Welcome to our fourth Webinar of the 2022/23 season, a thought-provoking and intriguing conversation on how state policies, school curricula, job markets, and everyday life are still shaped by assumptions about gender, race, and class.
In this occasion, we had the pleasure to host a team of experts: Jorge Sanchez-Perez, assistant professor at the University of Alberta; Maísa Edwards, Ph.D. Candidate at King's College London; Lucia Sarmiento Verano, humanistic therapist; Rafia Zakaria, journalist and author. Our guests discussed how these oppressive structures and patterns can effectively be dismantled to build a more inclusive society. Many thanks to our Deputy Research Director and Research Analyst, Julia Hodgins, who chaired the event.
Authors: Alessandro Spada, Francesca Belotti and Januaria Gizzi - UK & European Affairs Team
Exactly one year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, both countries are at an impasse. On the one hand, Moscow has not obtained as many territories as it had wanted; on the other hand, the Ukrainian resistance has yet to make any progress in defeating Putin. This might be due to the lack of weapons at Kyiv's disposal. Indeed, until a few days ago, only lighter weaponry was given to Zelensky's troops to keep their line of defence intact. Unfortunately, a war cannot be won by playing only defence, so Kyiv has started asking its Western allies for additional support. In particular, Germany and the USA were asked to supply its high-tech Leopard 2 tanks, although, with initial insecurity, such a wish was finally granted.
The reasons behind the reluctance
The main reasons Germany was reluctant to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine are the following. The first one is certainly linked to the vast historical significance of World Wars One and Two. German modern-day leaders feel the weight of history, meaning that they feel a deep responsibility for the death of millions of Russians during the two world wars. Indeed, as the aggressor in two world wars, many Germans opt for a cautious line of being Ukraine's leading supplier of battle tanks. Moreover, this decision would be a further break for Berlin with its post-World War Two non-belligerent policy.
The second reason is related to German society. A significant segment of the population, particularly situated in the former communist German Democratic Republic, feels traditionally close to Russia and has an aversion to the values and functioning of Western society. Shortly before Christmas, 40% of Germans who took part in a poll said they recognized the Kremlin's justification to invade Ukraine, blaming the West for the eastward expansion of the Nato military alliance. In addition, according to a Jan. 19 poll, only 46% of Germans were in favour compared to 43% who opposed the supply of Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.
The third reason is Scholz's governing coalition and even the SPD. The German Chancellor Scholz couldn't ignore the strong pacifist wings inside both major parties to its governing coalition, the Social Democrats and the Greens. Especially, many Social Democrats voters live in former East Germany, which has been more sympathetic to Moscow".
Another reason for such reluctance would be that the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, wouldn't have authorized any Leopard 2 tank supply to Ukraine unless the US government agreed to send M1 Abrams tanks.
Lastly, granting Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine could mean overstepping Germany's position as a mere weapons supplier and cause a military escalation.
Source:shorturl.at/bdoIJ
The two sides' reactions
Ultimately, the decision of Germany to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine generated some reactions at the international level. How did Russia react to this decision? Can we consider this decision proof that the Western powers are escalating into war more than before?
From a realist perspective, we could say that Russia perceived this decision as a proper threat, which will most likely reflect in Russia counter-attacking or entering a defensive approach towards Germany and the West in particular. Hence, in a statement, the Russian Embassy said that the current conflict would escalate to a new level.
Western powers play an essential role in understanding the reactions. First of all, NATO utterly supported Germany's decision, making clear that it would help Ukraine win against Russia. From this, Russia's threat perception has significantly increased, allowing Russia to undermine the Western powers consequently. Interestingly, the position of Britain in this given context reflected on Rishi Sunak, the current Prime Minister, to underpin Steffen Hebestreit's decision-making. Thus, the British Prime Minister clearly expressed his position on Twitter by saying, "The right decision by NATO Allies and friends to send main battle tanks to Ukraine. Alongside Challenger 2s, they will strengthen Ukraine's defensive firepower," and "Together, we are accelerating our efforts to ensure Ukraine wins this war and secures a lasting peace.".
