European border management practices have undergone an astonishing transformation in the last few decades, and this process is both co-constitutive of and constituted by technological advancement. New dynamics and effects are unfolding every day.
The objective of this article is to point out some of the complexities and controversies of the relationship between technological development and the securitisation of migration. This objective is achieved by analysing the functioning of one of the more important European border management instruments: the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR).
Eurosur can be viewed as a “system of systems” a digital infrastructure with several nodes dislocated around Europe. Each Member State, in fact, has a National Coordination Centre (NCC) that exchanges information with all authorities responsible for external border monitoring, as well as with other NCCs and Frontex.
The NCCs maintain national situational pictures, which aggregate in the European situational picture, that provides a nearly real time mapping of the relevant events occurring at the EU external border, and determines the type and amount of assets that need to be deployed, according to the impact and risk level associated to a border section (green means low, yellow means medium and red means high - as the reader can see in the picture below). A higher impact level means that a given border section is more likely to be subjected to strong migratory pressures, and therefore, more resources should be preventively deployed to that area in order to improve border stress capacities. This calculation occurs through the collection of historical data and the detection of patterns of events in order to evaluate possible future risk scenarios. EUROSUR hence both serves an archiving and anticipatory function.
By: Federica Montanaro, Maria Makurat, Giovanni Tricco
EUROSUR: Challenges and controversies
As stated by the dedicated regulation, EUROSUR is being used to achieve three major goals: increasing situational awareness; improving border authorities' reaction capability; and finally, saving the lives of immigrants at sea, particularly in cases of overloaded vessels, as Dirk Vande Ryse, Frontex's Director of Monitoring, Analysis, and Vulnerability, pointed out.
Human rights implications with EUROSUR
In general, political elites usually focus on saving lives at sea, the core priority of EUROSUR. For example, in the aftermath of the 2013 infamous shipwreck near Lampedusa, the EU commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom presented the incoming deployment of Eurosur as a strategic move aimed at improving the EU efficacy in search and rescue (SAR) operations. However, already during its launch, concerns were expressed whether refugees would truly benefit from this type of surveillance. Opinions were split on whether Frontex and EUROSUR actually had the goal to save refugees or if deterrence was the main concern. A harsh debate is still ongoing, but its openness and democratic nature is heavily contested; scholars and experts are struggling to find reliable information which allows the monitoring and evaluation of the functioning of such said system. This is mainly due to the classified or reserved nature attached to the work it performs. One improvement shows that the system is being scrutinized more closely and undergoing new regulations such as the Regulation (EU) 2021/581 introduced in April 2021 with the following goals: more secure information exchange, more effective reporting, better efficient rescue operations, better cooperation with third countries involved and setting up an independent Security Accreditation Board. This should bring about improvements to tackling the issues of transparency and secrecy, however questions remain such as whether the willingness to share data will take place and which criteria are in the end important to deem such a system effective in the long term run?
However, looking at the bigger picture, the virtually nonexistent impact of the Eurosur on the SAR capability of the EU and its member states can be easily demonstrated by considering 2013 (the year of the deployment of the apparatus) as a benchmark, and by considering the death rate in the Mediterranean Sea before and after this critical date. An International Organisation for Migration report shows that before and after 2013 there has been no significant change in the fluctuation of the death rate. On the contrary, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) denounced that in some instances the death toll was rising even in periods in which the number of arrivals was declining. This is even more astonishing if we consider the 2011 Frontex statement about the incredibly high number of boats (98%) that they were able to detect at sea even before their arrival to the European shores.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while technological progress is central to the management and surveillance of the Mediterranean, it is not clear whether it is also as important for the safety of migrants at sea. The numbers seem to prove that with or without EUROSUR people on the move continue to die at European shores, testifying that higher visibility does not automatically lead to a lower death rate. The objective of this article was to shed some light on the issue, while calling for further and in depth research.
Efforts to improve human security in situations of violence have increasingly recognized the differential experiences and vulnerabilities of specific communities – like women or the elderly. In this line, advances have also been made in exploring the intersectionality of these contexts – that is, the fact that those belonging to multiple marginalized groups endure compounded risks. We are now at a point where we explore identity in conflict with more nuance than ever before. Yet, one collective still often remains excluded from our analysis – the LGBTQI+ or Queer community.
Despite efforts at inclusion and nuance in international security, like the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, we still implicitly marginalize or exclude the queer community from policy or alleviation measures, offering little differential protection or recognition. As such, in the words of Academic Jamie Hagen, “those vulnerable to insecurity and violence because of their sexual orientation or gender identity remain largely neglected by the international peace and security community”.
Queer human security and protection in conflict: where we fall short
From Chechen leaders, to Zimbabwe’s President or Turkey’s Erdogan, world leaders often don’t only decline to offer protections to LGBTQI+ people – they actively deny their existence. Be it within their borders or entirely, the majority of world leaders still deny basic recognition and rights to the queer community, paving the way for discrimination, abuses, and killings.
As a result, LGBTQI+ experiences are often implicitly or explicitly excluded from policy, research, and services addressing identity-based violence and mass atrocity. A recent paper by Protection Approaches has explored the multiple ways queer experiences of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide remain under-explored and unaddressed.
As we have stated, this is often due to pervasive political, legal, and social discrimination. However, another prominent effect is that, due to the community’s exclusion from research and debate, there is a stark lack of data pertaining to the lives of queer populations. Even when attempts at inclusion are made, we have little experience in how to ethically and effectively gather data on the community. Firstly, as violence is often viewed through a dichotomous lens with regard to gender, there is little space or recognition for communities that do not conform to this binary. Secondly, even if research focuses on LGBTQI+ minorities, challenges remain when attempting to ethically explore identity outside primarily western categorizations of gender and sexuality – which need to be adapted to different cultural realities – as well as in deciding which collectives to include and how to do so without putting them in danger. Lastly, researchers face the potential lack of availability of basic data on abuses – as many people do not report violence due to the fear of stigmatization or reprisals. As a result of these converging dynamics, queer populations suffer a double attack: victimization and erasure.
