On the 15th of November 2024, Colombian officials announced the capture of Jeison Alexander Lorca Salazar, the second-in-command of the Venezuelan criminal organisation Tren de Aragua.
Long considered the most pre-eminent and prolific Venezuelan criminal enterprise, Lorca Salazar’s arrest is representative of the increasing transnationalisation of Tren de Aragua, and crime in Latin America more broadly.
Although the organisation began to grow its cross-border network in 2018, it has been internationalising at an increasingly rapid pace in recent years.
In October 2023, early reports from the Cook County Sheriff's Office indicated members of Tren de Aragua were present in Chicago, Illinois. Further activity from the organisation in the US in the following months prompted the US Department of the Treasury to designate Tren de Aragua a “Significant Transnational Criminal Organization,” and the US Department of State to officially call for members’ arrests.
Rise of Tren de Aragua in Chile
This year, reports of the group’s presence in Chile have been growing in particular, with Venezuela’s political and economic turmoil pinpointed as a driver of this trend. Instability in Venezuela has not only created a humanitarian crisis but also created an opening for organisations like Tren de Aragua to engage in human trafficking in and around Chile.
The kidnap and murder of Venezuelan political dissident Ronald Ojeda in Santiago by Tren de Aragua in February 2024 was one of the most prominent incidents over the course of the past year, and a clear signifier of the organisation’s increased criminal activities in the country.
In a May 2024 BBC article, Venezuelan investigative journalist Ronna Rísquez named the rise of Tren de Aragua in Chile as the first instance of a transnational organised crime group operating in the country.
“It was easy for them to take over territories. They took over nearly unpopulated areas to establish their dealings, [and] began to offer services, such as getting migrants across one border to another, providing security to businesses or falsifying identity documents,” he said.
One such example of Tren de Aragua exploiting a less populated region of Chile includes the installation of Los Gallegos—a local Tren de Aragua cell—in Arica, a coastal region in the north of the country bordering Peru.
Some experts see the increasing internationalisation of organised crime across Latin America as a paradigm shift in the field, with Will Freeman, a fellow for Latin American studies at the Council on Foreign, dubbing the change the rise of “reorganised crime.”
While the exportation of Tren de Aragua abroad is only one of several significant security ramifications of Venezuelan political instability, increasing levels of transnational crime in Latin America will be crucial to monitor moving forward. With the shape of organised crime in Latin America changing more and more by the day, it is yet to be seen whether authorities can tackle the growing challenges of “reorganised crime,” or whether it will be here to stay.
In this session, Dr. Baldaro discusses the root causes of jihadism in the Sahel, focusing on how civil wars, local grievances, poor governance, and corruption have been inadequately addressed by the European Union’s counter-terrorism strategy in the region, which was heavily securitised. He then expands on Russia’s current counter-insurgency strategy—an even more hardline and militarised approach—that not only fails to address local grievances but also contributes to increased chaos and violence.
Dr. Baldaro concludes by expressing scepticism about the possibility of a future return of European aid, noting that the military juntas governing the various Sahelian states have adopted a strictly repressive approach to tackling the issue. However, he highlights some exceptions, such as Italy’s presence in Niger and the growing involvement of new actors like Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf monarchies.
Dr. Edoardo Baldaro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Palermo. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Scuola Normale Superiore, Institute of Human and Social Sciences. He is a leading expert on the Sahel region and themes such as state fragility, jihadism and regional conflict management.
Interviewers: Axelle Bougouma, Angelo Saad Hintermayer and Camilla Cormegna - Africa Team
by Miguel Jiménez, Ingrid Heggstad, & Dan Ziebarth - Political Economy, Development, & Energy Security Team
Introduction
It was announced on Tuesday, November 5th that Donald Trump, the candidate for the right-wing Republican Party, had won the 2024 Presidential Election in the United States of America and would officially become the President-Elect. Kamala Harris, the left-wing Democratic Party candidate, conceded defeat in a speech on Wednesday, December 6th, urging voters to accept the election results. While Harris and her vice presidential running mate, Time Walz, received significant party support ahead of the election and were seen as a new phase for the Democratic Party, the party will be weakened following the election results. Even though during the campaign she lacked a compelling economic narrative and often avoided answering how to fund any proposal she brought to the table, in terms of global economic relations, a Harris presidency was expected to maintain continuity with the current Biden administration's approach largely.
The second Trump presidency is expected to have major ramifications for global politics, particularly global economic relations, particularly as Trump has been a vocal proponent of protectionist trade policies. The Republican Party, led by Trump, will also control both chambers of the legislature, while conservative justices make up 6 of the 9 seats on the Supreme Court of the United States. These conditions could give Trump a strong mandate for policy change. In particular, economic relations with China, the European Union, and Russia are expected to be affected by a second Trump presidency.
China
Trump has announced that, if re-elected, he will impose a 10–20 per cent across-the-board tariff on imports into the United States, with an additional 60 per cent tariff on all imports from China. Trump has also pledged to terminate the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) passed by the Biden administration, which would be expected to increase domestic production and reduce Chinese imports. This is in contrast to what would have been expected under a Kamala Harris administration, where the usage of tools to inhibit the arrival of Chinese goods would have come from domestic policies with the continuation of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), the single largest climate investment in American history. Based on building domestic champions in the field of energy transition, which is currently dominated by China, being the world’s leader in clean energy production and the refinement of the majority of mineral inputs.
