Activities

March 29, 2022 — No Comments

The U.S. on the brink of an Energy Ultimatum: Will old habits die hard?

By: Aida Cavalera.

Russian belligerence against Ukraine turned the issue of energy independence into a concrete reality for many countries and underscored the inextricable nexus between issues of national, international, and energy security.

In response to the international energy crisis, the US may choose to work towards energy independence in one of two ways: either be lulled into a false sense of security by leaning on dirty drilling and reverse any progress in the field of sustainability or place its trust in the hands of clean energy solutions. While reverting to traditional fossil fuel resources to secure energy independence may be a tempting choice because of its apparent immediacy, working on sustainable sources is likely to prove not just the most environmentally-friendly, but also the most politically-sound alternative.

US Gas and Oil Industry Players: Exploiting the Energy Crisis

Since the beginning of Russian aggression on Ukraine, US gas and oil industry actors have been fanning the flames of panic and mistrust in sustainable energy solutions by trumpeting the virtues of increased extraction practices. A quick look through the American Petroleum Institute's Twitter posts since the beginning of the war highlights the common talking points put forward by the US energy industry: the need for the deregulation of drilling practices, the loosening of permitting standards, the relaxation of health and environmental safeguards, and an increase subsidies to the oil and gas industry. When faced with the reality of arguments that the US is already almost at an all-time high in the production of oil and gas, industry actors make a number of lofty claims as to the ability of increased extractive practices to solve the energy crisis; some Big Oil actors claims that, although not absolutely necessary to the US domestically, an increase in drilling will be essential in supplying gas and oil to Europe and evening out prices internationally. Other actors, such as those involved in the fracking industry, have chosen to lay low and engage in more silent but equally harmful profiteering tactics by taking advantage of escalating prices.

*Image Source*: https://pixabay.com/photos/pump-jack-oilfield-oil-fuel-848300/

The compulsive quest to collect drilling permits despite already holding the title of the world’s largest producer of oil and gas is a habit the US fossil fuel industry cannot shake. According to a report by the Bureau of Land Management, oil and gas companies already control 25 million acres of public land and have racked up 9000 approved but unutilized drilling permits on public land. This practice is encouraged by the fact that oil and gas companies can make an easy profit by simply sitting on permit-regulated federal land without even investing in actual projects.

A potential threat to sustainability initiatives

The most discouraging foreseeable consequence of the reversal to dirty extraction practices is the progressive unmaking of a number of recently passed bills and initiatives representing a first step in the direction of encouraging fossil fuel reversal in the US. Initiatives like the THRIVE Act, the Build Back Better framework, and the America the Beautiful campaign, while still not even coming close to comprehensively addressing issues of sustainability, climate change, and fossil fuel reversal, determined a partial discursive shift towards policies aimed at achieving environmentally-sound energy solutions and reducing the influence of Big Oil. The US’s choice to refrain from fully falling back into old habits of drilling its way into a false sense of security would be a sound choice from a variety of standpoints.

Implications and possible scenarios

Firstly, it may be true that the US, unlike European countries, does not have a supply shortage problem when it comes to oil and gas. It has been proven time and time again that a country’s supply independence is not sufficient when it comes to globally-priced commodities like gas and oil because of the effects of global price fluctuations. This notwithstanding, a reckless increase in drilling permits is highly unlikely to provide any relief in the stabilization of prices in the global energy market in the short term, according to reports by the Government Accountability Office.

Additionally, an increase in drilling practices and reliance on extraction activities would most likely prove counterproductive from a strict national security standpoint. Increased reliance on energy-related critical infrastructure may expose national infrastructure to heightened Russian hybrid warfare tactics such as cyberattacks aimed at infrastructure disruption. Russia is no stranger to selecting energy infrastructure projects as targets for cyberattacks as occurred in 2021 when Russia was identified as likely being responsible for the cyberattack on the Colonial pipeline.

Finally, the pursuit of energy independence through unfettered recourse to drilling would most likely generate friction between the United States and the European Union since the latter has overtly chosen to base its pursuit of energy independence on sustainable, clean energy sources through the adoption of the REPowerEU action plan. By continuing on the path of fossil fuel dependency, the US risks being politically and economically isolated.

All things considered, it is not difficult to imagine that no positive outcomes will arise from an increased reliance on fossil fuels and dirty extraction practices in pursuit of energy independence. Reversal to clean, sustainable energy sources is clearly the more environmentally-sound and politically-reasonable way to gain freedom from oil autocracies e and the recurring imminent threat of global energy crises. However, this does not mean that transition towards more sustainable energy is not fraught with a number of intricacies and potential for new geopolitical imbalances. Electrification of industry and transportation sectors, for example, constitutes one of the most obvious double edged weapons: the transition towards electrification relies on powerful batteries (such as Li-ion batteries) the main components of which are natural substances such as lithium and nickel. China and, in more recent times, Russia have already taken action to secure their control on the mining of these increasingly essential resources through investments in mining projects in lithium-rich countries like Argentina. One of the most demanding challenges of large-scale electrification-based transition will be ensuring that countries, including the US, do not trade in energy independence for further entrenched forms of supply chain dependency, thus never breaking the endless cycle of geopolitical and energy coercion.