Being Queer in war: lived experiences of LGBTQI+ populations in modern conflict
The reality is that LGBTQI+ persons suffer disproportionate violence during armed conflict. The continued abuse and discrimination the community is subject to in peacetime only aggravates within this context, with the worsening of social chaos and the erosion of the rule of law. Indeed, the violence extends beyond self-identification, as even those being only suspected of belonging to the community face reprisals. While progress has indeed been made in terms of the recognition of LGBTQ+ populations under human rights law and existing abuses are increasingly being documented by media, human rights bodies, and civil society, queer populations remain among the least protected of all communities in armed conflict.
“I was on my way home [from work] when five or six men (…) stopped me. They kicked and punched and slapped me all over my head and body. They (…) threw me in a garbage bin. I lay down (…) and they pulled out a razor blade and a screwdriver and poked and cut me all over (…). They sliced me up and poured around five liters of gasoline all over my body and face and set me alight…. The neighbors rescued me”.
Beyond this, queer populations often contend with a severe lack of accountability and a sense of impunity, with states and armed groups tending to be involved in their abuses. Unlike other collectives, queer individuals not only have little or no recourse in law, they often can’t even find social or NGO support.
With discriminatory targeting driven by gender and sexuality worsening in much of the world, some scholars have come to consider these persecutions as amounting to crimes against humanity– as they are systematic, planned, and exercised against primarily civilian populations.
Notable examples of systematic abuses to LGBTQI+ populations continue to arise. Queer Afghans have been targets of increasingly severe attacks since 2021, in the wake of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. While same-sex relations were criminalized even before the Taliban took control, the situation has notably worsened. According to a report by Human Rights Watch and OutRight Action International, LGBT Afghans have been threatened, sexually assaulted, attacked, and often been forced to flee as refugees. In some cases, family members themselves that support the Taliban have become threats to their safety. Nevertheless, obtaining testimonies remains complicated and there is no accurate estimate of the scale of attacks currently targeting LGBT people in the country.
While Afghanistan may be one of the cases that has received the most coverage, similar abuses have been reported in Iraq, Syria, Colombia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among others. In Syria, the Assad regime has continued to progressively exacerbate its persecution and abuse of LGBTQI+ persons, or those considered to be so. This has been exemplified by reports of sexual violence – including rape, forced stripping, and cavity examinations – threats, severe assault, extortion, kidnapping, and killings by both the state and rebel militias. Even localized conflicts may severely affect the attitude of entire states toward the queer community – in Ukraine, Russian-influenced anti-homosexuality policies and attitudes proliferated since 2014, with the advent of conflict in the Donbas, and negatively affected the lives of LGBTQI+ persons in Kyiv. In this line, we need to consider not only wars, but other severe conflicts as sources of victimization. For example, LGBTQI+ persons – especially trans women – have been recognized as more vulnerable to violence both by armed militias and organized crime across Central America. As such, queer populations stand at the intersection of exacerbated vulnerability and reduced social or institutional support, especially in situations of conflict or protracted human security crises.
Conclusions
While LGBTQI+ people are not the only collective facing increased risks to their human security, the lack of attention paid to their protection, as well as their exclusion from most policy and research efforts on international security, have led their needs and vulnerabilities to be marginalized in humanitarian responses and social assistance during violent conflict.
There is an urgency to recognize the dire situation of queer populations in modern conflict and develop a policy architecture that is able to ensure their protection at an international level. As it stands, the recognition of LGBTQI+ experiences is often absent from even from the most seismic of security crises, and unless that changes we will continue to fail in efforts to holistically protect human rights.
China’s influence in Africa is becoming increasingly deep. 2021 saw a bilateral trade between Beijing and the African continent of 254 billion dollars, with a 35% growth compared to the previous year. Given these findings, China is Africa’s largest trading partner for the twelfth consecutive year.
Over the last decade, Beijing has replaced “classical” colonial powers thanks to a new paradigm which privileges trading, infrastructural investments and non-interference in the home affairs of the countries with whom it cooperates. This success can be attributed not only to the fact that China has not been a colonial power, but also to a precise strategy pursued by its government, which is based on specific principles. One of the most important of these is financial support: from 2007 to 2020 Chinese development banks provided more funding than all other foreign financial institutions put together. The second point is the aforementioned neutrality in Africa’s countries home affairs, with no political interference, in contrast to the classical Western multilateral approach. This does not mean that Beijing does not show its soft power, but it prefers a strictly economic type of support, with no assistance, for instance, in the development of new democratic institutions or interventions in African political crises. Another important point is the “raw material for infrastructures” policy, which allows China to pay for African goods (mainly natural resources) by building new strategic onsite facilities (bridges, roads, railways etc.).
Given this strategic approach, African governments see China as a reliable partner and the main interlocutor for their economic development. The recent opposition of several African countries on the condemnation of Russian invasion of Ukraine at the UN General Assembly (17 abstained, following China and India, 8 were absent and 1 vote against), underlines the strong political connection which links the Beijing government and Africa, pushing African leaders to pursue Chinese interests in the international arena. This connection is bilateral but not equal: China, as a global superpower, extends its political influence by leveraging African countries’ debts. In particular, failure on their part to return money granted to them by China for the construction of strategic infrastructure may lead to repossession of that infrastructure by Beijing. Main examples are the Djiboutian port of Doraleh or the Mombasa port, used as collateral for the building of the Mombasa-Nairobi railway.
Chinese military presence in Africa: is this the beginning of a new framework?
As well as stronger financial and political intervention, in the last few years Beijing has intensified its military presence and cooperation. This engagement runs through the UN peacekeeping missions, which see a high presence of Chinese soldiers. This engagement aims to give China the chance to improve the expertise of its soldiers in operational contexts and to establish its presence in the continent.