In a nutshell, the decision to send Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine was made to help it defend itself better, but it was not made lightly. The fears of becoming too involved in a war "that is not ours to fight", the weight of history, and the pacifistic forces within Germany's main parties were all weighed carefully before lending the peculiar tanks to Ukraine. Unfortunately, this is not the end of the conflict or the requests. Indeed, the day after the announcement made by the Chancellery, a new request for fighter jets was filed by Kyiv in order to switch strategy to an attack-based one. Western ally has yet to respond positively to a possible supply of fighter jets, but all remains to be seen. Will the West stand by, or will it contribute even more than it already has?
The war in Ukraine has forced the European Union (EU) fundamentally to rethink its stance on defence policies. While the EU is still, first and foremost, a peace project, it can simply no longer keep defence cooperation and innovation in the background considering its borders are actively threatened by increasingly undemocratic regimes. The EU has the means and the knowledge to become an autarkic defence power which will rely less on the protective umbrella of the United States, which has been in place since the end of World War II. A newly drafted agreement allowing for easier US-EU defence project collaboration already explicitly excludes joint research cooperation. The first steps towards more independent EU defence can be noticed, such as introducing the Directorate General for Defence industry and Space (DG DEFIS) in 2021 or creating the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017.
It is interesting to note the various developments that can be observed regarding research and development (R&D) in European defence, especially since most EU Member States have not invested in defence R&D until now. As such, this article will outline the steps taken in recent years to promote increased collaboration and cooperation to establish a leading EU-focused R&D related to defence.
The EDA has a specialised Research, Technology & Innovation Directorate (RTI), which coordinates, develops and manages research activities as well as the implementation of the European Defence Fund presented further down. In addition, the EDA hosts a crucial activity in order to heighten preparedness for what the future might bring: it regularly conducts technology foresight exercises. The study of ‘futures’ has become an essential tool for researchers and policymakers despite being often neglected by the latter. However, the activity of foresight allows for educated scenario buildings, presenting a long-term vision of where technological innovation might bring the defence sector and security more generally. As a result, foresight enables policymakers and states, in general, to effectively prepare for possible ‘futures’. In the specific case of technology foresight, developing scenarios around future technological defence capabilities for the next 20 to 30 years provides defence actors with concrete, educated guesses to develop strategies and agendas.
The emergence of an array of think tanks and research institutes specialised in European security and defence research has enormously contributed to multiple EU researchers collaborating and setting up policy recommendations and analysing possible future defence cooperation. It is also interesting to note that the 2005-established European Security and Defence College (ESDC), targeted primarily towards military personnel, encourages research cooperation by offering a Doctoral programme on CSDP and publishing an academic journal. This encourages experienced military personnel from Member States to have academic exchanges regarding best practices and their thought on CSDP. Moreover, renowned think-tanks such as RAND Europe and the Dutch Clingendael Institute have also established research teams dedicated to European defence and security research.
One of the well-established think tanks already in place since 2002 is the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). It was set up as an autonomous EU Agency tasked with supporting CFSP/CSDP implementation and knowledge production. It regularly produces insightful publications on timely matters, such as examining existing EU cyber defence policy and related suggestions for its development or the important discussion on the EU’s defence partnerships with recommendations for a more effective way forward.
Moreover, the EUISS is notably always present at an ever-increasing number of conferences and fora organised around EU defence cooperation. The first-ever ‘Schuman Security and Defence Forum’ was organised this year in March 2023. This has been designed as an event which will happen every two years and is aimed at providing grounds for discussion among politicians, decision-makers, military representatives and civil society representatives, all engaged in security and defence. This initiative represents a significant opportunity for a plethora of actors to come together, effectively establishing tighter cooperation to promote more autonomous and empowering EU security and defence mechanisms.