March 24, 2022 — No Comments

The Lesser Known Side of Al Qaeda’s Conventional Warfare: 055- Brigade

By: Francesco Bruno

As a member of the Armed Forces, I have recently become involved with battlefield studies where, as students of war, we aim to enrich our knowledge on a variety of topics to rediscover practices and knowledge that would sustain our fighting ability in the future. This process of active learning is also known as “Lessons learned” and can be conducted across military campaigns and battlefields They also allow for the exploration of a variety of dimensions, including tactics, movement of troops, objectives, targets, and how these dimensions impact the war in broader terms. Personally, I found these exercises extremely interesting and exciting. I, therefore, decided to conduct a Lessons Learned of al-Qaeda, especially of the 055 Brigade to demonstrate how this group of staunch fighters summarises al-Qaeda’s best traits and practices. It is one of al-Qaeda’s finest products and has become a forgotten dimension of al-Qaeda’s war in Afghanistan due to the much more famous and developed networking capabilities of the organisation. Why would this analysis be important? Gen. Erwin Rommel once said, “Sweat saves blood, blood saves lives, but brains saves both,”. Thus, by providing an alternative analysis of al-Qaeda’s conventional warfare capabilities, I aim to spark curiosity and interest in the practices, capabilities, and tactics of the 055 Brigade to learn from our enemy and gather lessons that we could implement in the future. Of course, I do not believe that this article will in any way provide a complete analysis of the Brigade due to the limited amount of information available, but, as Otto Von Bismarck said, “Fools learn from experience. I prefer to learn from the experience of others”. Finally, to do the aforementioned, I will encompass three aspects: the nature of the brigade, its role and main functions, and finally its warfare capabilities.

Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of the Centre of Gravity stated “no matter what the central feature of the enemy’s power may be—the point on which your efforts must converge—the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin, and in every case will be a very significant feature of the campaign”. Al-Qaeda’s fighting force was composed of two main parts, the 055 Brigade or Lashkar-E-Zil and its extensive international network.^[1] The 055 Brigade came to life in the aftermath of al-Qaeda’s relocation from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1998. It had a multinational fighting force between 500 and 5000, which experts argue was comparable to “Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guards”. Some of the militants were veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War (1979 - 1989) while others were sent by a variety of regional and national jihadist groups including Uzbeks, Libyans, Saudi, Egyptians, Algerians, Sudanese, Chadi, Mauritanians, Somalians, Yemenites, Indonesians, Malaysians, and Uyghurs. The brigade was trained in a military base outside Kabul and became the conventional force of al-Qaeda reporting directly to Osama bin Laden and worked jointly as the backbone support for the Taliban forces across the country. 055 Brigade was therefore a multinational joint project which is often underestimated due to their lack of high-profile operations during the Afghan War between 2001 and 2003. However, their presence was felt in the campaign to capture Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998, the battle for Bamiyan in 1999, the massacre of Shia population near Hazarajat in 2001, and in the battle for Tora Bora the same year. The head of the brigade was Jumaboi Ahmadjonovich Khodjiyev, known as Juma Namangani, an Uzbek with three decades of warfare experience and a very scarce public record.^[2]

The 055 Brigade resembled al-Qaeda’s creative and unique approach to warfare. To explain this, the article will explore three functions of this formation. The first and most known function was to support the Taliban forces in conventional fighting by providing frontline support to the less experienced Taliban fighters. A key feature of the brigade was to provide critical morale boost to the Taliban troops demonstrating its ideological commitment and military expertise. It is indeed important to understand that the Taliban have never been a fully integrated group as many might think. Instead, they have historically been divided among smaller factions and splinters, often divided between staunch ideologically motivated and professional fighters and local grievance-motivated fighters. This second group was composed by inactive members working temporarily for the Taliban often being farmers or shepherds. Based on this distinction, the 055 Brigade constituted a backbone against defection.

Secondly, the 055 Brigade defines al-Qaeda Organization’s unique chameleonic and elitist nature. The 055 Brigade was a conventional force using unconventional techniques mostly based on an arabicized version of British and U.S. special forces training methods. This is unique across terrorist organisations. The ability of an organisation, such as al Qaeda, to train, equip, and deploy a force of this nature and to employ it flexibly demonstrates its ability to mix creativity and warfare knowledge. Specifically, the variety of personalities and characters within the brigade is quite stunning. It included not only veterans of the Afghan-Soviet War, which were trained in guerrilla warfare including ambushes, sieges, raids, strongpoints, and urban combat, but also a new generation of fighters with a much better education and deeper loyalty towards al-Qaeda’s leader, Bin Laden. This coupled with their staunch ideological convictions and decisiveness in sacrificing themselves in the name of the cause made of them an extremely useful and powerful tool.

