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February 14, 2023 — No Comments

Space Warfare: How are offensive military operations conducted in Space?

This is a transcript of an indepth interview with Paul S. Szymanski who has a 49 year experience conducting military operations research analyses for the United States Air Force and Space Force, Navy, Army and Marines. These include outer space program analysis, management, and development of space warfare theory, policy, doctrine, strategies, tactics and techniques. He has worked with the Air Staff at the Pentagon (Secretary of the Air Force), the Space and Missiles Systems Center (Now SSC) in Los Angeles, and the Air Force Research Labs (AFRL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico, along with experience in operational field testing of missile systems at China Lake, California. He is the author of several publications. This transcript is last in a three-part series of content extracted from an interview with Mr. Szymanski.

Interviewed and Edited by: Danilo delle Fave.

Based on your experience in the field and the expertise that you have acquired, you have developed a set of rules to fight and win the next space war, could you explain these?

Preconflict Positioning: Since it is very difficult to change orbits at the last minute (especially changing orbital inclination), immediate space combat can only be fought with the current resources on hand in the local area, for quick space wars. There will be no transconflict redistribution of space forces to help those forces under immediate attack, unless the space war continues for months on end if a decisive space attack is not accomplished in the beginning. Thus, preconflict positioning of space assets is possibly the most important aspect of space strategies. This principle is related to the other fundamental principle of maximizing high maneuvering abilities of space assets. Dominating and survivable preconflict satellite positioning and extensive satellite on-board maneuvering fuel is of most importance.

Space Situational Awareness and Weapons Range: It does not matter how plentiful or how brilliant your adversary space weapon systems are if they cannot find or reach your critical space systems. If you are constantly maneuvering so that he cannot find you, or your satellites are in hard to reach orbits, or have low observables, or you possess many believable satellite decoys, then he can never dominate you. Perceptive space situational awareness (SSA), Space Domain Awareness (SDA) and predictive battlespace awareness (PBA) will dominate any offensive weapons capabilities. Because of the inherent instability of offense vs. defense in space warfare, the most important tool for senior military and political space leaders is space surveillance and identification sensors with corresponding automated assessment algorithms, particularly those that provide PBA.

Decisive Political Will: Having space forces that are superior in numbers and technological quality are useless if there is not the political will to fully and quickly use them. This principle may imply dictatorships are more at an advantage than democracies. Hesitation and uncertainty can rapidly lead to failure in space warfare. Effective doctrine and decisive and confident political will is most necessary to counter adversary military actions in the space environment. However, let’s be frank – mistakes will be made regardless of full domain awareness.

Maneuver: A satellite’s ability to frequently conduct large, small, or continuous maneuvers, especially just before and during a space conflict, might be the best capability to keep your adversaries guessing as to your space control intentions and planning, besides complicating his targeting solutions, especially when said adversary may lack worldwide space surveillance sensor coverage.

Unusual Orbits: Unusual orbits increase the difficulty of your adversaries to determine your intentions or target you quickly.

Value of Space: Due to the newness of space warfare, your adversary probably does not fully understand the value of space both to himself and to his adversaries. This complicates his ability to prioritize his targeting plans, and may contribute to him wasting precious maneuvering fuel and limited “shots” from space weapons going against low-value satellites, along with ceding time and tempo advantages to the other side. Ultimately, space warfare is actually information warfare, so it is difficult to mathematically assess the value of the information generated or transmitted by satellites to the commanders’ minds with timely and decisive decision-making processes.

Political Consequences: Due to the newness of space warfare, our adversary and probably ourselves do not fully understand the political, diplomatic, economic, and international ramifications of employing space weapon systems, especially post conflict.

Effective Doctrine: Due to the newness of space warfare, our adversary and probably ourselves do not fully understand the best theory, doctrine, strategies, tactics, and techniques for conducting optimized space warfare. Big mistakes will be made by both sides.

Mistakes Will Be Made: Due to the newness of space warfare, most carefully laid plans, doctrines, strategies, tactics, techniques, political, technological, and correlation of forces assumptions will prove false and be immediately thrown out (or worse, be so dearly held, they lead to immediate defeat). This rule equally applies to both sides of the conflict, unless one side is lucky enough to have gotten space doctrine slightly more correct than the opposing side.

