In this session, prof. Rivetti talks about Iran in the aftermath of Mahsa Amini's death, dwelling into the movement Women Life Freedom, Iran's geopolitical position after the protests, and future prospect for the country (de)stabilisation.
Interviewers: Ilaria Lorusso, Shahin Modarres, Margherita Ceserani. - Iran Team
Authors: Will Kingston-Cox, Ilaria Lorusso, Margherita Ceserani, Shahin Modarres - Iran Team
The Russo-Iranian strategic military cooperation in the Red Sea unfolds against the backdrop of a multifaceted and changing geopolitical scenario. The evolving situation in the area prompts a reevaluation of the Russo-Iranian partnership, drawing parallels with their collaboration in Ukraine. While historical dynamics may inform the alliance, the Red Sea theater introduces a maritime dimension, reflecting an adaptive strategy. The interstate treaty between Tehran and Moscow further solidifies their alliance, positioning Iran strategically alongside Russia and China, as geopolitical alignments shift post-Russia's invasion of Ukraine1.
As Iran rejects US’s accusation of its support to the Houthis’ attacks, in turn linked to the conflict unfolding in the Gaza Strip, the complexities in the Red Sea underscore the delicate nature of their partnership and the need for a nuanced analysis considering historical context and evolving geopolitical dynamics. In this context, this article will attempt at providing such a summary of the Russo-Iranian partnership so far, and what prospect for the latter the new scenario in the Red Sea holds2.
On 17 January 2024, Maria Zakharova, the Kremlin’s spokeswoman, announced that Russia and Iran will sign a new comprehensive interstate cooperation agreement imminently3. This treaty, a furtherance of the Russo-Iranian strategic partnership already evident in Ukraine and before, will serve to consolidate this strategic partnership and entrench it both politically and legally. The signing, as told by Zakharova, has been expedited by the changing international context, a reference perhaps to the global discord resultant from conflicts in Ukraine and, pertinently, the Red Sea region. Such a contention is affirmed by prior comments from the Kremlin in November 2023, in which it was announced that significant work in deepening and developing “military-technical cooperation” was under way4.
It is important to emphasise the importance of such an agreement’s final draft being catalysed by events in the Red Sea, pertinently those relating to the Yemeni Houthis and the Red Sea shipping route. British and American strikes, described as “defensive” by NATO, on Yemeni Houthis on 11th January were condemned by Moscow, with Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov denouncing them as “illegitimate” and that the Western coalition were seeking to manipulate the international legal order. Tehran’s stance, too, was resolute. Nasser Kanaani, the spokesperson for the Iranian foreign ministry, derided the coalition strikes as “arbitrary” and “[in clear breach of Yemeni’s] sovereignty and territorial integrity…against international law.”
The level to which Iran involves itself, be it politically, diplomatically, or militarily, will undoubtedly concern the actions of policymakers in Moscow. The degree to which the Russo-Iranian politically-military strategic partnership will be seen in the Red Sea will depend on the extent to which the current Houthi conflict embroils Tehran.
Since the 1979 revolution, the Houthis have been intricately tied to the Islamic Republic of Iran, functioning as one of its proxy groups. This relationship unfolds against the backdrop of international sanctions, shaping Iran's defense strategy. Unable to engage in research development or scientific collaboration in defense due to sanctions, Iran has devised a defense doctrine grounded in two key pillars: proxy groups and a ballistic program.
The first pillar, involving proxy groups, has seen Iran establish and support various entities across Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Israel, and neighboring countries. The primary objective seems to be destabilizing regional and international security, and strategically deploying conflicts as leverage during negotiations.
The turning point emerged after the October 7th attack, prompting the Islamic Republic to perceive a threat to what it terms the "axis of resistance." In response to diminishing Hamas influence within the Gaza Strip and an effort to alleviate pressure on the group, Iran allegedly directed the Houthis in Yemen to escalate security destabilisation in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait region.
Source: An armed Yemeni sits on a boat in front of the Galaxy Leader cargo ship - EPA/via BBC News- Keystone archivio
Backed and provided by Iran, the Houthis pose a multifaceted threat against maritime security and Israel in the region. The first dimension involves the use of missiles sourced from Iran, followed by the deployment of drones also supplied by the Islamic Republic. Lastly, the Houthis reportedly possess and have been strategically placing sea mines since 2021 in the Red Sea, adding another layer of complexity to the threat.
Considering that a substantial 12% of international trade traverses the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the ongoing situation becomes increasingly untenable5. The intersection of geopolitical interests, proxy dynamics, and strategic maneuvers underscores the urgent need for international attention and diplomatic resolution to avert potential catastrophe in this crucial maritime passage.