Funding military independence
A notable increase has slowly joined the above-outlined increased research regarding EU Defence cooperation in EU funding dedicated to this field. This is particularly important given that according to the latest EDA report for 2020-2021, only two Member States invest 20% of their defence budget into R&D, and the other 24 states remain well under 10%. However, a significant increase could be observed regarding Research and Technology (R&T) investment, reaching an aggregate of €3.6 billion in 2021 compared to around €1.7 billion in 2019. Nevertheless, the agreed-upon 2% benchmark has not yet been reached. However, the investment surge shows that Member States have acknowledged the increased role of technology in defence, recognising that investing in researching technology will ultimately improve the EU’s defence capabilities in a future of omnipresent technology.
The European Defence Fund (EDF) has recently been inaugurated for a project period of 2021-2027 with a current budget of €8 billion to promote EU cooperation regarding defence technology. Incentives to participate in a joint collaboration between member states include the involvement of SMEs with a funding bonus awarded in such cases. It is important to highlight that EDF grants are solely awarded to projects in collaboration with at least three EU member states. This effectively encourages companies, state agencies and general defence actors to cooperate on a cross-border level, enabling them to lead more extensive projects.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this article laid out the multitude of actors and initiatives engaged in enhanced research cooperation in European defence—these range from state-level collaboration on the EU level to research institutes and multi-actor fora of discussion. As can be noticed, a lot has been done in recent years, but the war in Ukraine has served as a decisive push towards a truly independent European defence sector. This does not mean that the road towards a unified EU army is now wide open. However, the efforts mentioned above show that EU Member States and the EU institutions have recognised that the EU’s security relies on ever-closer cooperation in the various defence sectors. Intensive research cooperation has the advantages of cost benefits, EU-wide standardised capabilities and increased innovation opportunities bringing together European minds.
Authors: Margherita Ceserani, Will Kingston-Cox, Ilaria Lorusso, Shahin Modarres
Russia’s war in Ukraine has reached its 398th day and the pro-Russian mercenary Wagner Group is still engaging in the battlefield of Bakhmut, in the Donetsk province, after eight months of combat. They have been assaulting the city since August 2022 and, even though they succeeded on the East frontline, there is still room for a defeat by hands of the Ukrainian resistance backed by three Mi-8 helicopter gunships.
That the war was also being conducted from the air is not news as several sources confirmed the deployment of Iranian drones serving the Russian army, although information was repeatedly denied by Tehran. Moreover, Iran has just confirmed a deal through which it will be in receipt of three SU-35 fighter planes from Russia. This signals two trends: firstly, the Iranian intention to reconstitute its military arsenal and to strengthen its aircraft forces; ultimately, its willingness to develop a weapon market and become a relevant seller, given that the embargo on ballistic missile commerce is expiring in October 2023.
The ties with Moscow have been growing increasingly close. Indeed since the rapprochement in 1989, the interests of the two Eastern powers have often converged, for example, on critiques of Western sanctions and the JCPOA. Today, the presence of Iranian personnel in Ukraine has the double aim of bringing support, training and know-how to Russian soldiers employing Iranian kamikaze drones, observing their functioning, and finding vulnerabilities to be improved. How do the military doctrines of these two countries meet? What should we expect from their bilateral relationship?
Russia’s military doctrine can be defined by its active pursuit of modernization and expansion in Russian military capabilities, such as investing in new weapons systems and conducting full-scale military exercises. The current doctrine–adopted in 2014–enshrines the importance of securing Russia’s borders and Moscow’s interests overseas, as well as the maintenance of the Kremlin’s strategic nuclear deterrence, vis-à-vis the identification of NATO and the United States' expansion of its missile capacity as a significant threat to Russia’s national security. It also contains the concept of ‘strategic deterrence’, which seeks to deter adversaries from attacking Russia under the notion that Moscow is willing to employ ‘preemptive strikes’ wherever it deems necessary
Similarly, the military doctrine of Iran is centred around the principles of defence and deterrence. Iranian military authorities emphasize the importance of perpetuating a strong, unwavering defensive position to deter potential threats and defend Iran’s territorial sovereignty against external belligerence. The doctrine’s latest update, in 2018, identifies the importance of enhancing and refining Iran’s military capabilities–both conventional and asymmetric–to advance the end goal of protecting Iranian territorial integrity.
