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December 17, 2024 — No Comments

The Empire Strikes back

By Francesco Marchesini - UK & European Affairs Team - editing Valentina Gruarin

Rule Britannia: what remains of the Empire?

The United Kingdom once used to rule the largest Empire in human history. It was the first real superpower; ruling half of the World for a Century. Subsequently, after two World Wars and the Suez crisis of 1956, the UK lost its title of world superpower to the USA.

For decades, Great Britain has been playing the role of a medium-sized power. In fact, the military budget of HM Treasury -UK’s economic and finance Ministry- has been shrinking more and more over the years: from 8.65% of UK GDP in 1956 to 2.25% in 2018. After the Falkland War of 1982, the UK has not led a military campaign by its own initiative.

Despite this condition, the UK has some peculiarities: it is a nuclear power, with a leading role in the Commonwealth of Nations, NATO (being in command of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, which are NATO’s strike forces) and both the G7 and the G20 councils. The UK also takes part to the Five Powers Defence Arrangements -a military alliance with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore- and the Five Eyes programme -joining the intelligence agencies of UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Lastly, the UK still holds strategic positions on seas via the control of Dominions, such as. Gibilter, Bermudas and Ascension, as well as through the presence of its military bases set in several key points of international routes.

The UK is thus maintaining a privileged position in matters of diplomacy and soft power, based on its trustworthiness and reliability. This can be witnessed by a British Council’s study of 2021 showing that the UK is the most attractive G20 Nation. According to the same study, the UK's soft power seems to be strongest in the southern hemisphere, particularly in South-East Asia and the Pacific. Moreover, the Consultancy Brand Finance’s Global Soft Power Index ranks the UK second, just behind the USA.

However, after Brexit, EU countries tend to perceive the UK as less willing to cooperate in terms of economy and security. The UK is not showing cohesiveness on how to implement its foreign policy and relations with the EU. Agreements for leaving the EU have been problematic, led by indecision and incoherence, and have been one of the main factors of the UK’s political instability over the last years.

Nevertheless, the UK and the European Countries are now developing new bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation. It is still too early to assess their effectiveness. A productive collaboration with the European Union might benefit the UK’s military and economic systems, consequently strengthening both its foreign policy and bargaining power with other European nations.

Per mare, per terram: how strong is the UK?

Considering the UK’s military strength, the 2024 Global Firepower Index ranks the UK at 6th place and it is composed of a total of 230.000 personnel. In 2021 PM Boris Johnson launched the Integrated Review (IR), a programmatic plan for Britain’s security and strategic policies for the following decade. It included a vision of the UK’s future as a cosmopolitan, open and flourishing country, which could lead the “competitive World” through its soft power and technological advancement; while also increasing the investments in defence. Concerning technological advancement, the IR planned to enhance scientific research around matters related to AI development, cybersecurity, quantum technology, biomechanics and semiconductors -part of the so-called CyberPower Agenda- as well as energy security and environmental protection.

Photo by New Zealand Defence Force from Wellington, New Zealand - MC 10-0422-021.jpg

In the following years, both Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak changed this strategic plan, adapting it to the aggravation and multiplication of challenges and threats that the UK had to face. The most recent version, IR23, shows that the primary threat to the security of Britain is Russia, and that the UK has been in first line since before the mass invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, training Ukraine’s personnel and furnishing military equipment more and before other Western allies (over £12 billion). These data show that the UK is still a reliable and strong ally for the European countries. The second concern is China, a rising superpower, which is both intensifying its military operations in the South Chinese Sea and the Taiwan Strait and strengthening its armed forces, as well as employing soft power skills, for instance with the Belt and Road Initiative or the financial support to sub-saharan Countries. China can be seen, by some African and Asian countries, as a valid alternative to the so-called “Western world” and the UK fears losing control over Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

In 2024 the British PM Starmer declared the commitment of the Kingdom to reform its Armed Forces and increase the defense budget to 2.5% by the end of the decade, reaching £87 billion in 2030. Despite the former Chief of General Staff Gen. Sir Patrick Sanders declaring in January 2024 that the UK could not stand a conventional war, some work has been done. The UK is financing a new class of aircraft carriers (Queen Elizabeth Class), the new nuclear submarines programme (SSNR Class, included in the AUKUS cooperatio programme with the US and Australia), the new multirole fighter jet (Tempest Class, as a result of the Global Combat Air Programme with Italy and Japan) and the new main battle tank class (Challenger 3 Class).

All these avant-garde war machines will be developed by BAE Systems -a multinational firm with the participation of HM’s Government- as well as the partnership with other leading firms in defence, such as Leonardo, Mitsubishi, Thales and Rheinmetall. Despite its firepower, the UK is relying on Donald Trump's re-election as POTUS could be a game-changing event. He will probably focus its efforts on the internal front, de-prioritising the US’ foreign policy agenda. Indeed, during the electoral campaign, he repeatedly declared his intentions to disengage the US from their current grounds of action abroad, including Ukraine. Without the military and economical support of the USA, NATO’s existence itself could be compromised.

In this scenario, the UK and EU would necessarily have to strengthen their military and economical bonds, both inside and outside of NATO’s framework. Something is already. moving: UK’s Foreign Secretary David Lammy labelled the EU as the most urgent foreign policy priority, and PM Starmer declared that the negotiations for a pact over common security will start in Spring 2025. This could be a historic occasion to build an effective European defence strategy and to reunite the UK and the EU, perhaps even to reform the European Union itself into a more fair and functional confederation, able to play a crucial role in the geopolitical arena.

We should not forget that the UK is facing an unseen economic crisis that could make it impossible for the Government to keep pursuing their programmes, that's why the future negotiations will need to include forms of economic reintegration of UK and EU economies. The United Kingdom has ambitious goals for the future, which appear to be more and more unpredictable every day; only time will tell if their new route will be successful.

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December 9, 2024 — No Comments

Security Challenges in Rojava

by Angelo Calianno & Jaohara Hatabi - Middle East Team

Introduction

In 2016, after years of struggle and political action, the Kurdish-majority Rojava region, located in northeastern Syria, proclaimed itself an autonomous and independent state.  Kurdish militias, together with an international coalition led by the United States, reconquered territories occupied by the Islamic States (ISIS) -. News agencies were showing photos of the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) fighters, and especially those of YPJ (Women's Protection Unit) troops, who were hailed as the new champions of freedom.

In their fight against ISIS, the Kurds in Northeastern Syria had become the bulwark against terrorism. Rojava's new democracy was laying the foundations of its constitution: an idea of a State where different religions and ethnicities coexist and most people are represented, regardless of religion, gender, or ideology. After 13 years of struggle since the first autonomy movement founded by the PYD (Democratic Union Party), the Syrian equivalent of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Syrian Kurds also had their own homeland. This democratic experiment captured the attention and interest of diplomats, journalists, researchers, and onlookers from all over the world. After the initial hype, media interest has dropped dramatically for years, with hardly any reports about this region. That changed two years ago, when Turkey's bombing brought the region back to the headlines.

Inside Rojava: present-day reality

In our analysis, we reported the current situation in Rojava, especially in relation to the continuous attacks by Turkey.

The Kurdish population in Rojava finds itself caught between a rock and a hard place. The southern part of the territory is heavily controlled by the Assad regime, which does not recognize Rojava’s autonomy. The regime maintains dozens of checkpoints that restrict the flow of essential supplies, including building materials, food, and medical equipment. As a result, many of these goods must be smuggled in from Iraq, in an attempt to avoid Damascus' screening.

Southeast of Rojava, ISIS cells still exist, especially in the rural areas of Raqqa, Kobane, and Deir ez-Zor. While these cells have lost much of their former strength and financial resources, they still pose a threat to local populations by perpetrating attacks and raids.

Conflicts in recent years have caused approximately one million Internally Displaced People (IDP), who have lost their homes and now live in semi-detention camps. The suburbs of these cities teem children working amid mountains of garbage looking for material to sell for recycling. The Al-Hol camp, one of the largest, holds around 55,000 people, the majority of whom are women and children, including many who are related to most radical ISIS terrorists. These families are not formally charged with crimes, but the Rojava authorities have adopted controversial measures, such as confining them in camps, as a preventive measure against the potential reorganization of ISIS cells. While the security rationale behind this approach is clear, it has drawn criticism for the humanitarian implications.

