February 4, 2022No Comments

The Perils of Movement in 2022: Understanding the Factors conditioning the Human Security of Migrants

By: Arslan Sheikh, Esther Brito Ruiz and Reka Szabo.

Image Source: https://www.growthinktank.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Photo-by-Sandor-Csudai-is-licensed-under-licence-CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0.jpeg

Human security is conditioned by a variety of external factors - like war or famine - and personal characteristics - such as gender, ethnic identity, or sexuality. These intersecting realities lead to rapidly evolving patterns of threats to human dignity across the globe. Indeed, humanitarian crises or large scale natural disasters serve to reconfigure the lives of those affected and exacerbate already existing social vulnerabilities. In this line, it becomes important to explore how recent political and social developments have notably worsened the conditions of one particular collective of people: migrants. 

Recent estimates suggest that over 281 million people are migrants - amounting to about 3.6 % of the global  population. Yet in spite of the significant increases in people flows across national boundaries, migrant groups continue to be politically, socially, and economically targeted and discriminated against. Migrant communities routinely face difficulties in accessing basic services and often see their identities become instrumentalized for political propaganda. As those seeking refuge, fleeing violence, or attempting to find a better future are confronted with rising political polarisation, stricter border control, and worsening social protections. We must reflect on the barriers to movement that affect this collective and the trends that have come to act as drivers of migration flows. Only then can we understand the severity of the conditions migrants face today. 

Trends

Economic trends are significant drivers of migration today. Economic divergence has been growing between countries, highly impacted by the global recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Available instruments of developing economies aiming at tackling such challenges are much more limited than the ones of advanced economies, which leads to a bifurcated economic recovery. Another longer lasting global challenge to be faced is climate change. Similarly to the pandemic, it impacts countries unevenly: some are going to be more resilient thanks to their more fortunate economic situation and/or geographical location than others. 

Adaptation to climate-related changes are going to have socio-economic consequences for individuals. Unskilled workers, for instance, are going to be vulnerable to industrial transformations — for instance, in carbon-intensive, heavy industries—, and may decide to migrate to countries in which their skills can still be used, in the hope of opportunities of economic advancement.

Climate change and countries’ various responses to it can cause not solely voluntary economic migration in the future, but also large-scale involuntary migration. This falls into the category of societal global risk, influencing numerous countries and industries negatively. Climate action failure is one of the potentially damaging risks that are going to contribute to involuntary migration on a global scale. Extreme weather, biodiversity loss, livelihood crises, and social cohesion erosion are also listed by the latest Global Risks Report of the World Economic Forum. Climate action failure and extreme weather are the most influential factors. 

Climate change contributes to natural disasters, too. Because of such disasters, internal and cross-border displacement is going to occur. Interestingly, it is not necessarily the direct effects of such disasters that are going to affect migration, but the worsening economic conditions they will cause. This means that links between migration and disasters caused by the accelerating climate change are rather indirect, manifesting in migration caused by decreasing incomes, worsening livelihood opportunities, and changes in food security.

Violence, conflict and persecution are still going to play a role in the future when it comes to migration or displacement, however, data on recent trends indicate that disaster related internal displacement is more common, and, at the same time, more volatile than internal displacement related to the previously mentioned factors.

Another factor to take into account when observing voluntary or involuntary migration, is the lack of possibility to migrate, caused by environmental change. People without assets to move can be trapped in certain areas, which can lead to more defenselessness against environmental change. Meanwhile, these trends are further creating many barriers to migration which need to be addressed simultaneously. 

Image Source: https://cdn.britannica.com/80/187480-050-824606F2/refugees-line-officials-Middle-East-Slovenia-Iraq-October-25-2015.jpg

Contemporary barriers to Migration

The barriers to migration are very complex, interlinked, and multifold. The recent Global Risks Report 2022 by World Economic Forum has identified several contemporary barriers to migration which include national level barriers, such as the movement restrictions related to the COVID-19, financial pressures in advanced economies, and greater focus on domestic priorities. The report has also identified three potential barriers to the cross-border migration; which include post-pandemic effects on international mobility, future employment trends, and increased national interest postures of several countries.

Movement restrictions because of the COVID-19 have interrupted several migration flows. These restrictions are temporary, but as the post-pandemic economic rebound demands more labour, creating further opportunities for  migrants, Western policymakers need to be prepared to address a new influx of migrants and be able to explain to their residents why welcoming this labour force would not diminish their employment opportunities, as well as why certain post-pandemic employment opportunities would need a migrant labour force to fulfil them. Failure to do so may cause further rise in anti-immigrant sentiments in resident populations.

National interest postures are increasingly becoming a world-wide phenomena where nations are actively reframing their migration policies to exclude migrants from basic financial and healthcare services, as Chile and Peru have done recently. Another such example are the restrictive policies of the  United Kingdom and USA, which originally were implemented because of  public health concerns, but have sustained and are causing a decline in the issuance of visas to  migrants.  

Apart from these issues, the nature of public discourse and disinformation campaigns are making the migration issue worse. Migration has increasingly become a controversial issue in Western countries, generating right-wing and nationalist reactions. The media has played a very important role in this by ‘normalizing discriminatory labels used to describe migrants’, whereas  disinformation campaigns against migrants portray them as a threat to  public health, security, and the economy of host countries are fuelling hate speech and violence against them. These two issues make a crucial impact on the voting behaviours of host countries and the governments they choose to elect, who usually have an anti-migrant stance when framing and implementing the migration policies in their respective countries.

Conclusion

The worsening socio-economic conditions and global trends we have explored have served to notably increase the risks migrants face. Whether it be to emergency displacements, worsening social retribution, or economic push and pull factors, migration is not only becoming a more pronounced phenomenon, but one subject to expanding threats to human dignity. 

As the world reopens its borders and struggles to manage the after-effects of a global pandemic, policy and assistance efforts need to look towards the plight migrants face and provide the resources, social networks, and institutional support necessary to protect the human security of one of the world's most politicised collectives. 

