April 13, 20221 Comment

Enlargement of NATO to Eastern Europe: Reasons and Consequences for European Security

By: Alessandro Spada.

Introduction

Today, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) is an intergovernmental military alliance among the US, Canada and 28 European countries – but it has not always been this  large. Indeed, when Nato was first conceived in 1949 it was made up of just 12 members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US. The creation of the Alliance pursued three essential purposes: “deterring Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration”. The accession process is regulated by Article 10 of the Treaty and other European Countries can be invited to participate. The aspiring member countries must meet key requirements and implement a multi-step process including political, economic, defence, resource, security and legal aspects. In case they are experiencing any issue, they can request assistance, practical support and the advice by a NATO programme, which is called the Membership Action Plan (MAP)

Image Source: The Expansion of NATO Since 1949

Past enlargements

After the end of the Cold War, we can witness four different waves of NATO expansion to Eastern Europe. The first important wave of expansion to the East was launched by the reunification of Germany in 1990. On 12th September 1990, the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, commonly known as Two Plus Four Treaty, was signed by the foreign ministers of  the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR, France, Russia, the UK and the USA. The Treaty regulated all the foreign policy aspects of German reunification, including the membership to Nato, and imposed the withdrawal of all the foreign troops and the deployment of their nuclear weapons from the former East Germany and also the prohibition to West Germany’s possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. On October 3rd 1990, the  German Democratic Republic and Federal Republic were reunited again.

As to the second wave, the new member countries were Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. First, on 15th February 1991 they formed the Visegrad Group. Then, on 1st January 1993, Czechoslovakia split into two independent countries: Czech Republic and Slovakia. In 1997, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary took part in the Alliance’s Madrid Summit and on 12th March 1999, the three former Warsaw Pact members joined NATO. The main reasons were: “to ensure thecountry’s external security”, to impede “the possibility of a great war in unstable Central Europe” and for Poland also “to advance its military capabilities”.

In May 2000, a group of NATO candidate countries created the Vilnius Group (Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). The Vilnius Group resorted to the Membership Action Plan which was introduced by NATO for the first time at the 1999 Washington Summit. In addition, Croatia joined the Vilnius Group in May 2001. The Summit of the NATO Aspirant countries “Riga 2002: The Bridge to Prague” started the path towards the alliance’s membership which took place in Riga, Latvia, on July 5-6, 2002, where the leaders of NATO member and aspirant countries gathered for the last time before the NATO 2002 Prague Summit in November. On 29th March 2004, the largest wave of enlargement in alliance history materialized, except for Albania and Croatia. For Baltic states and Bulgaria, NATO membership symbolized their wish to be part of the European family. NATO was perceived not just merely as a military alliance with security guarantees under Article 5, but as a symbol of higher development, where Baltic states could find their proper place. Moreover, it was the attempt to escape Russian influence, in favor of the protection provided by the American strategic nuclear umbrella and a collective defence.

The same path of the Vilnius Group was followed by the Adriatic Charter of European  countries. The Adriatic Charter was created in Tirana on 2nd May by Albania, Croatia and Macedonia and USA for the purpose to obtain their North Atlantic Alliance admission. Albania and Macedonia were previous participants of MAP since its creation in 1999, while Croatia joined in 2002. Moreover, Macedonia also took part in Nato's Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1995. On 1st April 2009, the North Atlantic Alliance officially annexed Albania and Croatia after their participation in the 2008 Bucharest Summit. Macedonia accession was postponed because of a dispute on the formal name with Greece. Macedonia became NATO's 30th country on 27th March 2020. Montenegro emulated the same path of the latter, but joined three years before on 5th June 2017, after the Accession Protocol signature in May 2016. For Montenegro itself, the major incentives to join NATO were the future eventuality of EU membership, the highest prestige of the Atlantic Alliance and to achieve “Nato’s security guarantee”.

Future enlargements

Bosnia Herzegovina is the only potential candidate which joined the Membership Action Plan on 5th December 2018.  In spite of Georgia and Ukraine expressing the will to start their path to the North Atlantic Alliance, their situation is still uncertain. The primary reason remains the need to meet all necessary requirements through important reforms focused on key areas; and, the current Russia-Ukraine war.

Consequences for the European Security

On one hand, many consequences, which were the main reasons for NATO expansion to the East, materialized in reality. For example, the inclusion of Eastern Europe nations in the military agreement have promoted democratic reform and stability there, provided stronger collective defense and an improved ability to address new security concerns, improved relations among the Eastern and Central European states, fostered a more stable climate for economic reform, trade, and foreign investment, and finally, improved NATO's ability to operate as a cooperative security organization with broad European security concern,” as stated in the clear purposes contained in a prepared statement of the Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright on 23rd April 1997.

On the other hand, in spite of NATO's open door policy with Russia, the latter constitutes  the largest threat for European security once again in the energy, political and military field. Indeed, the current conflict in Ukraine shows the evident ambition to create a new Russian empire by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Many warnings about Russia’s reaction were expressed in the declarations of Biden’s CIA director, William J. Burns, when he worked as counselor for political affairs at the US embassy in Moscow in 1995. On 26th June 1997, a group of 50 prominent foreign policy experts that included former senators, retired military officers, diplomats and academicians, sent an open letter to President Clinton outlining their opposition to NATO expansion”In the end, the father of the Cold War containment doctrine, George F. Kennan described the NATO expansion as a “tragic mistake”.

Conclusion

The current Russian invasion in Ukraine puts in clear evidence the necessity for the EU countries to accelerate the formation process of the European Army. They will have to achieve energy independence by using Russian gas, diversifying their own supplier countries and to invest massively in the green economy. Moreover, the EU must strengthen its common foreign policy, implementing an effective diplomatic action and speaking with one voice to cope with the great tensions around Europe and the rest of the world. If not, the European project will risk crumbling. 