In terms of operational capabilities and equipment, the 055 Brigade demonstrated its superiority by being better equipped and trained than the average Taliban soldier. They wore commercial night goggles, advanced Western sniper rifles with night sights, light spotter aircrafts, and utilise modern communication systems in addition to mortars, RPGs, machine guns, and AK-47s. The troops were involved in longer and more sophisticated training than what was provided by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Pakistan. The latter tied the brigade to fighting operations in Kashmir against the Indian Security forces. Whilst, the experience from the Soviet-Afghan War in al Qaeda’s 055 Brigade became evident in Operation Anaconda (2002). US and allied forces found themselves to fight asymmetric guerrilla fight, closely resembling the mujahidin’s skirmishes with Soviet heliborne Spetsnaz troops (Russian Special Forces) in the 1980s. Consequently, the fighters could operate in large and small groups as well as specialized mobile teams up to 3 to 4 people, granting them the mobility to transfer across multiple frontlines and regions of the country. In addition, they were given the chance to choose which path suited their career development. This included changing theatres of operations as well as deciding to commit martyrdom.^[3] This last point highlights al-Qaeda’s ability to provide its members with a simple “Career Development Plan”, but very much in line with those provided by employees across western businesses, demonstrating a commitment to upskill the troops.

Thirdly, the 055 Brigade’s flexibility and adaptability aligns with al-Qaeda Organization’s ability to optimise, remodel, and redeploy its forces and capabilities based on operational needs. It is clear that the 055 Brigade could not operate outside the region as an entity due to the lack of heavy equipment and transportation. However, al-Qaeda could count on another side of its fighting capabilities, the unconventional network of cells and partners around the globe. Al-Qaeda was at the time, and certainly continues to be, one of the most elite terrorist organisations across the globe. Their expertise in military tactics, administration, and logistics built on years of protracted conflicts has allowed the members to possess a certainly rare expertise and knowledge base. The 055 Brigade has been employed to provide specialist training and logistical support to al-Qaeda’s partners around the globe with the objective to initiate local jihadi revolts. The latter focused on providing leadership in technical, military, and administrative matters to al-Qaeda’s international partners. This was demonstrated by the use of such fighters in the expansion in Southeast Asia, where 055 Brigade members were routinely used to train local fighters across Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.^[4]

Since 2002, the 055 Brigade has been renamed Lashkar-E-Zil and reformed in Pakistan as an auxiliary force of al-Qaeda to support a variety of local groups and the Taliban insurgency moving across border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It also continues to participate in the fighting in Kashmir. Some of the most devastating attacks committed by this brigade were under the direction of Mustafa Abu Yazid and Ilyas Kashmiri, who were both killed in 2011. Some of the most ferocious attacks include Major General Amir Faisal Alvi, the former commander of Special Services Group of the Pakistan Army, in November 2008, in Islamabad and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Members of Laskar-E-Zil include former member of the Pakistani armed forces, veterans, and newly acquired members recruited from a variety of organisations and conflicts globally.

To conclude, despite Qaeda has never had the ability to field a conventional army in the purest sense, the internationalisation of the 055 Brigade, its mobility, adaptability, chameleonic nature coupled with employing highly advanced technology tools resemble al-Qaeda’s creativity, knowledge and highly adaptable nature as an organisation. The ability to acquire soldiers from over a dozen nations demonstrate its attractiveness and elitist nature. The staunch ideological commitment of the 055 Brigade fighters should be of clear interest as it demonstrates the commitment of al-Qaeda’s members to fulfil their mission and decisiveness in battle and in operations. The introduction of administrative and logistical practices built upon almost three decades of wars has enabled the organisation to provide its members with “Personal Development Plans”, providing them the flexibility to choose their role, career path, and development within the organisation while being paid for it. The ability to work in large as well as small, specialised groups resembling U.S. and British special forces demonstrates the ability of the organisation to remain at the forefront of warfare knowledge. The adaptability of these forces to become a multiplier was exemplified by their ability to join and form cells to provide specialised training to a variety of global partners while adding that extra edge to the Taliban forces during the Taliban insurgency. All in all, the 055 Brigade demonstrated to be one of the finest products of al-Qaeda. This, in turn, shows how the organisation can hardly be seen as a relic of the past.

^[1] Rohan Gunaratna.2001. Inside al-Qaeda pp.58-60

^[2] For more information on Juma Namangani please visit: http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e1214

^[3] Gunaratna Inside al-Qaeda p.60

^[4] Rohan Gunaratna.2001. Inside Al-Qaeda p.222

March 21, 2022 — No Comments

Interview with Nawres Arif

ITSS Verona's Middle East Team interviews Nawres Arif, an Iraqi entrepreneur, where he discusses the problems facing Iraq, the region, and the entire world.

Interviewing Team: Angelo Calianno and John Devine.

March 21, 2022 — No Comments

Russia-Ukraine War Fact Sheet

By: Sofia Staderini

The Russian tactic is that of a pincer encirclement of entire Ukraine – from Russian territory and occupied Crimea, Donbas, and Belarus - and inside they follow the same tactic as Kyiv's focus, methodically destroying civilian infrastructure and nuclear power plants. The attempt is to demoralize and coerce Ukrainians. Yet morale is rising and these same civilians are becoming soldiers. Such support somewhat offsets the quantitative advantage of the Russian army in manpower and equipment. Now, Russian troops make advances into Ukrainian territory only at the cost of hundreds of soldiers every day, failing for now to take control of any regional center.