February 4, 2022No Comments

Barbara Tommassini on the New Biomedical Technologies and Healthcare System in Tanzania

Barbara Tomassini [Barbara Tommassini is a Biomedical Engineer, CTO at BIOVERSE srl, currently volunteering in the Civil Service program in Tanzania.

Interviewing Team: Alessandra Gramolini, Rebecca Pedemonte, and Michele Tallarini.

What is the health situation in Tanzania? What impact did COVID-19 have?
Tanzania is making major progress in the health sector leading to a continued increase in life expectancy for Tanzanians at birth. Despite this, there are still several issues such as the lack of adequate infrastructures and human resources. The impact of HIV/AIDS represents one of the most dramatic realities.
The management of COVID-19 in Tanzania has gone hand in hand with politics. After a long period of official denial that coronavirus exists in Tanzania, the government has completely changed course in early 2021, after the death of the previous president. The country, however, is still facing major challenges to obtain vaccines and to overcome hesitancy amongst the population, which has only got more confused by these several changes. Now the situation is quite stable: there are no restrictive measures even if the epidemic is still going on, but, at the same time, hospitals are not overcrowded. In similar contexts, the situation and the decisions to be taken are even more delicate, and it’s necessary to find a balance between the containment of the epidemic and the maintenance of a stable social situation.

What are the opportunities for the development and application of new biomedical technologies in Tanzania? Why did you choose to bring your project to Tanzania? 

In Tanzania, there are a lot of needs but few resources and infrastructures available in the country. The healthcare sector is full of opportunities for the development and application of new biomedical technologies, but we should always keep in mind the specific contexts and needs, to design more appropriate and useful technologies.

Indeed, the biggest mistake made so far with these countries has been to give them technologies that are unsuitable for the context, not economically sustainable, without staff training and spare parts available locally.

The new medical device I’m developing together with a colleague of mine (we are both biomedical engineers), is about the treatment of severely burned patients (TBSA> 20%) up to 5 years of age, and it is specifically designed for low-middle income countries. We chose to bring our project to Tanzania for epidemiological and personal reasons: every year 11 million severe burns occur from open flames and boiling liquids alone. 95% of the victims occur in low-middle-income countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, and 70% are children less than 5 years of age. Furthermore, the idea was born during a past trip in Tanzania, during a visit to a rural hospital.

In your opinion/based on your experience on the field,what is the role of Italian ONGs in Tanzania?
Since Tanzania is a peaceful and not high-priority country, Italian NGOs in the country play a role in supporting government institutions for the creation of developed systems adaptable to local contexts for improving the existing ones. This support takes place, supporting the activities and training the local staff, to achieve long-term sustainability and local autonomy, with no need of foreign help anymore.

How do you think Italy-Tanzania cooperation in the healthcare system will develop in the future? Which are the most important fields that need external support to be developed?
I think healthcare system in Tanzania in the coming years will need external support in the area of Emergency management, with in-depth analysis of national and international guidelines, for improving the knowledges of local staff and training it, as well as the management and purchase of appropriate medical devices in terms of accessibility, availability of spare parts, ease of use and training of personnel on use and maintenance. There should be a strong cooperation between NGOs themselves and manufacturing companies, to have more appropriate and effective devices.

February 2, 2022No Comments

The Ukrainian Crisis which Washington wants Resolved Quickly

By: Francesco Cirillo

Image Source: https://pixabay.com/photos/moscow-spasskaya-tower-3895333/

With the letter delivered to Moscow the dialogue on the guarantees linked to security put forward by the Russian Federation, we enter the difficult task of keeping open a channel that should aim at a decrease in tensions on the Russian-Ukrainian border.

For Moscow now it is necessary time for Russian President Vladimir Putin to carefully analyze all the documents received from both the United States and NATO; but Russian foreign minister Lavrov himself said that both Washington and the Atlantic Alliance rejected Russia’s request to suspend NATO’s eastward expansion.

While both NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg and US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken have stated that they are ready for dialogue with the Kremlin, which at the moment has given no signs of reducing troops (according to some networks, almost 100,000 men and armored vehicles) near the border with Ukraine. To increase the pressure on the Russian leadership and Putin, Blinken himself stated that in the event of a Russian invasion, Washington would implement a strategy, with Berlin, to block the completion of the North Stream 2 gas pipeline. Europe. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has asked the United States to take Russian concerns seriously.

The US dilemma on the Ukrainian crisis concerns the desire to resolve it quickly to avoid bogging down the other dossiers that the Biden administration considers vital, first and foremost the internal economic situation and the internal pandemic. Other concerns the issues concerning the Indo-Pacific and that concerning the confrontation with China. It is vital for Washington to resolve the issue in Europe that it avoids engaging directly and leaving the field to the European allies of the EU and NATO. In recent days, Jens Stoltenberg declared that NATO will not send Pact troops to Kiev, a statement also accompanied by the US, a statement coming from the White House spokesman, in which it was explicitly stated that the United States does not intend to send troops in Ukraine.

In this Kiev finds itself closed by the desire to prepare for a possible Russian invasion and with only informal and diplomatic support, with economic and military aid that comes from the Baltic countries, Poland and the UK. Meanwhile, Moscow decides to keep the units near the Ukrainian border and the US has put 8,500 people on alert ready to be deployed in NATO allied countries. Another burden will concern the possible negotiations between Washington and Moscow on the "security guarantees" that the latter expects to deal with. The Kremlin aims to gain recognition of its spheres of influence from neighboring countries and opposition to the entry of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine into the Atlantic Alliance. On the opposite front, both Washington and NATO, in the documents delivered to Moscow, ask the Russians to start a diplomatic path that leads to discussing Russian requests and a possible de-escalation but rejecting the request to suspend expansion towards Eastern Europe.

The dialogue between Moscow and Washington / NATO / EU continues, but with 100,000 troops from the Russian Federation close to the Ukrainian borders.

January 31, 2022No Comments

Iran’s Foreign Policy towards East: Causes and Consequences

By: Shahin Modarres, Filippo Cimento and Yasmina Dionisi.