While the Houthis, threaten commercial shipping in the Red Sea, oil has so far continued flowing. According to one Houthis political leader, Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, maritime routes around Yemen are safe for Chinese and Russian vessels, as long as they are not associated with Israel. Moscow, while publicly indicating support for Washington's efforts to maintain order in the Red Sea, has only a small amount of its trade passing through the Suez Canal. Moreover, Russian officials suggest that the Red Sea crisis could potentially redirect shipping to the Northern Sea Route or the North-South Transport Corridor via Iran to the Indian Ocean.
All in all, the renewed Russo-Iranian strategic partnership, in the Middle East space on this occasion, represents an adaptive response to the changing geopolitical landscape. The intricacies of the Red Sea, added to the Iranian grip on the Houthis, brings another dimension to the relationship between the two states. In this article, we have demonstrated how the partnership's strategic implications and the evolving nature of conflicts in the region underscore the need for a multilevel approach while addressing today’s complexities and potential risks in the Red Sea.
Darfur is once again experiencing a terrible crisis that, according to many international experts and organisations, has all the characteristics to be considered as genocide - or perhaps, it has always been.
The country of Sudan has faced multiple severe episodes of war and what can be classified as genocide in its recent history; including the First Sudanese Civil War (1955 to 1972), the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983 to 2005), the 1990’s genocide in the Nuba Mountains, and the 2000’s escalation risk of genocide in Darfur – which has, arguably, seen a continuation at a lower intensity over the last two decades. More recently, in April 2023, violence erupted in the capital, Khartoum, and soon expanded throughout the country as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) clashed with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group.
The current escalation of violence can be directly traced to the impacts of the Second Sudanese Civil War and the subsequent non-resolution of the Darfur genocide. During the second civil war, while the central government in Khartoum was engaged in armed conflict with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – a clash which would give way to the creation of the world’s newest state – a combined breakdown of fundamental aspects of human security and the cumulative displeasure with structural inequality would precipitate the war in Darfur. Mainly, the onset of violence in Darfur was triggered by: 1) disputes regarding land and resource use that became identified with ethnicity, further exacerbated by climate change; 2) perceptions of unequal political power and preferential access, and 3) the uncertainties driven by the nation’s ongoing civil war.
The Genocide in Darfur
As noted, the social cleavages affecting the conflict in Darfur are related to a complex opposition based on decaying access to vital resources and unequal power representation in the state. Indeed, tensions rose in tandem with national policies seen as supporting Arab dominance in the region, at the cost of agency and representation for black Africans. With the presence of Chadian rebels in Darfur throughout the 1970s and 1980s facilitating access to weapons for both local Arab and African groups, and the embracing of these rebels of Arab supremacist ideology, perceptions of mutual risk increased progressively. This social suspicion was both often the result of and reinforced by local resource competition and tensions derived from scarcity. In fact, Darfur has been referred to as the “first climate change conflict”.
These points of contention exploded in 2003, when two Darfuri rebel groups – the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – accused the central government of the marginalization and dispossession of non-Arab groups in Darfur; launching an attack against a government post in the region. Contending with the threat of a massive territorial secession in the South and fearing similar claims in the West, the Sudanese government funded and armed Arab local militia groups, known as the Janjaweed, as proxy forces to push back against the rebels and deter any further social support through the targeting of African groups in mass atrocities – including mass killings, torture, sexual violence, and mass displacement – as part of a scorched earth campaign. Estimates suggest that between140,000 and 400,000 people were killed as a result. This instance would lead the International Criminal Court to sign an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir in 2009 for crimes including genocide – a controversial response at the time as the first indictment of a sitting president.
Past the genocide’s peak, the dynamics and actors built up during the initial war in Darfur have served to drive significant political developments in Sudan – such as the 2019 coup that deposed al-Bashir, the 2021 coup that ended civilian governance, and notably the renewed violence in 2023. This situates both the 2003 and 2023 conflicts as inherently interrelated, demanding aligned analysis and responses.
While the intensity of the violence in Darfur lessened under international pressure in 2005 and with the entry of UNMIS until 2011, the genocide did not truly end – with continued forms of both direct and structural targeting, and the maintenance of a situation of ethnically defined mass displacement for two decades. This semi-permanent mass displacement not only endures today, but has continued to worsen as a result of the recent escalation.
It is the lack of comprehensive accountability for the genocide, as well as the non-transformation of power structures and drivers of conflict, that has led directly into the current war. In fact, the RSF formally emerged in 2013 from the consolidation and reorganization of Janjaweed militias, for the purpose of more effectively continuing repression operations and mass violence in Darfur. The 2023 eruption of violence in the capital was triggered due to disagreements between the SAF and the RSF, which had priorly been aligned in their operations in Darfur, and further orchestrated both the 2019 and 2021 coups. As such, the actors, power relationships, and immunity that defined the genocide in Darfur have become the core triggers of the current war, which has not only affected the capital and its surrounding areas, but heightened the intensity of genocide in Darfur as well.