The conditions in the tent-city of Al-Hol are difficult, with many living in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions, surrounded by wire nets and armoured vehicles. There is limited access to basic services like water, electricity, and fuel for heating. These challenges are particularly severe for women and children, who are disproportionately affected by the harsh living conditions. The camp remains heavily guarded, with a large security presence due to concerns about radicalisation and the potential for violence. Despite the difficult circumstances, local authorities have faced pressure from international organisations and human rights groups to improve conditions and provide better support for those in the camp.

One of them told us: 

“They treat us like criminals, but we have done nothing. Every morning, the military drags us out to search us. Our husbands are in jail, but we are innocent, we do not even know why we are here”. In fact, many of the women here have never committed any crime. Some of them have had no contact with their husbands for years, being in some cases a second or third wife. While they may have been married to members of a terrorist organization, they now face serious consequences for their associations, even if they themselves have not been involved in any criminal activity.

The situation in Rojava caused international responses that are varied and complex, which reflects the intricate web of alliances and conflicts in the Middle East. When Kurdish groups declared the autonomy of Rojava, they were met with a mixture of support and opposition from global and regional powers. The United States, seeking reliable partners in the fight against ISIS, formed a crucial alliance with the YPG, providing military support and training under the broader umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This partnership significantly contributed to the defeat of ISIS in Syria, garnering international recognition for the Kurdish-led forces.

However, the U.S. support for the YPG strained the former’s relations with Turkey, a NATO ally, which views the YPG as an extension of the PKK, which is designated by Turkey, the US, and the EU as a terrorist organization. Turkey has repeatedly launched military operations against the YPG, most notably Operation Olive Branch in 2018 and Operation Peace Spring in 2019, aiming to create a "safe zone" along its border free of YPG presence. These actions drew international condemnation, with European countries particularly vocal in denouncing Turkey's incursions, citing humanitarian concerns and potential destabilisation of the region. The EU called Turkey to cease its military actions, while several EU member states imposed arms embargoes on Ankara.

Russia's involvement in Rojava has been pragmatic, balancing its alliance with the Syrian government and its strategic interests in the region. Initially, Russia allowed Kurdish autonomy as a counterbalance to U.S. influence, but once the Syrian government regained territory, Russia facilitated agreements between the Kurds and Damascus, aiming to reintegrate Rojava under Syrian sovereignty while ensuring Kurdish rights. 

Iran, which supports the Assad regime, has opposed any form of Kurdish autonomy that could inspire Iranian Kurds. Thus, Tehran's policy towards Rojava aligns closely with that of Damascus and, to some extent, Ankara. Meanwhile, international human rights organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have reported on human rights abuses by various actors in the conflict, urging all parties to respect international law and protect civilians.

As of now, there are no formal high-profile peace negotiations taking place. Although efforts have been made by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) to engage in dialogue with the Syrian government and other regional powers, they have not resulted in any comprehensive peace agreement.

Arguably, the presence of external powers with their own interests such as Turkey, the US, Russia and Iran, further complicates the situation. However, the US continues to engage diplomatically, balancing its support for the SDF with its broader regional interests, including its relationship with Turkey. European countries have also been involved in providing diplomatic channels and humanitarian aid, advocating for a peaceful resolution and respect for human rights in the region.

Picture by Angelo Calianno, Rojava, Northeastern Syria

Final Considerations

In conclusion, the situation in Rojava remains a complex and multifaceted challenge. The region's pursuit of autonomy has led to a diverse set of responses from international actors, highlighting the intricate balance of power and interests at play. The humanitarian crisis, particularly the plight of displaced persons and those in camps like Al-Hol, underscores the urgency of a coordinated international response that prioritises human rights and humanitarian principles. While the Kurdish forces have been instrumental in the fight against ISIS, the geopolitical realities involving major powers such as the United States, Turkey, Russia, and Iran complicate the pathway to a stable and peaceful resolution. Moving forward, it is crucial for the international community to support dialogue and negotiations, respecting the rights and aspirations of all parties involved while ensuring the protection of civilians and the adherence to international law. The future of Rojava will depend significantly on the ability of these various actors to navigate the delicate political landscape and work toward a sustainable and inclusive solution.

* This article was written before the events of December 8, 2024.

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December 9, 2024 — No Comments

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Double-Edged Sword for the Pacific Region

by Dejvi Dedaj - SouthEast Asia & Oceania Team

Introduction

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an initiative adopted by China in 2013 to strengthen connectivity and cooperation among Asia, Europe, and Africa – and even extending to some regions in Latin America and Oceania – making its influence felt as the reinvigorated and wider Silk Road. The BRI establishes an extensive network of infrastructure projects to facilitate international trade and accelerate economic growth. Ranging from railways, highways, ports, and electricity power plants, the initiative is committed to rendering the movement of goods, services or resources more efficient.

The BRI stands upon two fundamental pillars, namely the Silk Road Economic Belt, which uses railways, roads, and pipelines to connect China to Europe via Central Asia, and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, a maritime route that links China to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Europe via strategic ports and shipping lanes. 

Notably, under the BRI, China allocates funding to the countries participating in infrastructure projects, mostly in the form of loans. Accordingly, notwithstanding the general interest in the BRI initiative, the project has attracted considerable criticism. Although proponents of the BRI assert that it boosts development, employment, and trade within participating countries, critics counter that BRI projects may elevate some countries into high debt levels, thus increasing their economic dependence on China and raising issues of sovereignty and environmental impact and sustainability. Indeed, the BRI is often viewed as a double-edged sword, both filling gaps in infrastructure and improving trade routes, but also positioning China as a leading financier in the global arena.

BRI Economic Benefits in Southeast Asia and Oceania

The BRI has provided a forum for investing in improving infrastructure, which, in turn, enhances connectivity and the interchange of goods among Southeast Asia and Oceania. For example, the China-Laos Railway—completed in 2021 and spanning 1000 km—facilitates the cheaper export of goods by connecting Laos to China’s southern Yunnan province, helping to spur economic growth in Laos by improving its access to international markets. In addition, the deep-water port in Gwadar, which is part of the much-discussed BRI despite being located in Pakistan, is relevant for Southeast Asian and Oceania trade as it significantly boosts maritime linkages with the Indian Ocean.

In addition, BRI investments have provided employment and stimulated sectors such as construction and manufacturing in developing regions. For instance, BRI projects such as the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway, in Indonesia not only bring new transportation possibilities but also foster job creation and knowledge transfer that advances and reinforces local industries while expanding economic capabilities.

Financial Challenges and Debt Risks

The biggest challenges faced by the BRI are debt vulnerabilities. Most of the projects involved are financed by loans, imposing significant burdens to smaller economies. Indeed, massive Chinese loans used to fund contemporary megaprojects have landed entire countries in a debt trap—Laos today stands burdened by a substantial debt relative to the country’s GDP. Similarly, in Malaysia, the East Coast Rail Link raised doubts about the viability of Chinese loans, causing the Malaysian government to renegotiate project terms amidst worries they would not be able to pay back such large loans, thus reducing the country’s financial strain.

Besides, the reliance on Chinese financing for BRI projects has created economic dependence of some Southeast Asian and Oceanian countries. Such dependence threatens to undermine the countries’ political and economic independence and sovereign control over their infrastructure and natural resources, as they become more and more beholden to Beijing. Fears emerge that these nations may become even more entangled with Chinese interests, thus helping China to gain more control over their policy decisions. For instance, Papua New Guinea faces akin challenges, since reliance on Chinese-funded ports and mining ventures, could make the country highly vulnerable, if revenues generated from these investments are not as expected. 

Picture by Joe Shlabotnik, "Cargo Ship" - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/

Strategic and Geopolitical Implications

The establishment of Chinese capital is remaking strategic and geopolitical realities in Southeast Asia and Oceania, as countries increasingly align their economic policies with Chinese interests. Nowhere has this been truer than in countries that rely on BRI investments as the primary conduit for infrastructure financing. Among the more prominent beneficiaries are Indonesia, home to some of China's most considerable BRI investments—as well as Pakistan, a key player in the initiative through its participation in CPEC and various infrastructure projects spanning energy and transportation. Laos, Kenya, and Sri Lanka are other countries that have raised substantial amounts via BRI-financing, which has supported necessary development in areas such as transport and energy, but this has come at the cost of taking on sizable levels of debt to the Chinese government.