Image Source: https://www.irna.ir/news/82866036/توصیه-مسافرتی-وزارت-خارجه-به-مسافران-خارج-از-كشور

 "No ties to the East, no ties to the West, just the Islamic Republic" (Image Reference)

This motto engraved at the entrance of the Iranian ministry of foreign affairs represents Islamic Republic's ideology regarding its foreign policy. An ideal of independence mixed with a heavily ideological theme. Where do we stand 43 years after this motto was first chanted? Is the Islamic Republic an independent state from what it defined as East and West or is it becoming more and more dependent on one side in order to survive? In this article we will briefly review what pushes the Islamic Republic towards the East and what is to be expected from such pattern.

Within international relations, sanctions typically act as a tool of foreign pressure aimed at targeting the policies of other States (Marinov 2005, 564): compromises from leaders are more likely if their existence in power is threatened by an external pressure (Marinov 2005, 564). Even so, in the history of global politics, States have been targeted by sanctions, by foreign countries, according to diverse strategic rationales. In regards to the Iranian case, economic sanctions have been directed at curbing the regime’s nuclear programme, restraining its regional policy, and condemning its human rights violations.

Sanctions have acted as the preferred policy tool of the States most concerned by the development of the State’s nuclear programme (Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick 2011, 143). Though the Islamic Republic of Iran has faced sanctions since the November 1979 takeover of the US embassy in Tehran, the first US sanctions in regard to Iran’s nuclear intentions date to 1995 with President Clinton’s issuing of the Executive Order 12957 of March 1995 and the Executive Order 12959 of May 1995. These involved US export controls banning the transfer to Iran of dual-use that could be applied for weapons purposes. The international community would universally consider the matter a decade later, with the first UN sanctions against Iran imposed in 2005 by the Security Council Resolution 1737, which mandated a ban on assistance to Iran’s enrichment programme (Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick 2011, 144). If effects of the sanctions are to be assessed, it could be said that the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions of 1996 (ILSA), for instance, whose principal purpose had been to deter foreign investments in Iran’s energy industries, penalized the Iranian companies investing annually in Iran’s oil and gas sector; the ILSA was extended and the Iranian oil production stalled, growth was hampered (Schott 2012, 190). 

Iran’s regional policy has additionally been a subject of concern within global politics and for neighboring countries. The Islamic Republic boasts a geostrategic position enabling it to project its influence on Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean (Švejdová 2017, 46). Among the effects of economic sanctions relating to Iran’s regional aspirations the most significant amount to the impact of the state’s national economy. (Švejdová 2017, 47). That said, the stabbing of the economy has not haltered the regime’s resilience, which has exploited the foreign pressure by stabilizing its roots and empowering its policies, mainly through its religious ideology (Naghavi and Pignataro 2015, 3).

The last grounds on which Iran has been targeted by the U.S. and the international community are its human rights violations. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been accused of violations both traditionally tied to oppressive regimes and also related to the regime’s codification of provisions found in Shi’a jurisprudence (Mokhtari 2004, 469). But in Iranian internal politics, Iranian policy changes have far from been implemented as a result of the U.S. sanctions nevertheless, as, on the contrary, the Iranian regime has condemned the United States for self-inflicting a domestic economic distress (Schott 2012, 191).

On the Chinese side, we must investigate the reasons behind the choice of Iran as an ideal partner for Beijing. We will analyze some past choices in order to find the constant characteristics.
We can take into consideration the example of Sri Lanka, where according to Ganeshan Wignaraja, *1“The pattern of Chinese investment reveals a nuanced picture of benefits and costs. Chinese multilateral policies are required to maximize the benefits and minimize any risks of its investment.” Moreover, it is not to be underestimated the role of Beijing’s influence in the political equilibrium, Jayadeva Uyangoda in fact affirms that 2* “China was using corruption as a controlling device. Chinese assistance to Rajapaksa was a means of buying his support by helping him increase his grip on the country.”
Other peculiarities can be studied in the case of Pakistan, where the construction of the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) is involving investments valued at 60 billion dollars, embedded in the wider Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing is applying a strategy that was defined by Zhao Shurong as 4* “cross-continental mercantilism, a policy that, through State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), allows China to endorse free trade aiming at the accumulation of capital, setting a new model of economic growth”. Investing in the strategic Gwadar Port could be a plastic representation of a policy that, according to Francois Godement, 3* “has a special significance for China, which considers regional connectivity as a fundamental element to rise at global level.”
We can therefore individuate a pattern, also in Africa, where 5* “trade has not been fair and has been detrimental to African businesses. For example, in South Africa factories had to close because of the cheap influx of Chinese goods”. Moreover 6*“Human Rights Watch alleges that Chinese organizations have been accused of inhuman treatment of workers in Zambia.“ From what emerges, China appears to search for a weak partner, who may accept exploitative measures in order to attract unfair but still useful investments.

Even though the details of the Iranian-Chinese 25-year agreement have not been published, yet considering China's pattern to a modern form of exploitation makes it quite clear. The illusion of economic growth generates a lasting debt with China that will harm the economy on a much larger scale in the long-run. It appears that the only reason behind such shady alliance is Islamic Republic's crucial need to trade which has been frozen by the U.S. sanctions. 

January 28, 2022No Comments

Why is it vital for Russia to restore the USSR Borders?

By: Igor Shchebetun, Fabrizio Napoli, Alessio Calzetti and Davide Gobbicchi.

Image Source: https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/UsefulNotes/SovietRussiaUkraineAndSoOn

Russian ships are trailing NATO in the Black Sea, and Putin is threatening to knock the teeth out of foreign aggressors which has given rise to serious disagreements. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost the gains of hundreds of years of territorial expansion. The country has crossed the threshold of the millennium licking its wounds and is under threat of further disintegration. Today, the post-Soviet states are facing a familiar unease; many are looking back at the past and cautiously awaiting Moscow's future actions. Faced with a cornered bear, the best strategy is to do nothing to anger it. 

