On April 3, 2022, Fox News released an article about the failure of the Pentagon to find evidence proving the military is a hotbed of extremism, reporting less than 100 cases in 2021. The article then presented comments from current and former service members, who all seemed to dismiss the problem as non-existent considering the low number of extremist-affiliated instances and thus not a priority for the Armed Forces, blaming the media for exacerbating the issue. Historically, although policies have been implemented, the US military has struggled to identify and manage radicalised personnel, and this trend seems to continue today. The DoDI 1325.06 was implemented in 2009, listing the prohibited activities in the Armed Forces such as active participation in supremacist, extremist or criminal gang milieus and giving recommendation for preventive measures. In the aftermath of the Capitol attack, the Instruction 1325.06 was reviewed in December 2021, clarifying the definitions of “extremist activities” and “active participation” in an effort to better address the threat of extremists within ranks. However, the policy still presents an important loophole, as membership in extremist groups such as the KKK or white supremacists is still not prohibited, only active participation is limited, failing to account for racism in the ranks and reflecting the bias of the US government.
This article aims to show that the danger of domestic terrorism posed by current and former military personnel with links to far-right extremist groups (FREGs) is often underestimated and discarded as an uninfluential phenomenon by lawmakers and the wider community of defence specialists and academics. However, despite the issue of extremists in the US military may only apply to a handful of individuals, dismissing it as non-existent can make military and law enforcement underestimate the security threat posed by the far-right fringe due to their ability to conduct high-impact events, such as the 2021 Capitol insurrection. This article will explore three aspects: the actual extent of the problem, the security concerns posed by anti-government militias, and the symbiotic relationship between military personnel and FREGs.
Image Source: unsplash.com
Current scope of the issue
The recent global increase of the involvement of the military in far-right groups needs to be highlighted. Indeed, one in five applicants of the white supremacist group Patriot Front belongs, or has belonged to the US military. In 2020, 6.4% of domestic terrorist attacks and plots were committed by US military personnel. This is a dramatic rise in number since 2019, when only 1.5% of domestic terrorist attacks were committed by the same, is alarming. For instance, 20% of the people prosecuted for various crimes committed during the US Capitol attack on 6 January 2021 are members of the US military. Therefore, the downplaying of the issue by the Armed Forces, as relayed by the studied article, is problematic because it does not allow for a common awareness that would lead to the adoption of more effective measures and legislation.
Anti-government militias and security concerns
Although the American far-right is ideologically diverse and fragmented, according to the National Security Council the main threat to domestic terrorism comes from anti-government and anti-authority violent extremists. Various data shows that active-duty personnel, veterans, and reservists make up about 25% of active militia groups such as the Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, and the Three Percenters, groups which have taken part in the incursions of January 6th. Conspiracy theories are at the core of militias’ ideology. They believe the US government is part of a conspiracy to create a new world order, a socialist one-world government which will be the downfall of the white race starting with stripping Americans of their gun ownership. The military is also part of this conspiratorial worldview, and militias legitimise their violence against the government, military, and law enforcement by positioning them as corrupt. One possible contributor to the radicalisation of military personnel could be the socio-political polarisation prevalent in the country and narratives such as the fraud in the election, the Covid pandemic, and Black Lives Matter, which have provided an excuse to ramp up the violence. The combination of narratives and conspiracy theories on the US’s tyrannical government and the increased interest in recruiting military members and veterans suggests an increase in activity of militia and anti-government movements in the next few years. This development is concerning because the law enforcement has a history of underestimating the threat from the far-right dating back to Timothy McVeigh and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Paul Eaton, a retired US army general, believes the US is not keeping up with domestic terrorism, the growing rise of extremism in the US military, and all the “McVeighs” still active today.
An historically interconnected relationship
The symbiotic relationship between FREGs and military personnel helps understand the domestic security risk posed by them. Historically, far-right groups have always had ties with the US military, starting from the founding members of the KKK, confederate officers and soldiers were, to active-duty soldiers and veterans recruited after the Vietnam war by white power activists. A handful of these individuals has been involved in domestic terrorist attacks and plots, with the attack on Capitol Hill being just the latest incident, with 81 out of 727 charged defendants with ties to the military, 66 veterans, and 5 active-duty service members.
This interconnected relationship is powered by the need for mutual assistance between FREGs and military personnel. Indeed, FREGs direct their propaganda and actively recruit military personnel for their notable abilities and skills, such as their proficiency in firing weapons, training personnel, and conducting surveillance. Meanwhile, FREGs members are seeking access to military training and their recruitment has been facilitated by the relaxation of military recruitment standards due to the War on Terror. Moreover, members or former members of the US military may find refuge in FREGs after a traumatic experience in combat, because these groups operate on a similar structure, and share some cultural aspects with the military.
Conclusion
Right-wing extremism in the US military is an issue of relative size but of considerable importance. Indeed, neither military training nor service are instruments of radicalisation of individuals. Nevertheless, they are subject to a number of factors such as PTSD or return to civilian life that could make them more susceptible to FREGs’ propaganda. Consequently, it is essential to consider military or veteran extremists as a special category and to increase vigilance because of their involvement in institutions dedicated to the protection of the US population. Indeed, their skills for violence and the symbolic value of service members being involved in terrorist groups and acts, as well as the rise in terrorist acts committed by members of the US military, justify the urgency of improving legislation and implementing effective measures.
Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) is an intergovernmental military alliance among the US, Canada and 28 European countries – but it has not always been this large. Indeed, when Nato was first conceived in 1949 it was made up of just 12 members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US. The creation of the Alliance pursued three essential purposes: “deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration”. The accession process is regulated by Article 10 of the Treaty and other European Countries can be invited to participate. The aspiring member countries must meet key requirements and implement a multi-step process including political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects. In case they are experiencing any issue, they can request assistance, practical support and the advice by a NATO programme, which is called the Membership Action Plan (MAP).
After the end of the Cold War, we can witness four different waves of NATO expansion to Eastern Europe. The first important wave of expansion to the East was launched by the reunification of Germany in 1990. On 12th September 1990, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, commonly known as Two Plus Four Treaty, was signed by the foreign ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR, France, Russia, the UK and the USA. The Treaty regulated all the foreign policy aspects of German reunification, including the membership to Nato, and imposed the withdrawal of all the foreign troops and the deployment of their nuclear weapons from the former East Germany and also the prohibition to West Germany’s possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. On October 3rd 1990, the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic were reunited again.