European Union
The second Trump presidency could challenge Europe through an “America First” trade policy, focused on reducing the U.S. trade deficit, with tariffs as high as 20 per cent on imports and even more on Chinese goods. These tariffs would increase costs for European exporters and consumers, impacting the EU’s economy. Ongoing disputes from the Biden era, such as steel and aluminium tariffs and green subsidies, may also escalate, while the expiration of paused EU retaliatory tariffs in 2025 and the Airbus-Boeing subsidy conflict in 2026 could further strain EU-U.S. trade relations, adding to Europe’s economic uncertainty. It is noteworthy that during his tenure as president, Donald Trump's imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from the European Union and China resulted in the implementation of retaliatory tariffs on U.S. agricultural products.
Russia
A renewed Trump presidency could also impact global economic relations with Russia. In his 2024 campaign, Trump promised to swiftly resolve the Ukraine conflict, asserting he could achieve peace within 24 hours through negotiation. However, if Russia resists a settlement, Trump has signalled he would impose tougher economic sanctions, potentially targeting Russia’s central bank and curtailing energy exports to key markets like India and China. This intensified economic pressure, coupled with increased US energy production to lower global prices, would squeeze Russia’s vital oil revenue.
Additionally, Trump’s scepticism toward ongoing US aid to Ukraine, which has amounted to $92.7 billion since 2022, raises concerns over a potential reduction in support, which could compromise Ukraine’s defence and shift the regional balance in Russia’s favour. Trump has also suggested that Europe should shoulder more responsibility for its security, which may lead to a reevaluation of US commitments to NATO. It is possible that a reduction in the US role in NATO could have the effect of weakening collective defenses, which might in turn expose Europe to greater tensions with Russia. This approach indicates a shift toward a more isolationist US foreign policy, with strategic economic measures as leverage to influence Russia's actions.
Additionally, Trump’s expected policies in oil and gas could intensify competition with Russia and reshape global energy markets. Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska has predicted that Trump’s support for US oil production might drive global prices down to around $50 per barrel by 2025, creating pressure on Russia’s oil-dependent economy. Trump’s approach would likely include promoting US LNG exports, reviving paused projects, and further challenging Russia’s position in Europe’s energy market.
His stance on projects like the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which he previously sanctioned to limit Russia’s influence, suggests he might continue efforts to curb Russia’s global LNG ambitions while supporting policies to maintain affordable oil prices for US consumers. By influencing OPEC+ to stabilise prices favourable to the US, Trump could further impact Russia’s revenue, potentially reducing its leverage in Europe and heightening competition in the global energy sector.
Conclusion
Taken together, based upon a previous presidency led by Donald Trump and his recent claims on the campaign trail, global economic relations could become increasingly tense between the United States and other nations and political unions.
In particular, trade relations between China and the United States are expected to worsen, with major increases in tariffs on Chinese goods entering into the United States possibly leading to retaliatory tariffs and an intensification of trade competition between the two countries. The European Union could also be affected by the competition between the United States and China, as well as the possibility of increased tariffs on goods from the EU going into the United States. The conflict in Ukraine also casts a shadow over Trump’s second term and whether the Trump administration continues to provide funding to Ukraine and keep sanctions on Russia in place will affect both the war in Ukraine, as well as economic relations between the United States and Russia.
These considerations will all have ripple effects across the entire world, meaning it is important for policymakers, scholars, and citizens alike to continue watching the effects of the second Trump presidency on global economic relations.
by Giacomo Bortolazzi (Italy Team) & Marco Verrocchio (Military Strategy & Intelligence Team)
Despite the relative overcoming of the crisis sparked in early 2020, the global shortage of semiconductor chips has precipitated countries and companies into fierce competition on a global scale. This paper examines the potential response of Italy and its strategic initiatives in one of the most strategic issues in the near future. Nonetheless, Italian initiatives are propelled and integrated into the European framework of the Chips Act. By analysing Italy's alignment with the EU's objective, the article provides insights into the nation's efforts in the complex global semiconductor landscape.
Semiconductors' crisis: Europe's role in the global Chip shortages
The world is not newto the fierce competition among countries on semiconductors. However, the demand for cutting-edge technologies and the massive need for semiconductors in everyday life smart devices are determining insecurities on the endurance of the GVCs. The global chip shortage during the Covid-19 pandemic has drawn the attention of industries and states on the strategic value of semiconductors. While supplies of chips began to improve in 2022, the already high demand for advanced chips, such as those for the automotive and military sector, is continuing to intensify: the global market of semiconductors is projected to scale from $573.44 billion in 2022 to $1,380.79 billion by 2029 at a compound annual growth rate of 12.2%. However, chips are not so easy to make: While building factories and clean laboratories requires years, transforming a single silicon wafer into semiconductors takes months. Based on said high demand and the complexity of making semiconductors, the latter’s GVCs are highly amenable to geopolitical tensions such as the US-China trade competition. For these reasons, governments are investing to boost domestic production, attract foreign investment, and discourage the export of semiconductor technologies.