April 13, 2022No Comments

Admiral (Retired) Lee Hsi-Min on Taiwan’s Military Defence

Admiral Lee Hsi-min (retired) is a Senior Fellow at the Project 2049 Institute. He previously served as the Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Armed Forces from 2017 to his retirement in July 2019 after 42 years of service in the ROC Navy. Before his retirement, he was awarded the Order of the Cloud and Banner with Special Grand Cordon by President Tsai Ing-wen in recognition of his service in enhancing the overall capabilities of Taiwan’s military. He has authored articles in The Diplomat and War on the Rocks on issues related to Taiwan.

He answers a series of questions regarding Taiwan’s preparedness against potential Chinese invasion, lessons for Taiwan’s Territorial Defence Force from the Ukrainian experience and the edge it may or may not have as an island state against China when compared to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.

Interviewing Team: Sandra Watson Parcels and Carlotta Rinaudo

April 11, 2022No Comments

Maxim Alyukov on Russian Media, Autocracy and Information Control

In this interview, Dr Maxim Alyukov explores how political engagement in authoritarian states affects the ways in which its citizens interpret the news, particularly focussing on the Russia-Ukraine War. How does the media in Russia document the conflict in Ukraine? What is the response from the Russian community? This discussion centres on research by Dr Alyukov on how citizens living in authoritarian regimes interpret political information in a heavily regulated media landscape.

Dr Maxim Alyukov is a postdoctoral fellow at King’s Russia Institute, King's College London. He is also a researcher with Public Sociology Laboratory (St Petersburg). His research has been published in a variety of disciplinary and area studies journals, such as PoliticsQualitative Psychology, and Europe-Asia Studies. He holds a PhD in social sciences from the University of Helsinki and an MA in sociology from the European University at Saint-Petersburg. 

Interviewers: Leigh Dawson, Julia Hodgins, and Sofia Staderini.

April 11, 2022No Comments

Alessandro Vivaldi on the Challenges for Intelligence and Geopolitical Analysts of our Times

Alessandro Vivaldi talks about the main challanges for intelligence and geopolitical analysts in our times. He is president at AIAIG - Associazione Italiana Analisti di Intelligence e Geopolitica. In this session, Alessandro Vivaldi talks about the role of the analyst in Italy and Continental Europe in the public and private sector. He also explains the most common mistakes committed by analysts and how they can overcome them in the era of infodemic and fake news.

Interviewer: Danilo delle Fave.

This is ITSS Verona Member Series Video Podcast by the Intelligence and Military Strategy Team ITSS Verona - The International Team for the Study of Security Verona is a not-for-profit, apolitical, international cultural association dedicated to the study of international security, ranging from terrorism to climate change, from artificial intelligence to pandemics, from great power competition to energy security.

April 6, 2022No Comments

Security Relations between Italy and the Middle East (Italiano)

By: Sarah Toubman and Filippo Grassi.

Italian state security has become evermore intertwined with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in recent days, as the invasion of Ukraine by Russia has highlighted the need for Europe to secure a renewable, multi-origin energy supply, as well as the importance of European food supplies in North Africa. The impact of war on Ukrainian and Russian harvests has not only caused wheat shortages in European markets, but also devastated grain imports across the MENA region, such as in Tunisia, Morocco and Libya. European sanctions on Russian oil and gas have also sent the cost of energy soaring, leading European leaders to seek other sources of fuel, including in the Middle East. War in Eastern Europe could see Western Europe and the EU seeking out a stronger partnership with the MENA region in both trade and diplomacy. However, Europe and the MENA region would have to overcome historic and contemporary tensions in order to achieve closer collaboration.

Currently, Egypt imports 54.5% of its wheat from Russia, while Tunisia imports 47.7% of the grain from Ukraine. With this year’s harvests rotting in warehouses in Eastern Europe as war rages, the Middle East and North Africa must seek alternative supplies to feed their populations. Numerous EU countries could stand to benefit. France is a huge global wheat producer, growing 30.1 millions ton of the grain in 2020--less than Russia’s 85.9 million ton harvest, but more than the 24.9 million tons Ukraine raked in the same year. Germany also produced a competitive 22.2 million tons in 2020. Although Italy grew a more modest 6.7 million tons, the country did export over $24.8 millions in wheat in 2020. Thus, Middle Eastern and North African nations could reasonably seek to procure more EU and Italian grain exports.

European leaders are already considering the increased purchase of oil and gas from the MENA region. Such measures would ensure energy diversity and security for the continent, and further damage the Russian economy, which the EU hit with a package of sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine. For example, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian held talks with officials from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on March 27th on possibly increasing energy purchasing from the Middle East. The Foreign Minister also held a similar discussion withQatar's Minister of State for Energy Affairs, Saad Sherida al-Kaabi, on the 28thConsidering the increase in calls for joint European energy procurement, such a move by France could also strongly influence Italian oil and gas purchasing habits.

Further Western European importation of Middle Eastern and North African gas and oil would serve to strengthen a pre-existing trade relationship between Italy and MENA. While the EU as a whole imported 27, 41, and 47 percent of oil, gas, and coal, respectively, from Russia in 2019, it also imported 9% of oil from Iraq, 8% of oil from Saudi Arabia, 8% of natural gas from Algeria, and 5% of its gas from Qatar. While Italy also imported roughly 44% of natural gas from Russia in 2016, its imports from the MENA region vastly exceeded that of the EU, with 37% of gas coming from Libya or Algeria.