As to the second wave, the new member countries were Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. First, on 15th February 1991 they formed the Visegrad Group. Then, on 1st January 1993, Czechoslovakia split into two independent countries: Czech Republic and Slovakia. In 1997, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary took part in the Alliance’s Madrid Summit and on 12th March 1999, the three former Warsaw Pact members joined NATO. The main reasons were: “to ensure thecountry’s external security”, to impede “the possibility of a greatwar in unstable Central Europe” and for Poland also “to advance its military capabilities”.
In May 2000, a group of NATO candidate countries created the Vilnius Group (Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). The Vilnius Group resorted to the Membership Action Plan which was introduced by NATO for the first time at the 1999 Washington Summit. In addition, Croatia joined the Vilnius Group in May 2001. The Summit of the NATO Aspirant countries “Riga 2002: The Bridge to Prague” started the path towards the alliance’s membership which took place in Riga, Latvia, on July 5-6, 2002, where the leaders of NATO member and aspirant countries gathered for the last time before the NATO 2002 Prague Summit in November. On 29th March 2004, the largest wave of enlargement in alliance history materialized, except for Albania and Croatia. For Baltic states and Bulgaria, NATO membership symbolized their wish to be part of the European family. NATO was perceived not just merely as a military alliance with security guarantees under Article 5, but as a symbol of higher development, where Baltic states could find their proper place. Moreover, it was the attempt to escape Russian influence, in favor of the protection provided by the American strategic nuclear umbrella and a collective defence.
The same path of the Vilnius Group was followed by the Adriatic Charter of European countries. The Adriatic Charter was created in Tirana on 2nd May by Albania, Croatia and Macedonia and USA for the purpose to obtain their North Atlantic Alliance admission. Albania and Macedonia were previous participants of MAP since its creation in 1999, while Croatia joined in 2002. Moreover, Macedonia also took part in Nato's Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995. On 1st April 2009, the North Atlantic Alliance officially annexed Albania and Croatia after their participation in the 2008 Bucharest Summit. Macedonia accession was postponed because of a dispute on the formal name with Greece. Macedonia became NATO's 30th country on 27th March 2020. Montenegro emulated the same path of the latter, but joined three years before on 5th June 2017, after the Accession Protocol signature in May 2016. For Montenegro itself, the major incentives to join NATO were the future eventuality of EU membership, the highest prestige of the Atlantic Alliance and to achieve “Nato’s security guarantee”.
Future enlargements
Bosnia Herzegovina is the only potential candidate which joined the Membership Action Plan on 5th December 2018. In spite of Georgia and Ukraine expressing the will to start their path to the North Atlantic Alliance, their situation is still uncertain. The primary reason remains the need to meet all necessary requirements through important reforms focused on key areas; and, the current Russia-Ukraine war.
Consequences for the European Security
On one hand, many consequences, which were the main reasons for NATO expansion to the East, materialized in reality. For example, the inclusion of Eastern Europe nations in the military agreement have promoted democratic reform and stability there, provided stronger collective defense and an improved ability to address new security concerns, improved relations among the Eastern and Central European states, fostered a more stable climate for economic reform, trade, and foreign investment, and finally, improved NATO's ability to operate as a cooperative security organization with broad European security concern,” as stated in the clear purposes contained in a prepared statement of the Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright on 23rd April 1997.
On the other hand, in spite of NATO's open door policy with Russia, the latter constitutes the largest threat for European security once again in the energy, political and military field. Indeed, the current conflict in Ukraine shows the evident ambition to create a new Russian empire by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Many warnings about Russia’s reaction were expressed in the declarations of Biden’s CIA director, William J. Burns, when he worked as counselor for political affairs at the US embassy in Moscow in 1995. On 26th June 1997, a group of 50 prominent foreign policy experts that included former senators, retired military officers, diplomats and academicians, sent an open letter to President Clinton outlining their opposition to NATO expansion”. In the end, the father of the Cold War containment doctrine, George F. Kennan described the NATO expansion as a “tragic mistake”.
Conclusion
The current Russian invasion in Ukraine puts in clear evidence the necessity for the EU countries to accelerate the formation process of the European Army. They will have to achieve energy independence by using Russian gas, diversifying their own supplier countries and to invest massively in the green economy. Moreover, the EU must strengthen its common foreign policy, implementing an effective diplomatic action and speaking with one voice to cope with the great tensions around Europe and the rest of the world. If not, the European project will risk crumbling.
Italian state security has become evermore intertwined with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in recent days, as the invasion of Ukraine by Russia has highlighted the need for Europe to secure a renewable, multi-origin energy supply, as well as the importance of European food supplies in North Africa. The impact of war on Ukrainian and Russian harvests has not only caused wheat shortages in European markets, but also devastated grain imports across the MENA region, such as in Tunisia, Morocco and Libya. European sanctions on Russian oil and gas have also sent the cost of energy soaring, leading European leaders to seek other sources of fuel, including in the Middle East. War in Eastern Europe could see Western Europe and the EU seeking out a stronger partnership with the MENA region in both trade and diplomacy. However, Europe and the MENA region would have to overcome historic and contemporary tensions in order to achieve closer collaboration.
However, in order to establish mutual food and energy security, Italy and the MENA region would have to build stronger ties in both the trade and diplomatic spheres, working through historic and contemporary tensions. To this day, Italy’s relations with the MENA region are still damaged by the country’s legacy of colonization in Libya and the Horn of Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, as well its support for France’s colonization of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.
La sicurezza dello stato italiano è diventata negli ultimi giorni sempre più legata alla regione del Medio Oriente del Nord Africa. Infatti l’invasione dell’Ucraina da parte della Russia ha evidenziato, da un lato, la necessità per l’Europa di assicurarsi un approvvigionamento energetico rinnovabile e diversificato, dall’altro ha posto l’accento sull’importanza delle forniture alimentari europee in Nord Africa. L’impatto della guerra sui raccolti ucraini e russi non solo ha causato carenze di grano nei mercati europei, ma ha anche colpito duramente le sue importazioni in tutta la regione MENA, così come in Tunisia, Marocco e Libia.
Inoltre, le sanzioni di Bruxelles sul petrolio e sul gas russo hanno causato un’esponenziale crescita del costo dell’energia, portando i leader europei a cercare nuove fonti di carburante, in particolar modo anche in Medio Oriente.
A tal proposito, la guerra in Ucraina potrebbe spingere l’Europa occidentale e l’Unione Europea a formare una partnership più forte con la regione MENA sia a livello commerciale che diplomatico. Per raggiungere un livello di collaborazione più stretta, è necessario tuttavia che l’Europa e i paesi del MENA superino le tensioni storiche e contemporanee che pervadono nei loro rapporti internazionali.