While Japan and the US dominated semiconductor manufacturing in the 90s, today Taiwan and South Korea are leading the market both in terms of volume and of production of the smallestnanometer chips. The eruption of the US-China trade competition and the shortage of chips during the Pandemic, on the other hand, led the US and Japan to adopt policies against the exports of chips-related technologies, encouraging the establishment of factories in the homeland. In this scenario, in July 2023 the EU adopted the European Chips Act, a regulation aimed at strengthening the European semiconductor market through more than €43 billionof investments. Based on the premises of the Chips Act, in the same year the regulation was implemented by the Chips JointUndertaking (Chips JU), a call for funding based on public-private partnership to bridge the gap between R&D and the market.
The Italian implementation of the Chips Ju
Among the several European countries that became an active implementer of the Chips Joint Undertaking, Italy certainly represents an actor with an important burden on its shoulders. The first active participation of the country in the JU was in November 2023, when Chips.IT, the new Italian Centre for the Design of Semiconductor Integrated Circuits, and the Italian strategy for microelectronics were presented in Pavia. The two novelties are strongly intertwined: Chips.IT was born as part of the strategy to coordinate and strengthen the microchip design sector with state-of-the-art equipment, all in order to foster an overall development of the sector. The role of public and private entities was also stressed, with €225 millionbeing allocated and big firms such as Intel, Sony, Infineon and the Italian STMicroelectronics willing to collaborate.
The national efforts in the field of the JU will also foster the birth of further projects that will have a positive impact on the national landscape: after the approval of the Governing Board of the JU, a new advanced microelectronics infrastructure was set up in the middle of the Etna Valleywith the main task to build prototype devices for the development of innovative applications in the field of electric mobility and telecommunications. The initiative was strongly supported by the Italian Ministries of Enterprise and Made in Italy, the University and Research Ministry and the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) and received an allocation of €360 million to be divided between the European Union and the participating states (namely Finland, Poland, Sweden, Austria, France and Germany). This investment will certainly have a positive impact on the area by fostering employment, newly established activities and a general blooming of the industrial sector directly related to microelectronics.
Another important presence in the Italian landscape will be that of Silicon Box, a Singaporean tech giant has planned to invest €3.2 billion in the Italian microelectronics industry with a new plant located in Novara. The role of this company is certainly not to be underestimated, as it could contribute to the Italian role in the market of the so-called “chiplets”. Sehat Sutardja, one of the founders of Silicon Box, introduced this concept in 2015 as an innovative and performance-enhancing technology. A chiplet is in fact a processor with multiple cores that is printed on the same layer with other chiplets: this would consent a more efficient communication, thus erasing the issue of hardware-software data transfer.
Photo by Dan Williams via Pixabay
Italian expectations in the EU scenario
In a nutshell, Italy does not dispose of forgeries equiparable to those of countries such as China, which can hold entire GVCs inside their territory. Even though small enterprises are common in the Italian tech sector, many new important initiatives such as those started in the Etna Valley and in
Novara can be considered as holding a great potential. At the same time, the European Union has realised the importance and the scarcity of semiconductors and of the materials needed to produce it. Due to the important influx of investments received by Member States, Italy has experienced positive spillover effects, resulting in the transfer of valuable know-how and the creation of more job opportunities. In light of these novelties, the future possibility for Italy to start a “solo project” and to become itself a global actor is not to be excluded. Still, it’s important to bear in mind that key global actors such as South Korea, China or Taiwan are still a long way ahead and that multiple efforts will be required to launch Italy among the stars. Still, Italian efforts to be imprinted in the global semiconductor market are slowly revealing their “dual use”: they’re helping the European Union to reduce its dependency on external actors while securing the country’s competitiveness in the field of semiconductors.
The return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan has shed light on Central Asia’s geopolitics and security issues, with many analysts fearing that Afghanistan would initiate a domino effect of destabilisation and Islamic radicalisation across a particularly unstable region of the world. Kashmir has best symbolised the complexity of South Asia, given its decades of instability, ethnoreligious tensions and major great powers' interests. Assessing this region helps us understand one of the most strategic and complex areas in the world.
This article attempts to uncover the motivations behind the long-standing conflict that turned Kashmir into the world’s most militarised region, to consequently try providing policy recommendations that could bring Kashmir stability and development, much to the benefit of its people, the larger geographical area, and the international community as a whole.
This article will be divided into two parts: the first will focus on the region’s historical and sociocultural context as well as its political structure, investigating the factors behind Kashmiris’ unique identity and the developments leading Kashmir to its current state of affairs; the second part will then analyse the solutions to the conflict proposed by the recent international academic literature and try to uncover the motivations behind Indo-Pakistani inability to implement such solutions, finishing by presenting policy recommendations for the actors involved in the conflict.
Understanding Kashmir: history and cultural identity
Kashmir’s geographical position at the crossroads of empires and its predominantly mountainous nature created throughout the centuries two conditions common to such regions across the world: a highly heterogeneous population within an isolated territory. The centuries-old melting pot resulting from the region’s location destroyed classic patterns of identity (religion and language) and generated a society with incongruous religious-linguistic divisions, thus preventing the radicalisation of social groups along ethno-religious lines and instead nurturing a culture of peaceful coexistence among different religions and ethnicities that became known as “Kashmiriyat”. Simultaneously, Kashmir’s territorial morphology provided a natural barrier- mountains-against excessive foreign influence, thereby preserving a strong regional identity based not on a unique language, culture, or religion, but rather on the unique coexistence and intermingling of many.