At the moment, a number of potential scenarios can lead to the further escalation of the Sudanese conflict. Among them, perhaps the most prominent are the following: 1) the entry of international backers into the conflict, either directly or indirectly; 2) the establishment of only partial negotiations with a focus on Khartoum – thus excluding Darfur –; and 3) the further regression of international aid and attention, favoring further atrocities or another iteration of unresolved stalemates – which leave those displaced in a state of extreme vulnerability, enabling further cycles of communal violence. Given that Sudan shares borders with South Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the potential for spillover risks exacerbating or even precipitating a number of regional conflicts cannot be overstated.
However, there are also windows of opportunity for conflict mitigation. The death of RSF leader Mohamad Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo could lead to an organizational breakdown within the group, making it more likely to put down its weapons in favor of amnesty and a renewed integration process into the SAF. Another possible avenue can come from the involvement of regional institutions, such as the African Union (AU). While AU engagement has not traditionally been well received by the government of Sudan, there is a potential for entry in helping to manage the growing refugee crisis that can then be expanded into a role in negotiation and DDR across the country. This is of course dependent on a significant level of international aid and institutional commitment from the AU, as well as a change in positioning from the SAF, which would need to be motivated by the inability of the government to navigate the mass displacement that has followed the violence both nationally and in Darfur. Given that this latest episode has led 3.8 million people to flee, with around 7.1 million people now being internally displaced, this may be a necessary concession from the SAF – particularly as humanitarian needs continue to rise exponentially, with 24.7 million people currently in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and protection. However, this will not be an easy endeavor, as there has been a cessation of relief operations in parts of the country – including areas in West Darfur – as a result of targeted attacks on humanitarian aid workers and property.
The cost of avoidance
The current conflict in Sudan is a result in great part of the lack of attention and resolution afforded to the war and genocide in Darfur. The RSF is a direct consequence of the Janjaweed’s impunity, and as the situation deteriorates, we are at risk of once again seeing the international community settle for only a cosmetic resolution of the hostilities in Khartoum and a continuation of the attritional genocide in Darfur. The genocide convention explicitly notes that in the absence of prevention and prosecution of genocidal violence, further war will follow. What we see in Sudan is the physical manifestation of that warning; where international response waned as atrocities became more low-intensity and institutionalized in nature, failing to address the continued targeting of Darfuri civilians and the parallel strengthening of the RSF into what it is now. Currently, as atrocities increase in intensity again – to a scale comparable to the beginnings of the last-high intensity campaign in Darfur – it is important that patterns of conflict resolution follow a different trajectory.
The views and opinions expressed are exclusively those of the author or authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the association.
Authors: Idriss El Alaoui Talibi and Michele Mignona (Edited by Iris Raith) - Defense & Procurement Team
Introduction
Since October 2023, tensions in the Red Sea have reached unprecedented levels, largely due to a series of aggressive manoeuvres by Houthi forces stationed in Yemen. These actions have included multiple drone and missile assaults targeting both Israeli territories and various vessels—both commercial and military—operating in the region. The Houthi attacks are interpreted as direct responses to Israel's military campaign in Gaza.
To address the escalating threat, the U.S. began Operation Prosperity Guardian in December, a multinational military initiative aimed at safeguarding the Red Sea against further Houthi incursions. Subsequently, beginning on January 12, the U.S. and UK have jointly executed targeted strikes against Houthi installations within Yemen in the aftermath of the beginning of Operation Poseidon Archer. This consists of a coalition of states willing to conduct offensive operations in the region to deteriorate Houti’s military infrastructure.
Both President Biden and Prime Minister Sunak emphasized that the military strikes were a direct response to the attacks on ships in the Red Sea, which endangered trade and threatened freedom of navigation. This is especially pertinent given that approximately 15% of global seaborne trade typically passes through the Suez Canal. Consequently, this shift is causing substantial global economic losses.
Who are the Houthis?
The Houthis are an armed political and religious group supporting Yemen's Shia Muslim minority. Aligned with Iran's "axis of resistance", they emerged in the 1990s under Hussein al-Houthi's leadership, now led by his brother Abdul Malik. Since 2000, they have battled the Yemeni government for autonomy in northern Yemen, expanding influence during the 2011 Arab Revolt. By 2016, they had seized significant territories in Yemen’s West.