The convergence of Russian and Iranian military doctrines through security cooperation is not a new phenomenon. For example, both Tehran and Moscow supported Bashar al-Assad in Syria to assert their geopolitical interests and strategic partnership in the region. However, in the context of the Russo-Iranian strategic partnership vis-à-vis the Ukrainian invasion, we can identify a greater synthesis of the military doctrines of Tehran and Moscow and their respective political and economic objectives. The war in Ukraine provides another dimension to the Russo-Iranian strategic cooperation.
Source: KREMLIN/ALEXANDR DEMYANCHUK via Associated Press
Both Russia and Iran find themselves increasingly isolated from the international community. Thus, strategic military cooperation provides unparalleled economic and political relief for the two ‘quasi-pariahs’. Russia, now a state proficient in the avoidance of sanctions, has been keenly training their Iranian counterparts the same techniques so as to continue fruitful trade between the two nations. Through the provision of loitering munitions–“kamikaze” drones–to Russia on the Ukrainian battlefields, Iran is hopeful it can alleviate the pressures of its current economic position–a position exponentially compounded by sanctions imposed by the West, as well as a metaphoric flex of muscles to its regional adversaries.
For Moscow, importing Iranian drones provides a cheap and effective method of carrying out its strategic goals in Ukraine. Costing roughly $20,000 per unit, Iranian “kamikaze” drones, such as the Shahed-136, strategically emboldens Putin’s war machine at little significant cost to Moscow. The capability of devastation loaded to these drones, however, should not be underexaggerated. Not only does ‘strategically cooperating’ with Iran alleviate the pressures of drone production on a beleaguered Russian economy, but it also perpetuates the likelihood of Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
The so-called strategic cooperation between the Islamic Republic and Russia is in reality, mostly a one-way pact in favour of the Kremlin. Russia has backed its allies, such as Syria and Belarus to suppress the protests ruthlessly. In this case regarding Iran, Russian intervention can be divided into three categories:
Sending forces, which is not possible considering the serious lack of forces on the Ukrainian front. It is also crucial to mention that officials such as Sergei Surovikin who is one of the very few suitable forces to have such a role is now the new commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine.
Intelligence and Security cooperation, which precedent shows cannot exceed a certain level as it is a double-edged blade. Such cooperation in precedent was provided for Ba’ath movement in the Arab world but never exceeded a certain limit
Disinformation and #propaganda support, for which Russia holds the first place in the world but has already offered its best to the Islamic Republic.
Hence, it should not be a point that can discourage the Iranian people. Also, the international community is closely following the Tehran-Kremlin affairs. They will respond to such cooperation under many causes, making them take more serious positions regarding Iran's atrocious human rights violations.
The Islamic Republic’s interest in Russia is mostly based on three main elements. The first element is cooperation regarding the development of satellite technologies because the Islamic republic wants to save its three satellite positions and benefit from Russian satellites, not only for communication means but also for espionage. The second element to consider is Islamic republics’ dependency on the Russian campaign and models of disinformation, which they try to apply within the country. Finally, the third reason is their #intelligence cooperation and their need for structural support from Russia. Beyond these three elements, we should consider something called “the mad king phase, " a state where it’s a totalitarian system, before its demise, tends to commit grave strategic mistake after strategic mistake.
The response by the international community can only manoeuvre a little on the particular matter of drones because of legal technicalities that make this matter quite hard to analyze. However, it is crucial to consider that the political will to oppose the affluence of the Islamic republic will become much stronger, more systematic, and more collective.
Ukraine’s best strategy to counter the drones made by the Islamic Republic can come from a country that has been studying them for quite a few years. Israel has developed both #IronDome and IronBeam at the Rafael Company by precisely studying and developing mathematical models of the technologies that were used in most of the missiles and drones that came from Gaza and Lebanon, but originated from the Islamic republic. Even though the Israelis have expressed that they will not intervene in this war, it does not keep Israel from giving Ukraine practical, useful intelligence that can help them with countermeasures for these drones.