At the moment, Beijing has a military base in Djibouti operated by the Chinese People's Army Navy (PLAN). The African country is an important hub for the control of worldwide trade: located in the Horn of Africa at the intersection of important shipping routes such as Bab-el-Mandeb and the Aden Gulf, which is the entry point for the Suez Canal, where 30% of global maritime trade takes place. Because of its strategic importance, the country hosts several military bases, notably the US, France, Italy, Spain and Saudi Arabia. The Chinese base hosts 2000 soldiers.
Endorsed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, the Djibouti base was inaugurated in 2017 and tasked with peacekeeping operations (PKO) and convoy duty. Regardless of the official purpose of the base, its size and the onsite facilities set out its possible role as a starting point for future military expansion in the African continent, with the creation of new bases in other countries. U.S. Gen. Stepen Townsend referred to it, in an interview with The Associated Press: “They have arms and munitions for sure. They have armoured combat vehicles. We think they will soon be basing helicopters there to potentially include attack helicopters.” Moreover, the above-mentioned multipurpose port of Doraleh, built by China and located near the base has been strategically important for it. Again, Chinese military expansion would appear to go hand in hand with the spread of its commerce and investments, following the routes of the “Maritime Silk Road” and taking advantage of facilities built and controlled for cooperation purposes.
It is plausible that Beijing will reproduce the “Djibouti base model” in other African countries, following the same steps and dynamics. In this regard, the recent agreement between Chinese and Tanzanian governments for the extension of the Bagamoyo port (75 km north of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) could be the first stage of further military expansion. The seaport could give Beijing the chance to reinforce its presence in the region and act as a centre for ship repair. Moreover, a new base in the Indian Ocean could help resolve Chinese dependence on the Malacca Strait.
Between money and weapons: the end of Chinese soft power?
As we’ve seen, recent Chinese expansion in Africa seems to lead to an increasingly strong military presence in the continent. This new framework set up by Beijing, which combines investments, the building of new infrastructure, huge lending and limited political interference in African countries’ home affairs could be the forerunner for further military expansion. In the near future it is possible that China will decide to increase its presence in areas interested by The Belt and Road Initiative, in order to protect its own business through a greater control of the territory.
At the same time, the setting up of new military bases in key locations, especially on Indian Ocean coasts, will allow China to improve the strategic capabilities of its naval forces. It is hard to say if it is the beginning of a stronger approach: as seen, one of the main principles which drives Chinese interventions in Africa is the non-interference in the home affairs of local governments. Moreover, from the African countries point of view, Chinese interest, and new investments onsite, could represent a chance to develop their own economies, modernise their infrastructures and build new strategic facilities. Maybe this framework will not be overturned, but it is clear that Beijing aspires to a deeper and more active presence, underlining the importance of Africa in its global strategy.
The Venezuelan exodus qualifies as the largest forced displacement of people in the history of Latin America and the second one after the Syrian crisis at the global level. Since 2014, important fluxes of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers from Venezuela to other Central and Latin American countries have destabilized the region. This critical situation - aggravated by the pandemic crisis- persists despite the attempts made by various national governments to legalize migrants’ status. Indeed, the inability of receiving countries to adopt adequate and effective measures is leading to social unrest throughout the region and threatening the social cohesion of the region.
How did we get to the current situation?
The political turmoil and the socio-economic instability of Venezuela are among the root causes of the huge population outflow, the largest external displacement crisis in Latin America in recent years, according to the United Nations migration organization. Indeed, since 2014, more than 6 million migrants, asylum seekers and refugees have fled the country looking for a better life, food, and work.
In the last decade, the national economy has been in crisis and the healthcare system lacking funds: it caused an alarming increase in infectious diseases, unemployment, hunger and malnutrition, and maternal and child mortality. Since May 2016, Venezuela has been governed under a state of exception, meaning that wide and discretionary powers are in the hands of the president. As a result, armed forces and police have excessively and extensively used force and arbitrary detention during demonstrations. In May 2018, Nicolas Maduro won a heavily disputed election, followed in January 2019 by the self-proclamation of the leader of the National Assembly Juan Guaidó as president. Internationally, the United States and other fifty governments around the world have recognized Guaidó as the legitimate president; conversely, China, Russia, other countries and the Venezuelan military have stood with Maduro, who has true executive and legislative powers in his hands.
In the last years, hyperinflation, shortages in food and medical care, and violence have led to a deep humanitarian, health and economic crisis, enhanced by the ongoing leadership conflict and the government’s inability to provide adequate social services. These highly unstable conditions continue to represent relevant push factors behind Venezuelan migration.
Most Venezuelans are fleeing to neighboring countries, thus around 80% of them are hosted by countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. They reach their destination through diverse routes, by land, plane, or sea, in many cases crossing the borders illegally and facing the concrete risk of being victims of smuggling and human trafficking. A high number of Venezuelans has reached the coasts of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: while hosting a smaller number of migrants in total, the island has received the most in relative terms. This results in intense competition for employment and poses an important challenge to national institutions. The island has not offered refugees a special temporary status; however, it has developed a refugee policy with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) and non-governmental organizations’ support. The highest concentration of Venezuelan migrants is in Colombia, where more than 1.8 million of them have relocated; Peru, Chile and Ecuador follow, in order.
The Venezuelan crisis consists mostly of migrants and refugees fleeing threats of violence: hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans have received legal asylum in their new host countries, around 2 million people have residency permits or some other document to stay regularly in the country of destination, but over a million and a half are undocumented or at risk of being so.
How have neighboring countries reacted to the exodus?
Countries in the region have generously opened their borders, providing Venezuelans with access to healthcare, education and employment. Legally speaking, the asylum systems of the region were soon overwhelmed making the process for obtaining the refugee status long and slow: as a result, several countries of the region have opted for temporary residence permits and visas to allow Venezuelan migrants access to work and public services. Besides this effort, many Venezuelans remain undocumented.
