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October 17, 2023 — No Comments

Ecuador’s Dangerous Crossroads: Gangs, Trafficking Pathways and Future Perspectives

Authors: Shams Jouve and Isabelle Despicht - Crime, Terrorism and Extremism Team

Ecuador making headlines: brutal assassinations and increased gang violence

As of today, Ecuador is ranked as the least safe country in Latin America, finding itself in the midst of a bloody turf war, with soaring violence linked to organised crime, civil unrest as well as drug trafficking. Just a glance at the crime rate of 2021 paints a sobering picture of Ecuador's current state of affairs, revealing an alarming 79.79% increasecompared to the previous year. Fast forward to 2023, homicide rates, too, are set to increase up to 40 per 100,000 individuals.

This surge in violence was accompanied by the assassination of at least six political figures, including presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, whose death made headlines in August 2023. The murder of Villavicencio, who previously worked as an investigative journalist and uncovered corruption cases in the country, serves as a potent symbol of the growing influence of gangs and their willingness to assert dominance and territorial control in Ecuador.

How have Ecuador's geographical location and institutional weaknesses contributed to criminal influence?

Ecuador's geographical features have long played a role in shaping trafficking routes in the region. Ecuadorian ports represent key transit points for drugs, which are then shipped to Europe and the United States. Laura Lizarazo, senior analyst for the Andean region at political risk consultancy Control Risks, explains: "The market is flooded with cocaine and criminal organisations are adapting to explore this over-production". Equally, Ecuador represents an ideal transhipment point for both human trafficking and illegal arms trade.

For decades, Ecuador was shielded from cocaine-related violence that plagued many other countries in Latin America. This was the result of various factors, among others, an agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), one of the most active armed groups in the Andes region. The FARC, a Marxist guerrilla group founded in 1961, underwent extensive shifts to finally become involved with the drug trade in Latin America in the 1990s. By 2016, it controlled a staggering 60% of the world's most productive coca crops.

Despite the aforementioned, the Ecuadorian government remained engaged with the FARC in the 2000s and 2010s. Meanwhile, the 21st century observed a phenomenal expansion of illegal trafficking and Ecuadorian gangs' influence in the area. Initially mainly governed by Mexican and Colombian cartels and mafia groups, working with local criminal entities as intermediaries, the country slowly became a key transhipment point for illegal trafficking.

New players, such as Chinese mafias in the case of human smuggling, emerged. Local criminal groups gained considerable power and organisational capabilities, including control over a considerable part of the prison system, and gang violence led to several prison massacres and an unprecedented homicide rate.

Another significant obstacle is the emergence of protection rackets, which arose out of prison gangs empowered by police intelligence. These illicit webs thrive at developing patronage networks by establishing connections with the government and accessing its resources. They frequently enlist public officials and coerce them, reaping benefits from state dismantlement. Amongst others, they have been recognised for their role in disseminating prison intelligence to purposely misinform the public.

Amid the aforementioned, several government policies over the last decades have participated in declining criminal activity through social inclusion, police reform, and innovative approaches to criminal justice, including the legalisation of several local gangs. However, public institutions remain weakened by endemic corruption, facilitating criminal activities and compromising state integrity.

The state's inability to monopolise the use of legitimate violence, along with its lack of transparency, has highly damaged public trust in authorities. This further compounds the already challenging economic situation, which fuelled a series of protests over a cost of living crisis in summer 2022.

While all these challenges exist, Ecuador currently aims to build a robust and adequate legal framework to tackle organised crime through local, interstate and transnational cooperation. Nevertheless, implementing such legislation appears to be a significant challenge due to insufficient resources and the lack of independence of Ecuador's judiciary.

*Source*: *https://www.pexels.com/photo/the-national-flag-of-ecuador-15652224/*

A wake-up call for Ecuador’s democracy

Juan Papier, Human Rights Watch's acting deputy director for the Americas, considers Villavicencio's death to be "a wakeup call for Ecuador's democracy". Indeed, strong security policies are needed to reinforce public authorities and tackle transnational organised crime.

As part of the Global Programme on Implementing the Organized Crime Convention, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) currently works with Ecuador representatives to establish a National Strategy against organised crime. This partnership aims to reinforce international cooperation and local coordination between representatives of various Ecuadorian institutions. Moreover, the Republic collaborated with the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) "Ecuador SinCero Programme" to tackle Corruption Prevention, Transparency and Citizen Participation between January 2020 and June 2023. This cooperation programme articulated various initiatives, mainly focusing on Public Integrity and the Open Government Model.