Concerned about potential Houthi-Iran alignment, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition to intervene but has been unable to dislodge Houthi control despite years of airstrikes and battles. Although Iran denies supplying the Houthis weapons, instead claiming political support, there is widespread recognition of a tangible Iran-Houthi relationship. In this context, Houthi attacks may pose a greater threat to global security than Gaza's conflict. Indeed, based on pragmatic security and economic calculations, the Houthis' actions could disrupt the delicate regional equilibrium, carrying significant escalation risks despite their relatively small size.
Regional and International Responses
In response to the Houthis’ attacks and their impacts on international trade and freedom of navigation, Operation Prosperity Guardian was launched to safeguard the security of the southern part of the Red Sea. This operation includes over 20 countries, including the UK, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, with Bahrain being the only Arab country in the coalition.
As mentioned, these assaults against commercial vessels have caused deep economic losses, as it pushed shipping companies to steer clear of this vital trade route. Thus, shipping vessels are now constrained to change itineraries and take the longer route around the Cape of Good Hope, situated at the southern tip of Africa. This alternative corridor extends the journey by over 3,500 nautical miles (6,500 km) and nearly two weeks of sailing time for each voyage, thereby substantially inflating shipping expenses.
The current Red Sea crisis has highlighted the unequivocal importance of this location for geopolitics. With both commercial and strategic implications, the Houthi’s actions have pushed the international community to cooperate to counter these attacks and safeguard freedom of navigation. While the U.S. was eager to engage a military coalition with the initiation of Operation Prosperity Guardian, the EU also began to step out of its shadow by introducing Operation Aspides, if so, with a delay due to its still reactive strategy. It remains to be seen if and how this crisis will de-escalate in the future, as this will be influenced by the war in Gaza and the destabilization of the region. Nevertheless, next to military cooperation, it will certainly be vital to engage in diplomatic efforts aiming to de-escalate the enduring Yemeni conflict by including all parties involved and affected.
We bring you an interview with Maria Zuppello a Latin America researcher and analyst based in Brazil.
In this interview conducted by Giovanni Giacalone, Dr. Rabiah Ryklief, and Sarah Toubman, Maria Zuppello unpacks the current situation on the ground in Ecuador, as well as the underlying drivers which have contributed to conflict there. Maria looks at the role of Albanian and Mexican gangs in Ecuador, explaining the role these groups have historically and continue to have in the country.
Interviewers: Giovanni Giacalone, Dr. Rabiah Ryklief, and Sarah Toubman - Central & South America Team
In this session, Professor Mishra discusses the capacity of the security forces to control the territory, the Islamic State Khorasan Province, and the division within the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
Professor Anant Mishra is a Visiting Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales.
Interviewers: Agostino Bono and Camilla Cormegna - Crime, Extremism and Terrorism Team
The interlinkages between international phenomena such as the illicit drug economy, transnational organised crime, conflict, and terrorism have become the absolute reality of globalisation and the complex interdependence that reflects its savage side. The spread of Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and their regional affiliates as key predatory actors in global governance through paradoxical guerrilla warfare using theological justifications and political fabrications to promote “narco-jihadism,” exploiting Haram money for a Halal cause, makes Africa the new epicentre of the nexus between organised crime, narcotics, and terrorism's nebulae.
A triptych of terrorism, religion and organized crime: a marriage of carp and rabbit between haram and halal
In Islam, the main source of prohibitions and permissions comes from the Qurʾān. Thus, “Halal” means anything that is permitted or conforms to Islamic law with a set of rules concerning the adherents' principles of life and “Muslim morality.” It includes, among other things, nutritional standards that comply with Sharia law. Conversely, the concept of “haram” refers to matters that are unacceptable or illegal under Islamic law, i.e., all harmful chemical substances (toxins) that are dangerous to human life and health, as well as the consumption of narcotics and drugs are considered prohibited (Haram). While the involvement of al-Qaeda and Daesh in the dirty narcotics business is a heady cocktail under a triangle that combines politics, religion, and jihadist crusades, narcotics and terrorism have no religious hue.