Stretched from west to east, Russia is Goliath on the world stage. The country has 20,000 km of common borders with seventeen states, twelve of which were part of the Soviet Union. Having such a long land border seriously complicates security. As early as the 15th century, the Grand Duchy of Moscow was immediately confronted with a geopolitical problem at the dawn of its restoration. Surrounded by enemies on all sides, Russia began to expand its territory and take possession of geographical barriers that could protect it. Be it rivers, lakes, mountains, or seas. In the first century of its existence, the country expanded annually by an area equal to the entire area of Belgium. By the early 18th century, Russia had grown to its present borders. Even today, the country's geography offers significant advantages. The frozen crown of Arctic ice that adorns Russia's territory makes land invasion from the north impossible. Even the most experienced admirals will not be able to approach Murmansk and Arkhangelsk by water, two serious obstacles will stand in their way: the Faro-Icelandic frontier and the Bear Frontier. The first is an open-ocean defense line between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom, and the second is between Spitsbergen and northern Norway. 

Image Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_Union#/media/File:Cold_War_border_changes.png

These narrow passages are easily defended by submarines, of which Russia has plenty. To the east, the rugged coastlines of Siberia adjoin the Bering Strait, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Sea of Japan. The short distance between Alaska and Russia may seem passable, but the Arctic climate: strong tidal waves and the presence of heavy firepower on both sides limit the movement of armed forces in this area. By controlling the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kuril Islands, Russia can deter hostile actions in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. At the same time, the Stanovaya Ridge and the Sayan Mountains strengthen Russia's position in the Far East. The harsh climate further restricts movement even in places where passage is possible. Most of Russia's eastern borders give the country's armed forces an advantage in any conflict, but the situation looks more complicated in the eastern European part of the country. 

Central Russia stretches from St. Petersburg to Kazan and Volgograd. About 80 percent of the population lives in this geographic area. Almost every decision the Kremlin makes is based on these people's needs and interests, but the center shares its periphery with six other former Soviet republics: Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. Their territories are among the most troubled regions of the world. Two anomalies, the Crimean Peninsula and the exclave of Kaliningrad, are a start. They are both strategic military bases, preventing hostile forces from entering the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. Both regions house heavy weaponry and assets to prevent access and maneuvering. Other powers have to think twice before approaching Crimea or Kaliningrad. Near the borders of the Russian Federation, the European Plain is more than 2,000 km wide, making it the largest open stretch of landscape in the world. The terrain here is flat, open, and defenseless. The main battle tanks provide some protection on this type of terrain, so Russia has about 13,000 of them-almost a fifth of the world's tank fleet. Still, no amount of weaponry can fully protect 2,000 km of flat terrain. For 750 km east of the Ukrainian border to the city of Astrakhan on the shores of the Caspian Sea there is a continuous hilly landscape called the Volgograd Corridor. The German military attempted to break this line in both world wars. Both times Russia hung on by a thread until the offensive was repelled. The collapse of the Soviet Union put the Baltics in the hands of NATO, which gave the three republics the confidence to negotiate with Russia as equals. The loss of Eastern European possessions took a heavy toll on Moscow, both politically and financially. The country had to fortify its borders with one of the most advanced weapons on the planet. Meanwhile, control of the Baltic would allow Russia to push its border as far as Kaliningrad. Thus, by restoring Soviet borders, Moscow would reduce the length of its unprotected flank to.

January 25, 2022No Comments

The Colombia-Brazil Drug Connection

By: Giovanni Giacalone and André L. V. C. Carvalho.

Image Source: https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frontera_entre_Brasil_y_Colombia#/media/Archivo:Trijunction.JPG

On January 3rd, 2022, Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office announced the arrest of five men in Colombia’s southern department of Putumayo. The detained individuals are now facing drug trafficking charges as they are accused of running their own marijuana plantations and cocaine labs in Colombia’s department of Cauca and using the local indigenous communities to transfer the drugs near the Colombia/Brazil border before having it shipped across to Brazilian territory by boat.

During the operations, the police seized over $250,000,000 from the organization, together with a large quantity of cocaine, marijuana, and three cargo carriers.

The Attorney’s office also revealed the identities of the arrested individuals: Medardo Alfredo Cifuentes Giraldo “Gordo”, in charge of coordinating the purchase, storage, and concealment of the merchandise, as well as handling transactions on the Colombian-Brazilian border; Wilmer Alexander Bastidas Bernal “Engineer”, indicated by investigators as the financial link; Kelly Johana Gómez Gómez “Mona”, allegedly responsible for recruiting transporters and guards at the collection centers; Pablo Giovanny Landázuri Cortés “Negro”, one of the alleged drug producers; and Víctor Ferney Giraldo Barrera, “Vaca”, who is credited with transporting the drug.

The Attorney General’s Office also revealed that the drug loads were supposed to be sold to major criminal enterprises operating in Brazil, such as Comando Vermelho (CV) - one of the oldest criminal organizations of Brazil -, and Família do Norte (FDN), the biggest organization of the Amazon region, with chapters in Peru, Venezuela and Colombia.

Over 900 km of border between the two countries in the dense Amazon jungle, make it extremely difficult to control illegal trafficking, and rivers such as the Putumayo, Rio Caqueta, Vaupes, and Rio Apaporis have become major ways of transit for illegal substances.

As exposed by InsightCrime, while much of the drug flow into Brazil comes from Bolivia and Paraguay, the Colombia connection has become increasingly relevant. This aspect should not be underestimated since in the past few years, Brazilian narco-organizations have become major exporters of drugs to Europe. As explained to Reuters by custom inspector Oswaldo Dias, in less than a decade Brazil’s drug gangs have risen from domestic street sellers to major international players in the drug business, using Santos and other ports to ship narcotics, mainly to Europe, with a value of over $10 billion only for the European market. The phenomenon was confirmed by Laurent Laniel, a senior analyst at the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).

As to Colombia, the ongoing clashes near the tormented border with Venezuela between ELN and FARC over illegal business control, with the Colombian army having to send reinforcements, surely doesn’t help the central government as it swallows up resources that could be used to control the southern part of the border with Brazil.

Additionally, the Colombian government has to deal with the increasing activity of the Urabeños drug cartel and paramilitary group and specifically with its franchise-like model of trafficking that relies on local gangs with no formal links to the cartel as they are simply sub-contracted to operate for them, in their name. (ITSS exposed the Urabeños drug cartel activity in November 2021).