Conclusive remarks

While it seems certain that crime and violence rates are still set to rise, recent political events, including Fernando Villavicencio’s assassination, could well represent a pivotal moment for Ecuador. However, to stand ground on these incredibly difficult challenges, measures tackling rampant corruption and promoting judicial independence, transparency and the accountability of perpetrators are needed.

To that end, it is in Ecuador’s interest to seek international guidance in building an effective National Strategy against Transnational Organised Crime and strengthen its collaboration with neighbouring countries. Yet, international cooperation can only complement guidance and concrete domestic efforts. Governmental initiatives must improve public sector management and emphasise civic education and engagement.

In addition, more effective measures should be implemented concerning the protection of local whistleblowers, which still fall short of adequate reporting mechanisms, as demonstrated by the case of Julio Rogelio Viteri Ungaretti v Ecuador, brought before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), in which a member of the Ecuadorian military suffered reprisals for noting irregularities, including acts of corruption within the Armed Forces.

Nevertheless, reducing corruption, strengthening the domestic legal system, improving public sector management, and promoting education and citizen participation will certainly not prove enough to the immense task of strengthening Ecuador’s institutions. Change needs to come from within. Ecuador has an inherent interest in innovating and coming up with solutions that truly allow for this change to be sustainable. Perhaps it could in the future explore the avenues brought by emerging technologies, which may be used, for instance, to reduce human interaction and control corruption within administrative processes.

October 4, 2023 — No Comments

The tension between China and the US also has an impact on the technological world

Author: Francesco Cirillo - U.S. Team

Washington and Beijing have planned strategies to increase semiconductor production with the advent of Artificial Intelligence. For this reason, Washington is somewhat concerned about China's chip production capabilities; the concern increased after the unveiling of the new Mate 60 Pro smartphone by Huawei. The chip component of this product is unique: in fact, semiconductor companies in Beijing and the People's Republic produce them entirely. US analysts think this demonstrates Beijing's technological capabilities and China's ability to become independent in technology production.

It is crucial for many companies, particularly Nvidia, to maintain a steady relationship with the People's Republic; this is a different view for the US government. To slow the growth of the industry, especially the development of the artificial intelligence field, the White House, Congress, and the defence and intelligence apparatuses should implement a containment strategy in the supply chain of the semiconductor industry. The New York Times states that China has used artificial intelligence tools, in particular, to pursue disinformation actions. This, according to Microsoft researchers, indicates that Beijing is eager to use generative AI to produce images and disseminate them online to apply disinformation actions.

For Beijing, one of the ways China could obtain the resources to compete with the US in that area is through the technology race. In a recent report translated by the CSIS (Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP, 2023), At the Seventh Collective Study Session of the CCP Central Committee Politburo, Xi Jinping Emphasized Comprehensively Strengthening Military Governance and Using High-Standard Governance to Promote High- Quality Military Development [习近平在中共中央政治局第七次集体学习时强调全面加强军事治理以高水平治理推动我军高质量发展]. Interpretation: China (originally published 2023), a working group of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, outlines guidelines for the integration of HiTech tools into the Chinese armed forces.

*Source*: https://www.pexels.com/it-it/foto/luce-blu-e-rossa-dal-computer-1933900/

Beijing recently announced the launch of a new approximately USD 40 billion investment fund intending to support the industrial growth of technology companies. The contention between the People's Republic of China and the US has also affected the artificial intelligence sector. The US is trying to impose restrictions on US companies operating and selling technology products to Chinese companies to hinder China's access to the industrial chain.

The Semiconductor Industry Association has stated that China will purchase chips and semiconductors worth around $180 billion in 2022 and only a few companies, including Intel, Nvidia and Qualcomm, have a significant relationship with Beijing. These companies are the only ones authorised by the US authorities to sell chips for Huawei's smartphones. In an economic and technological competition that Washington hopes will limit China's growth and development in the HiTech sector, further trade conflicts could also hurt US companies themselves.

September 28, 2023 — No Comments

Taiwan: What’s Next?

For our first Webinar of the 2023/24 season, we had the pleasure of hosting a great team of experts on Taiwanese affairs: Dr. Dafydd Fell, a distinguished Professor at SOAS University and the Director of the SOAS Centre of Taiwan Studies, and our very own ITSS researchers Sandra Watson Parcels and Ho Ting Hung (Bosco).

Our guests navigated the complexities of Cross-Strait relations, the upcoming Taiwanese elections, and the future of the semiconductor industry.