Islamist terrorist groups have justified jihad as halal and part of the acts of “ijtihad” or martyrdom as a necessary religious duty carried out by the “muharribun” against the “kuffar” (infidels), thus constituting a halal and legitimate cause. Although the Qurʾān explicitly forbids the outbreak of war and authorises combat only against real aggressors, jihadist thinking has adapted to political realism, authorising wars of expansion, even using illegitimate means, i.e., Haram. Indeed, with the internationalisation of the jihad, previously focused on the “near enemy,” then towards the “far enemy,” described in the Islamic vision as the “home of war” (dar al-ḥarb), thus making it possible to wage an offensive jihad, using narcotics to spoil Western society with drugs and the ongoing use of mass production and distribution of illicit drugs, intrinsically contrary to Islam, as a pretext to advance religious and ideological objectives and justify the “holy” war against the West.African Jihadist terror-crime nexus spectrum: A cross-trigger-incubator cycle
African Jihadist terror-crime nexus spectrum: A cross-trigger-incubator cycle
“Narco-jihad” is the contradictory and absurd justification of acts of violence in the name of religion, fuelled by the revenues of the illegal drug trade, which consists of spoiling “infidel” Western forces with drugs and consolidating Islamic rule, not by faith but with a well-calculated guerrilla strategy, since the drug economy remains one of the main sources of funding for jihadist-matrix terrorism in Africa. The practice of narco money for jihad dates from the Islamist “mujahideen” groups against the Soviet Union. As for post-modern jihad, the use of cryptocurrencies and bitcoin has overtaken traditional methods of transferring funds as part of “crypto-jihad.” Meanwhile, with globalisation, the end of the Cold War, and the “global war on terror,” the “terrorism-crime continuum” became a growing threat, forming an adaptive alliance to changing circumstances. On others, terrorist and organised crime groups used a dual “modus operandi” nexus, including logistics and material support, and protections under geographical “safe havens” deeply intertwined over “hybrid groups.”
Henceforth, African jihadi narcotics rely on religion, local conflicts, anti-western rhetoric, corruption of government officials, and the general feeling of injustice to gather support. However, the “black hole syndrome,” in which the convergence between terrorist nebulas and transnational organised crime groups is mainly occurring within Sahel’s “ungoverned space,” where a weak or failed state has created conditions ripe for jihadist actors connections, including Niger’s narco-networks to gain economic and political power. In so doing, a complex “glocal jihad” is emerging, linking local, national, regional, transnational, and global levels in a dialectical, blurred, and intertwined process that goes beyond local spatial realities, as applied by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in its strategy of geographical expansion in the Sahel with complex interconnections between smuggling networks and illegal arms and drug trafficking. In this respect, jihadist groups operating in West Africa have maintained their actions and even expanded, opportunistically and pragmatically resorting to various sources of funding, with the smuggling of drugs and narcotics, particularly cocaine and cannabis resin, playing a key role in the entrenchment of “narco-jihadist” activities in the Sahel region. Notably, Al-Mourabitoun and the Gourma Katiba focus on kidnapping for ransom and trafficking in drugs, arms, and transnational criminal activities.
Africa’s narco-jihadism landscape and trends: dual dynamics between hybridization and trans-nationalisation
The African threat landscape has consistently changed, and the narcotics routes are varied, with Guinea-Bissau as a key “narco-state” facilitating the flow of illegal narcotics, with drugs transiting through the Sahara, passing Jihadist zones, North Africa, and then on to Southern Europe. As a result, the east coast of Africa is becoming a hub for the international heroin trade networks and forms an integrated regional criminal economy with its long coastline providing landing sites and safe routes for Afghan heroin destined for markets in Europe and North America. Simultaneously, according to the UNODC World Drug Report 2023, Africa remains a key region for cocaine trafficking, mainly in West Africa, while North Africa is a central axis for the inter-regional smuggling of cannabis resin and cannabis. However, half of the pharmaceutical opioids seized worldwide between 2017 and 2021 were in Africa, largely due to the non-medical use of tramadol. This is why, more recently, tramadol has been a main aspect of “narco-jihadism” under an era of “low-cost terror”, including Captagon, which has become the “drug of Jihad” used initially by Islamic state fighters and militants of narco-terror groups in the Middle East region, also known as the “cocaine of the poor,” “ISIS’s drug,” and then spread through African jihadist operatives as war drugs and money laundering business.
AfricaIndeed, the 2023 Global Terrorism Index report has heightened the relationship between terrorism and ecological threats under a vicious cycle of progressively greater asymmetrical challenges, mainly clustered in African regions. As such, the 2022 Ecological Threat Report (ETR) identified that most African countries have emerged as “hotspots” affected by climate change, terrorism, conflict, and crime, with the highest risk in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). However, African jihadist groups are moving more towards environmental terrorism, which encompasses not only wildlife crime but also smuggling and all kinds of activities, including the illegal taxation of natural resources, which accounts for 38% of conflict financing, drugs (28%), seizures and looting (26%), and money extorted from kidnappings for ransom (3%).While a study conducted in 2023 by UNODC has demonstrated that illicit financial flows (IFFs), including smuggling of migrants (SOM) and trafficking in persons (TIP), especially women and children, with the involvement of non-state armed groups and terrorist and violent extremist groups (VEGs), have cross-border implications through the west African region with Islamic state local affiliates,.