Their qualitative advantage is very reduced, as can be inferred from the high level of losses, which seems to be well above 5%, in men and materials. Russia could take control of the territory, but only with long times and high destruction. Reservist and conscript call-ups, as well as the ongoing shipment of Syrian and Chechen militants to Russia and Belarus, will not be able to affect the balance of troops around Kyiv in the coming week, slowing down the Russian tactic as it is momentarily unable to conduct simultaneous attacks.

*Image Source*: https://it.depositphotos.com/folder/La%20verità%20sulla%20guerra%20della%20Russia%20in%20Ucraina-299150880.html?offset=200&qview=551211048&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ntf_ruby_war&utm_term=100_images

Russia is now deploying maneuverable Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, reported by Russian state news agencies as a “next-generation weapon”. While it is very unlikely that the deployment of Kh-47M2 missiles will have a major impact on the current stall of the invasion, It could likely point out a shortage of other weapons and a propagandistic effort to distort Russia’s military failure.

However, after an end of decades of deterrence orthodoxy, the danger of a possible escalation involving nuclear weapons is real. Indeed, Putin has used nuclear threats to create a wide perimeter in which he may pursue a conventional war in Europe. NATO countries are doing everything to avoid escalations, complying with a policy of non-intervention for avoiding direct contact with the Russian military.

While not directing intervening in Ukraine, NATO countries are deploying significant military aid to the country while drastically raising defense spending, reclaiming the alliance's historical role as a protective haven against Moscow's military activities. Germany in particular is now increasing its defense spending to more than 2% of its economic output: a historic departure from its postwar commitment not to transfer armaments to combat zones. Moreover, the European Union's recent investments (€500 million) in arms and other aid to the Ukrainian military mark a “watershed moment” in its history.

*Image Source*: https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/russia-now-global-economic-pariah-ruble-worth-less-than-one-penny-us-2811892

However, many countries are starting to be bitten by the economic effects of the war, especially those with currencies linked to the rubble. More sanctions implications are quite likely to emerge in the coming weeks, particularly in a case like the EU-Russia energy partnership, where dependency is significant. Indeed, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is now serving as a geopolitical catalyst on key strategic, economic, and societal issues and will certainly bring to consider re-alignments, particularly in Post-Soviet countries and the Middle East. NATO's deterrent posture must be strengthened as well as cooperation and dialogue with the various regional actors in order to figure out the next evolutions in the geopolitical chessboards.

March 18, 2022 — No Comments

Book Review: Reconfiguring the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor by Jeremy Garlick

By: Mariam Qureshi

In his latest book, Jeremy Garlick analyses the conceptions and perceptions surrounding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the ‘flagship’ project of China’s greater Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). CPEC was initially intended to provide a shorter and potentially safer trade route across Pakistan for Chinese imports and exports which would also serve as an alternative to the existing route via Straits of Malacca. However, over the years, Pakistan’s economic situation and security considerations have dampened progress on the $62 billion project announced in 2017. Garlick argues that CPEC is not really a ‘game-changer’ for Pakistan or the region, rather is more of a geopositional gambit as the project is driven more by geopolitical and security motivations than by economic considerations.

Garlick dives into the history of Sino-Pak cooperation – from shared support against territorial disputes with India to China’s clandestine support for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program – to show how political considerations play a critical role behind CPEC’s vision which ultimately aims to preserve and bolster this ‘all-weather’ alliance between the two neighbours. To deconstruct the perceptions of CPEC as an ‘economic corridor’ or ‘game-changer’, Garlick quantitatively and qualitatively analysed over 100 most-cited publications for general assumptions and more specifically for terms such as ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and ‘Game-Changer’. Divided into six chapters, the book unpacks existing narratives around CPEC, the reality and myths around the economic considerations, the Malacca Dilemma, geopolitical and security considerations, all culminating into the concluding chapter that shows how CPEC is not the ‘game-changer’ for Pakistan.

*Image Source*: https://www.routledge.com/Reconfiguring-the-China-Pakistan-Economic-Corridor-Geo-Economic-Pipe-Dreams/Garlick/p/book/9780367863210

First, Garlick shows how it is doubtful that CPEC could serve as an ‘economic corridor’ for the region given how almost all the projects initiated under it are situated within Pakistan. These projects solely focus on boosting Pakistan’s economic, energy, transport, and infrastructure sectors, except for the fiber-optic cable project, which is the only project running cross-border into China. This, Garlick argues, shows how CPEC could be restricted to deepening Pak-China ties and supporting Pakistan’s dwindling economy that has been unable to secure both foreign investors and American aid.