September 25, 2023 — No Comments

The Complex Path to Climate-Neutral Militaries

Authors: Michele Mignona, Iris Raith, Frederik Steinhauser - Defense & Procurement Team

Introduction

As climate change intensifies, militaries around the world are gradually recognizing the need to climate-proof their forces. That is crucial given that climate change has a clear impact on militaries – and vice versa. Transitioning armed forces to be more sustainable and climate-resilient brings important benefits but also poses challenges. This piece explores the advantages of armed forces pursuing climate neutrality. It will also discuss the difficulties like technology constraints that militaries face in greening defences. Next, the approaches of the US, Russian and Chinese militaries will be considered regarding their adaptation efforts to climate change. Finally, the role of organisations like NATO and the EU in driving climate action in militaries will be analyzed. Their target-setting, funding initiatives and interoperability mechanisms influence allied armed forces to mitigate emissions while maintaining operational readiness.

Advantages of going climate-neutral

Transitioning armed forces to be more sustainable and climate-resilient brings significant strategic and operational benefits. One major advantage is increased energy efficiency and cost savings. By reducing reliance on fossil fuels and shifting to renewable energy sources, militaries can significantly cut costs, especially for fuel-intensive operations. For instance, the US military's use of Advanced Medium Mobile Power Systems (AMMPS) in Afghanistan cut fuel consumption by 21%. Moreover, local renewable energy production also reduces the vulnerable supply lines required for transporting diesel and other fuels to forward locations. This increases the self-sufficiency of missions, decreasing dependence on external actors, which may jeopardize a mission’s efficacy.

Furthermore, investing in technologies and infrastructure resilient to climate impacts allows militaries to maintain readiness as operational environments change. Adaptive planning, training and capabilities preserve the armed forces' effectiveness as extreme weather affects theatres of operation. For example, NATO's Cold Response exercises in Norway help prepare troops to operate in Arctic conditions. Additionally, transitioning away from fossil fuels will reduce the major environmental footprint of militaries as institutional polluters. For instance, the UK aims to cut military emissions by 70% through measures like biofuel use. This contributes to global climate change mitigation efforts.

Proactively climate-proofing defences keeps militaries ahead as innovators and standard-setters in a climate-altered world. It also promotes their strategic position compared to adversaries, slower to adapt.

Disadvantages & Challenges

Major global military powers have adopted a diverse energy portfolio, encompassing oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear, hydropower, biofuels, wind, and solar energy. This diversification not only bolsters energy security strategies but also serves as a bedrock for system resilience. Shifting towards a greater reliance on electricity entails an increased dependency on minerals crucial for the functioning of electrical systems. These minerals, predominantly sourced from regions like China and countries where Beijing holds substantial economic and infrastructural sway, present a new set of challenges. This dynamic sets the stage for geopolitical competition among nations vying for access to these pivotal resources, where China has a strategic advantage. Transitioning from a diversified energy mix to one focused primarily on electricity will introduce challenges for a country’s military, like potential cyberattacks and threats to the supply chains.

A key challenge for the military in implementing environmental policies is maintaining long-term commitment and funding, especially in light of pressures to increase military capacity and shifting priorities. The insecurities and challenges within geopolitics, coupled with escalating threats from adversaries, compel nations to prioritize military preparedness. This often leads to reluctant transitions towards climate-neutral armies, as they lack prior experience in this domain.

For instance, Russia’s war in Ukraine has prompted questions about whether the West needs to rebuild its military-industrial capacity in preparation for a large-scale war. Following the Russian invasion, European nations announced increases of nearly €200 billion to their defence budgets. The pressure to spend quickly threatens to entrench further Europe’s dependence on fossil fuels for defence at a moment when policymakers are aiming to shift to climate-neutral forces.

Furthermore, policymakers are concerned about countries or adversaries lacking the necessary financial resources or the willingness to pursue complete decarbonization of their militaries. A recent study conducted by a British officer concluded that, given current capabilities and modes of combat, an electrified land force might struggle to achieve the same levels of firepower, protection, and mobility as a force relying on fossil fuels.

Source: *Image by Robert Waghorn from Pixabay*

The big powers: how China, Russia and the US militaries are adapting

Given the transnational nature of climate change, governments from all over the world have a shared responsibility to address it; however, it is questionable whether the interests of the world's three military superpowers, China, Russia, and the United States, are aligned. They differ in their approaches to addressing climate change and even more so in their views on how it affects the armed forces.

China's leadership avoids tying climate change to military might despite acknowledging its possible security consequences due to its links to the fossil fuel industry of the country, Sino-US rivalry and the consequent “conspiracy attitude” among some Chinese policymakers, and strategic secrecy regarding its military. Overall, there is little information available publicly on China's consideration of climate change, even though it very likely might have a significant impact on its military infrastructure.