Questa situazione rappresenta un’opportunità per numerosi paesi dell’UE di coprire il vuoto lasciato da Russia e Ucraina. La Francia, per esempio, è un grande produttore globale di grano con 30,1 milioni di tonnellate raccolte nel 2020, meno delle 85,9 milioni di tonnellate russe, ma più delle 24,9 milioni dell’Ucraina nello stesso anno. Anche la Germania, seppur in modo minore, contribuisce alla produzione europea di grano, avendo prodotto nel 2020 circa 22,2 milioni di tonnellate. Un altro paese che potrebbe giocare un ruolo importante nella regione si tratta dell’Italia. Nonostante questa abbia raccolto “solo” 6,7 milioni di tonnellate, il paese ha esportato oltre 24,8 milioni di dollari in grano nel 2020. Il sostegno dei paesi europei garantirebbero quindi ai paesi del Medio Oriente e del Nord Africa la possibilità di attingere dal mercato europeo e di soddisfare la propria domanda interna.
Tuttavia, al fine di stabilire una reciproca sicurezza alimentare ed energetica, l’Italia e i paesi del MENA dovrebbero perseguire nuove forme di collaborazione economica e diplomatica. Ad oggi le relazioni dell’Italia con la regione del MENA risentono ancora del passato imperialista di Roma, in particolare della colonizzazione della Libia e del Corno d’Africa nel XIX-XX secolo, e del sostegno alla colonizzazione francese di Algeria, Tunisia e Marocco.
Ad aggravare lo status diplomatico tra Italia e paesi del Medio Oriente e del Nord Africa si aggiungono anche eventi più contemporanei come la recente crisi migratoria. Questa, iniziata nel 2010 e intensificatasi nel 2015, ha visto milioni di rifugiati provenienti dall’Asia, dall’Africa e dal Medio Oriente fuggire in Europa in seguito alle guerre scatenatesi nei loro paesi. In alcuni momenti della crisi, la maggior parte dei migranti stava attraversando l’Italia dal Nord Africa, partendo specialmente dalla Libia. Questo ha creato una situazione di tensione e sfiducia tra i due paesi e a livello internazionale, dal momento che ai migranti stranieri veniva spesso negato l’ingresso in Italia e lasciati annegare in mare, oppure detenuti e maltrattati nei centri di detenzione in Libia. I politici italiani come l’ex Primo Ministro Matteo Salvini hanno spesso lanciato commenti infiammatori sugli immigrati provenienti dal Medio Oriente e dal Nord Africa, aumentando le tensioni e suscitando forti attriti tra le diverse comunità multietniche. Un esempio è la dichiarazione con cui Salvini difese un collega reo di aver sparato a un immigrato marocchino, oppure il processo che l’ex Primo Ministro ha dovuto affrontare per le accuse di rapimenti di 147 rifugiati, impossibilitati a scendere in Italia dalla barca della ONG Seawatch.
Mentre questi eventi hanno indebolito le relazioni diplomatiche tra l’Italia e i paesi del MENA, alcune ostilità di recente memoria sono in realtà servite a rafforzare i loro legami strategici. Nonostante non abbiano raggiunto i loro obiettivi strategici, le truppe di pace italiane a Beirut durante la guerra civile libanese negli anni ’80 sono state lodate per la loro “neutralità sostenuta, il comportamento rispettoso e il minimo uso della forza”.
By: Riccardo Bosticco, Lorenzo Caruti, Sofia Dal Santo, Miguel Jiménez, Michele Mignogna.
Introduction
The Russian invasion of Ukraine started on February 24, is already showing significant effects on a global scale. As most States and international organizations have officially condemned the war - from West to East between America, Europe, and Africa - openly criticizing Putin's behavior and deciding to sanction Moscow heavily, the biggest problem concerns the aspect inherent to energy supplies. "Europe depends on Russia for about 40% of its natural gas, with most of it transported by pipeline", explains Reuters. Luckily for them, most European countries have cut reliance on Russian gas in recent years. Yet dependency is still weighty, and the most recent sanctions on Moscow caused a further growth of gas prices. European states and companies have acknowledged the danger of relying too heavily on Russian energy, and also those countries that had a commercial, yet controversial, understanding of energy relations with Russia, like Germany, decided to act firmly.
The United States proposes solutions to Europe, while oil and gas producers in the MENA act controversially, and China remains cautiously in the background, carefully observing the evolution of the situation without intervening directly or taking a clear position. Where will the current energy decisions drive us?
The European Union
The EU is a substantial energy importer, largely reliant on Russia's supply. Accordingly, due to sanctions imposed to punish Russia, the EU has set about to make a significant course correction. The European Commission has proposed an outline of a plan to make Europe independent from Russian gas before 2030: REPowerEU. The main goal of this ambitious plan is to diversify to the greatest extent possible the gas suppliers of the EU by increasing LNG Imports and constructing alternative pipelines. To do so, a strong political will by the Member States to follow the correct route and avoid uncoordinated actions is needed.
Currently, there are not sufficient LNG terminals in the Eastern EU, although growing investments have been undertaken in recent years by the Union; it is, therefore, crucial that such countries have access to regional gas hubs. In addition, even the construction of alternative pipelines prompts some issues. Unsurprisingly, European customers are unwilling to commit financially to long-term gas purchase contracts, which would be necessary to sustain pipeline development, due to EU green obligations. Furthermore, authoritarian governments like Azerbaijan's, Turkey's, and the Gulf monarchies' influence on the gas trade would remain, leaving the door open for political exploits of energy flows. Besides, the existing alternative sources of natural gas to the EU appear to be already at the highest production level. Therefore, the most likely option seems to import from the Caspian Sea.
Overall, an emphasis is placed by the Commission on boosting energy efficiency and increasing the use of renewables. This is essential since it contributes to terminating the EU's overdependence on a single supplier, even though it does not provide a suitable solution in the short term. Last but not least, the Commission has even undertaken initiatives to mitigate high energy prices.
Conclusion As soon as the shock of the Ukrainian war arrived, the West discovered a hard truth: even in a globally interdependent world, it is not safe to be heavily dependent on a single country. As mentioned above, Europe is moving towards making plans to become energetically independent. Nevertheless, West leaders are conscious that the road to independence will be long and winding, indeed taking years to make it. However, the problem is not only a European matter: as previously said, even a solid Russian ally like China is facing the effect of the energetic crisis. On the other hand, Beijing will probably be seen as the only winner at the war's end, mainly for its ambiguous position. At the same time, the United States is dealing with a different situation: even though it does not depend on energy imported from Moscow, its role as a leader is put to the test. Washington needs to help its allies and, simultaneously, avoid the MENA Region ending up in the hands of China. Therefore, what is at stake is not only the energy question: the current world order could become very different at the end of the day.