Vary Space Weapon Types: Due to the newness of space warfare, it might be best to possess different phenomenology space weapon systems with varied basing options to increase the chance you developed your preplanning and space doctrine right for a type of conflict that has never occurred before. Remember, in all previous wars the first casualties are most, if not all, of the preconflict plans.

Define Winning: The concept of “winning” in space warfare is not clearly defined. Its definition may be made by political leadership with limited technological or military knowledge and may be based on purely political, propagandistic, or failed doctrinal principles. Your adversary will certainly have a very different definition of winning, which means both sides may perceive they have “won” the space conflict and derive quite different conclusions that will dominate their military, political, diplomatic, and economic (commercial and procurement strategies) thinking for decades to come. One’s space strategies employed during the conflict should take this into consideration to place your nation into a favorable position post conflict.

Space Debris: Creation of too much space debris during space conflicts may make losers out of all sides after the conflict, in the long term, and lead to global political consequences.

Future Political Impacts: You may be assured that after the conduct of a major space war, national and international protocols, treaties, rules of conduct, insurance claims, and alliances will be radically changed for space. One’s space strategies employed during the conflict should take these into consideration to place your nation into a favorable position post conflict.

Adversary Postconflict Reactions: You may be assured that after the conduct of a major space war, your adversaries and other nations will learn from this war and probably build up their own space weapon capabilities, even if necessarily covertly. One’s space strategies employed during the conflict should take these into consideration to place your nation into a favorable position post conflict.

Space Escalation Ladder: Due to the remote nature of space systems, the world’s populace may be kept in the dark (especially for low-level space conflicts) on what is truly happening, which provides additional, more subtle rungs, on the conflict escalation ladder, allowing nations to privately exhibit resolve and will while transmitting determined political messages.

Space Warfare Inherently Conflict Destabilizing: Because a small, relatively inexpensive space mine can take out a large billion-dollar satellite critical to the conduct of your military operations and actual satellite point defense is problematic due to probable ASAT hypervelocity closing speeds, offense is better than defense in space warfare, making it inherently unstable for conflict escalation.

Quick Space Attacks Possible: Due to the remote nature of satellites in space, small-scale space attacks may be initiated, executed, and completed before the recipient even knows he is under attack, who is attacking, what are their attack strategies and goals (end states), and when an uncomprehending senior political leadership can validate the attack and respond in a military, political, diplomatic, or economic manner. Large-scale space attacks may be initiated, executed, and completed within 24–48 hours. Without adequate and timely SDA/SSA and determined political will, an adversary can easily get within your Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) command-and-control loops for space and shock and confuse you in space, and on the ground.

Space Exhibits Escalation Imbalances: Due to the remote nature of satellites in space and the difficulty for space surveillance assets to determine the true nature of space attacks, and because space attacks may be initiated, executed, and completed within 24–48 hours, there is a good chance that the side that initiates space attacks first will be the side that wins the space war.

Covertness and Surprise of Prime Importance: Due to the remote nature of satellites in space and the difficulty for space surveillance assets to determine the true nature of space attacks, and because space attacks may be initiated, executed, and completed within 24–48 hours, covertness and surprise will significantly contribute to winning the space war.

Joint Military and Commercial Space Use: Mixing military and commercial systems on the same satellites increases the chances of space conflict escalation due to the general populace immediately becoming aware of the effects of satellite loss and placing pressure on political leadership to take precipitous actions. Thus, the nuances of steady and reasoned escalation control are lost.

Space Only Benefits Terrestrial Systems: Space conflict is all about denying satellite support to military forces or civilian populations on Earth—not simply the elimination of satellite systems for destruction sake or as a space “scorekeeper.” Currently, there are no colonies that the United States Space Force needs to protect in space. It’s all about space support to the terrestrial battlefield.

Small Space Forces Can Beat Larger: As in many other conflicts past and present, having space forces that appear superior in numbers and technological quality on paper does not guarantee a “win” under all circumstances. There are many examples throughout thousands of years of military history of numerically inferior forces beating their “betters.” Many times, it is the forces with better doctrine, planning, morale (political will), or positioning that win. This can only be truer for a new area of conflict in space that has little, if any, past military examples and experiences.