The convergence of Iranian and Russian interests has constituted a long-lasting partnership characterized by anti-Western sentiments focusing on limiting NATO expansion, protecting and affirming the countries’ respective sovereignty, and enhancing military and technological capabilities. This partnership has materialized, across the years, through a constellation of hard and soft power measures, spacing from exchanges of weapons and military know-how on one hand to the common ideologically-based spread of disinformation and counter-narratives against common enemies on the other. As for now, the war in Ukraine provides new momentum to this allyship as the conflicts continue to evolve.
Whether the international community is effective vis-à-vis Iran and Russia also depends on the cohesiveness of their collective action. We have already witnessed a round of sanctions from the EU and the UK on Iranian drones in October 2022, precisely in response to their use on the Ukrainian conflict. As for the US, punitive measures targeting drones’ producers for Teheran have been issued as of three days ago. While Western power keeps a strict opposing stand against the Iranian-Russian allyship, China may emerge from this as a new mediating power between the two parts. The latter has already facilitated the recent agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore their diplomatic relations. It will discuss a possible resolution of the war in Ukraine with Spanish PM Sanchez in a soon-to-come meeting.
In the meantime, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continues to deny the Islamic Republic’s involvement in Ukraine. Accordingly, and in line with the anti-Western rhetoric previously mentioned, the official position reiterated by the Ayatollah is that the conflict in general was devised as a US-based diversion to justify NATO’s enlargements. As the UK gets ready to send armour-piercing rounds containing depleted uranium to Ukrainian forces, between the Kremlin, already protesting for the use of “nuclear weapons”, and the care recommendations of the UN on radioactive exposure, the conflict confirms to be yet another chessboard where the international power games unfold, with Iran and Russia playing on the same side.
Vladimir Radunovic and Anastasia Kazakova talk about cyber diplomacy, the geopolitics of cyberspace, and the roles of state and non-state actors.
Vladimir Radunovic is Director, E-diplomacy and Cybersecurity Programmes, and Anastasia Kazakova is a Cyber Diplomacy Knowledge Fellow at DiploFoundation. This Swiss-Maltese non-governmental organisation specialises in capacity development in the field of Internet governance and digital policy.
Interviewer: Oleg Abdurashitov - Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence and Space Team.
Marco Bocchese is an Assistant Professor at the Webster Vienna private University specialized in international relations and law. He also got a PhD at Northwestern University in International Relations.
In this session, Dr Marco Bocchese talks about the relationship between international law and the Ukraine-Russia war, with specific reference to private paramilitary organisations and nuclear weapons. He also discusses the impact the war has had on international relations.
Interviewers: Patrick René Haasler and Eleanora Takitzi - Russia & the Post-Soviet Team
Prof. Inderjeet Parmar talks about the United States domestic and foreign policy in 2023. Parmar is a professor of international politics at the City, University of London, and co-editor of the book series "Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy".
In this session, he discusses the future of the Republican Party and former President Trump heading towards the 2024 elections, before shifting the focus overseas. The main issues addressed are American interests in the Indo-Pacific, including discussions on India, QUAD, and Taiwan, the Ukraine war and its impact on the international order, and the special relationship between the US and the UK.
Interviewers: Giovanni Luca Catucci and Anurag Mishra - US Team
Reinhold Gallmetzer is an Appeals Counsel at the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; and the founder and Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Center for Climate Crime Analysis (CCCA).
As of today, much of the current global CO2 emissions are either directly or indirectly linked to environmental crime, representing the 4th largest crime category in the world. Attempting to address this critical issue, Mr Gallmetzer founded the Centre for Climate Crime Analysis (CCCA), an NGO dedicated to fighting climate change by using the combined power of law, data and analysis.
In the interview, Mr Gallmetzer talks about the difficulties brought by the transnationality of such crimes to the pursuit of justice and clarifies the importance of generating and sharing information to accelerate law enforcement and significantly impact the climate crisis.