The African franchises of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: Narco-jihadism, a necessity that allows prohibitions
Some areas of the African continent, have become a new global hotspot for narco-jihadist activities. Local VEGs, claiming inspiration from ideologies espoused by Al-Qaida or Daesh, reflect a “proto-state” version of governance that operates within a wider political economy characterised by “business models” with “Big Man” patron-client organisations or “warlords,” as Mokhtar Belmokhtar's nicknamed “Mister Marlboro,” using cigarette smuggling to finance AQIM and affiliated groups such as Ansar Al-Sharia. However, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin has engaged with illicit economies and tactical use of economic warfare through its involvement in post-modern razzias (or rezzous), which replaced the ancient caravan trade in the Sahel-Saharan belt with a criminal economy based on cannabis resin (hashish), then cocaine. Indeed, the narco-jihadism networks spread across ethnicities and tribes, namely with “black jihad,”exploited by Ansaroul Islam, building alliances with criminal gangs such as Lahmar and Tuareg traffickers and TilemsiArabs. In West Africa, the drug trade has fuelled the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) with illicit trade networks, particularly synthetic opioids, and charges “transit taxes” to narcotics trafficking. However, Al-Shabaab militants have financial or operational links with the pirates. These close ties are referred to as the “sea jihad.” In fact, in December 2023, a new alliance was formed with Somali pirates operating off the coast, receiving 30% of all ransom proceeds.
Certainly, Al-Qaeda and Islamic State African affiliates have used the religious tax known in Islam as zakat as a source of legitimacy and religious authority, imposed on herders in the Sahel with the demand for cattle as payment for zakat, on the one hand in exchange for protection and on the other for financing jihadism. Although zakat in Islam is not explicitly given in exchange for services, it has been usurped by JNIM and the Islamic State-Sahel Province (ISSP) in the name of religion, becoming a coercive measure and a source of illegitimacy under the new guise of “cow jihad.”Meanwhile, Boko Haram has normalised gender-based violence as a strategy of terror with the commodification and militarization of women as sex slaves; this is built around some theological justifications that permit submission to men and the exploitation of women, including forms of slavery or human trafficking for sexual purposes. Whereas Islamic law considers human trafficking, including violence against women and children, drug trafficking, and smuggling, to be crimes of ta'zir.
Conclusions
The process of terrorist groups using religion to promote narcotics causes, particularly in the African continent, has become part of the postmodern jihadist landscape. That’s why counter-terrorism must be based first and foremost on an understanding of the patterns and modes of jihadist thought, as well as on a solid grasp of the intellectual matrices and theological foundations that represent an effective, preventive tool for building resilience in the face of violent extremism and mitigating the factors behind this globalized phenomenon. Hence, education and academic work in favour of the new moderate discourse are constants to expose their shortcomings and contradictions in the form of a soft approach that must accompany hard structural and operational counter-terrorism.
Once known for its cultural richness and economic resilience, Lebanon is located in the Eastern Mediterranean Levant region with over five million inhabitants and no Head of State. The complex interplay of economic and political mismanagement, multiple corruption cases, lack of accountability, instability, unrest and poor freedom of expression do not bolster any sociopolitical or economic positive change to thwart the spiralling crises affecting the Lebanese people. Currently, around 80% of Lebanon’s population lives under the poverty threshold.
Politics
Lebanon has been in a profound economic and political crisis since the banking system collapsed in 2019, damaging the currency, increasing poverty, and paralysing most of the country. Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s resignation in October 2019 triggered a series of unsuccessful attempts to form a new government. The ensuing political vacuum left Lebanon without a coherent leadership to address pressing economic challenges. External factors, including regional conflicts, have further complicated the political situation, hindering the formation of a government capable of steering the country out of crisis.
Lebanon's political landscape, characterised by a delicate sectarian balance, has been a source of strength and weakness. The confessional system, designed to distribute power among various religious communities, has often resulted in political gridlock, impeding effective governance. The parliament extended army commander Joseph Aoun's tenure last December to prevent a leadership vacuum. The army, which was rebuilt during the civil war, is viewed as essential to keep the country stable in the face of emergencies (e.g. an imminent border clash with Israel). Besides, the parliament prolonged the term of Lebanon's Internal Security Chief, a Sunni Muslim. Hence, the absence of a stable government capable of implementing crucial reforms has exacerbated the economic crisis.
Uncertainty in its governance structure persists, with rising vacancies in key governance positions. While Lebanon's economic and institutional crisis weakens its international standing, numerous players remain involved in the Lebanese geopolitical scenario. The prolonged delay in electing a new president and increasing polarisation are not easing this knot. Despite reaching an agreement on maritime borders, tensions persist. In addition to the traditional tensions with Israel, the presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the south of the country has become contentious.