Next, Garlick analyses one of the most significant projects under CPEC, the Gwardar Project, aimed at developing the Gwadar port in Pakistan which would allow China access to the Indian Ocean and port facility for its imports and exports among other benefits. Further, a Gwadar-Xinjiang Pipeline is expected to resolve the supposed ‘Malacca Dilemma’ – a chokepoint in the Straits of Malacca which, if blocked, could hamper 80% of Chinese oil supplies. However, upon closer inspection, Garlick shows how a Gwadar-Xinjiang Pipeline does not appear feasible owing to the difficult Himalayan terrain; a pipeline passing through the mountains would require insulation and supporting structure thus adding to the construction costs. Additionally, alternative routes through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Xinjiang or even maritime routes as opposed to the land route via Himalayan terrain renders a Gwadar-Xinjiang Pipeline rather illogical. Garlick also shows how the port capacity of Gwadar has not increased over the years, which makes its limited capacity unfit for greater Chinese shipments or even for trade in Central Asia. More importantly, the security threats in Baluchistan due to separatist and terrorist elements have, over the years, hindered any substantial progress on the project and have put lives of Chinese officials in danger. Given all the difficulties attributed with the Gwadar project, Garlick shows the significance of Chinese investment by terming their presence in Gwadar as geopositional hedging; the Chinese aim to establish their presence in a relatively strategic location – in this case near the Strait of Hormuz – so that it may prove beneficial against any potential future risk.

Garlick also argues that the lack of transparency with the project, particularly in terms of its financial details, raises doubts over corruption and cronyism. This is further fueled by the fact that an ex-general now serves as the head of CPEC, raising questions on the extent of military interference in Pakistan. Though lack of transparency is not the only trouble with finances; Pakistan’s mounting national debt – which stood at 35.8 trillion rupees (US$228 billion) in November 2020 – together with perpetual shortage of foreign exchange reserves and China's debt trap diplomacy has made it difficult for the country to pay off Chinese debt. Garlick also unpacks various energy and infrastructure projects initiated under CPEC in Pakistan to show how, even if the said $62 billion is invested under CPEC, the amount is too small to create a significant difference; further casting doubt on whether CPEC is a ‘game-changer’ for Pakistan.

The book very succinctly maps out the internal dynamics of Pakistan from the military influence in politics to separatist trouble in Baluchistan and its dwindling economy to explain how various factors impact CPEC’s vision and execution. Garlick's extensive research and meticulous analysis is evident as he challenges prevalent assumptions and perceptions regarding CPEC existing in literature and in media. Garlick offers a fresh and distinct perspective on why CPEC should not be considered a ‘game-changer’ and how instead it has become a source of “excessive debt, elite corruption, and poor outcomes for Pakistan’s economy and people”.

March 18, 2022 — No Comments

Leonardo Zanatta on the Russia Ukraine Conflict and its implications on European Energy Security

Mr Leonardo Zanatta is a current Phd candidate in International Security Studies at Corvinus University in Budapest. He talks about the role of the European Union in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, reflecting on the possibility to reduce EU dependency from Russian gas, the possible effect of the EU sanctions on Russia and the perspectives of the conflict.

Interviewers: Eleonora Shehu,Alessandro Spada, Rosa Maria Torraco

This is ITSS Verona Member Series Video Podcast by the UK & European Affairs Team.

ITSS Verona - The International Team for the Study of Security Verona is a not-for-profit, apolitical, international cultural association dedicated to the study of international security, ranging from terrorism to climate change, from artificial intelligence to pandemics, from great power competition to energy security.

March 16, 2022 — No Comments

Russian Military Doctrine: An Overview

By: Danilo delle Fave and Marco Verrocchio.

The Russian Military Reform of 2014

The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine has now skyrocketed among the news and masses of people are expressing their disapproval for the war through marches and protests worldwide. However, intelligence services and scholars had warned that a regional conflict between the two countries was foreseeable. To better understand the reasons behind Putin’s decision, an analysis of Russia’s 2014 military doctrine is fundamental. A military doctrine is essentially a public document that summarizes in strategic and theoretical terms the military capabilities in defending, offending and retaliating against threats. While Soviet-era doctrines were unpublished, the Russian federation documents are public, and they describe the political direction of Russia in military affairs. The 2014 version is divided in: generic provisions, the military dangers and threats, the military policy and the military economic-defence support. In comparison to the Soviet era, Russian military doctrines emphasize the defensive approach, and they profit from lessons learned from military conflicts and analysis of different scenarios. In the ethos of Russian “Motherland”, Russia is perceived as an object to be protected and a subject capable of reacting.

Military offensive operations are justified under a defensive provision which aims to prevent threats towards Russia. United Nations and international treaties are invoked in supporting this theory. Russia’s allies and partners are clearly mentioned. Belarus is the closest ally, with fully integrated armed forces, infrastructures and coordination. CSTO, CIS and BRICS countries are mentioned “to strengthen the system of collective security”. In comparison to the 2010’s military doctrine, the EU is perceived no longer functional to pursue national security, but an equal partner to maintain a status-quo.

The 2014 version also abandons all possible cooperation with NATO as well. The Russian ambition to pursue a regional defense policy guarantees that border states do not adopt an approach that threatens the Russian Federation. A specific section that implicitly was dedicated to the case of Ukraine mentions that overthrowing of legitimate governments in bordering states is a serious menace for Russia. Another reference regards 2011-12 Russian protests, declaring that anti-nationalistic information led by external parties is a menace. In some issues, Russia has a dualist approach, perceiving an issue both as a threat and as a mean. For instance, the use of private military contractors (PMCs) is a military danger but it is an inevitable component of contemporary warfare. The same idea is applied to the militarization of the information, which undermines Russia from abroad but is also a novel area of improvement. The 2014 also reflects a much more reliance on Russia in using tools of hybrid warfare. While the 2010 version made a generic use of hybrid warfare, the 2014 version highlighted that Russia would rely on military means only after political, diplomatic, judicial, economic, information and other non-kinetic means have been used.