Map 1: Erstwhile Princely State of Jammu & Kashmir. Currently, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, UT of Jammu & Kashmir and UT of Ladakh by India, and Aksai Chin by China. Source and link: Wikimedia Commons.
The establishment of the "Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu" in 1846 marked the beginning of a distinct political entity in the region. The Maharaja of this new kingdom retained control over most internal matters while recognising the suzerainty of the British Empire. During its century of quasi-independent rule (1846–1952), the region saw the cultivation of ideals such as tolerance, secularism, and pluralism, which had long been part of its historical identity. Challenges emerged following the partition of 1947, as ethno-religious tensions in the newly created states of India and Pakistan began to affect Kashmir. The initial neutrality and aspirations for independence within the Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu encountered opposition from both India and Pakistan, each of which viewed Kashmir as integral to their national identities.
In 1947, armed tribal forces from Pakistan entered Kashmir, citing reports of violence against Muslims in the region, and sought to integrate Kashmir with the newly established Islamic Republic of Pakistan. in response to the foreign invasion, the Maharaja of Kashmir and Jammu - being himself a Hindu - requested India to intervene and stop Pakistani incursions into Kashmir, consequently allowing for Jammu and Kashmir to become part of the country. India’s intervention marked the beginning of the First Indo-Pakistani War (1947-1948) and - upon India’s request - the intervention of the UN to settle the dispute. UN Resolutions 47 and 48 called for a ceasefire and proposed a plebiscite to allow the people of Jammu and Kashmir to determine their political future. While a ceasefire was achieved and a ceasefire line established, disagreements between India and Pakistan prevented the implementation of the plebiscite, leaving the region divided and its population in a state of uncertainty.
In the following decades, the political and territorial landscape of Kashmir underwent further changes. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 resulted in China gaining control of the eastern region of Aksai Chin. The Third Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 led to the 1972 establishment of the Line of Control (LoC), a de facto border based largely on the previous ceasefire line, separating Pakistani-administered and Indian-administered territories. Despite a fourth Indo-Pakistani war in 1999 and subsequent smaller clashes, the region remains a point of contention between the two nations.
Kashmir remains to this day under the fragile division established by the 1972 Line of Control. However, decades of Indo-Pakistani influence and conflict have changed Kashmiri identity, slowly eroding the principles of tolerance and pluralism (Kashmiriyat) on which it had been resting for the previous centuries: Islamic fundamentalism - backed by Islamabad and fueled by New Delhi’s Hindu nationalism - gradually moved away from its historical irrelevance to gain growing importance in political and societal discourses, becoming the pillar of several political and civil society movements within the region. The increasing radicalisation among segments of the Muslim Kashmiri population contributed to the eruption of violence and terrorism, leading to the displacement of several religious minorities, including the Hindu Kashmiri Pandits, who relocated to predominantly Hindu areas of the region; these migrations impoverished the society’s ethnocultural diversity and consequently led to the alignment of identity with religion, thereby allowing the flourishing of geographical and sectarian divisions within Kashmir. These newly arising divisions greatly worsened living conditions, further fomenting extremism and interreligious hatred.
Jammu & Kashmir (now “U.T. of Jammu and Kashmir”, and “U.T. of Ladakh”): This subregion under Indian control was given the status of “State” and granted a special degree of autonomy over its internal affairs by the Indian Constitution (article 370; article 35a). In 2019 the Indian Government - after decades of debate - approved the “Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act”, which abrogated the two articles and split the state into two “Union Territories” that enjoy far less autonomy than States: “the Union Territory of Ladakh”, and the “Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir”. Such a highly contested Act (justified by the Indian Government as a way to stimulate “financial activities, transparency in administration and growth in J&K’s economy.”) de facto marked the end to what was known as “Kashmiri Exceptionalism”, and was (and still is) met by widespread protests throughout the region (now divided into two different administrative territories), since many saw New Delhi’s centralism as an attempt to colonise the region and alter its unique identity.
Gilgit-Baltistan: this territory controlled by Pakistan is administered by the “Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009”, which officially grants the region self-rule but de facto puts it under the control of “an Islamabad-based council with its Chairman being the Prime Minister of Pakistan”. The order further facilitated Islamabad’s policy of ethnic substitution in the region - given Gilgit-Baltistan’s Shia majority in direct opposition to Pakistan’s Sunni tradition - thereby fueling tensions across the territory and demands for separatism.
Azad Kashmir: this second region under Pakistani rule officially enjoys a wide degree of autonomy under its Interim Constitution of 1974, though it de facto is - like the other Pakistan-controlled region - completely subject to the will of Islamabad. Major natural disasters and the resulting mass emigration rapidly changed the territory’s demographics, drawing it closer to the rest of Pakistan.
Having explained Kashmir’s sociocultural and political context, the second part of the article will focus on the solutions to its critical state of affairs.
In this episode, Marco Volpe talks about China's current and future role in the Arctic region, China's polar strategy including Antarctica, and academic bridge building between the Arctic and the Third Pole. Marco Volpe is a visiting researcher at the Arctic Centre in Rovaniemi.
In this session, Mr. Volpe lays out the scientific, economic, and geopolitical spheres of China's engagement in the Arctic region. He highlights China's long-term planning capabilities and looks at China's overall polar strategy, including Antarctica, through the lens of investments in polar climate science. Mr. Volpe also discusses the efforts of building bridges between Arctic and Third Pole (Himalaya) research, focusing on indigenous peoples and indigenous knowledge.