The newly emerging Chinese presence is therefore regarded as a counterbalance to the US’ traditional influence, subsequently shifting the scale of power in an area usually perceived as fostering and perpetuating the conventional paradigm of the status quo. Indeed, several local communities have objected to BRI-related projects owing to the fear of ceding sovereignty over resources and strategic assets. 

For example, the East Coast Rail Link in Malaysia has raised serious alarm about the possible adverse impact on the habitats along the coastline, as well as the control exerted by China over sensitive infrastructure. In Indonesia, critics have condemned Chinese-funded mining projects in Sulawesi due to environmental degradation, illegal logging, and displacement of locals. Sri Lanka’s leasing of Hambantota Port to a Chinese firm as a way of repaying a debt has likewise fuelled such fears that China could gain strategic leverage in the region. These cases show a hidden conflict between the general benefits that some countries get from infrastructure investments and threats to national sovereignty concerns.

Although BRI has also led to closer collaboration between Southeast Asian nations and China on shared infrastructure projects, promoting regional integration, it can also create tensions, as countries compete for Chinese investments or respond to public pressure to resist perceived Chinese overreach. For instance, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand are negotiating BRI projects cautiously, trying to strike a reasonable balance between economic benefits and potential national security risks.

Conclusion

Evidently, the impact of the BRI has been substantially felt across Southeast Asia and Oceania, with the participating countries witnessing critical improvements in connectivity and infrastructure. Indeed, BRI projects have presented unique economic advantages, especially in the fields of transportation and employment in developing areas. That said, financial and geopolitical difficulties stemming from funding such BRI projects cannot be dismissed. Heavy economic reliance on Chinese investments poses a significant challenge to national sovereignty and long-term fiscal sustainability for several countries such as Malaysia, Laos, or Papua New Guinea, whose dependence on the Chinese Government has been conducive to burdensome debt-induced obligations and foreign interference with local affairs. What is more, China’s ever-growing presence on the global scene has remodelled the geopolitical landscape, challenging the conventional Western influence in the region.

This intricate relationship between the sought-after economic development in the region and the associated sovereignty risks has often led to local resistance to some BRI projects. However, such nuanced navigation of interstate relationships, particularly with China, is the only way forward to ensure sustainable, independent growth in today’s rapidly globalising, interconnected world. Indeed, should these economic and geopolitical challenges not be effectively addressed, then the BRI’s success cannot be guaranteed.

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December 2, 2024 — No Comments

Tren de Aragua: The Threat of Transnational Crime in Chile

By Sarah Toubman - Central & South America Team

On the 15th of November 2024, Colombian officials announced the capture of Jeison Alexander Lorca Salazar, the second-in-command of the Venezuelan criminal organisation Tren de Aragua.

Long considered the most pre-eminent and prolific Venezuelan criminal enterprise, Lorca Salazar’s arrest is representative of the increasing transnationalisation of Tren de Aragua, and crime in Latin America more broadly.

Originally founded in Venezuelan prison Tocorón in approximately 2012, the organisation has since spread across North and South America, establishing a presence in Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and the United States, among other countries.

Although the organisation began to grow its cross-border network in 2018, it has been internationalising at an increasingly rapid pace in recent years.

In October 2023, early reports from the Cook County Sheriff's Office indicated members of Tren de Aragua were present in Chicago, Illinois. Further activity from the organisation in the US in the following months prompted the US Department of the Treasury to designate Tren de Aragua a “Significant Transnational Criminal Organization,” and the US Department of State to officially call for members’ arrests. 

Rise of Tren de Aragua in Chile

This year, reports of the group’s presence in Chile have been growing in particular, with Venezuela’s political and economic turmoil pinpointed as a driver of this trend. Instability in Venezuela has not only created a humanitarian crisis but also created an opening for organisations like Tren de Aragua to engage in human trafficking in and around Chile.

The kidnap and murder of Venezuelan political dissident Ronald Ojeda in Santiago by Tren de Aragua in February 2024 was one of the most prominent incidents over the course of the past year, and a clear signifier of the organisation’s increased criminal activities in the country.

In a May 2024 BBC article, Venezuelan investigative journalist Ronna Rísquez named the rise of Tren de Aragua in Chile as the first instance of a transnational organised crime group operating in the country. 

Speaking to Rísquez, Mauro Mercado Andaur,  National Head of Organised Crime at Chile’s Investigative Police, explained how in addition to the group’s transnational character, Tren de Aragua’s activities differ from previous organised crime in Chile due to their level of control and violence. 

“It was easy for them to take over territories. They took over nearly unpopulated areas to establish their dealings, [and] began to offer services, such as getting migrants across one border to another, providing security to businesses or falsifying identity documents,” he said.

One such example of Tren de Aragua exploiting a less populated region of Chile includes the installation of Los Gallegos—a local Tren de Aragua cell—in Arica, a coastal region in the north of the country bordering Peru.

Combating another such local cell, Chilean authorities conducted a raid on 69 properties in Viña del Mar on the 29th of August, 2024, and arrested 34 individuals suspected of working with the criminal organisation.

Photo by David Knox on Unsplash

Growing concerns for Chile and Latin America

Rising crime, and particularly transnational crime, is clearly a growing concern for Chileans. At a June 2024 State of the Union address, President Gabriel Boric stated that “crime and organised crime are the greatest threats we face today.” 

Some experts see the increasing internationalisation of organised crime across Latin America as a paradigm shift in the field, with Will Freeman, a fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign, dubbing the change the rise of “reorganised crime.”

While the exportation of Tren de Aragua abroad is only one of several significant security ramifications of Venezuelan political instability, increasing levels of transnational crime in Latin America will be crucial to monitor moving forward.  With the shape of organised crime in Latin America changing more and more by the day, it is yet to be seen whether authorities can tackle the growing challenges of “reorganised crime,” or whether it will be here to stay.

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November 25, 2024 — No Comments

The Impacts of Trump Presidency on Global Economic Relations

by Miguel Jiménez, Ingrid Heggstad, & Dan Ziebarth - Political Economy, Development, & Energy Security Team

Introduction

It was announced on Tuesday, November 5th that Donald Trump, the candidate for the right-wing Republican Party, had won the 2024 Presidential Election in the United States of America and would officially become the President-Elect. Kamala Harris, the left-wing Democratic Party candidate, conceded defeat in a speech on Wednesday, December 6th, urging voters to accept the election results. While Harris and her vice presidential running mate, Time Walz, received significant party support ahead of the election and were seen as a new phase for the Democratic Party, the party will be weakened following the election results. Even though during the campaign she lacked a compelling economic narrative and often avoided answering how to fund  any proposal she brought to the table, in terms of global economic relations, a Harris presidency was expected to maintain continuity with the current Biden administration's approach largely.

The second Trump presidency is expected to have major ramifications for global politics, particularly global economic relations, particularly as Trump has been a vocal proponent of protectionist trade policies. The Republican Party, led by Trump, will also control both chambers of the legislature, while conservative justices make up 6 of the 9 seats on the Supreme Court of the United States. These conditions could give Trump a strong mandate for policy change. In particular, economic relations with China, the European Union, and Russia are expected to be affected by a second Trump presidency.

China

Trump has announced that, if re-elected, he will impose a 10–20 per cent across-the-board tariff on imports into the United States, with an additional 60 per cent tariff on all imports from China. Trump has also pledged to terminate the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) passed by the Biden administration, which would be expected to increase domestic production and reduce Chinese imports. This is in contrast to what would have been expected under a Kamala Harris administration, where the usage of tools to inhibit the arrival of Chinese goods would have come from domestic policies with the continuation of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the single largest climate investment in American history. Based on building domestic champions in the field of energy transition, which is currently dominated by China, being the world’s leader in clean energy production and the refinement of the majority of mineral inputs. 

European Union

The second Trump presidency could challenge Europe through an “America First” trade policy, focused on reducing the U.S. trade deficit, with tariffs as high as 20 per cent on imports and even more on Chinese goods. These tariffs would increase costs for European exporters and consumers, impacting the EU’s economy. Ongoing disputes from the Biden era, such as steel and aluminium tariffs and green subsidies, may also escalate, while the expiration of paused EU retaliatory tariffs in 2025 and the Airbus-Boeing subsidy conflict in 2026 could further strain EU-U.S. trade relations, adding to Europe’s economic uncertainty. It is noteworthy that during his tenure as president, Donald Trump's imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the European Union and China resulted in the implementation of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products.