Colombia represents a highly discussed case considered an example by the European Union and the international community. Indeed, in February 2021, the president Iván Duque presented the draft of a decree for the temporary protection of Venezuelan migrants, a measure to allow legal permanence in Colombia for almost 1 million Venezuelans who were illegally in the country.
Enlarging the focus to the whole region, various hypotheses are under discussion. Firstly, the possibility to recognize Venezuelans as a group as refugees- on the basis of the Cartagena Declaration- is considered. This legal document is non-binding and offers guidance to the states of the region to develop their refugee protection frameworks. This decision would expand protection and expedite the asylum process. Secondly, the creation of a legal document aimed at facilitating the movement of Venezuelans within the region is on the table.
The influx of Venezuelan migrants into host countries has destabilized their internal order, placing considerable strain on the health and education systems, and increasing the competition for employment. Unstable social cohesion leaves room to the concrete risk of an explosion of xenophobic sentiments among locals. Indeed, as the number of Venezuelan people in neighboring countries increased, it inflamed tensions and increased the pressure on governments to adopt restrictive migration measures, which would have a domino effect. Moreover, as the case of Colombia demonstrates, many Venezuelan minors are exposed to job and sexual exploitation and risk being involved in criminal activities by some local criminal groups. It is estimated that around 40% of Venezuelan minors living in the country are out of the formal education system and that the majority of them suffer violence and are forced to work for some local criminal groups.
Conclusion
Latin American and Caribbean countries are facing social and economic challenges due to an important influx of Venezuelan migrants, and their institutions, security and social cohesion are at stake. Hence, hosting countries need international assistance to protect Venezuelans and provide them with emergency relief, as well as a better-coordinated strategy throughout the region to face the challenges of developing and implementing far-sighted and long-term integration and inclusion policies.
In recent weeks the debate has heated up on whether Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Quds Force, the elite extraterritorial operations unit, should be removed from the US’ Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list in order to advance the revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA was first signed in 2015 before being abandoned by the Trump administration in 2018, essentially annulling the agreement, despite the fact that Iran and other countries (UK, Germany, France, Russia, China) and the EU were still committed to it – with some more committed than others.
For now, US President Joe Biden has dismissed the idea of de-sanctioning the IRGC and opted to keep it on the FTO list. However, it is safe to say that if reviving the deal would benefit Biden politically and the IRGC issue remains a deal-breaker for the Iranians, the former is likely to ease or lift the sanctions altogether on Iran’s most powerful and dangerous tool – a tool that is in its essence more important than military nuclear capabilities.
Therefore, it is alarming that the ongoing indirect talks in Vienna between the US and Iran focus solely on the latter’s nuclear project , rather than on the more pressing issue – the IRGC’s destabilizing efforts across the Middle East and Iran’s existing tools, including its ballistic missile program. We argue that Iran uses the nuclear issue as a decoy – a very costly, yet beneficial and effective one – to allow its forces to spread its worldview, religious beliefs and geopolitical interests across the region – all of which are prioritized over obtaining military nuclear capabilities. A nuclear bomb is not the tool to achieve these goals, but it can clear the way for another tool to do so.
We argue that the IRGC’s operational capabilities are crucial to Iran’s interests more than obtaining nuclear military capabilities, with the latter aimed to enable the former. We allow ourselves to make this statement by analyzing the answer to the following question, which seems to largely be ignored: why does Iran want nuclear military capabilities and, once Iran has these capabilities, what will Iran do with them? Would Iran attack Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel or the US and its strategic assets with a nuclear bomb? There is only one possible answer and that is it is highly unlikely, considering the anti-Iran military coalition that would form and retaliate, as well as the expected excommunication of Iran from world politics and economic spheres. Iran, then, has a different end-goal than dropping a nuclear bomb.
Simply put, Iran’s nuclear military capabilities would allow Iran to divert all of its security effort to create relative superiority across the Middle East, through which it will promote its vision, attempt to recover its economy and become the leading regional super-power. That is the end-goal of the Iranian nuclear project. In practical terms, Iran aims to deter its enemies from intervening in its satellite territories and in Iran itself by obtaining nuclear military capabilities, essentially freeing the IRGC to operate with as little opposition as possible.
The IRGC, as an unconventional military force (Iran also has a conventional army), is arguably unparalleled in its importance to the country it serves. This can also be seen in financial figures. In 2022 the IRGC is planned to receive more than double of what it received in 2021: $22BN in comparison to $9.5BN. Iran’s conventional army is planned to receive $8BN in 2022. Furthermore, the IRGC is believed to control up to 40% of the Iranian economy. An economy that is stranded to and is controlled by security concerns.
Before concluding, it is important to state why the IRGC is on the US’ FTO list in the first place and what is expected to happen if the organization is de-sanctioned. To begin with, the IRGC’s internal security mechanisms terrorize Iranians in Iran – most Iranians live in fear of the authorities. Civil protests can turn into mass arrest operations, or mass killings. Second, the IRGC‘s Quds Force directly and indirectly destabilize Middle Eastern countries and the region as a whole via terror tactics by arming, advising, and financing terrorist organizations, as well as by subversion and sabotage. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been on the receiving end in recent months, it is mostly the citizens of Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon who had their lives ruined by the IRGC. Both Syria and Yemen have been torn apart by civil wars, with Iran playing a decisive role in each country (siding with President Assad in Syria and with the Houthi rebels in Yemen).Whilst in Iraq and Lebanon, Iran supports local militias that destabilize and undermine the local political and military systems. In fact, the Iranian-backed terror organization Hezbollah has been directly at fault for thousands of deaths in Lebanon, either by acting as the judge, jury and executioner, or by dragging the country into armed conflicts with Israel. Essentially, the US’ focus on the nuclear issue rather than on Iran’s actual and planned meddling allowed the IRGC to “run amok across the region, better funding its destabilizing proxy militias… while developing advanced ballistic missiles.”