*Image Source*: https://pixabay.com/photos/monument-to-minin-and-pozharsky-177843/

Gerasimov’s Doctrine and Hybrid Warfare

During an event in the Russian Academy of Military Sciences in 2019, the Russian Chief of General Staff, Valery Gerasimov described Russian military strategy as “Active Defense”. What does he mean by “Active Defense”? It is a strategic concept integrating preemptive measures to prevent conflict and wartime concepts of operations that seek to deny to the enemy a decisive victory in the initial period of war, degrading and disorganizing its effort, while setting the conditions for a counteroffensive or attaining war termination. The strategy privileges a permanent standing force, arrayed as high readiness operational formations in each strategic direction, prepared to execute operations jointly.

At the beginning, the Russian military needs to manipulate an opponent through the demonstration of his readiness, deployments, exercises, weapon tests and demonstrative actions and, if it is necessary, they can include a demonstrative use of force and limited strikes. After the period called “Pre-War”, the aim of the “Active Defense” is to inflict disorganisation on the opponent via long-range strikes against critically important objects at operational depths and beyond, in order to reach the goal of disorganizing the enemy’s effort, degrading his ability to sustain operation and affecting his political and at the same time maximize the survivability of the Russian units and preserve the force.

The “Active Defense” is based on two main tenets: Maneuver Defense and Non contact Warfare. Unlike World War I and World War II, the idea of using their own main effort to create a potential defense and a massive manned front, is totally obsolete in the eyes of the Russian strategists. Maneuver Defense for the Russian Military means that fires and strikes systems will attrit the opponent’s forces as they advance, and his aim is to destroy an opponent’s initial operation plan and buy time for reserves or follow forces to arrive, exhaust the opponent’s forces, and subsequently seize the initiative. Turning to Noncontact Warfare, the term is somewhat muddled, as there is a commonly held Russian military belief that modern warfare will feature forward operating sensors, fires, and precision strike systems. War will be driven by information, command and control systems, and precise means of destruction. However, non contact speaks more to the employment of longer-range capabilities to attack critical objects at substantial operational and strategic ranges.

With the Georgian and Ukrainian crisis of 2008 and 2013, the Russian armed forces have developed the so called New Generation Warfare, 4th Generation Warfare, or Hybrid Warfare. Hybrid warfare does not aim to victory through the defeat of the enemy on the battlefield but regime change and the achievement of the Kremlin’s goals. Therefore, the military became one element of a much larger set of foreign policy instruments aimed to reach political gains. The Hybrid force is composed of conventional forces and special corps, like the Spetsnaz, that operate in coordination with a militarized local population, like Donbass separatist militias. The militias are usually formed not directly by Russian forces, but by contracted forces from outside the area of operations which serves along militias, usually binded by a contract. Moreover, in the Hybrid force is also fundamental the role of Private Military Contractors (PMC), like the Wagner group, that can aid the efforts of regular forces and militias. It is the formalization of war by proxy, which is cleared witnessed by the praxis of Russian armed forces in Syria, Ukraine and Georgia.

The Russian military doctrine emphasizes therefore the political aspect of warfare, and the link between military operations and its ideological and foreign policy aspects: in all the three major fronts (Syria, Ukraine, Georgia), the Russians have carefully prepared the public affairs and the narrations in all their conflicts. They always claimed that their intervention was the result of a request for help, Ossetians and Abcazians in Georgia, russophone separatists in Ukraine, the Assad government in Syria. They deployed their PMCs in Africa, which helped them to further their influence on the Continent, with the successful coups in Mali and Central African Republic. The difficulties in improving their capabilities have inevitably shaped Russian military doctrine from conventional warfare of the Soviet era to a new form of warfare that can be defined as “non-linear”.

March 14, 2022 — No Comments

From a Hashtag to a Trans-State Insurgency: Cyberspace and the Antiracist Movements

By: Julia Hodgins and Leigh Dawson.

Following the anti-racist movement sparked by the killing of George Floyd, #BlackLivesMatter generated worldwide attention by connecting clusters of individuals with compatible claims about race, marginalization, and police brutality. The movement turned into a global social insurgency facilitated by shared long-term grief and amplified by cyberspace.

In July 2013, Patrice Cullors, Alicia Garza, and Opal Tometi created and tweeted the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter, in response to the acquittal of George Zimmerman, accused of killing Trayvon Martin, an unarmed African American teenager. Unlike social movements before it, #BlackLivesMatter reawakened the collective memory of racial oppression using a new medium – social media. This hashtag has become a referent to highlight multiple cases of African-American citizens killed by police officers in the USA. According to The Washington Post’s database, roughly 1252 were killed by police between January 2015 and July 2020. This social and cultural movement is iconic of the oppression that African-Americans have and continue to endure in USA – much of which is rooted in America’s slavery past.