Interviewers: Camilla Cormegna, Isabelle Despicht, Shams Jouve - Crime, Extremism and Terrorism Team
“Everybody says Hambantota was ‘invaded’ by the Chinese. Well, just look around… There are probably no more than twenty Chinese people in the whole town. We definitely were not invaded by anyone. If anything, we Sri Lankans are hostages – hostages of our political class”, says Dilshan while sipping his tea. He is an ordinary man that lives in Hambantota, a sleepy town at the Southern tip of Sri Lanka - a remote place where taxis are nowhere to be found, public buses remain rudimentary, and the local residents buzz around the streets on rusty TukTuks, making a living mostly out of fishing and agriculture. Those that visit Hambantota are soon warned by a yellow signal: beware of wild elephants - they might come out of the bush and cross your way. It seems ironic that this forgotten tropical town with only 11,000 residents has recently drawn intense scrutiny from international media, becoming the epicenter of a fierce debate in academic and political circles. At the heart of this debate is a metaphorical “white elephant” – not the one that might come out of the bush - but the giant port that sits on the town’s coastline: the Hambantota Port.
Source: (A common street in Sri Lanka. Credit: Flickr)
The Hambantota Port was part of Beijing’s signature Belt and Road Initiative, and its construction was mostly funded by Chinese loans. When in 2017, the debt-ridden Sri Lankan government decided to lease a 70% stake in the port to the China Merchants Group for 99 years, Hambantota became a symbol fiercely cited by devoted proponents of the so-called ‘debt trap theory’. This narrative depicts China as a predatory investor that invites the Global South nations to join the BRI’s family and then deliberately pushes them into debt through murky loans and contracts. At this point, when the naïve, cash-strapped government is buried in debts it can’t repay, Beijing carries out its calculated master plan and forces its victim to cease its national assets. “Look what happened in Hambantota!”, is a claim that still reverberates in many political discussions, often with a prophetic tone.
Walking in Hambantota today, however, reveals a more complex reality. The discontent of the local people and the semi-abandoned buildings give away a different truth: there is another side of the debt-trap theory - one that is often overlooked. The countries that join the Belt and Road Initiative are not always led by cash-strapped, naïve, unaware politicians that happen to find themselves buried in debt, with no other choice than ceasing national assets to Beijing. Often, these might actually be corrupt politicians, blinded by megalomaniac tendencies left unchecked, that utilize Chinese loans for their own political and material gains.
Source: (The Fishing Market of Hambantota. Credit: Flickr)
For almost two decades, Sri Lanka’s political landscape has been dominated by the Rajapaksa family, a political clan that essentially ruled Sri Lanka like an autocratic family business. When Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected President in 2005, part of his political manifesto promised to deliver economic revitalization by constructing megaprojects and new infrastructure. Unfortunately, Rajapaksa failed to become the architect of Sri Lanka’s economic miracle: instead, he created a ticking bomb. First, he built the foundations of this economic revitalization on unsustainable debt, recklessly borrowing from bilateral lenders, mainly China, India, and Japan, as well as from a wide range of private investors. On this shaky ground, the government erected a wide array of megaprojects without conducting proper feasibility studies – essentially, building pieces of infrastructure that would never be commercially viable. Meanwhile, the Rajapaksa family has been accused of corruption, nepotism, bribes, and money laundering, with its members secretly transferring billions to accounts abroad. The infamous port of Hambantota, therefore, might not be the story of a Chinese masterplan. It is more of a tale of Sri Lanka’s broken politics.
In the early 2000s, many experts frowned upon the decision to build a new port in Hambantota, only 200 km away from Colombo, which hosts the 25th busiest port in the world. For a small island nation like Sri Lanka, this did not seem like a calculated, rational decision. In fact, it was a political one. Mahinda Rajapaksa is from the Hambantota district, a place where he hoped to solidify his grip on power and build a political stronghold. He thus erected a wide array of megaprojects - some of them carrying his name – in an attempt to elevate himself as the strongman that was capable of delivering economic revitalization to his native area. Today, in Hambantota, the signs of Rajapaksa’s megalomania and heavy spending are everywhere – not only in the port itself. Take the cricket stadium, built with a capacity of 35,000 people for a remote town with only 11,000 residents: largely unsuccessful, it is often used as a wedding venue to recover some profit. Alternatively, the airport sits semi-abandoned with no departures or arrivals. Moreover, the huge convention centre that barely hosts any event – at the moment, it has mostly become a playground for Sri Lankan kids, who often play cricket next to the main entrance. These white elephants are the grim legacy of a political dynasty out of touch with reality, unable to comprehend the needs of the people they governed, whom they eventually dragged into bankruptcy in 2022. “They built a port, an airport, a conference centre, and a cricket stadium, but they forgot that we in Hambantota are mostly farmers. What we really need is agricultural reform – not another empty project,” says Anaya, who used to be a teacher.