Russia

A renewed Trump presidency could also impact global economic relations with Russia. In his 2024 campaign, Trump promised to swiftly resolve the Ukraine conflict, asserting he could achieve peace within 24 hours through negotiation.  However, if Russia resists a settlement, Trump has signalled he would impose tougher economic sanctions, potentially targeting Russia’s central bank and curtailing energy exports to key markets like India and China. This intensified economic pressure, coupled with increased US energy production to lower global prices, would squeeze Russia’s vital oil revenue. 

Additionally, Trump’s scepticism toward ongoing US aid to Ukraine, which has amounted to $92.7 billion since 2022, raises concerns over a potential reduction in support, which could compromise Ukraine’s defence and shift the regional balance in Russia’s favour. Trump has also suggested that Europe should shoulder more responsibility for its security, which may lead to a reevaluation of US commitments to NATO. It is possible that a reduction in the US role in NATO could have the effect of weakening collective defenses, which might in turn expose Europe to greater tensions with Russia. This approach indicates a shift toward a more isolationist US foreign policy, with strategic economic measures as leverage to influence Russia's actions.

Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Additionally, Trump’s expected policies in oil and gas could intensify competition with Russia and reshape global energy markets. Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska has predicted that Trump’s support for US oil production might drive global prices down to around $50 per barrel by 2025, creating pressure on Russia’s oil-dependent economy. Trump’s approach would likely include promoting US LNG exports, reviving paused projects, and further challenging Russia’s position in Europe’s energy market. 

His stance on projects like the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which he previously sanctioned to limit Russia’s influence, suggests he might continue efforts to curb Russia’s global LNG ambitions while supporting policies to maintain affordable oil prices for US consumers. By influencing OPEC+ to stabilise prices favourable to the US, Trump could further impact Russia’s revenue, potentially reducing its leverage in Europe and heightening competition in the global energy sector.

Conclusion

Taken together, based upon a previous presidency led by Donald Trump and his recent claims on the campaign trail, global economic relations could become increasingly tense between the United States and other nations and political unions.

In particular, trade relations between China and the United States are expected to worsen, with major increases in tariffs on Chinese goods entering into the United States possibly leading to retaliatory tariffs and an intensification of trade competition between the two countries. The European Union could also be affected by the competition between the United States and China, as well as the possibility of increased tariffs on goods from the EU going into the United States. The conflict in Ukraine also casts a shadow over Trump’s second term and whether the Trump administration continues to provide funding to Ukraine and keep sanctions on Russia in place will affect both the war in Ukraine, as well as economic relations between the United States and Russia.

These considerations will all have ripple effects across the entire world, meaning it is important for policymakers, scholars, and citizens alike to continue watching the effects of the second Trump presidency on global economic relations. 

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November 25, 2024 — No Comments

The Italian strategic alignment with the EU Chips Act

by Giacomo Bortolazzi (Italy Team) & Marco Verrocchio (Military Strategy & Intelligence Team)

Despite the relative overcoming of the crisis sparked in early 2020, the global shortage of semiconductor chips has precipitated countries and companies into fierce competition on a global scale. This paper examines the potential response of Italy and its strategic initiatives in one of the most strategic issues in the near future. Nonetheless, Italian initiatives are propelled and integrated into the European framework of the Chips Act. By analysing Italy's alignment with the EU's objective, the article provides insights into the nation's efforts in the complex global semiconductor landscape.

Semiconductors' crisis: Europe's role in the global Chip shortages

The world is not new to the fierce competition among countries on semiconductors. However, the demand for cutting-edge technologies and the massive need for semiconductors in everyday life smart devices are determining insecurities on the endurance of the GVCs. The global chip shortage during the Covid-19 pandemic has drawn the attention of industries and states on the strategic value of semiconductors. While supplies of chips began to improve in 2022, the already high demand for advanced chips, such as those for the automotive and military sector, is continuing to intensify: the global market of semiconductors is projected to scale from $573.44 billion in 2022 to $1,380.79 billion by 2029 at a compound annual growth rate of 12.2%. However, chips are not so easy to make: While building factories and clean laboratories requires years, transforming a single silicon wafer into semiconductors takes months. Based on said high demand and the complexity of making semiconductors, the latter’s GVCs are highly amenable to geopolitical tensions such as the US-China trade competition. For these reasons, governments are investing to boost domestic production, attract foreign investment, and discourage the export of semiconductor technologies.

While Japan and the US dominated semiconductor manufacturing in the 90s, today Taiwan and South Korea are leading the market both in terms of volume and of production of the smallest nanometer chips. The eruption of the US-China trade competition and the shortage of chips during the Pandemic, on the other hand, led the US and Japan to adopt policies against the exports of chips-related technologies, encouraging the establishment of factories in the homeland. In this scenario, in July 2023 the EU adopted the European Chips Act, a regulation aimed at strengthening the European semiconductor market through more than €43 billion of investments. Based on the premises of the Chips Act, in the same year the regulation was implemented by the Chips Joint Undertaking (Chips JU), a call for funding based on public-private partnership to bridge the gap between R&D and the market.

The Italian implementation of the Chips Ju

Among the several European countries that became an active implementer of the Chips Joint Undertaking, Italy certainly represents an actor with an important burden on its shoulders. The first active participation of the country in the JU was in November 2023, when Chips.IT, the new Italian Centre for the Design of Semiconductor Integrated Circuits, and the Italian strategy for microelectronics were presented in Pavia. The two novelties are strongly intertwined: Chips.IT was born as part of the strategy to coordinate and strengthen the microchip design sector with state-of-the-art equipment, all in order to foster an overall development of the sector. The role of public and private entities was also stressed, with €225 million being allocated and big firms such as Intel, Sony, Infineon and the Italian STMicroelectronics willing to collaborate.

The national efforts in the field of the JU will also foster the birth of further projects that will have a positive impact on the national landscape: after the approval of the Governing Board of the JU, a new advanced microelectronics infrastructure was set up in the middle of the Etna Valley with the main task to build prototype devices for the development of innovative applications in the field of electric mobility and telecommunications. The initiative was strongly supported by the Italian Ministries of Enterprise and Made in Italy, the University and Research Ministry and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and received an allocation of €360 million to be divided between the European Union and the participating states (namely Finland, Poland, Sweden, Austria, France and Germany). This investment will certainly have a positive impact on the area by fostering employment, newly established activities and a general blooming of the industrial sector directly related to microelectronics.

Another important presence in the Italian landscape will be that of Silicon Box, a Singaporean tech giant has planned to invest €3.2 billion in the Italian microelectronics industry with a new plant located in Novara. The role of this company is certainly not to be underestimated, as it could contribute to the Italian role in the market of the so-called “chiplets”. Sehat Sutardja, one of the founders of Silicon Box, introduced this concept in 2015 as an innovative and performance-enhancing technology. A chiplet is in fact a processor with multiple cores that is printed on the same layer with other chiplets: this would consent a more efficient communication, thus erasing the issue of hardware-software data transfer.

Photo by Dan Williams via Pixabay

Italian expectations in the EU scenario

In a nutshell, Italy does not dispose of forgeries equiparable to those of countries such as China, which can hold entire GVCs inside their territory. Even though small enterprises are common in the Italian tech sector, many new important initiatives such as those started in the Etna Valley and in

Novara can be considered as holding a great potential. At the same time, the European Union has realised the importance and the scarcity of semiconductors and of the materials needed to produce it. Due to the important influx of investments received by Member States, Italy has experienced positive spillover effects, resulting in the transfer of valuable know-how and the creation of more job opportunities. In light of these novelties, the future possibility for Italy to start a “solo project” and to become itself a global actor is not to be excluded. Still, it’s important to bear in mind that key global actors such as South Korea, China or Taiwan are still a long way ahead and that multiple efforts will be required to launch Italy among the stars. Still, Italian efforts to be imprinted in the global semiconductor market are slowly revealing their “dual use”: they’re helping the European Union to reduce its dependency on external actors while securing the country’s competitiveness in the field of semiconductors.

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November 23, 2024 — No Comments

The Kashmir Conflict: The Tip of a Dangerous Glacier- Part I

by Davide Gobbicchi - Human Security Team

The return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan has shed light on Central Asia’s geopolitics and security issues, with many analysts fearing that Afghanistan would initiate a domino effect of destabilisation and Islamic radicalisation across a particularly unstable region of the world. Kashmir has best symbolised the complexity of South Asia, given its decades of instability, ethnoreligious tensions and major great powers' interests. Assessing this region helps us understand one of the most strategic and complex areas in the world.

