emission-free blue hydrogen from natural gas, with captured CO2. Discoveries are fundamental in meeting European needs and bolstering local economies. Consequently, there is a heightened focus on developing untapped Arctic resources.

The Government's Northern Area Strategy of 2006 highlights Action Point 3 of 22 points, aiming to "further develop [drilling] in the Barents Sea through an award[s] policy, [increasing exploration acreage and additional geological mapping]," establishing a framework for oil and gas developments in the Barents Sea. Moreover, a 2010 agreement between Norway and Russia on maritime borders unlocked new opportunities (Article 5, Annex II), effectively transforming the place into Norway's latest petroleum province.  

Estimated undiscovered resources in the Barents Sea are 2400 million standard cubic metres of oil equivalent (or 15 100 million barrels), with natural gas comprising 1120 billion standard cubic metres — an area of 1,300,000 square kilometres.

Compared to other exploration sites in the Arctic, the Barents Sea offers low production costs and quicker project start-up times, accelerating extraction and distribution processes to be market-ready. Minimal ice cover, calmer winds, shallow waters, and easy-to-reach resources, collectively reduce drilling costs to around NOK 200 million per well ($21,000,000).

Growing global demand for oil and gas, particularly in Asia — led by China and India — is expected to boost consumption. The IEA forecasts a 3.2 million barrels per day rise in oil demand from 2023 to 2030, driven by increased jet fuel usage and petrochemical feedstocks. Gas demand has also surged, underpinning the importance of secure, flexible energy sources. The IEA predicts a 2.3 per cent increase in natural gas demand in 2024.

Closing infrastructure gaps is crucial for supporting Barents Sea discoveries. Ports like Hammerfest, Honningsvåg, and Kirkenes are integral. However, more infrastructure is needed for better connectivity with distant fields. Logistical and geopolitical challenges pose risks to future developments, but population growth, industry, transportation, and the petrochemical sector necessitate hydrocarbon investments.

Photo by Bit Cloud on Unsplash

Critical Decisions in Arctic Development

Arctic projects require careful planning and smart decisions based on detailed assessments. The Barents Sea has unique geological challenges, like tectonic movements, Arctic weather patterns, and varied soil and rock layers. It encompasses five areas, including the Finnmark platform, the Bjarmeland platform, Nordkappbassenget, Tiddlybankbassenget, and Fedynsky Høgda.

Oil and gas exploration entails identifying suitable rock formations, pinpointing reservoirs to store hydrocarbons, and maintaining secure containment to prevent leaks. Factors like sea depth affect operations, with shallower reservoirs in Bjarmeland and Fedynsky Høgda being more favourable. 

Environmental groups oppose Arctic drilling due to risks to biodiversity, wildlife, and Indigenous communities. Arctic ecosystems are fragile, and accidents can have lasting effects. Indigenous peoples depend on Arctic resources for their traditions and health, making them vulnerable to disruptions caused by drilling. Despite Norway's introduction of regulations like the 2006 Barents Sea policy and the 1996 Petroleum Act, opinions vary on whether these sufficiently mitigate concerns. 

In November 2021, six activists, aged 20 to 27, and two environmental groups, Greenpeace Nordic and Young Friends of the Earth Norway, brought their concerns to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). They filed a case dubbed 'the People vs. Arctic Oil' to challenge Oslo's energy policies. They cite Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to life and family, arguing that drilling could pollute ice sheets, accelerating melting. It is noteworthy that the ECHR requires applicants to be directly affected by alleged violations. Its decisions are legally binding on member states. Previously, three Norwegian courts dismissed the claims. In January 2022, the ECHR formally asked Oslo for counterarguments by April 2023. The case is pending a final verdict, with no significant developments reported since.

Oslo faced further headaches when the Sámi Parliament of Norway sued it for constructing a wind turbine farm on traditional Sámi lands. This action is part of Sámi efforts to defend their territorial rights and heritage, criticising renewable energy projects as green colonialism. Situated on the Fosen peninsula, the wind farm encroached on traditional Sámi reindeer herding territories. In 2021, Norway's Supreme Court ruled that the project violated Sámi rights under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. An agreement was reached this year, 2024, allowing the wind farm to operate under conditions that protect Sámi culture. Provisions include allocating a percentage of generated energy to the Sámi community, designating new reindeer herding areas, and granting NOK 5 million ($473,000) to support Sámi traditions.

Conclusion

The Arctic's importance in both domestic and foreign policy cannot be understated. Drilling can strengthen local economies and secure energy for Europe, but it also disrupts a delicate ecosystem. On the one hand, the Norwegian government seeks to ensure energy supplies for itself and its now-reliant European partners at great financial profits. On the other hand, the distribution of new licences prompts environmental concerns. The environment versus energy security is an ongoing battle. The critical question remains: How will the Norwegian government balance these concerns without compromising their energy security?

Newer PostsOlder Posts ›