Russia acknowledges climate change's security implications but opts for a national approach over international securitization, preferring to wait for the issue to materialize rather than preventing it. Moscow sees economic opportunities with climate change and minimizes the role of the armed forces, except in the Arctic, where defrosting reveals important natural resources.

The US takes the most proactive approach to climate change security, with integrated strategies, risk assessment, Arctic geopolitical competition, and disaster relief efforts, defining this issue as a priority. Clearly, it is common belief that this should not come at the cost of operational effectiveness. However, political divisions affect climate security actions.

NATO & the EU: Towards Climate Security Leadership

Remarkably, organisations such as NATO and the EU are important actors concerning climate security. NATO is intensifying its focus on environmental security, aiming to obtain a pivotal role in adapting to climate change security. It addresses risks to military operations, disaster relief, energy efficiency, and climate mitigation. Annual assessments, adaptation measures, emissions analysis, and collaboration with partners are also central to NATO's 2023 Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment.

The EU is a pioneer when it comes to green policies. However, the military sector has been largely omitted in light of the EU pacifist policies. Nonetheless, things are rapidly changing. In this context, incorporating the military sector into the European Green Deal policies would reduce emissions, enhance strategic autonomy, modernize operations, spur innovation, and boost the EU's credibility in combating climate change.

Conclusion

As climate change intensifies, militaries must innovate to cut emissions while maintaining readiness. Though approaches differ, organizations like NATO and the EU are driving climate action through target-setting and funding initiatives. With visionary leadership, armed forces can spearhead transformative change towards climate-resilient, sustainable societies.

August 18, 2023 — No Comments

Egypt: A genuine effort to end violence in Sudan or politics of symbolism?

Author: Chantal Elisabeth Hohe - Middle East Team

After the Gaza negotiations in 2019 and the COP27 2022 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt once again positioned itself as a diplomatic force within its neighborhood. This time, to address the violent conflict that broke out in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, this spring and ever since, plagued the country as a whole.

Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi hosted a neighbor’s summit in Cairo on July 13th, inviting the heads of state of all countries bordering Sudan. Namely: Libya, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Eritrea. After more than three months of violence, it is about time the regional powers undertook a joint effort to prevent the conflict from escalating even further, right?

What has happened in Sudan recently?

After the Sudanese people’s strife for democracy had grown increasingly vocal, in 2019, the authoritarian leader Omar Al-Bashir was toppled. Al-Bashir had been in power for almost three decades, with the SAF (Sudanese Armed Forces) and RSF (Rapid Support Forces) in place to ensure his protection. Especially the RSF, a former paramilitary organization active in the Darfur region, had been essential for Al-Bashir’s safety.

After his removal from power, an interim government was installed, consisting of military and civilian parties. In 2021, this sharing of power between the two military factions and civilian actors failed. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, chief of the SAF, and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as “Hemeti”), commander of the RSF, took to power in Khartoum. A new Prime Minister, Abdulla Hamdok, was installed, but resigned soon after, leaving al-Burhan as the de facto leader since 2022, with Hemeti in his shadow. A crucial detail, as Hemeti never liked being number two.

Ultimately, on the 15th of April, violence erupted in Khartoum — al-Burhan and Hemeti started a power struggle that ultimately led to a violent outbreak and chaos in Sudan’s capital. Since then, the conflict spread, thousands fell victim to the violence, and millions had to flee - around 700.000 to Egypt, living in inhumane conditions and without access to their basic needs such as food, water, and medical treatment.

What was decided at the Cairo Summit?

At the leaders’ summit, Egypt voiced two demands. For one, the regional powers should work towards a ceasefire between the RSF and the SAF, and ultimately initiate peace talks. And second, the warring parties should ensure safe passage for humanitarian aid convoys and facilitate access for international humanitarian workers to the country.

The Cairo Summit was the beginning of a series of ministerial talks to be held in the countries bordering Sudan in the following weeks and months, with the first round of the ‘Ministerial Mechanism’ taking place in Chad and resulting in an action plan created to work towards a ceasefire in consideration of the political sensitivity, the military risks, and the humanitarian facets of the conflict.

Let us look at what happened in Sudan, why Egypt took up the orchestrating role in diplomatic efforts, and what broader context these efforts are situated in.

*Source:* https://newsghana.com.gh/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Sudan-SAF-and-RSF-leaders-2048x1152.jpg

Why is Egypt interested in leading diplomatic efforts?