If the US hopes to help stabilize the region by reviving the JCPOA then it must not concede to Iran’s demands to drop the sanctions on its most effective tools, the ballistic missile program and the IRGC, as ultimately these are the most destabilizing forces in the Middle East today. Instead of miscalculating Iran’s intentions and following its decoy, the US should focus on Iran’s regional aspirations and its role in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon in particular. Once Iran’s influence is marginalized, all that a leverage-less Iran will be left with is nuclear military aspirations but without any interest to utilize them even if these aspirations are achieved, as it will lose its significance in the regional balance of power. Its nuclear military capabilities will become an obvious bluff.
How often do we consider nations with glorious histories tend to live under the constructed shadow of their past and continue a collective sense that is tangible yet sophisticatedly laying behind layers of time? Is it correct to assume the roots of Iran's nuclear program are somehow attached to reviving its past? What are the main differences between pre and post-1979 Iran and its nuclear development policies?
The issue appeared in the public debate a few years after Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi came to power in 1944. The latter, who studied in Switzerland, developed a western attitude enriched by power aspirations and ideals of modernization. In this project, the nuclear program has always been present. For Shah, modernization necessarily passed through the implementation of a nuclear program. First, Shah intended to give his country a real energy alternative, not forgetting that nuclear weapons could give a strong international legitimacy: a powerful state, a state capable of defending itself, is a compelling state and a state which is able to develop its regional influence. Moreover, the program could give birth to a process of technological and scientific progress, increasing the power of the country through investments in new researchers. With the 1979 revolution and the change in the alliance system, Iran remained isolated and the nuclear program was suspended.
The decision of resuming the nuclear program has been guided by the will to conserve independence from other powers, intensify the distances from the United States, and start the first net of relations with its neighbours from a strong position of power. The government started gradually to intercept the feeling of the elite and of the public that the nuclear strategy crystallized the regional position. In other words, nuclear power could give to Iran not only a decisive international bargaining leverage but mostly a stabilizing tool in domestic politics. In some way, the perception that the Iranian people could have of the government and of its action could have been influenced by the ideal of a political elite capable of taking strong decisions. The Iranians would see the development of a nuclear program as an ambitious project enabling the country to develop a strategic aim and enhance its regional influence. From this element, some scholars have claimed that a new uniting consensus aroused around the nuclear pact, allowing the executive power to gain a wider leeway. Scholars have argued that the main reason that pushed Iran toward a nuclear program was deterrence. In this reconstruction, a primary role is played by the War against Iraq, which must be analyzed in a wider context. The war broke out after 1979 when Iran was isolated, and Iraq exploited the opportunity to improve its relations with the US. Such an attack, which engaged Iran all of a sudden, found it unprepared and taught to Iran the importance of appearing strong and resistant.
However, it could be claimed that deterrence is a dangerous strategy and that Iran in this way could face enormous risks in challenging the international community in such an open approach. Nonetheless, among the political elite, a decisive idea has spread and motivated the choices of Iran: if Iran goes beyond the imposed threshold, the international community will accept it. This has been a compelling argument that animated the internal debate about the nuclear program. In the international non-proliferation agenda, Iran’s nuclear program has been placed as a priority security issue: the consequences of a nuclear Iran, in the fragile region of the Middle East, could trigger threatening outcomes. To counter such a threat and identify the main efforts to be undertaken to address it, studies have focused on understanding the causes behind Iran’s nuclear aspirations. Realism has been the predominant international relations theory for this purpose. Yet, an opposite analysis has placed constructivist interpretations at the center of the debate.
In constructivist views, the revolutionary values associated with the regime are linked to the development of the nuclear programme. As such, normative factors have been proposed as the elements behind the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foreign policy. Mahdi Mohammad Nia has argued that, since 1979 brought the clerical regime under Ayatollah Khomeini to power: The Iranian nation has been dominated by a revolutionary ethos and this has been translated into its foreign and security policy. Consequently, Iran's nuclear aspirations should be looked at through the lens of this discourse.
On April 3, 2022, Fox News released an article about the failure of the Pentagon to find evidence proving the military is a hotbed of extremism, reporting less than 100 cases in 2021. The article then presented comments from current and former service members, who all seemed to dismiss the problem as non-existent considering the low number of extremist-affiliated instances and thus not a priority for the Armed Forces, blaming the media for exacerbating the issue. Historically, although policies have been implemented, the US military has struggled to identify and manage radicalised personnel, and this trend seems to continue today. The DoDI 1325.06 was implemented in 2009, listing the prohibited activities in the Armed Forces such as active participation in supremacist, extremist or criminal gang milieus and giving recommendation for preventive measures. In the aftermath of the Capitol attack, the Instruction 1325.06 was reviewed in December 2021, clarifying the definitions of “extremist activities” and “active participation” in an effort to better address the threat of extremists within ranks. However, the policy still presents an important loophole, as membership in extremist groups such as the KKK or white supremacists is still not prohibited, only active participation is limited, failing to account for racism in the ranks and reflecting the bias of the US government.
This article aims to show that the danger of domestic terrorism posed by current and former military personnel with links to far-right extremist groups (FREGs) is often underestimated and discarded as an uninfluential phenomenon by lawmakers and the wider community of defence specialists and academics. However, despite the issue of extremists in the US military may only apply to a handful of individuals, dismissing it as non-existent can make military and law enforcement underestimate the security threat posed by the far-right fringe due to their ability to conduct high-impact events, such as the 2021 Capitol insurrection. This article will explore three aspects: the actual extent of the problem, the security concerns posed by anti-government militias, and the symbiotic relationship between military personnel and FREGs.
Image Source: unsplash.com
Current scope of the issue
The recent global increase of the involvement of the military in far-right groups needs to be highlighted. Indeed, one in five applicants of the white supremacist group Patriot Front belongs, or has belonged to the US military. In 2020, 6.4% of domestic terrorist attacks and plots were committed by US military personnel. This is a dramatic rise in number since 2019, when only 1.5% of domestic terrorist attacks were committed by the same, is alarming. For instance, 20% of the people prosecuted for various crimes committed during the US Capitol attack on 6 January 2021 are members of the US military. Therefore, the downplaying of the issue by the Armed Forces, as relayed by the studied article, is problematic because it does not allow for a common awareness that would lead to the adoption of more effective measures and legislation.