According to the aforementioned, the drug trafficking flow into Brazil comes in most part from Bolivia and Paraguay. Although ties between Brazilian and Colombian criminal enterprises are not new, they have been growing in the last year and the impacts on the security in the region are starkly. 

In 2017, investigations conducted by the Brazilian Federal Police and the Federal Prosecutor of the Amazon region pointed to a ‘strictly close’ relationship between the FDN and the FARC. The FDN operates primarily in the North region and has control over the main drug flow routes in the triple border region between Brazil, Colombia and Peru. Moreover, according to the reports, the organization used its connections with the Colombian partners to trade drugs and buy heavy weaponry to be used in Brazil. 

However, the FDN is not the only one. Both the CV and the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) – the two biggest criminal enterprises in Brazil - have also been strengthening their ties with Colombian organizations for a number of years. In 2019, the Army Chief of Staff of Colombia reported that the ELN had entered into a partnership with CV with the aim of facilitating drug trafficking (especially cocaine) in the Amazon region, specifically on the border between Leticia (Colombia) and Tabatinga (Brazil), using the Solimões River to provide an outlet for cocaine trafficking. 

The success of these organizations is due to an outdated patrolling system, which, when associated with the complex geography of the region, allows them to easily escape from army platoons and federal police units. Among other things, the partnership with Colombian cartels provided Brazilian organizations with heavy weaponry and high-quality navigation equipment and vessels, often superior to security forces in the region. Currently, the 1,632km Brazil-Colombia route is practically uninhabited and unprotected, a fact that drives its growth every year. A clear example is that in recent years, the volume of drugs seized in the region has grown by no less than 1,324%.

This generates a series of other problems for security in the region, since in addition to the existing alliance between Brazilian and Colombian organizations there is also a war for the control of the main trafficking flows. In 2017, with the help of weapons provided by Colombian organizations, the FDN murdered more than 60 members of rival factions that were at war over the flow of cocaine. In this way, taking into account the delicate situation faced by the security forces in the region, the region remains an eternal "no man's land" in the hands of large drug trafficking organizations. 

January 20, 2022No Comments

The implementation of Drone Warfare in Modern Ground Operations

By: Danilo delle Fave and Marco Verrocchio.

Image Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Berserk_combat_drone_(unmanned_military_land_vehicle)-_Milex-2021(1).jpg

The history of Unmanned Ground Vehicles

Despite the common public image of drones as hi-tech military assets, ground drones have a history dating back to the Second World War. The first type of Unmanned ground vehicle was deployed during the Winter War between Finland and the USSR in 1940 and the early phase of operation Barbarossa. The TT-26 was a teletank, a wireless remotely controlled unmanned tank. It worked via a control tank that would control the vehicle at a distance between 500 m and 1.5 km. The control tank was meant to stay back and grant fire support while maneuvering the teletank against the enemy. In case of malfunction, or any condition that would allow the capture of the vehicle, the control tank had to destroy the TT-26. Even older was the use of remotely controlled vehicles as bombs, since, during the First World War, the French developed the Crocodile Schneider Torpille Terrestre as mobile explosive against enemy trenches, later redisigned by the French veichle designer Adolphe Kégresse in the 1930s. Kérgesse technology was acquired by the German forces after the invasion of France of 1940, making it the base model for the Goliath tracked mine

The Goliath, together with its advanced version Springer and its heavier version the Borgward IV, was used massively by the Wehrmacht in all fronts, beginning in early 1942. However, they were expansive, slow and vulnerable to small-arms fire, too big to be carried by soldiers and with poor ground clearance, a common issue to the Anglo-American counterpart of the Goliath. Nevertheless, it managed to become the most advanced Unmanned Ground Vehicle of its times, laying down the premise for the contemporary ground drones. Despite their original nature as offensive weapons, during the second half of the XX century the first modern Unmanned Ground Vehicle was developed as explosive ordnance disposal. During “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland, the British army deployed the Wheelbarrow Mk 7 in order to reduce casualties in the soldiers ranks, which were caused mostly by improvised explosive devices of the Irish Republican Army. 

The development of Unmanned Ground Vehicles and their multiple purpose

In the recent years, there has been considerable improvement in Research and Development (R&D) in the field of electric vehicles and their overall capabilities. These technologies had a relevant impact on the Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) in warfare. Nowadays, the UGV can carry out many complex tasks and is becoming a real resource for the armed forces of various countries. The UGVs are classified into two broad types: autonomous and remotely operated.

Due to this evolution the machine can be used for multiple purpose such as:

  • Cargo: can transport critical materials or weapons in dangerous zone;
  • Surveillance: control the border between two areas without human instructions;
  • Armed Reconnaissance: can observe and locate targets of opportunity in a general area;
  • Fire Support: can be armed and equipped to provide air or ground support to the troops on field during an attack or the defense of the base;
  • Rescue: can save military wounded during a fire conflict;
  • Communication Relay: can help the headquarters to establish communication with all the troops on the ground.

Current deployment of Unmanned Ground Vehicles

In 2015, Russia’s military Industry Committee announced its objective of deploying 30 percent of Russia’s Kinetic weapons on remote-control platforms by 2025. In fact, in May 2018, the Russian military revealed it had combat-tested its Uran -9 Robot Tank in Syria for surveillance and counter-terrorism purposes. Respectively, in 2019, the United States’ Army held a major prototyping competition for developing robot combat vehicles which would provide the country with an unqiue edge. The US had in fact deployed on the frontline small UGVs like the Foster-Miller TALON and its successors, but is working on the construction on bigger UGVs like the Ripsaw. Many military experts are describing the coming year as “the year of the armored vehicle” due to the increasing competition between these countries.

Even though the Chinese government has focused on the improvement of his fleet, it has already built  a new type of UGV, like the new model SHARP CLAW 2, which can be filtered with a range of accessories, included weapon, robotic or sensor system and can be armed with a remote controlled gun carriage. In Europe, however, few countries, such as Germany and Estonia, decided to improve and invest in the UGV projects. 