Public Opinion Will Limit Military Options: Even though space wars entail very few, if any, human casualties, international public opinion values space wars as more politically unacceptable compared to terrestrial destruction and loss of human life from traditional warfare on Earth. In addition, space wars will fire the imaginations, good or bad, of your citizens, along with much of the rest of the world that is not actively participating in the conflict.

Allies Count Little Militarily for Space Wars: Due to the limited number of countries with future space weapons systems and their attendant need for covertness along with international political sensitivities, each adversary will probably have to go it alone, and his allies cannot or will not significantly help them openly in the coming space conflict. In addition, more than likely, allied space systems will be in the wrong space defense regions, and incapable of maneuvering closer for mutual defense in a timely manner.

Space Treaties Will Be Violated: Most space treaties will be violated in the first few hours of the coming space war. International treaties have usually been violated in most previous major terrestrial conflicts, and due to the remoteness of space, treaties concerning the military use of space are easier to ignore, especially when the world populace may not even be aware of this ongoing space conflict, and the United Nations does not possess space surveillance assets.

Data Relay Satellites Are Prime Targets: Possibly the most important space targets will be those satellites that relay data and commands directly to other satellites in remote orbits, making them choke points for critical space systems. This is particularly true for those countries without extensive worldwide satellite ground control stations.

Defense vs. Offense: Those nations that have more space systems being used by their military also have more space systems to defend and probably must emphasize defense over offense in their technology developments and in their military planning. If your adversary has few space systems, then there are fewer targets for your offensive space weapons, and you must emphasize defense, unless you believe that you have perfect SDA/SSA and you know all your adversaries’ and their allies’ offensive space weapons and believe you can target and neutralize these early in the space conflict before he can fully implement his offensive space warfare plans.

Space Warfare Systems Are Untested: If your adversaries’ space warfare systems are untested in real, sustained combat, then their true abilities against you are uncertain and they probably possess “cracks in their armor.” Unfortunately, the same is probably true of your space warfare systems (whether you believe this or not), but the true vulnerabilities and failure points of both sides may not be obvious or believable. However, be assured, due to the new nature of space warfare, they do exist in plenitude, and the quickest way to defeat is possessing overconfidence.

Differing Cultures and Military Traditions: Because your adversaries probably come from different cultures and military traditions than your own, they have a higher probability of detecting your space warfare systems nonobvious “cracks in their armor” than you do, and vice versa.

You Are Always Vulnerable: As in all military matters since time immemorial, due to the cleverness of human beings, especially under stressful combat conditions, your adversaries will ultimately find your vulnerabilities and get through any defenses you may fool yourself into thinking are “invulnerable.”

Decisive Commander: For those countries at war with roughly equal space warfare forces, the main decisive factor would be which country may be lucky enough to discover and believe in the one decisive commander who is a genius in space warfare organization, training, doctrine, strategies, and tactics. This is especially true for the nontraditional nature of space warfare. In addition, those countries with the least meddling in military matters by their politicians might be the decisive factor in winning the war (though possibly “losing” the peace afterward).

Little to No Human Casualties: Because space warfare involves little to no human casualties, commanders can be particularly decisive and coldhearted in their planning and execution compared to terrestrial warfare. As the late Maj Gen Roger G. DeKok, USAF, stated, “Satellites have no mothers.” In addition, morale and courage on the battlefield is of less importance, though command decisiveness remains a critical factor.

Low-Cost Offensive Weapons: Due to the hypervelocities of space orbits, one cannot adequately armor your spacecraft, and a small, relatively inexpensive space mine can take out a large billion-dollar satellite critical to the conduct of your military operations.

Space “Fog of War”: The potential for confusion known as the “fog of war” is well-documented for terrestrial battlefields; it will be even worse for space warfare, due to the newness of this theater for conflict, the tremendous distances involved, and the global nature of space.

Commercial Satellites Are on Their Own: Commercial satellite operators whose expectations are that the military will protect their space systems during conflicts will have a rude awakening.