Anti-government militias and security concerns
Although the American far-right is ideologically diverse and fragmented, according to the National Security Council the main threat to domestic terrorism comes from anti-government and anti-authority violent extremists. Various data shows that active-duty personnel, veterans, and reservists make up about 25% of active militia groups such as the Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, and the Three Percenters, groups which have taken part in the incursions of January 6th. Conspiracy theories are at the core of militias’ ideology. They believe the US government is part of a conspiracy to create a new world order, a socialist one-world government which will be the downfall of the white race starting with stripping Americans of their gun ownership. The military is also part of this conspiratorial worldview, and militias legitimise their violence against the government, military, and law enforcement by positioning them as corrupt. One possible contributor to the radicalisation of military personnel could be the socio-political polarisation prevalent in the country and narratives such as the fraud in the election, the Covid pandemic, and Black Lives Matter, which have provided an excuse to ramp up the violence. The combination of narratives and conspiracy theories on the US’s tyrannical government and the increased interest in recruiting military members and veterans suggests an increase in activity of militia and anti-government movements in the next few years. This development is concerning because the law enforcement has a history of underestimating the threat from the far-right dating back to Timothy McVeigh and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Paul Eaton, a retired US army general, believes the US is not keeping up with domestic terrorism, the growing rise of extremism in the US military, and all the “McVeighs” still active today.
An historically interconnected relationship
The symbiotic relationship between FREGs and military personnel helps understand the domestic security risk posed by them. Historically, far-right groups have always had ties with the US military, starting from the founding members of the KKK, confederate officers and soldiers were, to active-duty soldiers and veterans recruited after the Vietnam war by white power activists. A handful of these individuals has been involved in domestic terrorist attacks and plots, with the attack on Capitol Hill being just the latest incident, with 81 out of 727 charged defendants with ties to the military, 66 veterans, and 5 active-duty service members.
This interconnected relationship is powered by the need for mutual assistance between FREGs and military personnel. Indeed, FREGs direct their propaganda and actively recruit military personnel for their notable abilities and skills, such as their proficiency in firing weapons, training personnel, and conducting surveillance. Meanwhile, FREGs members are seeking access to military training and their recruitment has been facilitated by the relaxation of military recruitment standards due to the War on Terror. Moreover, members or former members of the US military may find refuge in FREGs after a traumatic experience in combat, because these groups operate on a similar structure, and share some cultural aspects with the military.
Conclusion
Right-wing extremism in the US military is an issue of relative size but of considerable importance. Indeed, neither military training nor service are instruments of radicalisation of individuals. Nevertheless, they are subject to a number of factors such as PTSD or return to civilian life that could make them more susceptible to FREGs’ propaganda. Consequently, it is essential to consider military or veteran extremists as a special category and to increase vigilance because of their involvement in institutions dedicated to the protection of the US population. Indeed, their skills for violence and the symbolic value of service members being involved in terrorist groups and acts, as well as the rise in terrorist acts committed by members of the US military, justify the urgency of improving legislation and implementing effective measures.
Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) is an intergovernmental military alliance among the US, Canada and 28 European countries – but it has not always been this large. Indeed, when Nato was first conceived in 1949 it was made up of just 12 members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US. The creation of the Alliance pursued three essential purposes: “deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration”. The accession process is regulated by Article 10 of the Treaty and other European Countries can be invited to participate. The aspiring member countries must meet key requirements and implement a multi-step process including political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects. In case they are experiencing any issue, they can request assistance, practical support and the advice by a NATO programme, which is called the Membership Action Plan (MAP).
After the end of the Cold War, we can witness four different waves of NATO expansion to Eastern Europe. The first important wave of expansion to the East was launched by the reunification of Germany in 1990. On 12th September 1990, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, commonly known as Two Plus Four Treaty, was signed by the foreign ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR, France, Russia, the UK and the USA. The Treaty regulated all the foreign policy aspects of German reunification, including the membership to Nato, and imposed the withdrawal of all the foreign troops and the deployment of their nuclear weapons from the former East Germany and also the prohibition to West Germany’s possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. On October 3rd 1990, the German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic were reunited again.
As to the second wave, the new member countries were Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. First, on 15th February 1991 they formed the Visegrad Group. Then, on 1st January 1993, Czechoslovakia split into two independent countries: Czech Republic and Slovakia. In 1997, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary took part in the Alliance’s Madrid Summit and on 12th March 1999, the three former Warsaw Pact members joined NATO. The main reasons were: “to ensure thecountry’s external security”, to impede “the possibility of a greatwar in unstable Central Europe” and for Poland also “to advance its military capabilities”.
In May 2000, a group of NATO candidate countries created the Vilnius Group (Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). The Vilnius Group resorted to the Membership Action Plan which was introduced by NATO for the first time at the 1999 Washington Summit. In addition, Croatia joined the Vilnius Group in May 2001. The Summit of the NATO Aspirant countries “Riga 2002: The Bridge to Prague” started the path towards the alliance’s membership which took place in Riga, Latvia, on July 5-6, 2002, where the leaders of NATO member and aspirant countries gathered for the last time before the NATO 2002 Prague Summit in November. On 29th March 2004, the largest wave of enlargement in alliance history materialized, except for Albania and Croatia. For Baltic states and Bulgaria, NATO membership symbolized their wish to be part of the European family. NATO was perceived not just merely as a military alliance with security guarantees under Article 5, but as a symbol of higher development, where Baltic states could find their proper place. Moreover, it was the attempt to escape Russian influence, in favor of the protection provided by the American strategic nuclear umbrella and a collective defence.