Interviewers: Irene Senfter and Max Giordano - Arctic Team
In this timely and thought-provoking discussion, Cristina Ramirez and Gesine Weber, PhD Candidates at King's College London, break down the 2024 US elections and their wide-reaching implications. From domestic shifts to global challenges, their insights are not to be missed.
In doing so, our special guests, moderated by our researcher and Webinar Series leader, Carlotta Rinaudo, will attempt to analyse the situation by answering the following questions:
Agenda:
00:00 -02:45 Opening remarks and Presentation by Carlotta Rinaudo (Lead of the ITSS Webinar Series)
02:48 What does Trump's return to power reveal about American society and identity? Have we misunderstood his appeal to American voters?
12:00 Is this the era of a new establishment? and if so, what might be its implications for policymaking?
15:18 Are democratic values eroding, and what could his transactional foreign policy mean for the world? Can we expect a rapid peace deal in the Russia-Ukraine war? How could a new Trump administration reshape relations with the EU, China, or impact the war in Gaza?
In this episode, our experts from the Asia & China desk, organize an incredibly insightful webinar, featuring Hyun-seung Lee, a former DPRK businessman and chair of the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League branch in Dalian, China. Mr. Lee currently serves as a director for One Korea Network and a fellow of North Korean studies at the Global Peace Foundation. He has also completed an internship with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Forced to defect in late 2014 due to a series of purges by Kim Jong Un, Lee offers an insider's perspective on North Korean society, the relationship between North Korea and China, and the impact of US policy on the regime.
Interviewers: Sandra Watson Parcels, Suha Choi, Ho Ting (Bosco) Hung, Skylor Pok Yuen Ko, Carlotta Rinaudo - Asia & China Team
Founded in 2017 by Oculus co-founder Palmer Luckey, ANDURIL INDUSTRIES is a California-based defense sector company1. As stated by Luckey and reflected in their mission, ANDURIL’s products aim to enhance the ability of the United States and its allies to counter both symmetrical and asymmetrical threats, thanks to the company’s cutting-edge technology and innovative production capabilities23. These capabilities stem from the very way the company was founded. Differently from other major companies in the sector, such as Northrop Grumman and RTX, ANDURIL is not dependent on external funders and avoids long-term contracts with the U.S. government45. This approach creates a system where the company’s success relies on its ability to develop cost-efficient, cutting-edge products6. ANDURIL secures the necessary funds through private venture capital investments, providing it with more autonomy compared to companies reliant on external funders7.
The company isn’t incentivised by project delays or increased costs, which is why having an ecosystem outside the traditional defence industry giants could position it to address some of the challenges faced by the U.S. and its allies89. By conducting R&D (research and development) internally and avoiding the typical long-term contracts that often overrun schedules and budgets, ANDURIL remains highly flexible and competitive1011.
The company has pursued a vertical acquisition strategy to diversify its capabilities. This approach to vertical integration allows ANDURIL to directly adapt its core product, “LATTICE OS,” to various systems1213. By automating processes such as quality checks, ANDURIL can scale production, achieving a competitive position in the industry14. A prime example of this vertical integration is the acquisition of Area-I, a Georgia-based company specialising in small unmanned aerial systems (UAS). This acquisition not only diversifies ANDURIL’s portfolio of autonomous systems but also provides a strategic advantage by integrating AI and their software directly into drones.15 As mentioned earlier, ANDURIL’s core product is “LATTICE AI,” a software that coordinates the ecosystem the company has created, providing users with complete battlefield awareness and intelligence-gathering capabilities16.
The strategic choice of being independent for R&D and for long-lasting contracts is also reflected in how their supply chain is structured. Thanks to the control and efficiency guaranteed by the vertical integration model, ANDURIL has gained an important edge in the industry, giving them the unique ability in the sector to adapt “faster” to what are the immediate demands coming from the battlefield. The in-house production and agile nature of the company enable quick scaling up production of both small drones and more complex sensor systems17. What gives ANDURIL this ability to quickly scale production is the modular design, giving them the ability to quickly repair, substitute, and update their systems, giving the important possibility of resisting warfare “ATTRITION” to the U.S. arsenal18. This means that the weapons or systems that are being used are sufficiently autonomous and relatively cheap, and so the problem that could present with the loss of said system would not impact so much on a country’s arsenal19. The supply chain is built in such a way that the most important components on which the production relies are directly produced in the U.S. or in-house, minimizing third-party dependencies in case of an all-out war20.
So, what emerges from this analysis is that ANDURIL is a uniquely structured company in the defense sector. Its approach to funding, marketing strategies and, more importantly, its engineering capabilities give it an edge in the agility to which the company adapts to emerging scenarios21.
How do Cruise missiles and loitering munitions/UAVs play into Americantheater level strategy?
One of the most recent additions to ANDURIL’s portfolio is the BARRACUDA AAV (autonomous air vehicle) (6). Before exploring how such a system could really change the current power competition happening over the South China Sea, it’s important to understand the role of cruise missiles and loitering munitions/UAVs. For decades, the U.S. has maintained uncontested air dominance wherever it has operated, giving it the possibility to deploy ground forces where needed. This has changed in the last decade; the new power competition that has emerged in the South Pacific is threatening the U.S.’s ability to maintain such a role. With the constant threats to Taiwan’s sovereignty, the United States is concerned about how, in an all-out conflict to protect the island, air superiority could be guaranteed22.