Tensions arose from a UN Security Council resolution in August 2022, allowing UNIFIL to act independently of local authorities, consequently altering the relations between UNIFIL and the Lebanese army. The Group of Five (formed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, Qatar, and the United States) was created to facilitate the resolution of Lebanon's political crisis. Unluckily, in July 2023, the shortfall of results from their second meeting worsened the state of affairs.
Economy
Lebanon’s fifteen-year-long civil war (1975–90) severely damaged this country’s economy. Due to its heavy dependence on banking and financial services since the conclusion of the civil war in 1990, along with the neglect of the agricultural and industrial sectors, Lebanon heavily relied on imports to fulfil the needs of its citizens. The Lebanese Central Bank subsidised wheat and fuel to make these commodities affordable, leading to significant challenges in the face of mounting public debt, a lack of economic reforms, and an increasing current account deficit.
In the early 2010s, Lebanon's economic issues worsened, and in 2019, widespread protests erupted against economic inequality, corruption, and poor public services, reaching a breaking point. A series of intertwined crises, starting with an economic downturn, followed by the impact of COVID-19, and culminating in the Beirut Port explosion, have severely impacted Lebanon. Besides, after the 2020 Port explosions, the lack of accountability has bolstered poverty in the country. Among these, the economic crisis has had the most substantial negative effect, with the Lebanese currency, the lira, experiencing a drastic depreciation of over 90% against the US dollar on the parallel market.
This configuration has resulted in hyperinflation, soaring prices of essential goods, and a sharp decline in the purchasing power of citizens, contributing to widespread business struggles, surging unemployment, and increased poverty rates. Indeed, the Lebanese currency's value has plummeted by over 95%. With the Central Bank depleting foreign reserves, discontinuing subsidies on crucial imports, and simultaneously witnessing a surge in electricity, water, and gas prices, essential utilities have become a luxury for many. A Human Rights Watch survey from November 2021 to January 2022 revealed that the median household income was only US$122, with 70% of households struggling to meet basic expenses. While the crisis affects the entire population, vulnerable groups such as women, children, migrant workers, refugees, and individuals with disabilities bear a disproportionate burden.
The population sector that appears to be most vulnerable to unemployment includes the migrants from Syria and Palestine, the inhabitants of North Lebanon, the youth and the women. Unemployment numbers have more than doubled since 2019. The unemployment level reached 29.6% in 2022. The Italian government estimated that 27.5% of people would be unemployed in 2023.
The younger generation in Lebanon faces a dilemma, resulting in many choosing to either leave the nation or feel closed in. High rates of youth unemployment and the burden of debts incurred for university education in a system controlled by the corporate sector further discourage young people from envisioning a future within Lebanon. The youth is also experiencing significant challenges in pursuing their education degrees, as the country's universities have raised tuition costs to an unprecedented rate, prompting many students to abandon their studies. Youth unemployment rocketed to 47.8% in 2022. Current data on out-migration could look better for the economy. In a recent survey, 77% of Lebanese youth between 18 and 24 years indicated their wish to leave the country to find better opportunities elsewhere. Even those youngsters with jobs who are paid in dollars report feeling insecure.
Around 2 million people face food insecurity in Lebanon. Alas, the situation is expected to get worse in the upcoming months. According to the IPC predictions, it is expected to reach 2.26 million people by April. Specifically, the refugees are the most affected. Vis-à-vis the nearly thirteen-year conflict in Syria, Lebanon has hosted over 1.5 million refugees, maintaining one of the largest refugee populations. This was the first time that the IPC Acute Food Insecurity analysis included Palestine refugees in Lebanon and Palestine refugees from Syria. Currently, many people are dependent on food assistance in Lebanon. While aid keeps flowing into Lebanon, people's needs still escalate due to local and global turbulences.
As we have seen, the food crisis in this country is linked to several other critical topics. It is necessary to talk about the water crisis. Regarding water use in the Middle East, agriculture uses 85 per cent of the total fresh water. The poor water governance and the inefficient irrigation systems augment this country's water shortages. As if this was not enough, water pollution affects the quality of drinking water, agricultural production, and food safety.
Needless to say, water shortages have affected agriculture. Water scarcity resulted in poorer agricultural yields, making it more difficult for farmers to sustain their livelihoods. A recent study discovered that significant rural areas are experiencing decreased production, particularly in coastal locations where citrus fruits and olives are cultivated and at higher elevations where deciduous fruit trees are. Areas depending on irrigation systems in the Beqaa Valley, the country's primary agricultural region, are being harmed by increased groundwater stress and loss of water resources. Farming communities in these areas have already seen severe consequences, such as unreliable household food supply.