Checklist Vulnerability: Operators who are trained to respond to unusual situations by rout “checklist” actions can be easily spoofed and manipulated by a clever adversary, especially in a contested environment with denied or degraded communications to higher headquarters (rule suggested by Paul Day).

February 13, 2023 — No Comments

The Ba-looming crisis

Author: Gianluca Catucci

Introduction

The undisturbed incursion by the Chinese balloon into American territory and over military sites captured the attention of analysts worldwide, climaxing in a spectacular battle between an F-22 fighter jet and a balloon. After some hesitation by American leadership, the downing was authorised and live-aired but raised many legal and political issues.

Vintage Balloons

The first question is why China, a technological giant, would need balloons to spy on US territory.Compared to drones and satellites, balloons are infinitely less expensive and preferable in an operation at a high risk of loss of the device. Furthermore, balloons float at an altitude significantly lower than satellites, thus potentially capturing audio that the latter cannot intercept, and providing higher-quality imaging. Balloons also allow constant surveillance whilst being much less detectable, as they can hover for long escaping radars, and can even deploy their drones. Lastly, whilst subject to wind patterns, they are more manoeuvrable and their flight altitude can be modified.

The test of International Law

Before addressing the political consequences of the balloon’s destruction, it is important to put the operation to the test of international law. According to the Chicago Convention (ICAO, 1944), articles 1-3, “every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.” Commercial airliners and balloons both qualify as civilian airships, and thus cannot fly over the territory of another country without permission.

But what constitutes sovereign airspace?

International law is very clear about the horizontal limits of sovereignty, which is established in the 1982 UNCLOS: it extends until the territorial waters of a state (12nm from the baseline). Conversely, there is no agreement over what constitutes the vertical boundary of sovereignty, a matter on which the Montego Bay Convention, the Chicago Convention, and the Outer Space Treaty are silent. States have thus used divergent standards to draw the line between national airspace and outer space. Technically, states could claim as sovereign territory up to 100 km of space above ground (62 mi, the Kármán line).

*Image* *Source:* https://unsplash.com/it/foto/GOX3FMgcWK4

The consequences of this distinction cannot be overstated: states have sovereign authority and jurisdiction over their airspace, but no one has authority over outer space, which is an international commons.

China contends that the balloon was a civilian device conducting meteorological research in outer space, while the most credible accounts report the UAV flying at 60.000 feet above the ground. According to US practice, this would be considered within American airspaces, like all aircraft flying below 100.000 feet, and its transit would thus be conditional upon permission by state authorities. Article 3(bis) of the Chicago Convention proscribes the use of force against civilian aircraft. Nonetheless, in the case at hand, international and domestic rules were violated, giving the US the right to restore its domestic law & order via countermeasures and the use of internal force, as long as proportionate and necessary, a test facilitated by the absence of human personnel on the airship.

Moreover, if it were proven that the balloon was a spy device - increasingly likely while it is being dismantled and studied - its status would not be regulated by the Chicago Convention, which deals only with civilian aircraft. Indeed, a spy balloon is considered a state military aircraft. A violation of sovereign airspace by such an airship would thus amount to a use of force in violation of “the territorial integrity or political independence” of the United States, as per art.2(4) of the UN Charter. As similar past episodes showed, the US was entirely within its rights in neutralising the possible threat, again provided that the response was necessary and proportionate.

The Communist Party answered in dismay, alleging a force majeure justification in a note by the Foreign Ministry. Top diplomats have harshly criticized President Biden for his aggressive tone in the State of the Union address. Nevertheless, the official response was not excessively confrontational, and a final answer on the nature of the incursion is yet to arrive. Furthermore, evidence is emerging concerning a larger swarm of Chinese balloons over all five continents, and of a case where China, on the receiving side of a surveillance balloon, shot it down in 2019 alleging similar justifications.

Political Consequences

After having established the legality of the shooting, the next step requires analyzing its political context and consequences. This incident inserts itself into a string of tensions between the two superpowers, the zenith of which consisted in Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last August.