Having a seat at the negotiating table in Sudan is not merely an act of benevolence, or an effort to end the violence for the Sudanese people’s sake. There is a lot to consider, without delving deep into the workings of Egyptian foreign and security policy. Most importantly, economy and natural resources play an essential role.

Though Egypt still is one of the strongest economies on the African continent, its power has weakened in recent years. The coronavirus pandemic, the increase in energy prices, and an uptick in food prices have taken their toll on the economy and the population. Inflation is high, and Egypt faces a currency crisis, finding itself in need of ever more uncertain international financial support.

Apart from the grim economic outlook, Egypt is in deep water stress. As it derives all of its freshwater resources from the Nile River, it has a strong interest in keeping friendly relations with the countries that sit at the river’s spring - one of them being Sudan. Of course, Egypt is keen on maintaining stability within these countries just as much. Before the spring of this year, Egypt played its part to ensure stability in Sudan by providing military support to the SAF. Now, this could backfire, as the weapons once supplied by Egypt are now used in the power struggle against the RSF, contributing to an escalation of the situation, and causing civilian deaths.

With Sudan collapsing, Egypt’s water supply could become uncertain. For instance, whoever holds the power in Sudan — itself a water-stressed country — could decide to limit the amount of water that crosses the border into Egypt, with devastating consequences for its people and its economy.

Water security and economic as well as political stability go hand in hand. Without the former, the latter will collapse, ultimately triggering a multifaceted crisis that Egypt is unlikely to shoulder, especially considering the current political and economic situation that is already destabilizing the country. Thus, positioning itself in the center of peace efforts in Sudan is likely to help Egypt prevent a domestic crisis of its own.

Where do we go from here?

With the violence continuing, and no peace deal in sight, a different approach might be needed to address the problem. A Berlin-based analyst for Foreign Policy magazine, Mahmoud Salem, has proposed an interesting take on what might help: a bottom-up approach. “Tak[ing] the side of the civilian parties“ as a balanced strategic response. This could help Egypt curb the influx of refugees that it cannot handle (neither economically nor politically). But could this also be the solution to the water struggle and the rivalry between General Burhan and General Hemeti?

It remains open to debate whether this approach is in line with Egypt’s foreign policy agenda, and if so, whether it will be accepted by Sudan’s other neighbors — and most importantly, how the warring parties should be included in this approach. For now, they were not invited to the table. And Egypt’s past with Sudan is not exactly the one of a neutral, diplomatic partner…

August 4, 2023 — No Comments

Dr. Sergii Masol on international criminal law in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war

In this podcast episode, Dr. Sergii Masol talks about the ongoing violation of human rights in Ukraine from the perspective of the law. This small, but informative, talk covers the nature of human rights and international criminal law; the Ukranian Conflict; and the legal status of mercenary groups (e.g. Wagner Group).

Dr. Sergii Masol is Humboldt postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Cologne. Sergii obtained his doctorate in law from the European University Institute in Florence, where he also worked as a research assistant.

Interviewer: Vittoria Brunazzo - Human Rights Team

August 1, 2023 — No Comments

Professor Ashok Swain on Water Security in South Asia

Professor Ashok Swain talks about Water Security in South Asia, its vulnerabilities and what approach could policymakers take to ensure water security in South Asia. Professor Ashok Swain is a Professor and Head of Department of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University Sweden. He is the UNESCO Chair on International Water Cooperation, and the Director of Research School of International Water Cooperation at Uppsala University, Sweden.

In this session, Prof. Swain introduces the concept of water security. He highlights major vulnerabilities endangering water security of South Asia and also talks about various approaches which state and non-state actors could take to ensure water security of South Asia.

Interviewer: Arslan Sheikh - Human Security Team

July 10, 2023 — No Comments

Iranian Drone Warfare: theory and praxis

Author: Danilo dalle Fave - Article Intelligence and Military Strategy Team

The Iranian strategic doctrine and the role of drone warfare

Iranian strategic doctrine has been influenced by the peculiar nature of its political regime and its history. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 infused in the Iranian strategic doctrine of Shah’s era, inspired by the contemporary Western military doctrines, some elements that influence the current role of drones in Iranian warfare: “holy defence”, export of the revolution, and especially the concept of self-reliance are the ideological foundation of the current Iranian strategic doctrine.

The Iraq-Iran war of the ‘80s has defined the current duality of Iranian armed forces: due to the distrust toward the Iranian army (Artesh), seen as an instrument of Shah’s supporters, the khomeinists developed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a parallel army and the main instrument of their foreign policy. The purges against the high command of Artesh and the lack of strategic doctrines among the pasdarans compelled them to create an ad hoc military doctrine, deeply influenced by their origin as an ideological militia with a revolutionary structure.