Source: (A train in Sri Lanka. Credit: Flickr)
For the much-debated port of Hambantota, China Exim Bank provided 85% of the funding at an unusually high-interest rate of 6.3%. The proponents of the debt-trap theory interpret this as yet another sign of Beijing’s plan to push Colombo into debt. Yet this might be simplistic thinking that once again fails to consider the broader context of the Sri Lankan reality. When construction of the Hambantota port began in 2007, Sri Lanka was still ravaged by one of the bloodiest phases of a decades-long civil war, struggling to generate public revenue. The government presented the port project to many investors, yet China emerged as the only country that was willing to take the risk of financing the megaproject. More than a predatory investor, China was a lender of last resort. Moreover, it demanded a high-interest rate because it essentially offered a high-risk loan to a conflict-torn country.
Once the Chinese loan was granted, the Sri Lankan government failed to plan its spending in a way that could offer quick returns. The Danish firm Ramboll recommended that, during the first phase of construction, the port should only manage the transport of non-containerized cargo, like oil tanks and cars. Once the Hambantota port generated the necessary revenue, Ramboll suggested, new parts could be constructed. Yet the Sri Lankan government took the hasty decision to request new funding and proceed with the second phase of the construction, immediately transforming Hambantota into a container port. “Experts suggested they constructed different parts of the port at different times, allowing each phase to be profitable and operational. Instead, the government preferred to build everything at the same time, although this implied more borrowing without solid revenues”, says Dilshan. Corruption and self-interest were also widespread. For instance, Ramboll forecasted that building a bunkering facility at Hambantota would cost roughly $33 million, yet the ports Minister submitted a document that demanded a $100 million loan. The extra cash was allegedly poured into the pockets of the Rajapaksa clan.
Source: (A Sri Lankan lady. Credit: Flickr)
By 2014, the Hambantota port was a fiasco and a burden to the Sri Lankan government. The Sri Lankan Port Authority found itself diverting money from the profitable Colombo port because Hambantota’s revenues were too low for the port to sustain itself. In 2016 many Western creditors were also demanding their annual repayments, and Sri Lanka found itself in need of foreign exchange. The ticking bomb created by Mahinda Rajapaksa was about to explode. And this is when Sri Lanka decided to lease out Hambantota to China Merchants Port for a 99-year concession. It was not about a predatory investor attempting to seize its debtor’s national assets: it was more about Sri Lanka getting rid of an inefficient and underperforming port to restore its foreign reserves, which had dried up after years of heavy borrowings and irrational spending.
The debt trap theory fails to consider that recipients of Chinese funding are often autocratic and corrupted leaders seeking to advance their political agenda. Visiting Hambantota and its semi-abandoned buildings suggests that, for the population of a developing country like Sri Lanka, living under these regimes might in fact be the real trap.
*For privacy and security reasons, pseudonyms are being used to de-identify those that shared information and personal opinions with the author
For the third Webinar of the 2022/2023 season, we had the pleasure to host three top experts in the field of Cybersecurity: Luca Nicoletti from the Italian National Cybersecurity Agency, Andrea Rigoni from Deloitte, and Antonello Vitale, a former Executive of the Italian Intelligence Community.
These experts explored the complex relationship between the public and the private sector in the context of cybersecurity - a relationship with countless challenges as well as opportunities. The event was chaired by our very own Martina Gambacorta, a member and researcher of the ITSS team.