Biden and Xi’s meeting in Bali helped thaw out the situation, with both leaders agreeing on the need for open and direct diplomatic channels to communicate. However, top American military officials have criticized the Chinese leadership for not fulfilling their promise in the case at hand, leaving calls by the Defense Secretary unanswered. Fears are that a lack of communication may make misunderstandings and flare-ups more likely; crisis hotlines during the Cold War with the Kremlin proved vital for averting open hostilities.

While the significance of the data collected is poor, the undisturbed penetration of a Chinese balloon within the US mainland caused a few headaches to American officials. It is a clear signal from the CCP that it has the capacity to trespass on American territory, and not only small atolls in the South China Sea. Moreover, through a grey-zone operation, Beijing has successfully used non-violent means for a clear political goal: destabilising its main adversary while averting an overt military response.

Hence, not only has the incursion shown the disruptive potential of Chinese technology, but it has exposed the vulnerability of American intelligence services, fuelling chaos in American public opinion and halls of power. Hawkish members of Congress, notably Republicans, have lashed out at President Biden for having failed to prevent or act quicker. The live coverage of the balloon’s destruction sought to remedy this fiasco but contributed to exacerbating tensions and Anti-Asian rhetoric, already high in the country, and to fan the flames of a spiralling escalation not only of words.

Conclusion

The balloon incident is just another episode of a saga of a looming US-China crisis. It highlighted the lack of true communication hotlines between the two nuclear powers and the threat this poses to international peace and security. Indeed, misunderstandings between nuclear powers and poor crisis management could lead to apocalyptic scenarios.

While the People’s Republic tested US tolerance, the latter responded by showing that it means business, by annihilating the balloon with a $400.000 missile fired by the most advanced fighter in the world. This adds to its muscle-flexing through a chip embargo and a deal with the Philippines for the use of four military bases.

Overall, both sides seem to ignore conciliatory avenues and through unscrupulous violations of sovereignty, grey-zone operations, discordance in crucial international fora, and muscle-flexing, they keep fanning the flames of strategic competition. Even worse, aggressive rhetoric bounces from Beijing to Washington with little consideration for its consequences.

Through belligerent discourse and the antagonization of the other, the US and China contribute to constructing the idea of the enemy and convincing stakeholders and citizens of the inevitability of conflict, potentially exposing the world to a self-fulfilling prophecy and global catastrophe. While the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists considers this only 90 seconds away, hope is that de-escalation efforts and the Bali agenda return to the central stage.

February 7, 2023 — No Comments

Space Warfare: How are offensive military operations conducted in Space?

This is a transcript of an indepth interview with Paul S. Szymanski who has a 49 year experience conducting military operations research analyses for the United States Air Force and Space Force, Navy, Army and Marines. These include outer space program analysis, management, and development of space warfare theory, policy, doctrine, strategies, tactics and techniques. He has worked with the Air Staff at the Pentagon (Secretary of the Air Force), the Space and Missiles Systems Center (Now SSC) in Los Angeles, and the Air Force Research Labs (AFRL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico, along with experience in operational field testing of missile systems at China Lake, California. He is the author of several publications. This transcript is second in a three-part series of content extracted from an interview with Mr. Szymanski.

Interviewed and Edited by: Danilo delle Fave.

What are some of the potential threats in Space?

Cyber Attacks: The most popular means of attack against space systems where the entire spectrum of space systems is vulnerable to these attacks. Each country is vulnerable to such hacking. A smaller/poorer country can purchase a surplus satellite (or critical parts thereof) and then conduct hacker contests against these test satellites with significant cash prizes to the teams that cause the best effects against these space system. The same techniques can be employed to train individuals on how to penetrate space ground systems. All of these space systems, including space jammers, are readily available on the commercial market for installation in your country of choice.

Terrestrial Attacks: Any country on Earth has special forces that can penetrate adversary ground systems (satellite control stations, RADARS, Optical Space Tracking Telescopes, etc.). These special forces can insert cyber codes into critical systems, install mines, etc. In addition, spy networks can be employed to “turn” the loyalties of adversary space technicians to influence them to insert threat cyber codes and sabotage critical adversary space systems on the ground.