In this sense, the ability to counter China’s A2/AD strategy (Anti-Access/Area Denial)—which includes advanced missile defense systems, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and long-range radar systems capable of detecting and neutralising U.S. forces in the area—is crucial23. In this scenario, the role played by cruise missiles such as the “Tomahawk” or the JASSM is pivotal, as they could target the intricate defense systems of China’s A2/AD network24. Another important feature of these cruise missiles is their ability to perform low-altitude missions; being hard to detect, U.S. forces could potentially overwhelm defenses, penetrate hypothetical defensive shield, and enable amphibious landings or aerial assaults.
In contrast, loitering munitions offer the ability to conduct surveillance and real-time targeting acquisitions while loitering in the air. The strategic advantage of these weapon systems lies in their relative affordability and ease of replacement compared to larger, more expensive cruise missiles. In a potential conflict, it is key not only to have superior hardware, such as the F-35s or cruise missiles, but also to deploy systems that can provide targeting and surveillance in large numbers and at a low cost25. These factors explain ANDURIL’s recent efforts to develop the BARRACUDA AAV. This weapon system, supported by the production, acquisition, and supply chain strategies outlined above, is designed to be cost-effective and easily replaceable26.
The features of the BARRACUDA, in its three possible iterations, combine elements of both a standard cruise missile and a loitering munition. The advanced LATTICE AI, integrated with the BARRACUDA, enables the system to operate autonomously, reducing the human workload and enhancing operational speed. Advanced sensors, machine vision, and AI-guided targeting allow the BARRACUDA to alter its target mid-course and remain airborne for extended periods27.
There are several variants of the BARRACUDA. The first iteration, the BARRACUDA 100, is the smallest and lightest version, with an estimated payload of around 35 lbs and an 85-mile range when air-launched. This version is deployable from AH-Z1 helicopters, AH-64, and C-130 variants. The second version, the BARRACUDA 250, has an estimated payload of 85 lbs and a much longer range of 200 miles when air-launched. This iteration can be deployed from a variety of platforms, such as the F-35 (for internal carriage in bombers) or the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 (for external carriage)28.
Barracuda’s technical role and how it stands out from existing systems
We rapidly talked in the last paragraph about the BARRACUDA-M family, but how does it really compare to the current family of cruise missiles? In the U.S. arsenal now, there are two types of similar systems, which are the TOMAHAWK and the JASSM. Both the JASSM and the TOMAHAWK feature a larger payload and a longer range (both with a payload of 1,000 lbs and a range of 200 miles vs 1,000-1,500 miles). The JASSM is primarily designed for air-launch from bombers and tactical aircraft, specialised in striking high-value targets from a stand-off distance. In contrast, the Tomahawk is a naval cruise missile, primarily launched from ships and submarines, and designed for precision strikes against land targets. Often used in maritime operations, it can engage various targets, including enemy ships and infrastructure.
After this summary of the current U.S. arsenal, it’s time to analyse where the actual competitive edge of the BARRACUDA family lies. With an estimated cost per unit of approximately $1.4 million for the JASSM (the newer JASSM-ER can cost around $2 million per unit) and from $1.5 to $2 million per unit for the Tomahawk, these systems are more expensive than the BARRACUDA in its larger iteration, the -500, which is estimated to be about 30% cheaper29. Another issue with the current U.S. stockpile of both the Tomahawk and JASSM systems is that, during various “war games” simulating an all-out conflict with China, this stockpile could be exhausted in just over a week of sustained combat operations. Given that the current production timeline for some munitions is around 20 months, concerns are raised about the U.S.’s ability to withstand a protracted conflict. This is one of the main reasons why the BARRACUDA-M family, if its premises hold true, could be a real game-changer, acting as a force multiplier and providing much-needed attrition capabilities in the potential conflict30.
Photo by Michael Wambangco: https://www.pexels.com/photo/us-navy-airplane-in-sky-20186687/
Export capability
The U.S. are not the only countries in the NATO alliance to have this kind of cruise missiles. In fact, France, Germany, Spain, and the UK have developed such systems. The UK and France use the “Storm Shadow/SCALP EG,” while Germany and Spain deploy the “Taurus KEPD 350”. The current stockpiles of these systems, along with production timelines and cost per unit, suggest that the advent of the BARRACUDA could be an interesting addition to these countries’ arsenals, providing a valid, cheaper alternative to more expensive and harder-to-produce systems31.
Conclusion
Anduril’s innovative contributions to the defense industry have the potential to significantly reshape global power dynamics in the years to come. With emerging threats like UAVs, loitering munitions, and the broader proliferation of drones, NATO countries such as the United States must recognize that preparing solely for symmetrical warfare is no longer sufficient32. Anduril’s approach becomes crucial in this evolving landscape. Its scalable production capabilities, combined with agility in research and development, position it to meet the rapidly changing demands of modern warfare. By integrating its core product, “LATTICE AI,” Anduril provides real-time, all-domain awareness and coordination, offering operators a comprehensive view of the battlefield. This adaptive technology bridges the gap between traditional military frameworks and the newer, faster-moving technological threats, such as autonomous systems and artificial intelligence. Anduril’s strength lies in its ability to complement the slower, more bureaucratic defense apparatus of conventional forces with its ability to react quickly and at a scale. By leveraging automation, modular systems, and software-driven innovation, Anduril ensures that NATO forces, especially the U.S., are better equipped to handle both large-scale conventional conflicts and smaller, asymmetric engagements.