The result is a strategic doctrine centred around three pillars: proxy warfare, which means the use of guerrilla groups of Shia communities around the Islamic world used as an instrument for the projection of Iranian influence abroad; asymmetric warfare, a direct consequence of the military and technological superiority of their enemies; the focus on Ballistic missiles, which is caused by the weak Iranian air forces and the foreign dependency for aeronautical components and have compelled to focus on specific arms systems that can provide deterrence and be produced domestically.

Despite being formally a defensive strategic doctrine, the current supreme leader Ali Khamenei has provided also the official state doctrine for external interventions in 2010, the so-called two-wing doctrine: the Foreign Ministry and the Quds Force, the overseas operations arms of the IRGC, have the task to protect Iran and enhance Iranian role in the region. This means that the military instrument is embedded in Iranian foreign policy.

IRGC interventions of the last ten years have shown how foreign operations are usually conducted when certain conditions are met: the presence of a Shia community that can provide the proxy actor (e.g. in Lebanon Hezbollah or the Houtis in Yemen), the weakness of the state actors, like in Iraq or Lebanon, that can allow the strengthening of pro-Iranian forces and provide a logistics pipeline, capable of transfer personnel, weapons and allowing training by IRGC forces.

In this framework, drone warfare is exclusively conducted by the IRGC aerospace force, which also controls Iran’s strategic-missile force. Drones are used to compensate for the weakness of Iranian air forces in the reconnaissance and surveillance domain and the industrial constraints to the mass production of warplanes.

IRGC drones are perfectly suited to match the IRGC view of warfare: in the air domain, drones can be used along with ballistic and cruise missiles to attack enemy positions to strike and rapidly retreat, for reconnaissance and to overwhelm enemy positions. Swarms of loitering munitions can overburden enemy air defence allowing missiles to strike their objectives. The recent use in the Ukraine of Iranian-made drones by Russia is a clear example of how these kinds of saturation tactics can be very effective.
In the sea, the traditional naval swarming tactics, developed during the Iran-Iraq war, can be augmented with unmanned vehicles and balance the military superiority of the US and their allies.

*Source*: https://president.ir/fa/135803

Iranian Unmanned Aerial vehicles and industry

The first family of Iranian drones are the Iranian Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA) Ababil: originally developed by the IRGC-owned Qods Aviation Industries, the Ababil-1 was a suicide drone used during the Iran-Iraq war usually launched by pneumatic truck launchers. Now they developed a specific Unmanned loitering munition drone, the DIO Arash.

This experience allowed the production in the 90s of the Ababil-2 and its different variants: the Ababil-B, a target drone for air-defence exercises, the Ababil-S, the first Iranian surveillance drone, the Ababil-T, a twin-tail variant that can be used for surveillance and as strike munition payloads and has been adopted by Hezbollah and the Houtis. The latter has deployed the Qasef-1 and Qasef-2K, Abadil-2 variants with 30 kg warheads, used as loitering munition against the Saudi-led coalition forces since 2016.

The Ababil-3, suspected to be a copy of the South African Denel Dynamics Seeker, is an Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR) drone and has been used extensively by Iranian forces during the Syrian civil war. The last member of this family, the Ababil-5, debuted in April 2022 and appears to be a Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, similar to the American Predator.

The other family of Iranian drones is represented by the Mohajer, the first ISR drone produced in the 80s and widely exported to Iranian proxies. Many Iranian drones are the result of a reverse-engineered version of Western drones, like the IAIO Fotros, IAIO Yasir, HESA Hamaseh, and IRIAF Kaman-22: the most important of them are the Saegheh, an entire family of drones that are the result of the acquisition of US Lockheed RQ-170 Sentinel, downed in 2011, which shows how Iranian industries are capable to copy stealth drones and in general to adapt western technology for internal purposes.

The most important drone family is the Shahed: the HESA Shahed-129, a dual-role drone is deployed for patrols and direct attacks for the Iranian Army and Navy, while the HESA Shahed-136 is a loitering munition designed for swarm attacks against ground targets. The last addition is the HESA Shahed-149, a reusable attack drone capable of launching missiles and bombs and being equipped for electronic warfare.