Space Surveillance Systems: In order to achieve smart space control, a country needs to better understand the orbits, status and capabilities of their adversary space systems. This can readily be achieved through ground-based RADARS and optical imagery/tracking systems. Optical tracking systems can be assembled using amateur astronomy telescopes, and many amateurs employ these around the World in this role. They do not cost that much, are fully automated, and can be placed on the rooftops of country embassies around the World, particularly in countries that have good weather conditions and visibility to space. With such situational knowledge, a poorer country can attack an adversary satellite at the same time a third country is “visiting” the targeted space system with an inspector/rendezvous satellite in order to place the attack blame on another country.

Laser Attacks: Currently, consumers can openly purchase hand-held 7.5-watt laser systems. Attach one of these to the above-mentioned astronomical telescope, and with the proper alignment techniques, a poorer country can blind an adversary imaging satellite, or maybe even spoof its Earth limb sensors. With even much more powerful and better collimated industrial lasers, a second world country may even be able to permanently damage these sensors. In the least, one should be able to initiate satellite self-defense mechanisms (close sensor shutters, roll satellite) that will take the attacked satellite systems offline for hours if not days, rendering it ineffective during some critical time during a terrestrial battle.

January 30, 2023 — No Comments

State Supremacy: Can it be Achieved?

This blog article is written following an indepth interview with Paul S. Szymanski who has a 49 year experience conducting military operations research analyses for the United States Air Force and Space Force, Navy, Army and Marines. These include outer space program analysis, management, and development of space warfare theory, policy, doctrine, strategies, tactics and techniques. He has worked with the Air Staff at the Pentagon (Secretary of the Air Force), the Space and Missiles Systems Center (Now SSC) in Los Angeles, and the Air Force Research Labs (AFRL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico, along with experience in operational field testing of missile systems at China Lake, California. He is the author of several publications. This blog article in the first in a three-part series of content extracted from an interview with Mr. Szymanski.

Interviewed and Edited By: Danilo delle Fave.

Space superiority debate borrows from postulates of sea (maritime) and air superiority but vastness, obscurity, and complexity of space making it near impossible for any country to achieve space supremacy.

The vastness of space could be understood by a simple thought-experiment: imagine taking a basketball and hiding it somewhere on Earth, and then challenging someone to find it. To further elaborate, Earth’s oceans contain 329 million cubic miles of water, both on and below the surface, the volume of space between the Earth and the Moon is 4.81097E+16 cubic miles. Therefore, to achieve space supremacy, a country has to “control” 146,230,091 times the volume of the Earth’s oceans; a near impossible task for this century.

Similarly, the notion that since there is no geographic feature in space, satellites cannot hide from Earth or space-based sensor networks is false. Satellites are “lost” all the time; often space objects are classified as ‘analyst objects’, simply because their characteristics and ownership is not known. This is a challenge when identifying targets for space weapons systems. How can a country be sure it has identified the correct asset? How can certainty that a potential satellite is really a threat be achieved?

Lastly, space is complex with multitude of space systems of interest to military targeteers. This adds to the complexity because possible adversarial attacks could be terrestrial-based, space-based, cyber or physical attacks, etc. and must be accounted for.

Beyond the basic characteristics of space that may create obstacles for outer space warfare, are other more complex issues of lawfare and defence. Whilst treaties exist to limit outer space weapons, the vastness and obscurity of space makes implementation of these treaties very difficult. This is because very few countries have space surveillance sensors – which fall short of the ability to adequately identify satellites, their capabilities and make up in an environment where they are rapidly moving and spinning. Furthermore, to verify a space treaty the United Nations would have to possess an extensive world-wide network of sensors, which would be very expensive to build and maintain, and would ultimately be imperfect anyway.

Outer space wars are likely to be very rapid and could conclude in 24-48 hours before a country can realise who attacked, for what intent and how to best defend. Any actual "fighting" can only occur with assets in the immediate area, because the ability to make large manoeuvres in space takes a lot of fuel and a lot of time. More than likely, an ally's space assets will be in places around the Earth that are far removed from the immediate conflict. Also, Rules of Engagement will be different, due to differing value systems. In Europe, causing human deaths to preserve equipment is not allowed, whereas in the US, it is different. For examples would Europeans allow bombs on a manned Earth station controlling an adversary space weapon?