The Estonian government aims to build and maintain an efficient export-based high-tech Europe-wide defence sector by encouraging cooperation between the Estonian Armed Forces and the country’s defence industry. Milrem, an Estonian robotic vehicle manufacturer, is this ambition’s best example, particularly with its THeMIS vehicle (short for Tracked Hybrid Modular Infantry System). The so-called “pocket tank” was designed to play a variety of roles, from logistics to reconnaissance. To go even further, the vehicle should also be able to support ground forces directly in combat, as the unmanned ground vehicle could be integrated with weapons and devices from other defence manufacturers. 

Milrem is not the only actor in the UGVs market in Europe; the German manufacturer Rheinmetall Defence is an interesting counterpoint. Despite not being part of the PESCO-funded industrial consortium, the firm has been busy developing new ground robots which ought to support soldiers on the battlefield as well. In November 2020, Rheinmetall unveiled its most recent project: the Mission Master Unmanned Ground Vehicle. According to the company, the vehicle was created for delivering “high-risk scouting missions and deliver a real-time common operating picture without putting soldiers in danger”, by using 360° camera, infrared technology and 7.62mm guns controlled from the weapon’s station. The Dutch army recently received some of Rheinmetall’s UGV prototypes for testing, while the United-Kingdom ordered four of them as part of its Robotic Platoon Vehicle Programme.

Despite the reliability issues, in primis the vulnerability to EMP and software viruses, that prevent the fully automatization of ground warfare, the UGVs have indeed changed the face of warfare. Their use for ordnance disposal, recons, and in general for support to infantry and tanks will be surely expanded in the near future. In Western countries UGVs will be massively implemented in order to reduce human casualties and drop the political cost of military missions. Naturally, if their cost would drop considerably, we could foresee “pocket divisions” that could be rapidly deployed in different battlefields and controlled via encrypted communications in the most technological advanced armed forces.

January 18, 2022No Comments

Kazakhstan: Putin’s New Geopolitical Victory?

By: Carlotta Rinaudo

Image Source: Flickr

A few months after Russia’s occupation of Crimea in early 2014, President Vladimir Putin sent another shockwave through another former Soviet state. Kazakhstan, according to a comment made by President Putin, was an artificial nation that “never had any statehood” - a vast land that historically belonged to the Russian empire. These remarks alarmingly recalled a similar statement made by Putin in 2008 when he claimed that Ukraine was “not even a state.” The questioning of Kazakhstan’s legitimacy promptly triggered an angry reaction in the arid steppes of Central Asia, where the Kazakh population called for the need to “send a history textbook to Putin”. 


Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan has actively sought to protect its hard-won autonomy from the looming threat of Russia’s expansionism. Yet, the prompt arrival of over 2000 Russia-led troops on Kazakhstan’s soil in early January 2022 may well pose a threat to such autonomy. As Russian military forces helped President Tokayev restore order, amidst domestic turmoil, Moscow gained a new opportunity to exert influence in its own backyard. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s political fate could now be tightly and irreversibly intertwined with the aspirations of President Putin. 

Kazakhstan’s desire to preserve its autonomy from Moscow is no secret. Over the past three decades, the oil-rich country has embraced a so-called “multivector” foreign policy, weaving a web of positive political and economic relationships, not only with Russia, but also with the other Great Powers engaged in the region – mainly, China and the United States (US). In the early 2000s, Kazakhstan quickly capitalized on China’s thirst for energy resources, and the first Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline was inaugurated in 2005 to transport oil from the Caspian Sea to the Xinjiang region. It was also in Kazakhstan in 2013, that Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced his ambitious megaproject, widely known as the Belt and Road Initiative. The country also attracted billions of dollars of investment from a wide array of American energy companies such as ExxonMobil and Chevron. Maintaining positive economic and political relationships with both China and the US has played an essential role in counterbalancing Russian influence and preserving Kazakhstan’s autonomy over time. 

To strengthen its national identity and further distance itself from Moscow, Kazakhstan sought to depict Russian and Kazakh civilizations as two separate cultural universes. In 2014, the government opened a new National Museum that emphasizes Kazakhstan’s century-long history as the cradle of the great steppe civilization, and in 2017 it shifted the national alphabet from Cyrillic to the Latin script. 

Despite these significant efforts, the unprecedented levels of violence raging across Kazakhstan largely proved that a hardly-won autonomy can be easily dismantled by structural corruption and internal power struggles between the kleptocratic élite. Kazakhstan sits atop massive reserves of oil, minerals, natural gas and uranium, yet these resources have always served the interests of the very few, rather than the needs of the Kazakh wider population. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many businessmen effectively took ownership over the country’s energy resources, accumulating massive wealth. Today, only 162 individuals account for 55% of Kazakhstan’s total wealth - with many of them living in lavish apartments in London - while some Kazakh citizens sole earnings are one hundred US dollars per month. It is in this context of stark income inequality that an increase in fuel prices triggered a series of anti-government peaceful demonstrations on January 1st. From January 4th to January 7th, these peaceful protests in several large cities were allegedly hijacked by violent criminal gangs. Human-rights activist Galym Ageleulov recalls that “an unruly mob of thugs” started to storm public buildings - a group of criminals that “did not look like students, bookish dissidents and middle-class malcontents who usually turn out for protests.” After January 4th, Kazakhstan’s largest city Almaty was transformed into “something from an apocalypse film,” with violence raging across the streets, burned buildings, incinerated cars, food shortages, massive internet outages and ultimately, the President ordering security forces to “fire without warning.” 