It was the 5th of January 2015 when a wanted man of Ugandan nationality turned himself after a long hiding. He surrendered to a US military base, located in the Central African Republic. His name was Dominic Ongwen and its name was already notorious well beyond the national borders of Uganda. Namely, he was known for its commanding role inside the Lord Resistance Army (LRA): one of the deemed most violent terrorist organization in all the African continent:
The LRA was founded in 1986 by its ongoing supreme leader Joseph Kony, as an opposition force to the government of Uganda led by Yuweri Museveni. Since then, the paramilitary organisation has been the perpetrator of brutal crimes against the civilian population. Notably, among the most contested of these acts, there is the kidnapping of children from their family, with the purpose to turn them into faithful soldiers through torture and indoctrination. Until his escape, Dominic Ongwen covered a central position in this terrorist scheme. As referred by prosecutor Benjamin Gumpert to the International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘Dominic Ongwen was one of the most senior commanders in the LRA’.
Today, more than a decade later, Joseph Kony is still on the run, while Dominic Ongwen decided to turn himself to international forces, triggering his prosecution before the ICC – which received jurisdiction on from Museveni in 2003. However, despite the large amount of evidence against the accused, the case has proven to be controversial since the onset. The problem lied in the fact that Dominic Ongwen was not part of LRA by his own volition, as he was abducted in 1988 when he was still 9 years old. Only after years of violent indoctrination in the values of the LRA, he become an asset for the group; eventually rising among the ranks and becoming commander of the LRA Sinia Brigade.
The proceeding before the ICC focused on this latter period, when Ongwen committed, directly and indirectly, crimes against the civilian population as a senior LRA officer. At the time Ongwen was not a minor anymore (around 21 years old), therefore formally he was legally a fully liable adult.
But really an entire childhood spent inside a violent terrorist organisation was meaningless in the eyes of the law? This question proved to be troubling for the sitting judges at the ICC. Ongwen’s trial was extremely important for setting a precedent on the legal treatment of child soldiers who have become adults.
The definition of ‘duress’
During the trial before the ICC it was invoked by the defence counsel the s.c. ‘duress’, which is understood as an exception to the general regime of criminal responsibility. Already in the eighteenth-century William Blackstone defined it in his ‘Commentaries on the Laws of England’ as ‘threats and menaces, which induce a fear of death or other bodily harm, and which take away for that reason the guilt of many crimes and misdemeanors’.
As we can see indoctrination is not taken into consideration in the latter definition. Nonetheless, the question is far from settled and there are multiple interpretations. For instance, the French Code provides that ‘a person is not criminally liable who acted under the influence of a force or constraint which he could not resist’. This provision is larger in scope than the one provided by Blackstone and seems focused on the free will of the perpetrator.
Instead, in the German Code states that ‘if someone commits a wrongful act in order to avoid an imminent, otherwise unavoidable danger to life, limb, or liberty, either to himself or to a dependent or someone closely connected with him, the actor commits the act without culpability’.This definition doesn’t mention free will, while it is evident a balance between – using the words of Blackstone – ‘the menace’ and the wrongful act.
The element of ‘duress’ has been analysed also by the International Military Tribunal (IMT), in the aftermath of World War II, where it was detached by the similar defence of the ‘hierarchical order’. The issue was then debated again fifty years later, by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Erdemovic case, which concerned a footman soldier that had killed 70 civilians during the siege of Srebrenica. Notably, in the latter case the defence counsel raised ‘duress’ before the ICTY, as Erdemovic was threatened with death by his superior if he was not to comply with the orders.
Nonetheless, after a debate between the sitting judges, Erdemovic was convicted for his deeds – with the notable dissenting opinion of Judge Cassese. The judgement was based on consequentialist considerations. Namely, that Erdemovic should not be acquitted since this could provide a defence to future perpetrators of international crimes and even harming the deterrence of international rules.
Even Cassese did not entirely disagree with the outcome of the majority, concluding that a general prohibition on resorting to ‘duress’ can be established in the case of the killing of innocent civilians. But with the notable exception in the case that ‘it is highly probable, if not certain’ that the person under ‘duress’ is fated to die along with his victims if he does commit the crime, which will be carried out in any event.
In the end, the argument of ‘duress’ was not accepted for Erdemovic by the ICTY. However, the dissenting opinion of Cassese proved to be hugely influential, years later, on the future definition of ‘duress’ enshrined in the Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the ICC.
The International Criminal Court and Dominic Ongwen
We finally go back to the case of Ongwen, an ex-child soldier who has been indoctrinated for a good part of his life. The reasoning of the ICC was bound by Art. 31(1d) of the Rome Statute, which states that for ‘duress’ is necessary a threat of ‘imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person’.
After hearing hundreds of witnesses and wiretaps the ICC established that this requirement of ‘duress’ was not met. The element of ‘imminence’, inside the first criteria, has been interpreted restrictively as otherwise, the ICC feared it could ‘provide a blanket immunity to members of criminal organisations which have brutal systems of ensuring discipline’. The specific conditions in which Ongwen grew was taken into consideration by the Court, but in a limited way.
Indeed, from a legal perspective, this outcome is legitimate. The ICC used ‘duress’ on the basis of what was established plainly in the Rome Statute. However, some uncertainties remain. As we have shown in this brief exposition, ‘duress’ is not homogenously justified in legal practice. Rather, we have witnessed that it is a rather relativistic, often rhetorical, concept.
This is even more controversial in a case concerning the actions committed by an abducted child. Ongwen did commit horrific crimes, but at the same time international law recognize undisputedly the particular vulnerability of younglings and the prohibition of their conscription under a certain age. Does international law really not recognize methods of coercion – such as a lengthy indoctrination – outside of the most obvious ones such as the threat of death?
In the end the discomfort of the Court in setting the final stone on this case was reflected in the final judgement. For 61 charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes, the ICC sentenced Dominic Ongwen to 25 years of imprisonment. A rather light penalty given the heavy accusatory load. Perhaps, showing that the peculiar history of the defendant could not deflect responsibility, but was taken instead as an extenuating circumstance.
Russian belligerence against Ukraine turned the issue of energy independence into a concrete reality for many countries and underscored the inextricable nexus between issues of national, international, and energy security.