However, in order to establish mutual food and energy security, Italy and the MENA region would have to build stronger ties in both the trade and diplomatic spheres, working through historic and contemporary tensions. To this day, Italy’s relations with the MENA region are still damaged by the country’s legacy of colonization in Libya and the Horn of Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, as well its support for France’s colonization of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco

More contemporary events have also impacted the relations between Italy and MENA. The migrant crisis which began in 2010 and intensified in 2015 saw millions of refugees from Asia, Africa and the Middle East fleeing to Europe following conflicts at home. At some points in the crisis, the majority of migrants were crossing over from North Africa into Italy, regardless of their country of origin. This created a situation of mutual blame and distrust between Libya and Italy, as foreign migrants were often either denied entry to Italy and left to drown at sea, or detained and mistreated at centers in Libya. Italian politicians such as former Prime Minister Matteo Salvini often made inflammatory comments about immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa. At one point, Salvini defended a colleague for shooting a Moroccan immigrant, and even faced kidnapping charges for detaining a boat of 147 refugees.

Tensions between Italy and the MENA region have also flared due to incidents involving Italian researchers and businesspeople on the African continent. In 2015, Italian PhD student Giulio Regeni was kidnapped, tortured, and killed in Cairo after allegedly being extorted for money. In December 2021, Patrick Zaki, an Egyptian student at the University of Bologna, was finally released after being unlawfully detained and beaten in Mansoura, Egypt, for almost a year. Marco Zennaro, a Venetian entrepreneur, was also detained in Sudan for almost a year before his release.While these events have weakened the diplomatic relationships between Italy and the MENA region, some hostilities in recent memory have actually served to strengthen their strategic ties. While they did not meet their strategic goals, Italian peacekeeping troops in Beirut during the Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s have been lauded for their “sustained neutrality, respectful behavior and minimal [use of] force.”

In a 2017 article, scholar Elisabetta Brighi observed that in the Middle East, “Italy has pursued a number of strategic interests—in the areas of migration, energy, security, and geopolitics—in parallel to, yet sometimes in open contrast to, a set of normative commitments to human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.” Italy has also had to contend with “the peculiar role of corporate interests—particularly those of oil and energy companies—in the country’s definition of ‘national interests.’ The need for Italy to balance strategic, human rights, and energy interests in the Middle East and North Africa has only become more crucial in recent weeks and will only continue to grow in coming years. As Italy and Western Europe seek diverse and secure energy sources outside of Eastern Europe, North Africa may too turn their grain purchasing power to the West. In order to create such a relationship of mutual security between the two regions, leaders must seek diplomatic solutions to long-standing strategic and human rights concerns.

Image Source: https://static01.nyt.com/images/2017/08/19/world/19Migrants2/19Migrants2-superJumbo.jpg?quality=75&auto=webp

ITALIAN TRANSLATION

La sicurezza dello stato italiano è diventata negli ultimi giorni sempre più legata alla regione del Medio Oriente del Nord Africa. Infatti l’invasione dell’Ucraina da parte della Russia ha evidenziato, da un lato, la necessità per l’Europa di assicurarsi un approvvigionamento energetico rinnovabile e diversificato, dall’altro ha posto l’accento sull’importanza delle forniture alimentari europee in Nord Africa. L’impatto della guerra sui raccolti ucraini e russi non solo ha causato carenze di grano nei mercati europei, ma ha anche colpito duramente le sue importazioni in tutta la regione MENA, così come in Tunisia, Marocco e Libia.

Inoltre, le sanzioni di Bruxelles sul petrolio e sul gas russo hanno causato un’esponenziale crescita del costo dell’energia, portando i leader europei a cercare nuove fonti di carburante, in particolar modo anche in Medio Oriente

A tal proposito, la guerra in Ucraina potrebbe spingere l’Europa occidentale e l’Unione Europea a formare una partnership più forte con la regione MENA sia a livello commerciale che diplomatico. Per raggiungere un livello di collaborazione più stretta, è necessario tuttavia che l’Europa e i paesi del MENA superino le tensioni storiche e contemporanee che pervadono nei loro rapporti internazionali.

Attualmente l’Egitto importa il 54,5% del suo grano dalla Russia, mentre la Tunisia importa il 47,7% del grano dall’Ucraina.  Con i raccolti di quest’anno che marciscono nei magazzini dell’Europa dell’Est, mentre infuria la guerra, il Medio Oriente e il Nord Africa si devono adoperare per individuare forniture alternative per sfamare la propria popolazione.  

Questa situazione rappresenta un’opportunità per numerosi paesi dell’UE di coprire il vuoto lasciato da Russia e Ucraina.  La Francia, per esempio, è un grande produttore globale di grano con 30,1 milioni di tonnellate raccolte nel 2020, meno delle 85,9 milioni di tonnellate russe, ma più delle 24,9 milioni dell’Ucraina nello stesso anno. Anche la Germania, seppur in modo minore, contribuisce alla produzione europea di grano, avendo prodotto nel 2020 circa 22,2 milioni di tonnellate. Un altro paese che potrebbe giocare un ruolo importante nella regione si tratta dell’Italia. Nonostante questa abbia raccolto “solo” 6,7 milioni di tonnellate, il paese ha esportato oltre 24,8 milioni di dollari in grano nel 2020. Il sostegno dei paesi europei garantirebbero quindi  ai paesi del Medio Oriente e del Nord Africa la possibilità di attingere dal mercato europeo e di soddisfare la propria domanda interna.

Dall’altro lato, i leader europei stanno già considerando di incrementare il proprio acquisto di petrolio e gas dalla regione MENA. Tale misura infatti garantirebbe una diversificazione del mercato e una sicurezza energetica per il continente europeo, danneggiando contemporaneamente l’economia russa, che l’Unione Europea ha già colpito imponendo dure sanzioni dopo l’invasione dell’Ucraina. Diverse azioni sono state quindi intraprese dai governi europei. Per esempio, il Ministro degli Esteri francese Jean-Yves Le Drian ha avuto colloqui con alcuni funzionari dell’Arabia Saudita e degli Emirati Arabi Uniti il 27 marzo su un possibile aumento degli acquisti di energia dal Medio Oriente. Inoltre il Ministro ha avuto anche una discussione simile con il Ministro di Stato del Qatar per gli affari energetici, Saad Sherida al-Kaabi, il 28 dello stesso mese. Considerando l’aumento delle richieste di acquisti congiunti di energia in Europa, una tale mossa della Francia influenzerebbe fortemente anche le abitudini italiane di acquisto di petrolio e gas.