The new public ‘agora’

The increased accessibility and connectivity of cyberspace made it possible for a seemingly mundane event to reach a global audience; a phenomenon, prior to the advent of internet, restricted to those with enough social capital that remained part of the public agora alone.

Today, non-state actors – particularly individuals and civil collectives – connect online under less complex rules and often without punishment. Although, some states, like China and former Soviet nations, heavily regulate and redact content its population can see and engage with online. The legal framework and its enforcement practices often do lag in relation to cyberspace’s exponential growth and innovation, enabling non-state actors to maximize their exchanges – in quantity and quality – and by extension, wield outside of their local networks.

The unprecedented speed and outreach capacity of social media foster an unparalleled amplification power, turning cyberspace into a transformative domain that enables communities of shared experiences or beliefs to amalgamate into influential worldwide trends. Increased interconnectivity leads to a new level of collective interoperability, benefiting individuals and groups directly by growing their social capital through these exchanges. Citizens ‘live’ as both virtual and kinetic personas connected in one living macrostructure alongside public and private networks, collective spaces, and the content these all produce. As an unintended consequence of the dynamics within cyberspace, persistent disruptive social processes have found new ways to create tangible influence; this is what happened with #BlackLivesMatter.

Optic fibers knit social tissue

Support networks between people, and the sense of belonging shaping them, are timeless. Just as centuries ago, today humans associate in search of mutual help, of spaces to share feelings, of making sense of their lives by revisiting their past and imagining their future. Part of this collective memory is shared grief, and remembrance. There is not, however, a natural link between collective memory or indignation, and cyber connectivity. How did collective memory migrate online?

Large-scale, corporate, non-state actors dominate cyberspace, and their influence sponsors the proliferation of smaller non-state actors; as Singer and Brookings state, “For all the talk of ‘community,’ these platforms are businesses.” Following the inception of cyberspace, social media companies grew and profited by offering online community spaces to individuals, civil collectives, and smaller business, either free or at a tiny fraction of office expenses and thereby connecting physically remote individuals through smartphones, computers, tablets, and other devices.

The number of Internet users has grown from 2.6 million in 1990 up to 4.66 billion in 2021, according to ourworldindata.org and Statista. The agency and power each actor have is uneven, and in most cases inferior to states’ power based on budget and influence, but the devil is in the detail. Cyberspace has enabled individuals to connect and share voices beyond borders, the interplay of online activity and offline creates a tangible social impact in a way that has altered the relationship between themselves and the state within cyberspace, though states do remain dominant offline.

While corporate actors reign in cyberspace, countless smaller non-state actors have gained traction and agency through mass leverage of their voices, thereby creating new patterns of social forces which challenge the status quo with diverse impact on power asymmetries.

And just like that…

That is how antiracist movements became a global movement for justice; the killing of George Floyd triggered colossal indignation, and spurred memory trips to similar events prompting the #BlackLivesMatter tweet, activated by pain, hopelessness, and rage deriving from both the remembrance of lost loved ones dead on the hands of racist police brutality, and historical struggles. As online activity continued trending, protests were replicated across the planet and headlines covering them increased, which reinforced both online activity and street protests; these two incorporated new cases of black citizens killed in similar ways. In Jay Winter’s words, “Suffering [was] democratized,” thanks to cyberspace. Winter also argues that such shared grief migrated geographically and intergenerationally; this double-dimension migration brought to the forefront a sentiment of restitution expressed in multivocal stories shaping a worldwide demand for social justice and equality. A paramount example is the video that Darnella Frazier, a 17 year-old high school student, spontaneously recorded when witnessing the arrest and asphyxiation of Mr. Floyd. Her video went viral after she posted it in Facebook in May 27, 2020, and was of essential value during the trial that convicted Derek Chauvin, the officer whose knee suffocated Mr Floyd. Ms Frazier stated that “she felt she has to document it.” The video later earned her a Pulitzer Special Citation and has been attributed as responsible for the rebirth of the civil rights movement.

Ms. Frazier’s video ignited feelings of grief and indignation around Mr. Floyd’s killing worldwide, which aligned in real-time clusters of social unrest that were geographically scattered but connect via tags, retweets and likes, thus, strengthening their activities. This collective remembrance later connected with the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter – active since 2013 – lending it new salience. Once hashtag and meaning were articulated together, the movement gained unprecedented momentum and aligned multiple antiracial protests within the USA and abroad into what Colin Gray forecasts in Another Bloody Century (2006); an intra-state and trans-state conflict. It also resembled David Kilcullen’s definition of irregular warfare, as memorialisation and social insurgency interplayed between urban settings and online venues.