Image Source: Flickr

According to Russian expert Danil Kislov, this chaos was not the result of popular discontent, but the product of a “desperate struggle for power” between two political clans – those loyal to President Tokayev on one side, and those loyal to his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, on the other. As the former dismissed the latter from his position as head of Kazakhstan’s security council, members of Nazarbayev’s political clan may have exploited the anti-government demonstrations in an attempt to remove Tokayev from power and restore Nazarbayev as President. Other reports reveal that between January 4 and January 6, the paramilitary groups encountered no resistance from security forces. Police seemed unable or unwilling to stop the ongoing violence, leading to President Tokayev requesting the support of Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Clearly, the intervention of Russia came as a double-edged sword. Although it helped President Tokayev restore order and secure his grip on power, it also compromised Kazakhstan’s hard-won autonomy. Although the Russian military forces began withdrawing from Kazakhstan on January 13, it is clear that President Putin secured an important geopolitical victory in Russia’s near abroad, linking Kazakhstan’s political fate to Russian interests. As political expert Dimash Alzhanov said, the intervention of these troops “has its own price and will not be forgotten.” Their counterparts, Kazakhstan’s political élites, may have learned a valuable lesson. Three decades of foreign investments and multivector foreign policy won’t protect Kazakhstan from Russia’s long tentacles – not so long as the country is weakened by structural corruption and internal Cold War-style power struggles between kleptocratic élites. 

January 4, 2022No Comments

The Far Right’s Threat On and Offline

By: Zachariah Parcels and Lucia Santabarbara.

Image Source: https://unsplash.com/photos/efrRLPZukCQ?utm_source=unsplash&utm_medium=referral&utm_content=view-photo-on-unsplash&utm_campaign=unsplash-ios

A United Nations (UN) report in July 2020 by the Security Counterterrorism Committee (CTED) showed a 320 per cent increase over the past five years in attacks by individuals and groups holding right-wing (RW) extremist ideas. The phenomena known as right-wing or far-right extremism is evidently becoming ubiquitous in nature, accelerated by the ever-increasing exchange of online content on social media platforms and imageboards. This article, thus, intends to briefly explore far-right extremism, how it might be defined, the role of the Internet, and the so-called “Lone Wolf” factor. There are various international initiatives that will be touched on to combat this cancerous, heterogeneous movement.  

What is far-right extremism?

Scholars and policymakers amalgamate ethnically-, racially-, and gender-based political violence, and various anti-liberal ideologies to define right-wing extremism (RWE). RWE’s heterogeneity translates to problematic umbrella definitions that are not necessarily categorically helpful. Nevertheless, many have attempted to address these conceptual challenges. For example, it might be conceptually useful to frame transnational RWE networks as internal revisionist challengers to the Liberal International Order.

Right-wing extremism (RWE) includes a swath of actors with differentiating beliefs and subcultures; these actors do not necessarily agree with one another or converge. Brenton Tarrant, who carried out the terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, exemplified the transnational nature of RWE. He wore a patch representing the Azov Brigade, a white supremacist paramilitary group fighting in Eastern Ukraine. He also supposedly interacted with and was evidently inspired by the Norwegian terrorist, Anders Behring Breivik, who carried out a car bombing in Oslo and a mass shooting on Utøya at a Labour Party youth camp.

RWE incorporates ideas such as ultra-nationalism, radical traditionalism, and neo-Nazism. In the United States (US), the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) perceives RWE dichotomously: there is the white supremacist sphere (the “alt-right,”neo-Nazis, and “racist skinheads”) and the anti-government extremist sphere like the radical militias and the sovereign citizens. ADL also highlights various single-issue movements on the fringes of mainstream social conservative movements that adopt extreme stances, such as anti-immigrant and Islamophobic sentiments. However, there is some intersectionality in the RWE phenomena that is helpful in conceptualising and addressing these ideologies.

Generally, RWE are anti-democratic and anti-liberal (hence, the revision challenger concept). Supremacy is an underlying foundation in RWE streams, which inherently opposes equality. RWE is associated with antisemitism (not necessarily anti-Israel stances; e.g.Anders Behring Breivik), racism, xenophobia, and authoritarianism, to name a few. 

There also appears to be shared catalysts in the rise of and a distinguished modi operandi among the various streams of the far right. The far right narratives share a collective memory of infamous events that justify their anti-government positions, namely the Ruby Ridge Standoff (1992), the Waco Seige (1993), the Brady Bill (1994) under former President Bill Clinton (perceived violation of their second amendments), and the Oklahoma City Bombing (1995) carried out by Timothy McVeigh. Two watershed moments further catalysed the rise and normalisation of various far-right notions, possibly unwittingly through political pandering. The election of President Barack Obama (2008-2016) created a nativist and white supremacist counter-reaction while the Presidency of Donald Trump (2016-2020) witnessed the normalisation of nativist, anti-government, anti-liberal, and antisemtic notions, individuals, and groups. For example, Trump infamously refused to denounce the far right and right-wing militia: “... Proud Boys, stand up and stand by…” The Proud Boys, one of many emerging organisations propagating far right notions, was founded by Gavin McInnes and have adopted various misogynistic, Islamophobic, transphobic, anti-immigrant, and, recently, antisimitic stances. The far-right have seemingly embraced Louis Beam’s notion of the “leaderless resistance” - a modi operandi known as “Lone Wolf” terrorism today was discussed as an alternative to a centralised hierarchy at an notorious RWE meeting at Estes Park, Colorado in 1992. This meeting is also perceived as the birthplace of the modern American militia movement.

The Internet and the “Lone Wolf” Risk

Individuals and groups espousing RWE ideologies have an exponentially growing online presence. This growth is being catalysed by the dissemination of conspiracy theories and disinformation that form or galvanise “enemies” in the COVID era’s anti-government zeitgeist. As illustrated through Raffaello Pantucci’s study of Breivik, the internet plays a focal role in disseminating extremist ideologies. The internet actualised Beam’s dreams of a “leaderless resistance” by inciting or mobilising individuals to violence, specifically to act as “lone wolf” terrorists. This was exemplified by Breivik in Norway, Alek Minassian in Toronto (2018), and Brenton Tarrant in New Zealand (2019). Boaz Ganor defines the latter as when one perpetrates a terrorist attack on their own or with the assistance or involvement of others, but without operational ties to any terrorist organisation. Beyond the essentiality to impede online mobilisation to violence to curb this “leaderless resistance,” studies have found that the far right are more likely to learn and communicate online than Jihadist-inspired individuals. Thus, there is plenty of impetus to combat far-right extremism online. 