This article attempts to uncover the motivations behind the long-standing conflict that turned Kashmir into the world’s most militarised region, to consequently try providing policy recommendations that could bring Kashmir stability and development, much to the benefit of its people, the larger geographical area, and the international community as a whole.

This article will be divided into two parts: the first will focus on the region’s historical and sociocultural context as well as its political structure, investigating the factors behind Kashmiris’ unique identity and the developments leading Kashmir to its current state of affairs; the second part will then analyse the solutions to the conflict proposed by the recent international academic literature and try to uncover the motivations behind Indo-Pakistani inability to implement such solutions, finishing by presenting policy recommendations for the actors involved in the conflict.

Understanding Kashmir: history and cultural identity 

Kashmir’s geographical position at the crossroads of empires and its predominantly mountainous nature created throughout the centuries two conditions common to such regions across the world: a highly heterogeneous population within an isolated territory. The centuries-old melting pot resulting from the region’s location destroyed classic patterns of identity (religion and language) and generated a society with incongruous religious-linguistic divisions, thus preventing the radicalisation of social groups along ethno-religious lines and instead nurturing a culture of peaceful coexistence among different religions and ethnicities that became known as “Kashmiriyat”. Simultaneously, Kashmir’s territorial morphology provided a natural barrier- mountains-against excessive foreign influence, thereby preserving a strong regional identity based not on a unique language, culture, or religion, but rather on the unique coexistence and intermingling of many.

Map 1: Erstwhile Princely State of Jammu & Kashmir. Currently, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, UT of Jammu & Kashmir and UT of Ladakh by India, and Aksai Chin by China.
Source and link: Wikimedia Commons.

The establishment of the "Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu" in 1846 marked the beginning of a distinct political entity in the region. The Maharaja of this new kingdom retained control over most internal matters while recognising the suzerainty of the British Empire. During its century of quasi-independent rule (1846–1952), the region saw the cultivation of ideals such as tolerance, secularism, and pluralism, which had long been part of its historical identity. Challenges emerged following the partition of 1947, as ethno-religious tensions in the newly created states of India and Pakistan began to affect Kashmir. The initial neutrality and aspirations for independence within the Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu encountered opposition from both India and Pakistan, each of which viewed Kashmir as integral to their national identities.

In 1947, armed tribal forces from Pakistan entered Kashmir, citing reports of violence against Muslims in the region, and sought to integrate Kashmir with the newly established Islamic Republic of Pakistan. in response to the foreign invasion, the Maharaja of Kashmir and Jammu - being himself a Hindu - requested India to intervene and stop Pakistani incursions into Kashmir, consequently allowing for Jammu and Kashmir to become part of the country. India’s intervention marked the beginning of the First Indo-Pakistani War (1947-1948) and - upon India’s request - the intervention of the UN to settle the dispute. UN Resolutions 47 and 48 called for a ceasefire and proposed a plebiscite to allow the people of Jammu and Kashmir to determine their political future. While a ceasefire was achieved and a ceasefire line established, disagreements between India and Pakistan prevented the implementation of the plebiscite, leaving the region divided and its population in a state of uncertainty.

In the following decades, the political and territorial landscape of Kashmir underwent further changes. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 resulted in China gaining control of the eastern region of Aksai Chin. The Third Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 led to the 1972 establishment of the Line of Control (LoC), a de facto border based largely on the previous ceasefire line, separating Pakistani-administered and Indian-administered territories. Despite a fourth Indo-Pakistani war in 1999 and subsequent smaller clashes, the region remains a point of contention between the two nations.

Kashmir remains to this day under the fragile division established by the 1972 Line of Control. However, decades of Indo-Pakistani influence and conflict have changed Kashmiri identity, slowly eroding the principles of tolerance and pluralism (Kashmiriyat) on which it had been resting for the previous centuries: Islamic fundamentalism - backed by Islamabad and fueled by New Delhi’s Hindu nationalism - gradually moved away from its historical irrelevance to gain growing importance in political and societal discourses, becoming the pillar of several political and civil society movements within the region. The increasing radicalisation among segments of the Muslim Kashmiri population contributed to the eruption of violence and terrorism, leading to the displacement of several religious minorities, including the Hindu Kashmiri Pandits, who relocated to predominantly Hindu areas of the region; these migrations impoverished the society’s ethnocultural diversity and consequently led to the alignment of identity with religion, thereby allowing the flourishing of geographical and sectarian divisions within Kashmir. These newly arising divisions greatly worsened living conditions, further fomenting extremism and interreligious hatred.

The political division of Kashmir 

As of today, India controls about 55% of Kashmir, Pakistan 30%, and China roughly 15% of it. Kashmir is now divided into four areas, with two under Indian control and two under Pakistani control, excluding the mostly uninhabited Chinese-controlled part of the region.:

  • Jammu & Kashmir (now “U.T. of Jammu and Kashmir”, and “U.T. of Ladakh”): This subregion under Indian control was given the status of “State” and granted a special degree of autonomy over its internal affairs by the Indian Constitution (article 370; article 35a). In 2019 the Indian Government - after decades of debate - approved the “Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act”, which abrogated the two articles and split the state into two “Union Territories” that enjoy far less autonomy than States: “the Union Territory of Ladakh”, and the “Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir”. Such a highly contested Act (justified by the Indian Government as a way to stimulate “financial activities, transparency in administration and growth in J&K’s economy.”) de facto marked the end to what was known as “Kashmiri Exceptionalism”, and was (and still is) met by widespread protests throughout the region (now divided into two different administrative territories), since many saw New Delhi’s centralism as an attempt to colonise the region and alter its unique identity.  
  •  Gilgit-Baltistan: this territory controlled by Pakistan is administered by the “Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009”, which officially grants the region self-rule but de facto puts it under the control of “an Islamabad-based council with its Chairman being the Prime Minister of Pakistan”. The order further facilitated Islamabad’s policy of ethnic substitution in the region - given Gilgit-Baltistan’s Shia majority in direct opposition to Pakistan’s Sunni tradition - thereby fueling tensions across the territory and demands for separatism. 
  • Azad Kashmir: this second region under Pakistani rule officially enjoys a wide degree of autonomy under its Interim Constitution of 1974, though it de facto is - like the other Pakistan-controlled region - completely subject to the will of Islamabad. Major natural disasters and the resulting mass emigration rapidly changed the territory’s demographics, drawing it closer to the rest of Pakistan. 

Having explained Kashmir’s sociocultural and political context, the second part of the article will focus on the solutions to its critical state of affairs.

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November 14, 2024 — No Comments

Barracuda-M: Could Anduril be a Game-Chnager in. Modern Warfare and Defense Agility?

By Giulio Civettini - Military & Strategy Team

Introduction about Anduril and their mission 

Founded in 2017 by Oculus co-founder Palmer Luckey, ANDURIL INDUSTRIES is a California-based defense sector company1. As stated by Luckey and reflected in their mission, ANDURIL’s products aim to enhance the ability of the United States and its allies to counter both symmetrical and asymmetrical threats, thanks to the company’s cutting-edge technology and innovative production capabilities2 3. These capabilities stem from the very way the company was founded. Differently from other major companies in the sector, such as Northrop Grumman and RTX, ANDURIL is not dependent on external funders and avoids long-term contracts with the U.S. government4 5. This approach creates a system where the company’s success relies on its ability to develop cost-efficient, cutting-edge products6. ANDURIL secures the necessary funds through private venture capital investments, providing it with more autonomy compared to companies reliant on external funders7.

The company isn’t incentivised by project delays or increased costs, which is why having an ecosystem outside the traditional defence industry giants could position it to address some of the challenges faced by the U.S. and its allies89. By conducting R&D (research and development) internally and avoiding the typical long-term contracts that often overrun schedules and budgets, ANDURIL remains highly flexible and competitive10 11.

The company has pursued a vertical acquisition strategy to diversify its capabilities. This approach to vertical integration allows ANDURIL to directly adapt its core product, “LATTICE OS,” to various systems1213. By automating processes such as quality checks, ANDURIL can scale production, achieving a competitive position in the industry14. A prime example of this vertical integration is the acquisition of Area-I, a Georgia-based company specialising in small unmanned aerial systems (UAS). This acquisition not only diversifies ANDURIL’s portfolio of autonomous systems but also provides a strategic advantage by integrating AI and their software directly into drones.15 As mentioned earlier, ANDURIL’s core product is “LATTICE AI,” a software that coordinates the ecosystem the company has created, providing users with complete battlefield awareness and intelligence-gathering capabilities16.