Un’ulteriore incremento nell’importazione di gas e combustibili fossili dal Medio Oriente e Nord Africa servirebbe a rafforzare una preesistente relazione commerciale tra l’Italia e il MENA. Nel 2019 l’Unione Europea ha nel complesso importato il 27,41 e 47% di petrolio, gas e carbone rispettivamente dalla Russia, ma ha anche importato il 9% del petrolio dall’Iraq, l’8% dall’Arabia Saudita, l’8% del gas naturale dall’Algeria e il 5% dal Qatar. In linea con i dati europei, l’Italia ha importato quasi il 44% del gas naturale dalla Russia nel 2016, mentre le sue importazione dalla regione MENA hanno superato di gran lunga quelle dell’UE, con il 37% del gas proveniente dalla Libia o dall’Algeria.

Tuttavia, al fine di stabilire una reciproca sicurezza alimentare ed energetica, l’Italia e i paesi del MENA dovrebbero perseguire nuove forme di collaborazione economica e diplomatica. Ad oggi le relazioni dell’Italia con la regione del MENA risentono ancora del passato imperialista di Roma, in particolare della colonizzazione della Libia e del Corno d’Africa nel XIX-XX secolo, e del sostegno alla colonizzazione francese di Algeria, Tunisia e Marocco.

Ad aggravare lo status diplomatico tra Italia e paesi del Medio Oriente e del Nord Africa si aggiungono anche eventi più contemporanei come la recente crisi migratoria. Questa, iniziata nel 2010 e intensificatasi nel 2015, ha visto milioni di rifugiati provenienti dall’Asia, dall’Africa e dal Medio Oriente fuggire in Europa in seguito alle guerre scatenatesi nei loro paesi. In alcuni momenti della crisi, la maggior parte dei migranti stava attraversando l’Italia dal Nord Africa, partendo specialmente dalla Libia. Questo ha creato una situazione di tensione e sfiducia tra i due paesi e a livello internazionale, dal momento che ai migranti stranieri veniva spesso negato l’ingresso in Italia e lasciati annegare in mare, oppure detenuti e maltrattati nei centri di detenzione in Libia. I politici italiani come l’ex Primo Ministro Matteo Salvini hanno spesso lanciato commenti infiammatori sugli immigrati provenienti dal Medio Oriente e dal Nord Africa, aumentando le tensioni e suscitando forti attriti tra le diverse comunità multietniche. Un esempio è la dichiarazione con cui Salvini difese un collega reo di aver sparato a un immigrato marocchino, oppure il processo che l’ex Primo Ministro ha dovuto affrontare  per le accuse di rapimenti di 147 rifugiati, impossibilitati a scendere in Italia dalla barca della ONG Seawatch.

Tuttavia, le tensioni tra l’Italia e la regione MENA sono esplose anche a causa degli incidenti che hanno coinvolto ricercatori e imprenditori italiani, in particolar modo nel continente africano. A tal proposito è necessario ricordare come nel 2015 il dottorando italiano Giulio Regeni venne rapito, torturato e ucciso al Cairo dopo una presunta estorsione di denaro. Allo stesso modo nel Dicembre 2021, Patrick Zaki, uno studente egiziano dell’Università di Bologna, è stato finalmente rilasciato dopo essere stato detenuto illegalmente e picchiato a Mansoura, in Egitto, per quasi un anno. Alla triste lista si può aggiungere anche Marco Zennaro, un imprenditore veneziano, tenuto prigioniero in Sudan per quasi un anno prima del suo rilascio.

Mentre questi eventi hanno indebolito le relazioni diplomatiche tra l’Italia e i paesi del MENA, alcune ostilità di recente memoria sono in realtà servite a rafforzare i loro legami strategici. Nonostante non abbiano raggiunto i loro obiettivi strategici, le truppe di pace italiane a Beirut durante la guerra civile libanese negli anni ’80 sono state lodate per la loro “neutralità sostenuta, il comportamento rispettoso e il minimo uso della forza”.

In un articolo del 2017, la studiosa Elisabetta Brighi ha osservato che in Medio Oriente “l’Italia ha perseguito una serie di interessi strategici – nelle aree della migrazione, dell’energia, della sicurezza e della geopolitica – in parallelo, ma talvolta in aperto contrasto con una serie di impegni normativi per i diritti umani, la democrazia e lo stato di diritto”. L’Italia ha dovuto anche fare i conti con “il ruolo peculiare degli interessi corporativi – in particolare quelli delle compagnie petrolifere ed energetiche – nella definizione di interessi nazionali del paese”. La necessità per l’Italia di bilanciare gli interessi strategici, dei diritti umani e dell’energia in Medio Oriente e Nord Africa è diventata più cruciale nelle ultime settimane e continuerà a crescere nei prossimi anni. Mentre l’Italia e l’Europa occidentale cercano fonti energetiche diverse e sicure al di fuori dell’Europa Orientale, anche il Nord Africa potrebbe rivolgere il proprio potere d’acquisto di grano in Occidente. È necessario quindi che si instaurino nuove forme di collaborazione e che i leader cerchino soluzioni diplomatiche a problemi strategici e di diritti umani di lunga data.

April 5, 2022No Comments

Putin’s War and the Shaping of a New Global Energy Map

By: Riccardo Bosticco, Lorenzo Caruti, Sofia Dal Santo, Miguel Jiménez, Michele Mignogna.

Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine started on February 24, is already showing significant effects on a global scale. As most States and international organizations have officially condemned the war - from West to East between America, Europe, and Africa - openly criticizing Putin's behavior and deciding to sanction Moscow heavily, the biggest problem concerns the aspect inherent to energy supplies. "Europe depends on Russia for about 40% of its natural gas, with most of it transported by pipeline", explains Reuters. Luckily for them, most European countries have cut reliance on Russian gas in recent years. Yet dependency is still weighty, and the most recent sanctions on Moscow caused a further growth of gas prices. European states and companies have acknowledged the danger of relying too heavily on Russian energy, and also those countries that had a commercial, yet controversial, understanding of energy relations with Russia, like Germany, decided to act firmly.

The United States proposes solutions to Europe, while oil and gas producers in the MENA act controversially, and China remains cautiously in the background, carefully observing the evolution of the situation without intervening directly or taking a clear position. Where will the current energy decisions drive us?

The European Union 

The EU is a substantial energy importer, largely reliant on Russia's supply. Accordingly, due to sanctions imposed to punish Russia, the EU has set about to make a significant course correction. The European Commission has proposed an outline of a plan to make Europe independent from Russian gas before 2030: REPowerEU. The main goal of this ambitious plan is to diversify to the greatest extent possible the gas suppliers of the EU by increasing LNG Imports and constructing alternative pipelines. To do so, a strong political will by the Member States to follow the correct route and avoid uncoordinated actions is needed.

Currently, there are not sufficient LNG terminals in the Eastern EU, although growing investments have been undertaken in recent years by the Union; it is, therefore, crucial that such countries have access to regional gas hubs. In addition, even the construction of alternative pipelines prompts some issues. Unsurprisingly, European customers are unwilling to commit financially to long-term gas purchase contracts, which would be necessary to sustain pipeline development, due to EU green obligations. Furthermore, authoritarian governments like Azerbaijan's, Turkey's, and the Gulf monarchies' influence on the gas trade would remain, leaving the door open for political exploits of energy flows. Besides, the existing alternative sources of natural gas to the EU appear to be already at the highest production level. Therefore, the most likely option seems to import from the Caspian Sea. 

Overall, an emphasis is placed by the Commission on boosting energy efficiency and increasing the use of renewables. This is essential since it contributes to terminating the EU's overdependence on a single supplier, even though it does not provide a suitable solution in the short term. Last but not least, the Commission has even undertaken initiatives to mitigate high energy prices

The United States 

Since the energy sector is the primary source of Russia's revenues, this was a primary target for Western sanctions. Yet, while the EU depends heavily on Russian energy, the US is a net energy exporter. Biden recognized this fact. When asked about Italy's carefulness at sanctioning energy, he answered that "this is an alliance of nations that each have their priorities and their […] concerns". Yet, on March 8, the US sanctioned all of Russia's energy exports in the US. The United States is now trying to convince the European allies to do the same by offering additional LNG supplies. On March 25, while in Brussels, Joe Biden announced that the US would send another 15 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas to Europe. The United States' primary objective is to disentangle European energy dependency on Russia. The challenges at stake are significant, and the following lines highlight them.

While the strategy to realize such an objective is to rely on scale capacity, what matters in a crisis like this is spare capacity, a factor that might complicate things for the US. Further, the opacity around the technical aspects surrounding the March 25 deal seems indeed mirror the difficulties of disentangling the EU from Russian gas. Moreover, LNG infrastructural capacities in Europe need funds. Turning to oil, the US has demanded an increase in oil output to avoid prices spiking. However, national frackers and OPEC+ countries show little interest in ramping up output. The dilemma is over the first-mover's disadvantage. There has been a phone call between Biden and King Salman of Saudi Arabia concerning additional output; yet, Riyadh answered that it does not want to politicize oil, preferring to observe the other producers' moves and the outcome of the Iranian sanctions lift issue. So, what is next for the US energy strategy?

MENA Region 

While the war is taking place in Europe, it will have long-term effects in the Middle East, too. The leaders found themselves at a crossroads: they condemned Russia but did not agree to impose such severe punitive sanctions. Russia is an essential economic and strategic ally, necessary to maintain control over the Iranian nuclear threat. Moreover, it is the main supplier of wheat, on which many countries in the North African area depend. However, the United States is a fundamental player, too, especially for the political stability achieved in recent years by some countries. In the war context, the oil-producing countries in the Gulf have seen increased revenues. However, beyond the economy, the outcome of this conflict could have significant geopolitical implications for the region, including reshuffling alliances and redefining pipeline routes.
The geopolitical consequences of the war also affected the oil market. Leading OPEC Plus member countries, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have stressed that cutting Russia out of the oil market would have severe consequences for both the European Union and the United States. Both Ryad and Abu Dhabi are moving closer and closer to Asia, also considering accepting the Yuan instead of the dollar as the oil currency, distancing themselves from Washington, which has been indifferent to the recent missile attacks they suffered. Another debate on energy matters is underway in the Mediterranean area. For example, Turkey is trying to maintain neutrality in the conflict in Europe: with the new energy alternatives that Europe could have at its disposal in order not to be dependent on Russian gas, Turkey could act as a bridge to bring gas to Europe via the Turkstream project, a possible option if Nordstream is not activated, and also for the East-med Pipeline, currently stalled due to the recent withdrawal of the US from the project.

China  

The eventual termination of European energy contracts would put Vladimir Putin under strain since these cash flows are helping the president sustain an already longer than expected invasion. That is where China comes into play. Even though the "red dragon's" stand on Russia's invasion has been somewhat ambiguous, the country has got many reasons for stepping up and taking over the gas imports that Europe will, in time, refrain from. Energy has fueled the extraordinary growth of the "workshop of the world". The country began to aggressively pursue energy sources beyond its borders after 1993, when it became a net energy importer. This deficit was accentuated by the surge of bilateral and multilateral deals after joining the WTO in 2001. The prospects which visualize the country undergoing a structural transformation and moving towards less energy-intensive sectors might alleviate these increased energy needs. However, guaranteeing energy security is a top priority for the one-party state until then. 