In response to the international energy crisis, the US may choose to work towards energy independence in one of two ways: either be lulled into a false sense of security by leaning on dirty drilling and reverse any progress in the field of sustainability or place its trust in the hands of clean energy solutions. While reverting to traditional fossil fuel resources to secure energy independence may be a tempting choice because of its apparent immediacy, working on sustainable sources is likely to prove not just the most environmentally-friendly, but also the most politically-sound alternative.
US Gas and Oil Industry Players: Exploiting the Energy Crisis
Since the beginning of Russian aggression on Ukraine, US gas and oil industry actors have been fanning the flames of panic and mistrust in sustainable energy solutions by trumpeting the virtues of increased extraction practices. A quick look through the American Petroleum Institute's Twitter posts since the beginning of the war highlights the common talking points put forward by the US energy industry: the need for the deregulation of drilling practices, the loosening of permitting standards, the relaxation of health and environmental safeguards, and an increase subsidies to the oil and gas industry. When faced with the reality of arguments that the US is already almost at an all-time high in the production of oil and gas, industry actors make a number of lofty claims as to the ability of increased extractive practices to solve the energy crisis; some Big Oil actors claims that, although not absolutely necessary to the US domestically, an increase in drilling will be essential in supplying gas and oil to Europe and evening out prices internationally. Other actors, such as those involved in the fracking industry, have chosen to lay low and engage in more silent but equally harmful profiteering tactics by taking advantage of escalating prices.
The compulsive quest to collect drilling permits despite already holding the title of the world’s largest producer of oil and gas is a habit the US fossil fuel industry cannot shake. According to a report by the Bureau of Land Management, oil and gas companies already control 25 million acres of public land and have racked up 9000 approved but unutilized drilling permits on public land. This practice is encouraged by the fact that oil and gas companies can make an easy profit by simply sitting on permit-regulated federal land without even investing in actual projects.
A potential threat to sustainability initiatives
The most discouraging foreseeable consequence of the reversal to dirty extraction practices is the progressive unmaking of a number of recently passed bills and initiatives representing a first step in the direction of encouraging fossil fuel reversal in the US. Initiatives like the THRIVE Act, the Build Back Better framework, and the America the Beautiful campaign, while still not even coming close to comprehensively addressing issues of sustainability, climate change, and fossil fuel reversal, determined a partial discursive shift towards policies aimed at achieving environmentally-sound energy solutions and reducing the influence of Big Oil. The US’s choice to refrain from fully falling back into old habits of drilling its way into a false sense of security would be a sound choice from a variety of standpoints.
Implications and possible scenarios
Firstly, it may be true that the US, unlike European countries, does not have a supply shortage problem when it comes to oil and gas. It has been proven time and time again that a country’s supply independence is not sufficient when it comes to globally-priced commodities like gas and oil because of the effects of global price fluctuations. This notwithstanding, a reckless increase in drilling permits is highly unlikely to provide any relief in the stabilization of prices in the global energy market in the short term, according to reports by the Government Accountability Office.
Additionally, an increase in drilling practices and reliance on extraction activities would most likely prove counterproductive from a strict national security standpoint. Increased reliance on energy-related critical infrastructure may expose national infrastructure to heightened Russian hybrid warfare tactics such as cyberattacks aimed at infrastructure disruption. Russia is no stranger to selecting energy infrastructure projects as targets for cyberattacks as occurred in 2021 when Russia was identified as likely being responsible for the cyberattack on the Colonial pipeline.
Finally, the pursuit of energy independence through unfettered recourse to drilling would most likely generate friction between the United States and the European Union since the latter has overtly chosen to base its pursuit of energy independence on sustainable, clean energy sources through the adoption of the REPowerEU action plan. By continuing on the path of fossil fuel dependency, the US risks being politically and economically isolated.
All things considered, it is not difficult to imagine that no positive outcomes will arise from an increased reliance on fossil fuels and dirty extraction practices in pursuit of energy independence. Reversal to clean, sustainable energy sources is clearly the more environmentally-sound and politically-reasonable way to gain freedom from oil autocracies e and the recurring imminent threat of global energy crises. However, this does not mean that transition towards more sustainable energy is not fraught with a number of intricacies and potential for new geopolitical imbalances. Electrification of industry and transportation sectors, for example, constitutes one of the most obvious double edged weapons: the transition towards electrification relies on powerful batteries (such as Li-ion batteries) the main components of which are natural substances such as lithium and nickel. China and, in more recent times, Russia have already taken action to secure their control on the mining of these increasingly essential resources through investments in mining projects in lithium-rich countries like Argentina. One of the most demanding challenges of large-scale electrification-based transition will be ensuring that countries, including the US, do not trade in energy independence for further entrenched forms of supply chain dependency, thus never breaking the endless cycle of geopolitical and energy coercion.
As a member of the Armed Forces, I have recently become involved with battlefield studies where, as students of war, we aim to enrich our knowledge on a variety of topics to rediscover practices and knowledge that would sustain our fighting ability in the future. This process of active learning is also known as “Lessons learned” and can be conducted across military campaigns and battlefields They also allow for the exploration of a variety of dimensions, including tactics, movement of troops, objectives, targets, and how these dimensions impact the war in broader terms. Personally, I found these exercises extremely interesting and exciting. I, therefore, decided to conduct a Lessons Learned of al-Qaeda, especially of the 055 Brigade to demonstrate how this group of staunch fighters summarises al-Qaeda’s best traits and practices. It is one of al-Qaeda’s finest products and has become a forgotten dimension of al-Qaeda’s war in Afghanistan due to the much more famous and developed networking capabilities of the organisation. Why would this analysis be important? Gen. Erwin Rommel once said, “Sweat saves blood, blood saves lives, but brains saves both,”. Thus, by providing an alternative analysis of al-Qaeda’s conventional warfare capabilities, I aim to spark curiosity and interest in the practices, capabilities, and tactics of the 055 Brigade to learn from our enemy and gather lessons that we could implement in the future. Of course, I do not believe that this article will in any way provide a complete analysis of the Brigade due to the limited amount of information available, but, as Otto Von Bismarck said, “Fools learn from experience. I prefer to learn from the experience of others”. Finally, to do the aforementioned, I will encompass three aspects: the nature of the brigade, its role and main functions, and finally its warfare capabilities.
Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of the Centre of Gravity stated “no matter what the central feature of the enemy’s power may be—the point on which your efforts must converge—the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin, and in every case will be a very significant feature of the campaign”. Al-Qaeda’s fighting force was composed of two main parts, the 055 Brigade or Lashkar-E-Zil and its extensive international network.[1] The 055 Brigade came to life in the aftermath of al-Qaeda’s relocation from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1998. It had a multinational fighting force between 500 and 5000, which experts argue was comparable to “Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guards”. Some of the militants were veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979 - 1989) while others were sent by a variety of regional and national jihadist groups including Uzbeks, Libyans, Saudi, Egyptians, Algerians, Sudanese, Chadi, Mauritanians, Somalians, Yemenites, Indonesians, Malaysians, and Uyghurs. The brigade was trained in a military base outside Kabul and became the conventional force of al-Qaeda reporting directly to Osama bin Laden and worked jointly as the backbone support for the Taliban forces across the country. 055 Brigade was therefore a multinational joint project which is often underestimated due to their lack of high-profile operations during the Afghan War between 2001 and 2003. However, their presence was felt in the campaign to capture Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998, the battle for Bamiyan in 1999, the massacre of Shia population near Hazarajat in 2001, and in the battle for Tora Bora the same year. The head of the brigade was Jumaboi Ahmadjonovich Khodjiyev, known as Juma Namangani, an Uzbek with three decades of warfare experience and a very scarce public record.[2]
The 055 Brigade resembled al-Qaeda’s creative and unique approach to warfare. To explain this, the article will explore three functions of this formation. The first and most known function was to support the Taliban forces in conventional fighting by providing frontline support to the less experienced Taliban fighters. A key feature of the brigade was to provide critical morale boost to the Taliban troops demonstrating its ideological commitment and military expertise. It is indeed important to understand that the Taliban have never been a fully integrated group as many might think. Instead, they have historically been divided among smaller factions and splinters, often divided between staunch ideologically motivated and professional fighters and local grievance-motivated fighters. This second group was composed by inactive members working temporarily for the Taliban often being farmers or shepherds. Based on this distinction, the 055 Brigade constituted a backbone against defection.
Secondly, the 055 Brigade defines al-Qaeda Organization’s unique chameleonic and elitist nature. The 055 Brigade was a conventional force using unconventional techniques mostly based on an arabicized version of British and U.S. special forces training methods. This is unique across terrorist organisations. The ability of an organisation, such as al Qaeda, to train, equip, and deploy a force of this nature and to employ it flexibly demonstrates its ability to mix creativity and warfare knowledge. Specifically, the variety of personalities and characters within the brigade is quite stunning. It included not only veterans of the Afghan-Soviet War, which were trained in guerrilla warfare including ambushes, sieges, raids, strongpoints, and urban combat, but also a new generation of fighters with a much better education and deeper loyalty towards al-Qaeda’s leader, Bin Laden. This coupled with their staunch ideological convictions and decisiveness in sacrificing themselves in the name of the cause made of them an extremely useful and powerful tool.
In terms of operational capabilities and equipment, the 055 Brigade demonstrated its superiority by being better equipped and trained than the average Taliban soldier. They wore commercial night goggles, advanced Western sniper rifles with night sights, light spotter aircrafts, and utilise modern communication systems in addition to mortars, RPGs, machine guns, and AK-47s. The troops were involved in longer and more sophisticated training than what was provided by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Pakistan. The latter tied the brigade to fighting operations in Kashmir against the Indian Security forces. Whilst, the experience from the Soviet-Afghan War in al Qaeda’s 055 Brigade became evident in Operation Anaconda (2002). US and allied forces found themselves to fight asymmetric guerrilla fight, closely resembling the mujahidin’s skirmishes with Soviet heliborne Spetsnaz troops (Russian Special Forces) in the 1980s. Consequently, the fighters could operate in large and small groups as well as specialized mobile teams up to 3 to 4 people, granting them the mobility to transfer across multiple frontlines and regions of the country. In addition, they were given the chance to choose which path suited their career development. This included changing theatres of operations as well as deciding to commit martyrdom.[3] This last point highlights al-Qaeda’s ability to provide its members with a simple “Career Development Plan”, but very much in line with those provided by employees across western businesses, demonstrating a commitment to upskill the troops.
Thirdly, the 055 Brigade’s flexibility and adaptability aligns with al-Qaeda Organization’s ability to optimise, remodel, and redeploy its forces and capabilities based on operational needs. It is clear that the 055 Brigade could not operate outside the region as an entity due to the lack of heavy equipment and transportation. However, al-Qaeda could count on another side of its fighting capabilities, the unconventional network of cells and partners around the globe. Al-Qaeda was at the time, and certainly continues to be, one of the most elite terrorist organisations across the globe. Their expertise in military tactics, administration, and logistics built on years of protracted conflicts has allowed the members to possess a certainly rare expertise and knowledge base. The 055 Brigade has been employed to provide specialist training and logistical support to al-Qaeda’s partners around the globe with the objective to initiate local jihadi revolts. The latter focused on providing leadership in technical, military, and administrative matters to al-Qaeda’s international partners. This was demonstrated by the use of such fighters in the expansion in Southeast Asia, where 055 Brigade members were routinely used to train local fighters across Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.[4]
Since 2002, the 055 Brigade has been renamed Lashkar-E-Zil and reformed in Pakistan as an auxiliary force of al-Qaeda to support a variety of local groups and the Taliban insurgency moving across border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It also continues to participate in the fighting in Kashmir. Some of the most devastating attacks committed by this brigade were under the direction of Mustafa Abu Yazid and Ilyas Kashmiri, who were both killed in 2011. Some of the most ferocious attacks include Major General Amir Faisal Alvi, the former commander of Special Services Group of the Pakistan Army, in November 2008, in Islamabad and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Members of Laskar-E-Zil include former member of the Pakistani armed forces, veterans, and newly acquired members recruited from a variety of organisations and conflicts globally.
To conclude, despite Qaeda has never had the ability to field a conventional army in the purest sense, the internationalisation of the 055 Brigade, its mobility, adaptability, chameleonic nature coupled with employing highly advanced technology tools resemble al-Qaeda’s creativity, knowledge and highly adaptable nature as an organisation. The ability to acquire soldiers from over a dozen nations demonstrate its attractiveness and elitist nature. The staunch ideological commitment of the 055 Brigade fighters should be of clear interest as it demonstrates the commitment of al-Qaeda’s members to fulfil their mission and decisiveness in battle and in operations. The introduction of administrative and logistical practices built upon almost three decades of wars has enabled the organisation to provide its members with “Personal Development Plans”, providing them the flexibility to choose their role, career path, and development within the organisation while being paid for it. The ability to work in large as well as small, specialised groups resembling U.S. and British special forces demonstrates the ability of the organisation to remain at the forefront of warfare knowledge. The adaptability of these forces to become a multiplier was exemplified by their ability to join and form cells to provide specialised training to a variety of global partners while adding that extra edge to the Taliban forces during the Taliban insurgency. All in all, the 055 Brigade demonstrated to be one of the finest products of al-Qaeda. This, in turn, shows how the organisation can hardly be seen as a relic of the past.