The strategic choice of being independent for R&D and for long-lasting contracts is also reflected in how their supply chain is structured. Thanks to the control and efficiency guaranteed by the vertical integration model, ANDURIL has gained an important edge in the industry, giving them the unique ability in the sector to adapt “faster” to what are the immediate demands coming from the battlefield. The in-house production and agile nature of the company enable quick scaling up production of both small drones and more complex sensor systems17. What gives ANDURIL this ability to quickly scale production is the modular design, giving them the ability to quickly repair, substitute, and update their systems, giving the important possibility of resisting warfare “ATTRITION” to the U.S. arsenal18. This means that the weapons or systems that are being used are sufficiently autonomous and relatively cheap, and so the problem that could present with the loss of said system would not impact so much on a country’s arsenal19. The supply chain is built in such a way that the most important components on which the production relies are directly produced in the U.S. or in-house, minimizing third-party dependencies in case of an all-out war20.

So, what emerges from this analysis is that ANDURIL is a uniquely structured company in the defense sector. Its approach to funding, marketing strategies and, more importantly, its engineering capabilities give it an edge in the agility to which the company adapts to emerging scenarios21.

How do Cruise missiles and loitering munitions/UAVs play into American theater level strategy?

One of the most recent additions to ANDURIL’s portfolio is the BARRACUDA AAV (autonomous air vehicle) (6). Before exploring how such a system could really change the current power competition happening over the South China Sea, it’s important to understand the role of cruise missiles and loitering munitions/UAVs. For decades, the U.S. has maintained uncontested air dominance wherever it has operated, giving it the possibility to deploy ground forces where needed. This has changed in the last decade; the new power competition that has emerged in the South Pacific is threatening the U.S.’s ability to maintain such a role. With the constant threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty, the United States is concerned about how, in an all-out conflict to protect the island, air superiority could be guaranteed22.

In this sense, the ability to counter China’s A2/AD strategy (Anti-Access/Area Denial)—which includes advanced missile defense systems, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and long-range radar systems capable of detecting and neutralising U.S. forces in the area—is crucial23. In this scenario, the role played by cruise missiles such as the “Tomahawk” or the JASSM is pivotal, as they could target the intricate defense systems of China’s A2/AD network24. Another important feature of these cruise missiles is their ability to perform low-altitude missions; being hard to detect, U.S. forces could potentially overwhelm defenses, penetrate hypothetical defensive shield, and enable amphibious landings or aerial assaults.

In contrast, loitering munitions offer the ability to conduct surveillance and real-time targeting acquisitions while loitering in the air. The strategic advantage of these weapon systems lies in their relative affordability and ease of replacement compared to larger, more expensive cruise missiles. In a potential conflict, it is key not only to have superior hardware, such as the F-35s or cruise missiles, but also to deploy systems that can provide targeting and surveillance in large numbers and at a low cost25. These factors explain ANDURIL’s recent efforts to develop the BARRACUDA AAV. This weapon system, supported by the production, acquisition, and supply chain strategies outlined above, is designed to be cost-effective and easily replaceable26.

The features of the BARRACUDA, in its three possible iterations, combine elements of both a standard cruise missile and a loitering munition. The advanced LATTICE AI, integrated with the BARRACUDA, enables the system to operate autonomously, reducing the human workload and enhancing operational speed. Advanced sensors, machine vision, and AI-guided targeting allow the BARRACUDA to alter its target mid-course and remain airborne for extended periods27.

There are several variants of the BARRACUDA. The first iteration, the BARRACUDA 100, is the smallest and lightest version, with an estimated payload of around 35 lbs and an 85-mile range when air-launched. This version is deployable from AH-Z1 helicopters, AH-64, and C-130 variants. The second version, the BARRACUDA 250, has an estimated payload of 85 lbs and a much longer range of 200 miles when air-launched. This iteration can be deployed from a variety of platforms, such as the F-35 (for internal carriage in bombers) or the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 (for external carriage)28.

Barracuda’s technical role and how it stands out from existing systems

We rapidly talked in the last paragraph about the BARRACUDA-M family, but how does it really compare to the current family of cruise missiles? In the U.S. arsenal now, there are two types of similar systems, which are the TOMAHAWK and the JASSM. Both the JASSM and the TOMAHAWK feature a larger payload and a longer range (both with a payload of 1,000 lbs and a range of 200 miles vs 1,000-1,500 miles). The JASSM is primarily designed for air-launch from bombers and tactical aircraft, specialised in striking high-value targets from a stand-off distance. In contrast, the Tomahawk is a naval cruise missile, primarily launched from ships and submarines, and designed for precision strikes against land targets. Often used in maritime operations, it can engage various targets, including enemy ships and infrastructure.

After this summary of the current U.S. arsenal, it’s time to analyse where the actual competitive edge of the BARRACUDA family lies. With an estimated cost per unit of approximately $1.4 million for the JASSM (the newer JASSM-ER can cost around $2 million per unit) and from $1.5 to $2 million per unit for the Tomahawk, these systems are more expensive than the BARRACUDA in its larger iteration, the -500, which is estimated to be about 30% cheaper29. Another issue with the current U.S. stockpile of both the Tomahawk and JASSM systems is that, during various “war games” simulating an all-out conflict with China, this stockpile could be exhausted in just over a week of sustained combat operations. Given that the current production timeline for some munitions is around 20 months, concerns are raised about the U.S.’s ability to withstand a protracted conflict. This is one of the main reasons why the BARRACUDA-M family, if its premises hold true, could be a real game-changer, acting as a force multiplier and providing much-needed attrition capabilities in the potential conflict30.

Photo by Michael Wambangco: https://www.pexels.com/photo/us-navy-airplane-in-sky-20186687/

Export capability

The U.S. are not the only countries in the NATO alliance to have this kind of cruise missiles. In fact, France, Germany, Spain, and the UK have developed such systems. The UK and France use the “Storm Shadow/SCALP EG,” while Germany and Spain deploy the “Taurus KEPD 350”. The current stockpiles of these systems, along with production timelines and cost per unit, suggest that the advent of the BARRACUDA could be an interesting addition to these countries’ arsenals, providing a valid, cheaper alternative to more expensive and harder-to-produce systems31.

Conclusion

Anduril’s innovative contributions to the defense industry have the potential to significantly reshape global power dynamics in the years to come. With emerging threats like UAVs, loitering munitions, and the broader proliferation of drones, NATO countries such as the United States must recognize that preparing solely for symmetrical warfare is no longer sufficient32. Anduril’s approach becomes crucial in this evolving landscape. Its scalable production capabilities, combined with agility in research and development, position it to meet the rapidly changing demands of modern warfare. By integrating its core product, “LATTICE AI,” Anduril provides real-time, all-domain awareness and coordination, offering operators a comprehensive view of the battlefield. This adaptive technology bridges the gap between traditional military frameworks and the newer, faster-moving technological threats, such as autonomous systems and artificial intelligence. Anduril’s strength lies in its ability to complement the slower, more bureaucratic defense apparatus of conventional forces with its ability to react quickly and at a scale. By leveraging automation, modular systems, and software-driven innovation, Anduril ensures that NATO forces, especially the U.S., are better equipped to handle both large-scale conventional conflicts and smaller, asymmetric engagements.

The flexibility of Anduril’s ecosystem, characterized by fast-paced R&D cycles and a domestic supply chain, allows for rapid deployment of crucial assets and weapons systems33. This ability to respond to emerging threats efficiently, through innovations like the Barracuda family of AAVs or scalable drone production, highlights the significance of Anduril’s role in shaping the modern defence industry. As global power competition intensifies, particularly with rivals like China, companies like Anduril will be essential in maintaining military superiority, ensuring that NATO forces are not only prepared for current challenges but also those of the future. The defense industry, traditionally slow to adapt, is now being pushed to evolve by Anduril’s pioneering model, which balances autonomy, scalability, and technological innovation.

This transformation might ultimately drive a shift in how conflicts are approached, moving from rigid, high-cost systems to more agile, lower-cost, and rapidly deployable alternatives. In this context, Anduril’s innovations could serve as a cornerstone of a new era in global defense strategy, one where agility, warfare-attrition capability, and adaptability become the pillars of power projection34.