As previously said, Iran relies on drones in order to overcome the lack of a proper aerospace industry: the cost-effectiveness of drones in production and maintenance avoids the costly traditional aircraft procurement. At the same time, it is also a matter of internal political dynamics. Drone producers are mostly linked with the IRGC which managed to concentrate power in recent years, especially with the current president Ebrahim Raisi. The main consequence of this, apart from a greater role of IRGC in Iranian politics, is the “capture” of funds by the IRGC, leaving the Iranian Air Forces with shrinking resources to develop their vehicles and devices.
That is why Iran relies, as during Shah’s era, on imports: the recent discussion for the procurement of the Russian Su-35, a 4th generation multi-role jet fighter, is a clear sign of the overreliance on imports for traditional aircraft.

Conclusion

Summing up, drone warfare is an important element of the Iranian way to wage war: it reflects Iranian leadership’s preference for asymmetric approaches and the adaptation to Western sanctions that prevented the development of traditional aerospace vehicles. Despite domestic strifes and tensions with the US, Iran can exploit its expertise in drones to obtain technology and know-how in the aerospace field that needs to scale up its military prowess: deeper cooperation with Russia, favoured by the isolation of both countries in the international arena, could augment Iranian aerospace forces, with consequences on the military balance in the Middle East.

July 3, 2023 — No Comments

Latin American street gangs in Europe

Paolo Grassi is an Assistant professor at the University of Milano Bicocca (Department of Human Sciences for Education “R.Massa”).

He has carried out ethnographic research in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Italy in the field of urban anthropology, focusing on the relationship between urban space and violence, gangs, youth cultures, and dynamics of socio-economic marginalization.

He was a research fellow at the Politecnico di Milano (2019-2022) and the University of Padua (2017-2019), visiting fellow at the Universidad del Valle de Guatemala (2019), the University of Utrecht (2018) and the Laboratoire Architecture Anthropologie (LAA) de l'École Nationale Supérieure d'Architecture de Paris La Villette (2017).

He has collaborated with the European projects "TRANSGANG: Transnational gangs as agents of mediation", coordinated by the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona and "Gangs, Gangsters, and Ganglands: Towards a Global Comparative Ethnography” coordinated by the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva.

He is the author of articles published in national and international journals and four monographs (including “Terreur à Guatemala-ville: Conflits territoriaux, violence et gangs”, L’Harmattan 2018).

Interviewer: Giovanni Giacalone - South America Team

June 26, 2023 — No Comments

Cultural Question and Cyber Quandary: Making Sense Of TikTok Bans Worldwide

Authors: Maria Makurat (Cyber Security and AI Team) and Anurag Mishra (USA Team)

TikTok and the “Ban Hammer”

The debate of apps such as TikTok being a security threat to individuals as well as countries has been going on for a while. Several articles, studies and other blog articles have been, and are still being released on this hot topic. One of the main concerns remains: TikTok is collecting data of users against their consent whilst one is also not using the app. Since TikTok is owned by ByteDance, a Chinese-owned company, many Western countries and especially the US are highly sceptical and states such as Montana have even taken the initiative to ban the app altogether. What does this mean for cyber as well as cultural security issues? Many factors and international events surround this debate such as TikTok already being banned in India, the issues of the Chinese state being seen as a spy and whether one can see TikTok as a surveillance weapon? Cyber security as well as cultural issues tie into the debate where we see theories of whether we have a “cyber war” in relation to social media platforms as well as cultural matters if TikTok is having a negative impact on countries. This article explores the issues highlighted above and opens up possible questions that still need to be asked.

Montana Mounts a “Blackout Challenge” to TikTok

Senate Bill #149 of the 68th legislature of Montana, which was introduced by state senator Shelley Vance makes the offering of the app on any application store illegal and prescribes a fine of $10,000 per day for each time someone accesses TikTok, “is offered the ability” to access it, or downloads it. Governor Greg Gianforte, a Republican from Montana, had approved the law on anticipating potential legal challenges. Although the law is not set to be enforced until January 1, 2024, there are doubts about the state's ability to implement it effectively. The impact of this new legislation in Montana is expected to be more significant than the existing TikTok bans already implemented on government devices in approximately half of the states and at the federal level in the United States.

From the outside, the one-of-a-kind ban looks like an assault on ByteDance’s data-gathering exercise but also has a deeper purpose of extinguishing the app’s ability to influence the impressionable youth of America.

One of the major reasons why TikTok became the conservative eyesore and a major cause of worry for parents was the “Blackout Challenge.” Also known as the "choking challenge" or the "pass-out challenge," it involved urging individuals to hold their breath until they lose consciousness as a result of insufficient oxygen. While the Blackout Challenge was the biggest troubling online challenge, causing as many as 20 children to lose their lives, a slew of similar troubling trends made TikTok infamous. "Dry-scooping," climbing on tall stacks of milk crates, removing your own IUD, and eating massive amounts of frozen honey and corn syrup, and the list goes on.