The same path of the Vilnius Group was followed by the Adriatic Charter of European countries. The Adriatic Charter was created in Tirana on 2nd May by Albania, Croatia and Macedonia and USA for the purpose to obtain their North Atlantic Alliance admission. Albania and Macedonia were previous participants of MAP since its creation in 1999, while Croatia joined in 2002. Moreover, Macedonia also took part in Nato's Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995. On 1st April 2009, the North Atlantic Alliance officially annexed Albania and Croatia after their participation in the 2008 Bucharest Summit. Macedonia accession was postponed because of a dispute on the formal name with Greece. Macedonia became NATO's 30th country on 27th March 2020. Montenegro emulated the same path of the latter, but joined three years before on 5th June 2017, after the Accession Protocol signature in May 2016. For Montenegro itself, the major incentives to join NATO were the future eventuality of EU membership, the highest prestige of the Atlantic Alliance and to achieve “Nato’s security guarantee”.
Future enlargements
Bosnia Herzegovina is the only potential candidate which joined the Membership Action Plan on 5th December 2018. In spite of Georgia and Ukraine expressing the will to start their path to the North Atlantic Alliance, their situation is still uncertain. The primary reason remains the need to meet all necessary requirements through important reforms focused on key areas; and, the current Russia-Ukraine war.
Consequences for the European Security
On one hand, many consequences, which were the main reasons for NATO expansion to the East, materialized in reality. For example, the inclusion of Eastern Europe nations in the military agreement have promoted democratic reform and stability there, provided stronger collective defense and an improved ability to address new security concerns, improved relations among the Eastern and Central European states, fostered a more stable climate for economic reform, trade, and foreign investment, and finally, improved NATO's ability to operate as a cooperative security organization with broad European security concern,” as stated in the clear purposes contained in a prepared statement of the Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright on 23rd April 1997.
On the other hand, in spite of NATO's open door policy with Russia, the latter constitutes the largest threat for European security once again in the energy, political and military field. Indeed, the current conflict in Ukraine shows the evident ambition to create a new Russian empire by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Many warnings about Russia’s reaction were expressed in the declarations of Biden’s CIA director, William J. Burns, when he worked as counselor for political affairs at the US embassy in Moscow in 1995. On 26th June 1997, a group of 50 prominent foreign policy experts that included former senators, retired military officers, diplomats and academicians, sent an open letter to President Clinton outlining their opposition to NATO expansion”. In the end, the father of the Cold War containment doctrine, George F. Kennan described the NATO expansion as a “tragic mistake”.
Conclusion
The current Russian invasion in Ukraine puts in clear evidence the necessity for the EU countries to accelerate the formation process of the European Army. They will have to achieve energy independence by using Russian gas, diversifying their own supplier countries and to invest massively in the green economy. Moreover, the EU must strengthen its common foreign policy, implementing an effective diplomatic action and speaking with one voice to cope with the great tensions around Europe and the rest of the world. If not, the European project will risk crumbling.
Italian state security has become evermore intertwined with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in recent days, as the invasion of Ukraine by Russia has highlighted the need for Europe to secure a renewable, multi-origin energy supply, as well as the importance of European food supplies in North Africa. The impact of war on Ukrainian and Russian harvests has not only caused wheat shortages in European markets, but also devastated grain imports across the MENA region, such as in Tunisia, Morocco and Libya. European sanctions on Russian oil and gas have also sent the cost of energy soaring, leading European leaders to seek other sources of fuel, including in the Middle East. War in Eastern Europe could see Western Europe and the EU seeking out a stronger partnership with the MENA region in both trade and diplomacy. However, Europe and the MENA region would have to overcome historic and contemporary tensions in order to achieve closer collaboration.
However, in order to establish mutual food and energy security, Italy and the MENA region would have to build stronger ties in both the trade and diplomatic spheres, working through historic and contemporary tensions. To this day, Italy’s relations with the MENA region are still damaged by the country’s legacy of colonization in Libya and the Horn of Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, as well its support for France’s colonization of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.
La sicurezza dello stato italiano è diventata negli ultimi giorni sempre più legata alla regione del Medio Oriente del Nord Africa. Infatti l’invasione dell’Ucraina da parte della Russia ha evidenziato, da un lato, la necessità per l’Europa di assicurarsi un approvvigionamento energetico rinnovabile e diversificato, dall’altro ha posto l’accento sull’importanza delle forniture alimentari europee in Nord Africa. L’impatto della guerra sui raccolti ucraini e russi non solo ha causato carenze di grano nei mercati europei, ma ha anche colpito duramente le sue importazioni in tutta la regione MENA, così come in Tunisia, Marocco e Libia.
Inoltre, le sanzioni di Bruxelles sul petrolio e sul gas russo hanno causato un’esponenziale crescita del costo dell’energia, portando i leader europei a cercare nuove fonti di carburante, in particolar modo anche in Medio Oriente.
A tal proposito, la guerra in Ucraina potrebbe spingere l’Europa occidentale e l’Unione Europea a formare una partnership più forte con la regione MENA sia a livello commerciale che diplomatico. Per raggiungere un livello di collaborazione più stretta, è necessario tuttavia che l’Europa e i paesi del MENA superino le tensioni storiche e contemporanee che pervadono nei loro rapporti internazionali.
Questa situazione rappresenta un’opportunità per numerosi paesi dell’UE di coprire il vuoto lasciato da Russia e Ucraina. La Francia, per esempio, è un grande produttore globale di grano con 30,1 milioni di tonnellate raccolte nel 2020, meno delle 85,9 milioni di tonnellate russe, ma più delle 24,9 milioni dell’Ucraina nello stesso anno. Anche la Germania, seppur in modo minore, contribuisce alla produzione europea di grano, avendo prodotto nel 2020 circa 22,2 milioni di tonnellate. Un altro paese che potrebbe giocare un ruolo importante nella regione si tratta dell’Italia. Nonostante questa abbia raccolto “solo” 6,7 milioni di tonnellate, il paese ha esportato oltre 24,8 milioni di dollari in grano nel 2020. Il sostegno dei paesi europei garantirebbero quindi ai paesi del Medio Oriente e del Nord Africa la possibilità di attingere dal mercato europeo e di soddisfare la propria domanda interna.