Official net-warring

Historical patterns of domination at the root of persistent social inequality, which are based on an assumed – yet not factual – racial superiority, have survived within many nations in the shape of systemic racism, fuelling counternarratives between state(s) and protesting groups. During the upsurge of this antiracist social insurgency, American President Donald Trump was at war with protestors and deployed the National Guard to help local authorities regain control of their cities after rebels hijacked the peaceful protests and began destroying businesses. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson delegitimized marches by calling them ‘thuggery’; and, the former Royal Canadian Mounted Police Commissioner Kristy Kirkup neglected the systemic racism blatantly present within the federal police force and other societal systems across Canada. The hashtag #AllLivesMatter, began circulating across the same channels, attempting to delegitimize #BlackLivesMatter, a Conservative response rooted in counterinsurgency tactics, arguing that everyone’s life is important, but failing to include the elements of structural racism at the heart of the BLM movement on it.

Conclusion

The Black Lives Matter movement has shone a spotlight on more than two centuries of racial inequality and structural racism that had been allowed to proliferate in the USA, and across the world, unchallenged. The movement empowered youth, connecting them with historical grievances of their ancestors and those of today that still shape societal relations, locally and globally. However, #BLM’s collective memory and remembrance would not have turned into this trans-state uprising reaching worldwide prominence, without the transforming power of the horizontal amplification and vertical proliferation that cyberspace provides.

March 13, 2022 — No Comments

The Right to Adequate Food

By: Diletta Cosco.

The right to adequate food was firstly recognized in article 25 of the Universal Declaration of human rights in 1948, as well in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man the same year; It then became a “legal entitlement”, “codified in article 11” of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Currently, 163 countries have ratified this convention, yet the right to food needs further practice both nationally and internationally. Since the 1948, especially after the recognition of the right to food into the two declarations mentioned above, the importance of this human right has captured further attention and it has been recognized in other several declarations and treaties.

The right to food is a basic human right protected under international human rights and humanitarian law and is recognized directly or indirectly by virtually all countries in the world through article 25.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Food is considered as part of the right to health and well-being and an important need for a proper “standard of living, health and well-being of people”. The right to food is interconnected with other human rights as well; in fact, the lack of enjoyment of this right excludes the proper enjoyment of “life, dignity or the enjoyment of other human rights”.

The Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural rights adopted a document which defines the definition of the right to food. According to the meaning given, the right to food involves a quantity and quality that should be good enough to allow an individual to fulfil the necessary dietary needs. The right to food implies also a nutrition that is aligned according the culture of a certain individual. The Committee also established a violation of human rights whether a state does not fulfil the right to food to its citizens. The interest to adopt a human right based approach towards the end of hunger constitutes now a core mission in the United Nations (UN) policies which focus in parallel towards the development and fulfilment of human rights. The UN Millennium Development Goals, precisely in the sustainable Goal number 2, encourage states to commit to the guarantee of food to its citizenships and the end of hunger by 2030. The right to food usually requires government’s accountability mainly, but also other international and national actors such as the inter-governmental organizations are doing their parts towards the fulfilment of right to food; although, states play the most crucial role in the fulfilment of right to food. In fact, “states are duty-bearers, while people are right-holders”.Specifically, states are responsible to ensure this right is fulfilled when an agreement, treaties or declaration is signed; this means that states have signed to take part to the compliment of the right to food and consequently adequate legislations are required as well. In fact, states have the primary role to “respect, protect and fulfil” the right to food; conventions, declarations and treaties are necessary but additional instruments are fundamental to facilitate its implementation. Integrating this right into a country’s constitution is the first and most important step to ensure its fulfilment and it represents the greatest commitment that a country can have. Embedding this right into the Constitution would give long-term protection to the right itself and any law found in contrast with the right to food would be submitted for review, as laws that are in contradiction with the right to food are considered unconstitutional. In the case of South America and the Caribbean region, 15 countries have officially included the right to food into their constitution. Even though, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba and Mexico are the only countries which recognize the right to food for all people, indistinctively. Countries in Latin America and the Caribbeans are a good example of commitment of ending hunger through the manifestation of various declarations about the right to food. A practical commitment should take place through the implementation of this basic human rights into their legislation as well. However, the recognition in constitutions itself is not enough but can be considered as a fair starting point towards the achievement of this objective; laws and legal framework are likewise necessary, cooperation between several actors at national and international level is fundamental as well.

March 8, 2022 — No Comments

Maria Zuppello on Tropical Jihad in Latin America

Maria Zuppello talks about Jihad in Central and Latin America, with a particular focus on her book “Tropical Jihad. The crime-terror nexus in Latin America”. Maria Zuppello is a freelancer video journalist who has worked with The Guardian, AFP, AP, The Economist, RSI.

In this session, Maria Zuppello shows the results of her research on tropical jihadism and presents the main arguments of her book “Tropical Jihad. The crime-terror nexus in Latin America”, foreword by Emanuele Ottolenghi. She investigates on the links between jihadist groups and narcotraffickers, as well as on the presence of al-Qaeda and Isis at the Triple Frontier shared by Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina.

Interviewers: Giovanni Giacalone, Marta Pace, Beatrice Tommasi

This is ITSS Verona Member Series Video Podcast by the Central and South America Team.

ITSS Verona - The International Team for the Study of Security Verona is a not-for-profit, apolitical, international cultural association dedicated to the study of international security, ranging from terrorism to climate change, from artificial intelligence to pandemics, from great power competition to energy security.

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