The flexibility of Anduril’s ecosystem, characterized by fast-paced R&D cycles and a domestic supply chain, allows for rapid deployment of crucial assets and weapons systems33. This ability to respond to emerging threats efficiently, through innovations like the Barracuda family of AAVs or scalable drone production, highlights the significance of Anduril’s role in shaping the modern defence industry. As global power competition intensifies, particularly with rivals like China, companies like Anduril will be essential in maintaining military superiority, ensuring that NATO forces are not only prepared for current challenges but also those of the future. The defense industry, traditionally slow to adapt, is now being pushed to evolve by Anduril’s pioneering model, which balances autonomy, scalability, and technological innovation.
This transformation might ultimately drive a shift in how conflicts are approached, moving from rigid, high-cost systems to more agile, lower-cost, and rapidly deployable alternatives. In this context, Anduril’s innovations could serve as a cornerstone of a new era in global defense strategy, one where agility, warfare-attrition capability, and adaptability become the pillars of power projection34.
Aitoro, Jill. “As Tech Startups Catch Dod’s Eye, Big Investors Are Watching.” Defense News, August 19, 2022. https://www.defensenews.com/smr/cultural-clash/2020/01/30/as-tech-startups-catch-dods-eye-big-investors-are-watching/. ↩︎
Tamir Eshel, By, Tamir Eshel, Tamir Eshel, News Desk, and Tamir Eshel - Oct 13. “Anduril’s Lattice AI - Defense Update:” Defense Update: - Military Technology & Defense News, January 6, 2024. https://defense-update.com/20231222_lattice-ai.html#google_vignette. ↩︎
Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. “The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.” CSIS. Accessed October 27, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan ↩︎
Gould, Joe. “US Defense Industry Unprepared for a China Fight, Says Report.” Defense News, January 24, 2023. https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2023/01/23/us-defense-industry-unprepared-for-a-china-fight-says-report/. ↩︎
Oberman, Justin P. “Redefining Disruption: A Plan to Upgrade Defense Innovation.” Defense News, August 18, 2022. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/09/09/redefining-disruption-a-plan-to-upgrade-defense-innovation/. ↩︎
Tirpak, John. “Anduril Unveils New Low-Cost ‘Barracuda’ Cruise Missiles.” Air & Space Forces Magazine, September 12, 2024. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/anduril-unveils-new-low-cost-cruise-missiles/. ↩︎
Schogol, Jeff. “The Pentagon Seeks to Stock up on Tomahawks and Other Tactical Missiles in $842 Billion Budget.” Task & Purpose, March 13, 2023. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/pentagon-2024-budget-missiles/. ↩︎
Shelbourne, Mallory. “Raytheon Awarded $217M Tomahawk Missiles Contract for Navy, Marines, Army.” USNI News, May 25, 2022. https://news.usni.org/2022/05/25/raytheon-awarded-217m-tomahawk-missiles-contract-for-navy-marines-army. ↩︎
by Margherita Ceserani, Shahin Modarres, Shir Mor, William Kingston-Cox - Iran Team
The Islamic Republic’s recent choice to directly confront Israel, avoiding its usual reliance on proxy groups, marks a significant shift in its Middle East strategy. Long dependent on groups like Hezbollah and Hamas for regional influence, the weakening of these proxies—amid Israeli retaliation and Iran’s internal crises—has led Tehran to reconsider its approach. This article explores the internal and external factors driving the Islamic Republic’s move toward a more direct confrontation.
Its proxies weakening
The Islamic Republic's decision to attack Israel directly, bypassing its traditional reliance on proxy groups - also called the "Axis of Resistance" - marks a significant shift in its strategic approach. This uncharacteristic behaviour is largely driven by the weakening of its proxies, particularly in the aftermath of the events following October 7th.
For decades, the Islamic Republic has built, supported, and relied on external groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis to exert influence, especially in the Middle East, and keep Israel engaged. However, recent Israeli military retaliation has severely weakened these proxies, diminished their operational capabilities, and reduced their effectiveness in countering Israeli threats and holding power positions in the Middle East and the whole world.
The Islamic Republic maintains a network of allied groups across the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. The IRGC Quds Force, responsible for operations beyond Iran's borders, coordinates with these groups in line with Iranian directives. This network supports Iran’s strategy to extend its influence throughout the region and beyond. For example, the Houthis have impacted maritime security in the Red Sea, prompting responses from U.S. and U.K. military coalitions in Yemen. Iran also provides funding and weaponry to groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, facilitating their actions against Israel despite Hamas' Sunni background. In Syria, Iran has established a direct influence on the Assad regime and deploys allied militias to strengthen its presence, using the country as a base for potential actions against Israel. By supporting these groups, Iran seeks to counter its adversaries, extend its ideological influence, and maintain leverage in key areas, which affects both regional and global security.