Surprisingly, oil meets a tiny fraction of China's domestic total energy demand, and much of it gets to China through the South Sea, a heavily disputed route among Asian countries. This supply uncertainty prevents China from reducing its coal consumption, representing 60% of energy consumption. Nevertheless, China's commitments to be carbon neutral by 2060 do inevitably accelerate the phasing out of coal. Besides having long-term plans for heavily investing in nuclear energy and hydrogen, natural gas supplied by Russia has become increasingly more relevant. The first steps towards this alliance materialized in 2019, with Siberia's pipeline pumping liquefied natural gas to northeastern China. This association was scaled up on February 4, when a 30-year contract was settled which secured the construction of a pipeline connecting with the northeast of the country. Yet, this alliance may even go beyond natural gas. Recent news of the departure of oil giants such as BP, Shell, and Exxon from their joint ventures with Russian companies have spurred speculations of China's state-owned companies stepping in.  

Conclusion 
As soon as the shock of the Ukrainian war arrived, the West discovered a hard truth: even in a globally interdependent world, it is not safe to be heavily dependent on a single country. As mentioned above, Europe is moving towards making plans to become energetically independent. Nevertheless, West leaders are conscious that the road to independence will be long and winding, indeed taking years to make it. However, the problem is not only a European matter: as previously said, even a solid Russian ally like China is facing the effect of the energetic crisis. On the other hand, Beijing will probably be seen as the only winner at the war's end, mainly for its ambiguous position. At the same time, the United States is dealing with a different situation: even though it does not depend on energy imported from Moscow, its role as a leader is put to the test. Washington needs to help its allies and, simultaneously, avoid the MENA Region ending up in the hands of China. Therefore, what is at stake is not only the energy question: the current world order could become very different at the end of the day.

April 5, 2022No Comments

The issue of grown-up child soldiers in International Criminal Law: The Ongwen Case

By: Luca Mattei

Introduction: a man named Dominic Ongwen

It was the 5th of January 2015 when a wanted man of Ugandan nationality turned himself after a long hiding. He surrendered to a US military base, located in the Central African Republic. His name was Dominic Ongwen and its name was already notorious well beyond the national borders of Uganda. Namely, he was known for its commanding role inside the Lord Resistance Army (LRA): one of the deemed most violent terrorist organization in all the African continent:

The LRA was founded in 1986 by its ongoing supreme leader Joseph Kony, as an opposition force to the government of Uganda led by Yuweri Museveni. Since then, the paramilitary organisation has been the perpetrator of brutal crimes against the civilian population. Notably, among the most contested of these acts, there is the kidnapping of children from their family, with the purpose to turn them into faithful soldiers through torture and indoctrination. Until his escape, Dominic Ongwen covered a central position in this terrorist scheme. As referred by prosecutor Benjamin Gumpert to the International Criminal Court (ICC), ‘Dominic Ongwen was one of the most senior commanders in the LRA’. 

Today, more than a decade later, Joseph Kony is still on the run, while Dominic Ongwen decided to turn himself to international forces, triggering his prosecution before the ICC – which received jurisdiction on from Museveni in 2003. However, despite the large amount of evidence against the accused, the case has proven to be controversial since the onset. The problem lied in the fact that Dominic Ongwen was not part of LRA by his own volition, as he was abducted in 1988 when he was still 9 years old. Only after years of violent indoctrination in the values of the LRA, he become an asset for the group; eventually rising among the ranks and becoming commander of the LRA Sinia Brigade. 

The proceeding before the ICC focused on this latter period, when Ongwen committed, directly and indirectly, crimes against the civilian population as a senior LRA officer. At the time Ongwen was not a minor anymore (around 21 years old), therefore formally he was legally a fully liable adult. 

But really an entire childhood spent inside a violent terrorist organisation was meaningless in the eyes of the law? This question proved to be troubling for the sitting judges at the ICC. Ongwen’s trial was extremely important for setting a precedent on the legal treatment of child soldiers who have become adults. 

The definition of ‘duress’

During the trial before the ICC it was invoked by the defence counsel the s.c. ‘duress’, which is understood as an exception to the general regime of criminal responsibility. Already in the eighteenth-century William Blackstone defined it in his ‘Commentaries on the Laws of England’ as ‘threats and menaces, which induce a fear of death or other bodily harm, and which take away for that reason the guilt of many crimes and misdemeanors’.

As we can see indoctrination is not taken into consideration in the latter definition. Nonetheless, the question is far from settled and there are multiple interpretations. For instance, the French Code provides that ‘a person is not criminally liable who acted under the influence of a force or constraint which he could not resist’. This provision is larger in scope than the one provided by Blackstone and seems focused on the free will of the perpetrator.

Instead, in the German Code states that ‘if someone commits a wrongful act in order to avoid an imminent, otherwise unavoidable danger to life, limb, or liberty, either to himself or to a dependent or someone closely connected with him, the actor commits the act without culpability’. This definition doesn’t mention free will, while it is evident a balance between – using the words of Blackstone – ‘the menace’ and the wrongful act. 

The element of ‘duress’ has been analysed also by the International Military Tribunal (IMT), in the aftermath of World War II, where it was detached by the similar defence of the ‘hierarchical order’. The issue was then debated again fifty years later, by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Erdemovic case, which concerned a footman soldier that had killed 70 civilians during the siege of Srebrenica. Notably, in the latter case the defence counsel raised ‘duress’ before the ICTY, as Erdemovic was threatened with death by his superior if he was not to comply with the orders.