The Russian tactic is that of a pincer encirclement of entire Ukraine – from Russian territory and occupied Crimea, Donbas, and Belarus - and inside they follow the same tactic as Kyiv's focus, methodically destroying civilian infrastructure and nuclear power plants. The attempt is to demoralize and coerce Ukrainians. Yet morale is rising and these same civilians are becoming soldiers. Such support somewhat offsets the quantitative advantage of the Russian army in manpower and equipment. Now, Russian troops make advances into Ukrainian territory only at the cost of hundreds of soldiers every day, failing for now to take control of any regional center.
Their qualitative advantage is very reduced, as can be inferred from the high level of losses, which seems to be well above 5%, in men and materials. Russia could take control of the territory, but only with long times and high destruction. Reservist and conscript call-ups, as well as the ongoing shipment of Syrian and Chechen militants to Russia and Belarus, will not be able to affect the balance of troops around Kyiv in the coming week, slowing down the Russian tactic as it is momentarily unable to conduct simultaneous attacks.
Russia is now deploying maneuverable Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, reported by Russian state news agencies as a “next-generation weapon”. While it is very unlikely that the deployment of Kh-47M2 missiles will have a major impact on the current stall of the invasion, It could likely point out a shortage of other weapons and a propagandistic effort to distort Russia’s military failure.
However, after an end of decades of deterrence orthodoxy, the danger of a possible escalation involving nuclear weapons is real. Indeed, Putin has used nuclear threats to create a wide perimeter in which he may pursue a conventional war in Europe. NATO countries are doing everything to avoid escalations, complying with a policy of non-intervention for avoiding direct contact with the Russian military.
While not directing intervening in Ukraine, NATO countries are deploying significant military aid to the country while drastically raising defense spending, reclaiming the alliance's historical role as a protective haven against Moscow's military activities. Germany in particular is now increasing its defense spending to more than 2% of its economic output: a historic departure from its postwar commitment not to transfer armaments to combat zones. Moreover, the European Union's recent investments (€500 million) in arms and other aid to the Ukrainian military mark a “watershed moment” in its history.
However, many countries are starting to be bitten by the economic effects of the war, especially those with currencies linked to the rubble. More sanctions implications are quite likely to emerge in the coming weeks, particularly in a case like the EU-Russia energy partnership, where dependency is significant. Indeed, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is now serving as a geopolitical catalyst on key strategic, economic, and societal issues and will certainly bring to consider re-alignments, particularly in Post-Soviet countries and the Middle East. NATO's deterrent posture must be strengthened as well as cooperation and dialogue with the various regional actors in order to figure out the next evolutions in the geopolitical chessboards.
In his latest book, Jeremy Garlick analyses the conceptions and perceptions surrounding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the ‘flagship’ project of China’s greater Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). CPEC was initially intended to provide a shorter and potentially safer trade route across Pakistan for Chinese imports and exports which would also serve as an alternative to the existing route via Straits of Malacca. However, over the years, Pakistan’s economic situation and security considerations have dampened progress on the $62 billion project announced in 2017. Garlick argues that CPEC is not really a ‘game-changer’ for Pakistan or the region, rather is more of a geopositional gambit as the project is driven more by geopolitical and security motivations than by economic considerations.
Garlick dives into the history of Sino-Pak cooperation – from shared support against territorial disputes with India to China’s clandestine support for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program – to show how political considerations play a critical role behind CPEC’s vision which ultimately aims to preserve and bolster this ‘all-weather’ alliance between the two neighbours. To deconstruct the perceptions of CPEC as an ‘economic corridor’ or ‘game-changer’, Garlick quantitatively and qualitatively analysed over 100 most-cited publications for general assumptions and more specifically for terms such as ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and ‘Game-Changer’. Divided into six chapters, the book unpacks existing narratives around CPEC, the reality and myths around the economic considerations, the Malacca Dilemma, geopolitical and security considerations, all culminating into the concluding chapter that shows how CPEC is not the ‘game-changer’ for Pakistan.
First, Garlick shows how it is doubtful that CPEC could serve as an ‘economic corridor’ for the region given how almost all the projects initiated under it are situated within Pakistan. These projects solely focus on boosting Pakistan’s economic, energy, transport, and infrastructure sectors, except for the fiber-optic cable project, which is the only project running cross-border into China. This, Garlick argues, shows how CPEC could be restricted to deepening Pak-China ties and supporting Pakistan’s dwindling economy that has been unable to secure both foreign investors and American aid.
Next, Garlick analyses one of the most significant projects under CPEC, the Gwardar Project, aimed at developing the Gwadar port in Pakistan which would allow China access to the Indian Ocean and port facility for its imports and exports among other benefits. Further, a Gwadar-Xinjiang Pipeline is expected to resolve the supposed ‘Malacca Dilemma’ – a chokepoint in the Straits of Malacca which, if blocked, could hamper 80% of Chinese oil supplies. However, upon closer inspection, Garlick shows how a Gwadar-Xinjiang Pipeline does not appear feasible owing to the difficult Himalayan terrain; a pipeline passing through the mountains would require insulation and supporting structure thus adding to the construction costs. Additionally, alternative routes through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Xinjiang or even maritime routes as opposed to the land route via Himalayan terrain renders a Gwadar-Xinjiang Pipeline rather illogical. Garlick also shows how the port capacity of Gwadar has not increased over the years, which makes its limited capacity unfit for greater Chinese shipments or even for trade in Central Asia. More importantly, the security threats in Baluchistan due to separatist and terrorist elements have, over the years, hindered any substantial progress on the project and have put lives of Chinese officials in danger. Given all the difficulties attributed with the Gwadar project, Garlick shows the significance of Chinese investment by terming their presence in Gwadar as geopositional hedging; the Chinese aim to establish their presence in a relatively strategic location – in this case near the Strait of Hormuz – so that it may prove beneficial against any potential future risk.
Garlick also argues that the lack of transparency with the project, particularly in terms of its financial details, raises doubts over corruption and cronyism. This is further fueled by the fact that an ex-general now serves as the head of CPEC, raising questions on the extent of military interference in Pakistan. Though lack of transparency is not the only trouble with finances; Pakistan’s mounting national debt – which stood at 35.8 trillion rupees (US$228 billion) in November 2020 – together with perpetual shortage of foreign exchange reserves and China's debt trap diplomacy has made it difficult for the country to pay off Chinese debt. Garlick also unpacks various energy and infrastructure projects initiated under CPEC in Pakistan to show how, even if the said $62 billion is invested under CPEC, the amount is too small to create a significant difference; further casting doubt on whether CPEC is a ‘game-changer’ for Pakistan.