Tuttavia, al fine di stabilire una reciproca sicurezza alimentare ed energetica, l’Italia e i paesi del MENA dovrebbero perseguire nuove forme di collaborazione economica e diplomatica. Ad oggi le relazioni dell’Italia con la regione del MENA risentono ancora del passato imperialista di Roma, in particolare della colonizzazione della Libia e del Corno d’Africa nel XIX-XX secolo, e del sostegno alla colonizzazione francese di Algeria, Tunisia e Marocco.
Ad aggravare lo status diplomatico tra Italia e paesi del Medio Oriente e del Nord Africa si aggiungono anche eventi più contemporanei come la recente crisi migratoria. Questa, iniziata nel 2010 e intensificatasi nel 2015, ha visto milioni di rifugiati provenienti dall’Asia, dall’Africa e dal Medio Oriente fuggire in Europa in seguito alle guerre scatenatesi nei loro paesi. In alcuni momenti della crisi, la maggior parte dei migranti stava attraversando l’Italia dal Nord Africa, partendo specialmente dalla Libia. Questo ha creato una situazione di tensione e sfiducia tra i due paesi e a livello internazionale, dal momento che ai migranti stranieri veniva spesso negato l’ingresso in Italia e lasciati annegare in mare, oppure detenuti e maltrattati nei centri di detenzione in Libia. I politici italiani come l’ex Primo Ministro Matteo Salvini hanno spesso lanciato commenti infiammatori sugli immigrati provenienti dal Medio Oriente e dal Nord Africa, aumentando le tensioni e suscitando forti attriti tra le diverse comunità multietniche. Un esempio è la dichiarazione con cui Salvini difese un collega reo di aver sparato a un immigrato marocchino, oppure il processo che l’ex Primo Ministro ha dovuto affrontare per le accuse di rapimenti di 147 rifugiati, impossibilitati a scendere in Italia dalla barca della ONG Seawatch.
Mentre questi eventi hanno indebolito le relazioni diplomatiche tra l’Italia e i paesi del MENA, alcune ostilità di recente memoria sono in realtà servite a rafforzare i loro legami strategici. Nonostante non abbiano raggiunto i loro obiettivi strategici, le truppe di pace italiane a Beirut durante la guerra civile libanese negli anni ’80 sono state lodate per la loro “neutralità sostenuta, il comportamento rispettoso e il minimo uso della forza”.
By: Riccardo Bosticco, Lorenzo Caruti, Sofia Dal Santo, Miguel Jiménez, Michele Mignogna.
Introduction
The Russian invasion of Ukraine started on February 24, is already showing significant effects on a global scale. As most States and international organizations have officially condemned the war - from West to East between America, Europe, and Africa - openly criticizing Putin's behavior and deciding to sanction Moscow heavily, the biggest problem concerns the aspect inherent to energy supplies. "Europe depends on Russia for about 40% of its natural gas, with most of it transported by pipeline", explains Reuters. Luckily for them, most European countries have cut reliance on Russian gas in recent years. Yet dependency is still weighty, and the most recent sanctions on Moscow caused a further growth of gas prices. European states and companies have acknowledged the danger of relying too heavily on Russian energy, and also those countries that had a commercial, yet controversial, understanding of energy relations with Russia, like Germany, decided to act firmly.
The United States proposes solutions to Europe, while oil and gas producers in the MENA act controversially, and China remains cautiously in the background, carefully observing the evolution of the situation without intervening directly or taking a clear position. Where will the current energy decisions drive us?
The European Union
The EU is a substantial energy importer, largely reliant on Russia's supply. Accordingly, due to sanctions imposed to punish Russia, the EU has set about to make a significant course correction. The European Commission has proposed an outline of a plan to make Europe independent from Russian gas before 2030: REPowerEU. The main goal of this ambitious plan is to diversify to the greatest extent possible the gas suppliers of the EU by increasing LNG Imports and constructing alternative pipelines. To do so, a strong political will by the Member States to follow the correct route and avoid uncoordinated actions is needed.
Currently, there are not sufficient LNG terminals in the Eastern EU, although growing investments have been undertaken in recent years by the Union; it is, therefore, crucial that such countries have access to regional gas hubs. In addition, even the construction of alternative pipelines prompts some issues. Unsurprisingly, European customers are unwilling to commit financially to long-term gas purchase contracts, which would be necessary to sustain pipeline development, due to EU green obligations. Furthermore, authoritarian governments like Azerbaijan's, Turkey's, and the Gulf monarchies' influence on the gas trade would remain, leaving the door open for political exploits of energy flows. Besides, the existing alternative sources of natural gas to the EU appear to be already at the highest production level. Therefore, the most likely option seems to import from the Caspian Sea.
Overall, an emphasis is placed by the Commission on boosting energy efficiency and increasing the use of renewables. This is essential since it contributes to terminating the EU's overdependence on a single supplier, even though it does not provide a suitable solution in the short term. Last but not least, the Commission has even undertaken initiatives to mitigate high energy prices.
Conclusion As soon as the shock of the Ukrainian war arrived, the West discovered a hard truth: even in a globally interdependent world, it is not safe to be heavily dependent on a single country. As mentioned above, Europe is moving towards making plans to become energetically independent. Nevertheless, West leaders are conscious that the road to independence will be long and winding, indeed taking years to make it. However, the problem is not only a European matter: as previously said, even a solid Russian ally like China is facing the effect of the energetic crisis. On the other hand, Beijing will probably be seen as the only winner at the war's end, mainly for its ambiguous position. At the same time, the United States is dealing with a different situation: even though it does not depend on energy imported from Moscow, its role as a leader is put to the test. Washington needs to help its allies and, simultaneously, avoid the MENA Region ending up in the hands of China. Therefore, what is at stake is not only the energy question: the current world order could become very different at the end of the day.