Nonetheless, after a debate between the sitting judges, Erdemovic was convicted for his deeds – with the notable dissenting opinion of Judge Cassese. The judgement was based on consequentialist considerations. Namely, that Erdemovic should not be acquitted since this could provide a defence to future perpetrators of international crimes and even harming the deterrence of international rules. 

Even Cassese did not entirely disagree with the outcome of the majority, concluding that a general prohibition on resorting to ‘duress’ can be established in the case of the killing of innocent civilians. But with the notable exception in the case that ‘it is highly probable, if not certain’ that the person under ‘duress’ is fated to die along with his victims if he does commit the crime, which will be carried out in any event.

In the end, the argument of ‘duress’ was not accepted for Erdemovic by the ICTY. However, the dissenting opinion of Cassese proved to be hugely influential, years later, on the future definition of ‘duress’ enshrined in the Rome Statute, the treaty establishing the ICC. 

Image Source: https://unsplash.com/photos/nSpj-Z12lX0

The International Criminal Court and Dominic Ongwen

We finally go back to the case of Ongwen, an ex-child soldier who has been indoctrinated for a good part of his life. The reasoning of the ICC was bound by Art. 31(1d) of the Rome Statute, which states that for ‘duress’ is necessary a threat of ‘imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person’.

After hearing hundreds of witnesses and wiretaps the ICC established that this requirement of ‘duress’ was not met. The element of ‘imminence’, inside the first criteria, has been interpreted restrictively as otherwise, the ICC feared it could ‘provide a blanket immunity to members of criminal organisations which have brutal systems of ensuring discipline’. The specific conditions in which Ongwen grew was taken into consideration by the Court, but in a limited way. 

Indeed, from a legal perspective, this outcome is legitimate. The ICC used ‘duress’ on the basis of what was established plainly in the Rome Statute. However, some uncertainties remain. As we have shown in this brief exposition, ‘duress’ is not homogenously justified in legal practice. Rather, we have witnessed that it is a rather relativistic, often rhetorical, concept. 

This is even more controversial in a case concerning the actions committed by an abducted child. Ongwen did commit horrific crimes, but at the same time international law recognize undisputedly the particular vulnerability of younglings and the prohibition of their conscription under a certain age. Does international law really not recognize methods of coercion – such as a lengthy indoctrination – outside of the most obvious ones such as the threat of death? 

In the end the discomfort of the Court in setting the final stone on this case was reflected in the final judgement. For 61 charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes, the ICC sentenced Dominic Ongwen to 25 years of imprisonment. A rather light penalty given the heavy accusatory load. Perhaps, showing that the peculiar history of the defendant could not deflect responsibility, but was taken instead as an extenuating circumstance. 

March 31, 2022No Comments

ITSS Verona 2021/22 Webinar Series: “The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: What’s Next?” with Tracey German (KCL)

For its forth event of the 2021/22 Webinar Series, entitled "The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: What's Next?", ITSS Verona members Ludovica Brambilla, Davide Gobbicchi and Fabrizio Napoli (from the Russia and Post-Soviet Space Team) discuss with Dr Tracey German (KCL) - one of Europe's main experts on Russian affairs - the status of the conflict in Ukraine, narratives, strategies, winners and losers, and political, social, cultural, economic implications for all actors involved.

Do not miss on the other ITSS Verona webinars, which are available at the following link: https://www.itssverona.it/activities

March 29, 2022No Comments

The Role of NGOs in the Sahel Region: A talk with Marianna Mormile

Progettomondo is an international non-governmental organization founded in 1966 to promote sustainable development, human rights, and a new form of justice and conscious migration in Latin America and Africa. In Italy and Europe, the NGO promotes global education and the encounter between different cultures. Marianna Mormile is the country director for the Sahel Region and in this podcast, she discusses the role of Italy’s ONGs in the Sahel region, and the situation in this conflict area.

Interviewing Team: Michele Tallarini and Alessandra Gramolini

English Translation of the Interview:

MICHELE: Good day everyone, and welcome back to the ITSS Verona Youtube Channel. We are Alessandra and Michele from the Africa Team. Today we will talk about the situation in the Sahel. For this episode, we are delighted to host Marianna Mormile from Progettomondo, an NGO from Verona which operates in Africa and Latin America. Marianna works as country director for the Sahel, and she lives in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. ​ We would like to start by expressing our gratitude to our guest for accepting our invitation and for sharing her high-level experience and knowledge with us. 

MARIANNA: Thanks Alessandra and Michele for this opportunity. Sharing your opinion and experience is always important and often there is no time to do so, so thanks again for the opportunity.

MICHELE: Thank you again. We would like to start with a first general question:  what is your point of view as an Italian who lives and works in Burkina Faso regarding the situation in this region? What are, in your opinion, the main problems affecting this area which is one of the most complicated in the world?

MARIANNA: I have a vision of the area's problems through the projects that we implement with Progettomondo, and through direct contact with communities, state actors, and other non-governmental organizations. As regards our interventions, I can tell you that certainly the news arriving in Italy are few but they allow us to give timely information on what are in a certain way stable situations of the presence of terrorist armed groups that organize attacks on populations and local authorities; hence a situation that is quite difficult from a security point of view. 

At the beginning, it was an issue of claims and attacks against the central power and therefore with attacks focused more on law enforcement agencies and state actors, such as mayors or other institutional objectives. In this context, the religious component seems to be more of a vehicle than a real justification. In fact, there are villages that are intimidated and subject to certain rules for women and men, forcing the population otherwise to abandon the area, but this seems more like a strategy to recover resources and therefore forage, pushing these flows of displaced persons. 