The targeted killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah by Israel, coupled with the assassination of Hamas figure Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, signifies a pivotal moment in the collapse of the "Axis of Resistance." These significant blows not only weaken Iran's most powerful regional proxies but also destabilise Tehran's long-standing influence in the Middle East. Established in the 1980s, Hezbollah evolved under Iranian support into a formidable political and military force; Nasrallah's death highlights how Israel's recent military operations have fractured Iran's strategic foothold, jeopardising its long-term plans. Similarly, Haniyeh's assassination, attributed to Israel despite no official claim of responsibility, directly challenges Iran's authority, especially given that he was in Tehran to coordinate efforts with Iranian leaders. The operation's occurrence within Iran sends a powerful message about Tehran's vulnerability and reflects a broader Israeli strategy to undermine Iran’s network of proxies which consistently threaten Israel’s security and complicates Iran’s ability to project power.
The Islamic Republic's long-term strategic plans have been significantly disrupted, prompting a notable shift toward a direct approach to its conflict with Israel. Historically reliant on proxy forces to advance its agenda, the recent weakening of these groups has forced Iran to reevaluate its strategy. The decision to directly confront Israel reflects not only an immediate tactical shift but also an acknowledgement that its traditional methods may no longer achieve its regional objectives. This transformation is underscored by the diminishing effectiveness of the "Axis of Resistance" and signifies a recalibration of tactics amid a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. These developments carry profound implications for both Iran's future strategies and broader regional stability and global security.
Domestic dissatisfaction
Tehran’s decision to escalate tensions with Israel can be understood by its multifaceted internal crises, which challenge the regime economically, politically, and socially. The economic decline of the Iranian economy has been worsened for years by international sanctions, global fluctuations and instability in oil prices, and rising inflation, fueling widespread discontent among an already-beleaguered Iranian population. Tehran has been unable to quell the resultant dissatisfaction, particularly following the protests after the death of Mahsa Amini in 2022. Amini’s death fuelled a popular challenge of cleric authority and demands for greater civil liberties.
The society of the Islamic Republic is becoming increasingly secularised, eroding the clerical influence of the regime. Its reliance upon the continued legitimacy of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which is increasingly contested as Iranian society, particularly its younger elements, becomes increasingly disillusioned with religious politicisation, and, in turn, becoming increasingly secularised. Many young Iranians are showing disdain for traditional practices, a consequence of exposure to Western media. This particular challenge for the regime is existential - its entire raison d’etre rests upon religious foundations.
Coupled with the endemic internal challenges and the pressures from its proxies, Tehran’s decision to strike Israel reveals itself as a tool of diversion; an attempt to rally patriotic fervour and unity in return for relative political stability. By framing a new national, external enemy, the Iranian regime can distract and obfuscate from its internal dissent, all whilst performatively asserting itself as a regional power. This approach undertaken by the Iranian government does, of course, risk exacerbating economic downfall as an overreliance on oil revenues could be manipulated to Tehran’s detriment. Whilst the Iranian leadership will no doubt conceive these external manoeuvres to be a part of a ‘survival strategy’, it cannot be overstated how further economic strife will precipitate deepening and widening domestic disillusionment and, ultimately, unrest, prompting new calls for regime change.
Source: photo-generated with the support of artificial intelligence.
Nuclear Advancements
Tehran’s approach to foreign policy in the Middle East is influenced by a combination of geopolitical, ideological, and military considerations, with its nuclear program playing a significant role. Since the United States' withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018, the Islamic Republic has advanced its nuclear developments, positioning these capabilities as a potential deterrent against perceived external threats, particularly from Israel. A notable development occurred in 2023, when the IAEA reported finding uranium particles enriched to 83.7% in a declared facility — a level approaching weapons-grade material.
These advancements have significantly strengthened the Islamic Republic’s strategic position, as the prospect of developing nuclear weapons reduces the likelihood of direct military intervention by its adversaries. With this deterrent in place, though not the sole factor, the Shiite regime feels emboldened to act more assertively, pushing the limits of its regional influence and responding more aggressively to external provocations. For instance, the Israeli strike on the Islamic Republic’s consulate in Damascus in April 2024 has been met with an increased likelihood of retaliation. Tehran’s nuclear capability serves as a protective shield, allowing it to project power and influence more aggressively, while its ideological goals and regional ambitions drive its assertiveness in confronting rivals like Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Despite arguments by some experts that nuclear weapons would undermine its security and diplomatic relations, Iranian officials view nuclear capabilities as a strategic asset that could grant superiority over regional adversaries. Engaging in a nuclear arms race could be economically unsustainable and diplomatically harmful for Tehran, however, nuclear capability is tied not only to military deterrence but also to a pursuit of prestige, both domestically and internationally. This aligns with its broader goal of establishing regional hegemony, while also reflecting its revolutionary ideology rooted in values like independence, anti-imperialism, and resistance to foreign domination since 1979.
Conclusion
The Islamic Republic’s shift to direct action against Israel reflects a new phase in its foreign policy. Weakened proxies and rising domestic discontent are challenging Tehran’s traditional strategies. As nuclear developments bolster its assertiveness, this new approach risks further regional instability and could have global security implications, underscoring a significant turning point in Middle Eastern dynamics.
Mirza, M.N., Abbas, H. and Qaisrani, Irfan Hasnain (2022). The Iranian Nuclear Programme: Dynamics of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), American Unisolationism and European Apprehensions. Journal of European Studies, 38(1), pp.14-32. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4002492.
Maleki, A. (2010). Iran’s nuclear file: recommendations for the future. Daedalus, 139(1), pp.105–116. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40544048 [Accessed 2024].