The ongoing agricultural crisis is a source of concern. Lebanon's prolonged neglect of the agriculture sector resulted in direct import reliance, which Lebanon still suffers today. Mainly, almost 80% of the food consumed in Lebanon is imported. First, agricultural labour has traditionally been precarious in Lebanon. Second, the high dependence on the agricultural labour of refugees has exacerbated the devaluation of farm workers. Third, more than 20 per cent of heads of households engaged in farming are highly vulnerable. Women farmers, marked by increased poverty, account for 9 per cent of the total farmers.
Over and above that, Lebanon's food resources are squandered due to several drivers. On the one hand, the multiple crises that have affected Lebanon since 2019 have damaged the food security status of its inhabitants. The national and local crises have a direct impact on food security. Referring back to the port incident, grain silos that were stored in the port were turned into rubble during the port blast in 2020, consequently boosting food insecurity in the region.
On the other hand, other global turmoils are impacting food security in Lebanon. To name a paradigmatic example, the Russo-Ukrainian War has added further pressure to the already exhausted Lebanese economy with rising food costs. In fact, 96% of the wheat consumed in Lebanon is imported from Ukraine and Russia. This configuration leads to considerable direct and indirect food price increases. Besides, due to the devaluation of the lira, food prices are currently increasing further. Indeed, food prices have surged by 332% since June 2021. Additionally, the WFP food aid cuts will not help this crisis. Unfortunately, poor water management and corruption add to this list.
So far, there have been several responses to the food crisis. The first is the provision of aid to vulnerable groups. Since 2012, the World Food Programme has assisted Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Actually, 90% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon now find themselves living in conditions of extreme poverty. Since the crisis began in October 2019, food costs have increased 19 times. The Wheat Supply Emergency Response Project was the second response to this food crisis. Lebanon received a USD150 million loan from the World Bank, effectively sustaining wheat subsidies despite a rise in the exchange rate from USD/LBP 15,000 to 30,000 in October 2023. In May 2023, more availability and access to USD, more job possibilities, and a continuous supply of subsidised wheat helped ease access to food and other vital resources.
Additionally, the World Food Programme's Country Strategic Plan for 2023-2025 is a strategic contingency mechanism against financial system shocks. Since the situation has escalated along the Blue Line in the South of Lebanon, 462 Hectares of agricultural land have been burnt, and 300k animals have been killed, aggravating the food insecurity in this area. Furthermore, OCHA’s Humanitarian Country Team has provided water, meals and food parcels, nutritional supplements, cash assistance and health services.
Conclusion
Lebanon is witnessing an unprecedented crisis, intertwining economic challenges, political instability, and social upheaval. This has led to a severe economic downturn marked by currency depreciation, hyperinflation, and growing unemployment. Vulnerable populations bear a disproportionate burden, while political instability undermines effective governance and exacerbates economic issues. Lebanon's weakened international standing and the recent violence pose additional threats to recovery. Despite initial hopes for 2024, the outlook could be better. Lebanon stands at a critical juncture, requiring collaborative efforts for a sustainable and prosperous future. The increasingly tumultuous political scene that started escalating last Autumn does not contribute to improving the country's economic and food security. Although there was a glimpse of hope last year prompted by the responses to the food crisis, food insecurity persists in Lebanon.
The country's food security status is weak and in danger of worsening over time. Continuous work is needed to combat food insecurity and protect vulnerable groups (e.g. refugees). Violence, political and economic uncertainty, inflation, and discontinuing food aid do not hamper this crisis. These factors indicate that food insecurity will likely worsen in the upcoming months.
Dr Andreas Østhagen talks about Arctic power relations, the nexus between traditional and non-traditional security in the Arctic region, US Arctic strategy, and the complexities of Arctic governance.
In this session, Dr Østhagen unpacks how US-China posturing and increased human activity in the Arctic are shaping the region's geopolitical significance. He outlines how increased US engagement in the Arctic is driven by security concerns, especially US-China competition. Moreover, Dr Østhagen believes it is unlikely that Russia will challenge the Law of the Sea in the Arctic. Furthermore, he suggests that the Nordic countries, as a bloc, could play a role in lowering tensions in the Arctic
Professor Joachim Koops talks about the prospects for international military interventions in light of the new geopolitical scenario, specifically the closure of the UN mission in Mali. Professor Joachim A. Koops is Chair of Security Studies and Scientific Director of the Institute of Security and Global Affairs at Leiden University’s campus in The Hague.
In this session, Professor Koops outlines the factors that led to Mali’s shift from supporting a UN peace mission with high involvement from Western powers to entering the Russian sphere of influence. He highlights how the increased instability in West Africa can be seen through the lens of West-Russia competition and how the war in Ukraine has not particularly influenced NATO’s efforts in its southern flank. He further notes that this will not likely be the end of large-scale UN multi-dimensional peace missions.
Interviewer: Michele Puggia - Military Strategy and Intelligence Team