There is therefore certainly a humanitarian crisis, both in Burkina and in Niger (which are the two countries that Progettomondo follows), albeit in a different way due to the different backgrounds of the two countries. At the moment Burkina is at the peak of its crisis, with a high presence of displaced people and the risk of an imminent food crisis. In fact, last year it did not rain and therefore we are waiting for the consequences that will come. International organizations are trying to understand how to frame the interventions in order to respond to this food crisis that is expected very soon. So in conclusion, the main issues are those relating to safety, which sees no improvement, and a food crisis that goes on for periods but which is configured as constant and which could have a peak this year.

ALE: Thank you very much, Marianna. Going back to what you said about Burkina Faso, which is currently reaching the highest level of crisis, do you think the recent coup d’etat will be a turning point on the political agenda as regards the fight against terrorism?

MARIANNA: It must be said that the communiqué of the coup leaders, who are now in power, and who are trying to establish a transitional government, contained a point concerning the fight against terrorism. It says there would be improvements and a specific interest in making Burkina out of this problem of security and instability. To date, however, there is no real improvement, even if it is necessary to specify that the coup happened only 2 months ago. 

The situation has not changed to date despite the coup leaders coming from the military world, and in theory they should have the right skills in the security field or in any case have a particular focus on this issue. In the press release, there is also a specific point concerning greater attention to the families of fallen soldiers: this certainly denotes an attitude of greater attention. However, even if the problem has been formally addressed, no real and concrete improvements are seen. In truth, this is not a result that can only be achieved by operating in Burkina and only by operating from a military point of view: it would in fact be necessary to do a wide-ranging work that includes several factors.

MICHELE: You talked about a moment of great crisis for Burkina and how these problems must be addressed in a global way and from different points of view. In this sense, what is the role of the Italian NGOs operating in the Sahel and in particular in Burkina and Niger? And are there any substantial differences in approach in the intervention strategies of the agencies of the various countries?

MARIANNA: It must be emphasized that the intervention in the Sahel is constantly changing. NGOs like us are trying to have a continuous analysis not only of the needs of the territory but also of the strategies to respond to these needs trying to enhance their expertise, and to form gradually. This is because there are various emergencies affecting the communities we work with and it is, therefore, necessary to continually re-calibrate interventions to respond to new needs. For this reason, I would point out, as a common strategy of NGOs, the continuous analysis of the needs of the territories: for example in one of our projects in the north of Burkina, on the border with Mali, we have recently completely redesigned the intervention strategy as regards nutrition and health. Indeed, in few years the situation has changed a lot and therefore the project, as it was originally conceived, risked no longer being operational in all areas. 

There is therefore a desire to integrate a humanitarian component more and more: Italian NGOs, and in particular Progettomondo, are helping the populations of some areas to stabilize, thus making the support offered effective and continuous. We see that in Burkina, and recently also in some areas of Niger, the need to find a balance between the two interventions is becoming crucial. Therefore the donors are pushing us in more multi-sectoral interventions, but in reality, it is necessary that we also work on the ground, completing each other and trying to have more elements in such a way as to operate on different levels. 

There is certainly a commitment from Italian NGOs to be able to continue to make their contribution in regions in which the situation is changing rapidly. In Niger, Italian cooperation has historically supported the agricultural sector; in Burkina, in addition to the agricultural sector, there is a strong aid in the healthcare sector, with interventions, for example, against malnutrition. Here there are also NGOs from other countries: some have had the most humanitarian fiber even in unsuspected times, due to purely periodic food crises. It must be said that Progettomondo and other Italian NGOs have a more proximity approach, working directly on the field, with direct assistance to the communities. This approach also helps to connect and to support the technical services and the local authorities, thus intervening both in the community and at the institutional level. Another type of approach can be the “substitution,”, mainly for emergencies, in which we intervene to replace the State, but always only until it organizes itself to be able to overcome these difficulties. 

ALE: Following this last sentence, according to your experience and your work in the NGO and seeing the work of other NGOs, can international cooperation be able to help make these countries independent of foreign influence?

MARIANNA: Answering this question is very difficult. I can only say that we, as Progettomondo, do not work in geopolitics so we do not have an institutional position, we work following the principle of neutrality, not favoring any kind of deployment but only for the overall improvement of the situation in these territories. We do not enter the political sphere, it must be said that in our work we have to deal with other States' choices in foreign policy. For example, Sahel is a region in which there are constant migratory flows, and in the 2015 Valletta summit, it was made explicit the principle of externalization of borders, i.e. blocking migratory flows at borders really far away from those of the European Union. 

Having said that, surely in the Sahel we can recognize France, China, Russia, and Turkey among the countries that have the most influence. Burkina was a former French colony, and therefore they are closely linked to France, which does not renounce to emphasize this link on every occasion. There is also an open debate on the ECOWAS situation and the new currency: the CFA franc is directly correlated to France. Now the  idea is to replace it with the ECO, but we do not know yet how things are going to change in reality. Perhaps in Mali after the CEDEAO sanctions, there will be the possibility to replace the CFA franc with the ECO, but in reality, it is still very complicated. So I don't know what kind of answer to give in this regard, certainly in some countries of this region foreign influence is very rooted and very often it is not contested, in some cases, it is even accepted.

ALE: You have been very kind, Michele and I would like to thank you again for your time and for sharing your perspective on the field. It was a pleasure for us to have you as a guest of our video podcast series. Thanks for watching, and stay tuned for all other ITSS initiatives here on youtube and on our official website. Have a nice day

March 29, 2022No Comments

Bordering Practices and Global Health Governance during the Covid-19 Pandemic – with Simon Ruston and Adam Ferhani.

In this podcast, Simon Rushton and Adam Ferhani from the University of Sheffield discuss with us their research on the bordering practices during the pandemic. They unpack the tensions between border control, global governance of public health, and human rights, raising a critical perspective on the conceptualization of borders.  

Interviewing Team: Arslan Sheikh and Ludovica Brambilla.