The problem with TikTok does not end there. When juxtaposed with the wider scheme of things, TikTok appears to be one of the many arrows in the Chinese quiver. The issue of Chinese Police Stations coming up on the United States’ territory has landed many in the stew and has made the American government restive. Taking a leaf out of India and some European countries’ books, several states in the US decided to ban TikTok on office/government-issued phones and devices. As of April, 34 American states have banned TikTok on government-issued devices. The idea behind banning the mischievous app has largely been to secure any data leaks. India was the first country to ban TikTok and several other Chinese mobile applications nationwide, citing national security concerns. India banned TikTok as early as June 2020. At first, the ban was seen as a mild yet conclusive response to the PLA’s misadventure across the Sino-Indian border, but as more countries put restraints on the Chinese app, the Indian government’s official position on the ban seems to have been vindicated.

Reservations and concerns abound TikTok and have only gone on to grow in the past three years. Not just the adversaries and rivals but even allies like Pakistan and North Korea have blocked TikTok. The question nevertheless remains whether TikTok is just an online pastime or a phisher.

*Source:* **Unsplash** **https://unsplash.com/photos/PuNW11NRjI4**

Weapon of Mass Surveillance: TikTok and its Cyber Security Issues?

The debate surrounding TikTok being a security issue has been around for a while. Several individuals as well as companies had their doubts but as of around April 2023, one has been seeing a surge in states and countries being serious about banning the popular app. The major concern lies within the fact that TikTok is owned by a Chinese company and several discrepancies have arisen concerning the security of the app. It is being repeatedly “expressed that TikTok and its parent company, ByteDance, may put sensitive user data, like location information, into the hands of the Chinese government.” This together with political tensions between Russia, China and the West in relation to the Ukraine war add to the TikTok debate with companies being concerned that data is being stolen. Countries find themselves recently in much more complicated relations.

One can link this to traditional international affairs theories such as whether we will even have a “cyber war” (discussion by Thomas Rid) and how social media is being “weaponized” (discussed by P.W. singer, Emerson T. Brooking and Dr Andreas Krieg). “In so doing, social media has evolved from a mere distraction machine into a tool of sociopolitical power, galvanising public awareness and civil-societal activism.” It is being discussed that ever since the 2016 elections in the US with Russian interference, that other social media platforms, where TikTok can possibly also be an instrument, can be used to spread false information and not only be used as a tool by itself to collect data. Countries such as Germanyalso increasingly see the issue of social media platforms being used to spread false information as well as collecting data (BIS: Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik). The so-called “Digitalbarometer 2020” released by the BIS, stated that in Germany for the year 2020, every fourth individual was affected by some type of cyber-attack and every third was affected financially. Whilst Germany has not released a law that forbids the use of TikTok, it is being discussed by the Federal Minister of the Interior and Community that one needs to stay alert and be aware of the possible consequences.

This issue is also being discussed very intensely by scholars such as Dr Andreas Krieg (recent work “Subversion - The strategic weaponization of narratives”) and Dr Kathleen Hall Jamieson (Cyber-War : How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President). We see both now in the international affairs academic world as well as the communications and cultural disciplines a debate, on how social media platforms are being weaponized (see also this blog article on hate speech on social media). Now perhaps more than ever, interdisciplinary communication between different academic strands is needed to address the issue. So we see it is not only the issue of TikTok being owned by a Chinese company and the possible spread of false information but also the physical issue of collecting data. We have both cultural/ethical and cyber security issues.

To Ban, or Not to Ban?

To mitigate the goodwill loss and the loss of business that TikTok has encountered, it would be wise for the company to make itself more transparent and even sell stakes, as beseeched by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. The company will also need to come clean on the accusations of data theft and spying. The root of all remains the involvement of the Chinese state in its corporate entities and in the long run, such involvement will not go unnoticed by the countries hosting Chinese businesses. When considering all these factors, open questions remain such as if we will see other countries following suit in banning TikTok and how likely is it that more organisations will take action? Do we see a certain cyber war taking place in the realm of social media or is it more an issue of moral and ethical values? Younger generations still use TikTok in their daily life, especially since this is also linked to businesses (such as Infleuncers as well as big companies) which could prove problematic in the future. Perhaps stronger rules are required that regulate the use of TikTok and its data collection if the app is to be further used. It remains to be seen how this develops and whether individuals will be concerned with the use of the app.

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