International Initiatives to Combat RWE Content Online

The events before, during, and after the storming of the US Capitol building on 06 January 2021 further illuminates the crucial role the cyber domain is playing in RWE recruitment and propaganda initiatives. The planning and logistical organisation behind the Capitol Hill violence were via social media platforms. They were supported by the spread of disinformation and nationalist propaganda, such as through Telegram, Twitter, and Facebook. Operational information - namely the best times and methods to conduct the attack - were shared on social media months before. Precise details about the streets to take and paths to tread to avoid police checks were disseminated beforehand.

Many governments, and public and private entities have undertaken initiatives and practices to counter RWE online extremism to avoid such expressions of far-right extremism. One such initiative to counter RWE online content followed the abhorrent events in Christchurch in March 2019. New Zeland Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s government together with French President, Emmanuel Macron, launched the Christchurch Call with high-tech companies and social media platforms to eliminate terrorist and violent content from social media sites. This initiative was followed also by a severe condemnation by United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) towards acts of violence based on religion or belief,”alluding to Tarrant’s targeting of Muslim worshippers in Christchurch. On the 2 April 2019, the UNGA released the Resolution Combating terrorism and other acts of violence based on religion or belief, denouncing “the heinous, cowardly terrorist attack.” On 09 October of the same year, after the deadly attack on a synagogue and murder of a regional Christian Democrat (CDU) governor by far-right extremists, Germany approved the Network Enforcement Act. This act aims at preventing the dissemination of far-right online content and combating online hate speech and fake news. A provision also requests social media networks (with more than 100 complaints) to publish biannual reports to clarify how they dealt with complaints about illegal content. Lastly, the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) - a partnership between the European Union (EU) Internet Forum, Meta, Microsoft, Twitter, YouTube, civil society and academia - was initiated in 2017. The GIFCT adopts a global synergic technological approach based on knowledge sharing and joint research to prevent terrorists and violent extremists from exploiting digital platforms.

However, recent studies consistently show the increasing ubiquity and mobilisation of right-wing extremism networks that make current measures less effective. Recent COVID-19 emergency measures have inaugurated changes entailing limitations on personal freedoms for collective public safety. These pandemic-induced changes have created an anxiety-rich online environment with an abundance of conspiracy theories, disinformation or “fake news,” and memes that normalise violence. 

​​In conclusion, it appears that these challenges to liberal values and public safety demand innovative and persistent approaches. The cyber domain is continuously being exploited to radicalise and propagate far-right, anti-government narratives. Therefore, effective governmental responses - especially in the form of counter-narrative and public resilience initiatives - need to continuously adjust to these dynamic and adaptive revisionist challengers. 

January 4, 2022No Comments

UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security perpetuating patriarchal norms?

By: Diletta Cosco and Anna Toniolo.

The United Nations (UN) resolution 1325 was officially adopted in October of the 2000 by the UN security council. The resolution addresses several critical points in the context of post-war and peacebuilding process by recognizing an “urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations”. The resolution highlights the importance of women as active agents of change in peacebuilding processes; the emphasis is put on the importance of their participation in every aspect of post-conflict period but also on their need to be protected along with the necessity to include women in field operations and give a “ gender component” to peacebuilding missions. In the resolution, women along children are portrayed as the most vulnerable categories in a conflict situation. Although, a special attention is given to the vulnerability of women and girls during conflict; speaking of which, the resolution manifests the urgency to give specialized trainings to peacekeeping personnel in order to address their protection and special needs and the necessity to gather further data on women and girls’ violence during conflict and post-conflict. 

United Nations Security Council resolution (UN SCR) 1325 represents a landmark document because it represents the first time that the UN identified women as “constructive agents of peace, security and post-conflict reconstruction”. Although this resolution is presented as a turning point in gender mainstreaming within the UN, we should not read this as a positive evolution of the lives of women and men in conflict zones. In fact, the language and the models used in resolution 1325 perpetuate patriarchal norms and weaken the UN’s ability to de-gender peace and security. In this sense it is worthy to underline that the stipulations of UN SCR 1325 are “women-centric”, inscribing gender mainstreaming operations on opposite tracks in which gender has been interpreted as woman, and woman remain differentiated from men weakening their agency and perpetrating the patriarchal pattern of hegemonic masculinity. The concept of “hegemonic masculinity” is associated with domination and power and this means that men are generally portrayed as the perpetrators of violence and the actors responsible for signing peace agreements, as they are seen as the most active participants in violence and conflict, thus denying women's ability to assert themselves and make decisions.

Furthermore, in UN SCR 1325 women are represented solely in gendered terms, excluding structural variables, inhibiting women acting as agents with truly transformative potential. In the vision of the French anthropologist Françoise Héritier, every time that sex is used as a sociological variable, it is accepted that women belong to a different category, putting them in a position of inferiority relative to a masculine norm of reference. In this regard, resolution 1325 perpetrates constructions of gender that assume it as a synonymous with biological sex, reproducing logics of identity that mark women as fragile and in need of protection. The conservancy of a stereotyped language in the document removes women’s agency and maintains them in the subordinated position of victims, defining women as civilians, vulnerable and in association with children. Associating women with children leads to an essentialist definition that categorize women as vulnerable and as mothers, resulting in the maintenance of a powerful assumption which sees women as one of the subjects who must be protected. Thus, it seems difficult to promote the participation of women in peace negotiations and in post conflict resolution, since they are considered primarily as caretakers and victims affected by war, with little possibilities to have a more dynamic role, subordinating them to male-dominated decision-making circles. In this sense, another important element to highlight is the emphasis on conflict-related sexual violence, which is treated like a plague only for women, with a systematic reluctance to confront the reality of that violence against men and boys, carrying out the patriarchal binary model of male-female gender power

Patriarchal norms are committed also by “re-sexing” of gender, in particular including women in peacekeeping missions which are highly masculinized in nature, appearing to be a case of “add women and stir” without really challenging the masculinist norms that dominate that type of missions. 

In the end, it can be said that even if resolution 1325 represents a shift toward a more inclusive global governance, it belongs to a discursive framework that is still dominated by state-centric, militaristic, and patriarchal practices.