The book very succinctly maps out the internal dynamics of Pakistan from the military influence in politics to separatist trouble in Baluchistan and its dwindling economy to explain how various factors impact CPEC’s vision and execution. Garlick's extensive research and meticulous analysis is evident as he challenges prevalent assumptions and perceptions regarding CPEC existing in literature and in media. Garlick offers a fresh and distinct perspective on why CPEC should not be considered a ‘game-changer’ and how instead it has become a source of “excessive debt, elite corruption, and poor outcomes for Pakistan’s economy and people”.
The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has now skyrocketed among the news and masses of people are expressing their disapproval for the war through marches and protests worldwide. However, intelligence services and scholars had warned that a regional conflict between the two countries was foreseeable. To better understand the reasons behind Putin’s decision, an analysis of Russia’s 2014 military doctrine is fundamental. A military doctrine is essentially a public document that summarizes in strategic and theoretical terms the military capabilities in defending, offending and retaliating against threats. While Soviet-era doctrines were unpublished, the Russian federation documents are public, and they describe the political direction of Russia in military affairs. The 2014 version is divided in: generic provisions, the military dangers and threats, the military policy and the military economic-defence support. In comparison to the Soviet era, Russian military doctrines emphasize the defensive approach, and they profit from lessons learned from military conflicts and analysis of different scenarios. In the ethos of Russian “Motherland”, Russia is perceived as an object to be protected and a subject capable of reacting.
Military offensive operations are justified under a defensive provision which aims to prevent threats towards Russia. United Nations and international treaties are invoked in supporting this theory. Russia’s allies and partners are clearly mentioned. Belarus is the closest ally, with fully integrated armed forces, infrastructures and coordination. CSTO, CIS and BRICS countries are mentioned “to strengthen the system of collective security”. In comparison to the 2010’s military doctrine, the EU is perceived no longer functional to pursue national security, but an equal partner to maintain a status-quo.
The 2014 version also abandons all possible cooperation with NATO as well. The Russian ambition to pursue a regional defense policy guarantees that border states do not adopt an approach that threatens the Russian Federation. A specific section that implicitly was dedicated to the case of Ukraine mentions that overthrowing of legitimate governments in bordering states is a serious menace for Russia. Another reference regards 2011-12 Russian protests, declaring that anti-nationalistic information led by external parties is a menace. In some issues, Russia has a dualist approach, perceiving an issue both as a threat and as a mean. For instance, the use of private military contractors (PMCs) is a military danger but it is an inevitable component of contemporary warfare. The same idea is applied to the militarization of the information, which undermines Russia from abroad but is also a novel area of improvement. The 2014 also reflects a much more reliance on Russia in using tools of hybrid warfare. While the 2010 version made a generic use of hybrid warfare, the 2014 version highlighted that Russia would rely on military means only after political, diplomatic, judicial, economic, information and other non-kinetic means have been used.
During an event in the Russian Academy of Military Sciences in 2019, the Russian Chief of General Staff, Valery Gerasimov described Russian military strategy as “Active Defense”. What does he mean by “Active Defense”? It is a strategic concept integrating preemptive measures to prevent conflict and wartime concepts of operations that seek to deny to the enemy a decisive victory in the initial period of war, degrading and disorganizing its effort, while setting the conditions for a counteroffensive or attaining war termination. The strategy privileges a permanent standing force, arrayed as high readiness operational formations in each strategic direction, prepared to execute operations jointly.
At the beginning, the Russian military needs to manipulate an opponent through the demonstration of his readiness, deployments, exercises, weapon tests and demonstrative actions and, if it is necessary, they can include a demonstrative use of force and limited strikes. After the period called “Pre-War”, the aim of the “Active Defense” is to inflict disorganisation on the opponent via long-range strikes against critically important objects at operational depths and beyond, in order to reach the goal of disorganizing the enemy’s effort, degrading his ability to sustain operation and affecting his political and at the same time maximize the survivability of the Russian units and preserve the force.
The “Active Defense” is based on two main tenets: Maneuver Defense and Non contact Warfare. Unlike World War I and World War II, the idea of using their own main effort to create a potential defense and a massive manned front, is totally obsolete in the eyes of the Russian strategists. Maneuver Defense for the Russian Military means that fires and strikes systems will attrit the opponent’s forces as they advance, and his aim is to destroy an opponent’s initial operation plan and buy time for reserves or follow forces to arrive, exhaust the opponent’s forces, and subsequently seize the initiative. Turning to Noncontact Warfare, the term is somewhat muddled, as there is a commonly held Russian military belief that modern warfare will feature forward operating sensors, fires, and precision strike systems. War will be driven by information, command and control systems, and precise means of destruction. However, non contact speaks more to the employment of longer-range capabilities to attack critical objects at substantial operational and strategic ranges.
With the Georgian and Ukrainian crisis of 2008 and 2013, the Russian armed forces have developed the so called New Generation Warfare, 4th Generation Warfare, or Hybrid Warfare. Hybrid warfare does not aim to victory through the defeat of the enemy on the battlefield but regime change and the achievement of the Kremlin’s goals. Therefore, the military became one element of a much larger set of foreign policy instruments aimed to reach political gains. The Hybrid force is composed of conventional forces andspecial corps, like the Spetsnaz, that operate in coordination with a militarized local population, like Donbass separatist militias. The militias are usually formed not directly by Russian forces, but by contracted forces from outside the area of operations which serves along militias, usually binded by a contract. Moreover, in the Hybrid force is also fundamental the role of Private Military Contractors(PMC), like the Wagner group, that can aid the efforts of regular forces and militias. It is the formalization of war by proxy, which is cleared witnessed by the praxis of Russian armed forces in Syria, Ukraine and Georgia.
The Russian military doctrine emphasizes therefore the political aspect of warfare, and the link between military operations and its ideological and foreign policy aspects: in all the three major fronts (Syria, Ukraine, Georgia), the Russians have carefully prepared the public affairs and the narrations in all their conflicts. They always claimed that their intervention was the result of a request for help, Ossetians and Abcazians in Georgia, russophone separatists in Ukraine, the Assad government in Syria. They deployed their PMCs in Africa, which helped them to further their influence on the Continent, with the successful coups in Mali and Central African Republic. The difficulties in improving their capabilities have inevitably shaped Russian military doctrine from conventional warfare of the Soviet era to a new form of warfare that can be defined as “non-linear”.