  1. Aitoro, Jill. “As Tech Startups Catch Dod’s Eye, Big Investors Are Watching.” Defense News, August 19, 2022. https://www.defensenews.com/smr/cultural-clash/2020/01/30/as-tech-startups-catch-dods-eye-big-investors-are-watching/.  ↩︎
  2. Ibidem ↩︎
  3. Tamir Eshel, By, Tamir Eshel, Tamir Eshel, News Desk, and Tamir Eshel - Oct 13. “Anduril’s Lattice AI - Defense Update:” Defense Update: - Military Technology & Defense News, January 6, 2024. https://defense-update.com/20231222_lattice-ai.html#google_vignette.  ↩︎
  4. Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.” CSIS. Accessed October 27, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan ↩︎
  5. Gould, Joe. “US Defense Industry Unprepared for a China Fight, Says Report.” Defense News, January 24, 2023. https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2023/01/23/us-defense-industry-unprepared-for-a-china-fight-says-report/.  ↩︎
  6. Losey, Stephen. “Anduril Unveils Modular, High-Production Barracuda Cruise Missiles.” Defense News, September 16, 2024. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2024/09/12/anduril-unveils-modular-high-production-barracuda-cruise-missiles/.  ↩︎
  7. See 3. ↩︎
  8. See 4-5. ↩︎
  9. See 5.  ↩︎
  10. Oberman, Justin P. “Redefining Disruption: A Plan to Upgrade Defense Innovation.” Defense News, August 18, 2022. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/09/09/redefining-disruption-a-plan-to-upgrade-defense-innovation/.  ↩︎
  11. See 1-4 ↩︎
  12. “Anduril Acquires Air-Launched Effects Company Area-I.” Inside Defense. Accessed October 27, 2024. https://insidedefense.com/insider/anduril-acquires-air-launched-effects-company-area-i ↩︎
  13. See 3 ↩︎
  14. See 6. ↩︎
  15. See 2-3 ↩︎
  16. Tirpak, John. “Anduril Unveils New Low-Cost ‘Barracuda’ Cruise Missiles.” Air & Space Forces Magazine, September 12, 2024. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/anduril-unveils-new-low-cost-cruise-missiles/. ↩︎
  17. See 6. ↩︎
  18. Schogol, Jeff. “The Pentagon Seeks to Stock up on Tomahawks and Other Tactical Missiles in $842 Billion Budget.” Task & Purpose, March 13, 2023. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/pentagon-2024-budget-missiles/.  ↩︎
  19. Shelbourne, Mallory. “Raytheon Awarded $217M Tomahawk Missiles Contract for Navy, Marines, Army.” USNI News, May 25, 2022. https://news.usni.org/2022/05/25/raytheon-awarded-217m-tomahawk-missiles-contract-for-navy-marines-army.  ↩︎
  20. See 1-4-5. ↩︎
  21. See 4-10-16. ↩︎
  22. See 4. ↩︎
  23. See18 ↩︎
  24. See 19 ↩︎
  25. See 6 ↩︎
  26. See 16 ↩︎
  27. See 6-1 ↩︎
  28. See 16 ↩︎
  29. See 18-19. ↩︎
  30. See 4-5-16. ↩︎
  31. See 18-19. ↩︎
  32. See 4-6-10. ↩︎
  33. See 3-5-16. ↩︎
  34. See 10- 5. ↩︎
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November 13, 2024 — No Comments

Iran’s Hostility Towards Israel: Three Influential Reasons

by Margherita Ceserani, Shahin Modarres, Shir Mor, William Kingston-Cox - Iran Team

The Islamic Republic’s recent choice to directly confront Israel, avoiding its usual reliance on proxy groups, marks a significant shift in its Middle East strategy. Long dependent on groups like Hezbollah and Hamas for regional influence, the weakening of these proxies—amid Israeli retaliation and Iran’s internal crises—has led Tehran to reconsider its approach. This article explores the internal and external factors driving the Islamic Republic’s move toward a more direct confrontation.

Its proxies weakening 

The Islamic Republic's decision to attack Israel directly, bypassing its traditional reliance on proxy groups - also called the "Axis of Resistance" - marks a significant shift in its strategic approach. This uncharacteristic behaviour is largely driven by the weakening of its proxies, particularly in the aftermath of the events following October 7th.

For decades, the Islamic Republic has built, supported, and relied on external groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis to exert influence, especially in the Middle East, and keep Israel engaged. However, recent Israeli military retaliation has severely weakened these proxies, diminished their operational capabilities, and reduced their effectiveness in countering Israeli threats and holding power positions in the Middle East and the whole world.

The Islamic Republic maintains a network of allied groups across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. The IRGC Quds Force, responsible for operations beyond Iran's borders, coordinates with these groups in line with Iranian directives. This network supports Iran’s strategy to extend its influence throughout the region and beyond. For example, the Houthis have impacted maritime security in the Red Sea, prompting responses from U.S. and U.K. military coalitions in Yemen. Iran also provides funding and weaponry to groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, facilitating their actions against Israel despite Hamas' Sunni background. In Syria, Iran has established a direct influence on the Assad regime and deploys allied militias to strengthen its presence, using the country as a base for potential actions against Israel. By supporting these groups, Iran seeks to counter its adversaries, extend its ideological influence, and maintain leverage in key areas, which affects both regional and global security.

The targeted killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah by Israel, coupled with the assassination of Hamas figure Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, signifies a pivotal moment in the collapse of the "Axis of Resistance." These significant blows not only weaken Iran's most powerful regional proxies but also destabilise Tehran's long-standing influence in the Middle East. Established in the 1980s, Hezbollah evolved under Iranian support into a formidable political and military force; Nasrallah's death highlights how Israel's recent military operations have fractured Iran's strategic foothold, jeopardising its long-term plans. Similarly, Haniyeh's assassination, attributed to Israel despite no official claim of responsibility, directly challenges Iran's authority, especially given that he was in Tehran to coordinate efforts with Iranian leaders. The operation's occurrence within Iran sends a powerful message about Tehran's vulnerability and reflects a broader Israeli strategy to undermine Iran’s network of proxies which consistently threaten Israel’s security and complicates Iran’s ability to project power.

The Islamic Republic's long-term strategic plans have been significantly disrupted, prompting a notable shift toward a direct approach to its conflict with Israel. Historically reliant on proxy forces to advance its agenda, the recent weakening of these groups has forced Iran to reevaluate its strategy. The decision to directly confront Israel reflects not only an immediate tactical shift but also an acknowledgement that its traditional methods may no longer achieve its regional objectives. This transformation is underscored by the diminishing effectiveness of the "Axis of Resistance" and signifies a recalibration of tactics amid a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. These developments carry profound implications for both Iran's future strategies and broader regional stability and global security.

Domestic dissatisfaction 

Tehran’s decision to escalate tensions with Israel can be understood by its multifaceted internal crises, which challenge the regime economically, politically, and socially. The economic decline of the Iranian economy has been worsened for years by international sanctions, global fluctuations and instability in oil prices, and rising inflation, fueling widespread discontent among an already-beleaguered Iranian population. Tehran has been unable to quell the resultant dissatisfaction, particularly following the protests after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. Amini’s death fuelled a popular challenge of cleric authority and demands for greater civil liberties. 

The society of the Islamic Republic is becoming increasingly secularised, eroding the clerical influence of the regime. Its reliance upon the continued legitimacy of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which is increasingly contested as Iranian society, particularly its younger elements, becomes increasingly disillusioned with religious politicisation, and, in turn, becoming increasingly secularised. Many young Iranians are showing disdain for traditional practices, a consequence of exposure to Western media. This particular challenge for the regime is existential - its entire raison d’etre rests upon religious foundations. 

Coupled with the endemic internal challenges and the pressures from its proxies, Tehran’s decision to strike Israel reveals itself as a tool of diversion; an attempt to rally patriotic fervour and unity in return for relative political stability. By framing a new national, external enemy, the Iranian regime can distract and obfuscate from its internal dissent, all whilst performatively asserting itself as a regional power. This approach undertaken by the Iranian government does, of course, risk exacerbating economic downfall as an overreliance on oil revenues could be manipulated to Tehran’s detriment. Whilst the Iranian leadership will no doubt conceive these external manoeuvres to be a part of a ‘survival strategy’, it cannot be overstated how further economic strife will precipitate deepening and widening domestic disillusionment and, ultimately, unrest, prompting new calls for regime change. 

Source: photo-generated with the support of artificial intelligence.

Nuclear Advancements 

Tehran’s approach to foreign policy in the Middle East is influenced by a combination of geopolitical, ideological, and military considerations, with its nuclear program playing a significant role. Since the United States' withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018, the Islamic Republic has advanced its nuclear developments, positioning these capabilities as a potential deterrent against perceived external threats, particularly from Israel. A notable development occurred in 2023, when the IAEA reported finding uranium particles enriched to 83.7% in a declared facility — a level approaching weapons-grade material.

These advancements have significantly strengthened the Islamic Republic’s strategic position, as the prospect of developing nuclear weapons reduces the likelihood of direct military intervention by its adversaries. With this deterrent in place, though not the sole factor, the Shiite regime feels emboldened to act more assertively, pushing the limits of its regional influence and responding more aggressively to external provocations. For instance, the Israeli strike on the Islamic Republic’s consulate in Damascus in April 2024 has been met with an increased likelihood of retaliation. Tehran’s nuclear capability serves as a protective shield, allowing it to project power and influence more aggressively, while its ideological goals and regional ambitions drive its assertiveness in confronting rivals like Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Despite arguments by some experts that nuclear weapons would undermine its security and diplomatic relations, Iranian officials view nuclear capabilities as a strategic asset that could grant superiority over regional adversaries. Engaging in a nuclear arms race could be economically unsustainable and diplomatically harmful for Tehran, however, nuclear capability is tied not only to military deterrence but also to a pursuit of prestige, both domestically and internationally. This aligns with its broader goal of establishing regional hegemony, while also reflecting its revolutionary ideology rooted in values like independence, anti-imperialism, and resistance to foreign domination since 1979.

Conclusion

The Islamic Republic’s shift to direct action against Israel reflects a new phase in its foreign policy. Weakened proxies and rising domestic discontent are challenging Tehran’s traditional strategies. As nuclear developments bolster its assertiveness, this new approach risks further regional instability and could have global security implications, underscoring a significant turning point in Middle Eastern dynamics.

  • Board of Governors (2023). NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General. Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/documents/gov2023-58.pdf.
  • Mirza, M.N., Abbas, H. and Qaisrani, Irfan Hasnain (2022). The Iranian Nuclear Programme: Dynamics of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), American Unisolationism and European Apprehensions. Journal of European Studies, 38(1), pp.14-32. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4002492.
  • Maleki, A. (2010). Iran’s nuclear file: recommendations for the future. Daedalus, 139(1), pp.105–116. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40544048 [Accessed 2024].
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November 1, 2024 — No Comments

The Harris-Walz Ticket and the Future of the Democratic Party

by Anurag Mishra - USA Team

As the world’s most awaited political battle commences, the ideological schism in American politics appears to be wider than ever. The two major parties remain divergent on almost every issue concerning contemporary American politics. While the Red Ticket packs an emboldened, fiercer (but older) Donald Trump with a very conservative up-and-coming senator from Ohio, J.D. Vance, the Blue Ticket offers the first woman Veep in American history with a dubbed-radical governor from Minnesota, Tim Walz. Both tickets stretch the rope further towards the right and left, and even four years hence, no American unity is in sight.

The Harris-Walz ticket is arguably the most progressive presidential ticket in America’s recent history. While Kamala was a natural choice to succeed President Biden on top of the Democratic ticket, Tim Walz’s naming was a bit of a surprise. While several pundits expected an attempt at ideological ticket balancing, given Harris’s liberal credentials, Tim Walz’s inclusion is presumably an attempt to encash Walz’s midwestern cool-dad image and muster the votes of the pro-choice women and young/first-time voters.

The Harris-Walz Ticket – Democratic Unity or Compromise?

Kamala Harris secured her nomination without contesting the primaries. A public mandate on her work as VP is yet to be duly recorded. The last time she contested for an elected position was the 2020 democratic primaries, where she put up a dismal show, failing to gather even a solitary delegate’s support. All of that together does not help her democratic vita. Amid Republican accusations that Kamala Harris is a handpicked candidate and lacks popular support, Kamala’s choice of a liberal governor with a midwestern appeal to accompany her on the ticket is, at best, a very curious political move. The pairing raises questions about the internal compromises or divisions within the Democratic party and if the pair carries a broad national appeal.

Recently at a press briefing, President Biden remarked that Kamala has been vital in everything his presidency has achieved and worked for and that Kamala is “singing from the same song sheet.” This, again, falters Kamala’s “call for change.” On the other hand, Tim Walz’s perception has been amorphous. The Minnesota governor started as a very bipartisan, moderate congressman but has steadily turned left over the years. The abortion bill that he signed into law removed “all restrictions to abortion,” and the following “shield law” makes it easier for women from other states to get abortions in Minnesota with no legal repercussions. All of this has played out in favor of President Trump and the GOP.

On Policy Front

The Biden White House registered strong numbers in post-Covid job creation and economic growth but has grappled with soaring gas prices and general inflation. Ms. Harris, while inheriting this troubled legacy, is promising to build an “opportunity economy” stilted on promises of mortgage assistance for first-time homebuyers, a tax credit for parents of newborns, and bans on price gouging at the grocery store. Harris has repeatedly said that her presidency will not be a continuation of Biden’s presidency but has remained unconvincing and unclear on what she would do differently. Her stance on abortion access (Tim Walz’s inclusion on the ticket is the biggest stressor) is expected to be fiercer compared to President Biden as she has been the most vocal critic of Roe v. Wade’s reversal. On gun safety laws, Kamala Harris, as president, is almost certain to undertake stricter measures, as she has been steadfast in support of a stricter gun law regime throughout her career. 

The issue where she might take a leap ahead of President Biden is her policy on crime; Ms. Harris has lately been non-committal on her personal stances on all three. Kamala Harris, then a senator, had supported the First Step Act of 2018, which provided for a lesser sentence for offenders and early releases, and hailed it as a step in the direction of “righting the wrong” in the criminal justice system. Ms. Harris also supports legalizing marijuana, although she has a disconcerting record of procuring more than 2,000 convictions for marijuana possession when she ran the justice department in the state of California. Ms. Harris will find it difficult to maneuver while being accused by the Republicans of being “soft on crime”. Her unrestrained praise for the “Defund the Police” movement is a veritable question mark on her crime policies. On Climate issues, Kamala Harris, both as a senator and as Vice President was averse to fracking and dependence on fossil fuel. However, close to the elections, she has taken a more moderate stance on fracking by replacing dependence on fossil fuels with dependence on foreign oil. However, once elected to office, Kamala Harris as president is likely to introduce aggressive measures to minimize fracking and reduce the country’s dependence on fossil fuels while opening the doors for a bigger Green New Deal.

Source: by Gage Skidmore - flickr.com

The handling of the southern border was one of the most burning election issues in 2016 as well as in 2020 and has continued to remain one even in 2024. While Ms. Harris has maintained a more humane approach to dealing with immigration, she seems to have toughened her stance on the same with elections approaching close. Her claims of tapering border immigration and a kinder yet terse appeal of “Don’t” (Don’t Come) have seemingly made her stance on border immigration difficult to predict. Amidst the policy uncertainty, Republican accusations against Harris (dubbed the Border Czar) for the mishandling of the southern border, the narrative against Haitian immigrants being pet-eaters, etc., are already proving to be a difficult punch to dodge.

The Future of the Harris-Walz Democratic Party

Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez are arguably the most progressive faces of the Democratic Party. While both of them never rallied behind President Biden except for the sake of partisan unity, they have both thrown their weight behind the Harris-Walz ticket and celebrated the Minnesota former teacher’s inclusion as Harris’s running mate. Tim Walz,  also known as the champion of progressivism (and given the unkind moniker Tampon Tim by his rivals), has suggested, through his works at the Minnesota gubernatorial office, his appetite for socialistic and progressive policy changes. On most issues of national importance, Walz either matches pace with Harris or is a step ahead. Walz supports gender-affirming care, calls abortion healthcare, and is in favor of creating a pathway to citizenship for illegal immigrants, as opposed to Trump’s call for the “biggest deportation operation.” A conclusive public mandate in favor of the Harris-Walz duo is almost certain of changing the Democratic Party’s character and making its entry into an entirely new world of politics. Is this another George McGovern moment for the Democratic Party? We will find out soon.

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