In conclusion, perhaps space supremacy might be achievable in in a specific orbital regime and a specific, limited time. However, hypervelocity attacks can come from any other orbit in a rapid manner and upset this ‘superiority’. But it is important to consider this: Satellites are worthless if they cannot communicate back to Earth to receive controlling instructions or download their data. If a country can cut off most, if not all, communications to a country’s space systems, then maybe they have achieved space supremacy. This denial of space communications would not only have to be effective within the country’s boundaries, but for other satellite control sites around the world that this country may employ, or for friendly satellite tracking ships on the world’s oceans.

January 23, 2023 — No Comments

The Middle East in 2023: From Revolution to Survival

Author: Omri Brinner and Chantal Elisabeth Hohe.

2022 brought about several game-changing developments in the Middle East and beyond. These events - from domestic political instability, through the weakening of American influence in the region, to the protests in Iran - will all leave a mark in 2023, a year that is shaping to be decisive for the Middle East’s future.

Of the many things to monitor in the region during 2023, four issues stand out the most, largely due to their international significance. These are the American involvement in the Middle East; climate change and the region’s efforts - or lack of - to counter it; the domestic upheaval in Iran and its global impact; and the economic situation across the region, with a growing number of countries in economic disarray (Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt and Yemen).

Image Source: https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/protests-in-iran-the-regime-s-trail-of-blood-a-8775e064-e031-4f80-8a87-5ec4cb59246c

The US in the Middle East

Going into 2023, the United State’s role in the Middle East is undefined. Had it been clear and obvious, American officials wouldn’t have to reiterate that their country will remain pivotal as it once was. The facts on the ground suggest less American physical involvement. There are less American troops in the region; American diplomacy has been weakened; and one is much more exposed to alternative soft power than before. In that sense we are expected to see declining American presence across the region. Diplomatically, the US is losing grip as well. While it largely has Israel on its side in its competition with China and Russia, other allies - most notably Saudi Arabia - are becoming less and less dependent on the US, fueling a multipolar world where the US is now one of many, rather than the one. The US can stay assured that it will continue to have leverage over several individuals and countries in the coming year, but all in all - and much due to the multipolar inertia across the region - this leverage is not infinite, and further distancing from American policies are likely to follow. This dynamic played out in the relations between President Biden and the Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin-Salman, where the latter refused to give-in to American pressure on oil prices, proving that the American leverage on him and his country is limited. In other words, American superiority will not only continue to be challenged from afar, but also from within the region itself.

Iran

2023 might very well be the year of the Persian Spring. The revolutionary protests that began in September have the potential to spin the regime out of control and to create a new reality in the country, and the region. What started as a social protest against the state’s brutality and the killing of Masha Amini has developed into a full regime-change movement, with the slogan “death to Khamenei” gaining momentum and legitimacy on social media. It is of course possible that the harsh and lethal crackdown by the state will break the back of the revolution, but these past few months and the ones to follow will certainly change Iran and affect the region as a whole, whichever way the wind blows.

Furthermore, in light of the internal turmoil and the fact that the Iranian nuclear deal is all but alive, it is likely that Iran will push to both enrich as much uranium as possible and to create destabilizing chaos across the region in the coming months. All in all, what happens in Iran during 2023 will determine the near future of the Middle East.

Climate

After a rather unsuccessful COP27 failed to produce actionable policy solutions or real commitments from the international community, a decisive year lies ahead for the Middle East, where people will continue suffering from the consequences of the climate crisis. Most prominently, water scarcity will lead to an increasingly dire situation, fueling food insecurity, economic downturn, civil unrest, and violent extremism. That said, several innovative start-ups and promising technologies are on the rise, with the GCC countries upping the funding to accelerate developments in the field. Hope now lies upon the Abu Dhabi COP28, set to take place in November and, ironically, hosted by UAE’s National Oil Company CEO, with civil society organizations and academia urging for serious action.

Economy

A cleavage in economic performance is increasingly visible among Middle Eastern countries, with the oil-based GCC monarchies witnessing continuous growth - whereas others are facing economic decline, leading to or exacerbating existing socio-political turbulences. The economic outlook for 2023 indicates that inflation is likely to surpass 30% in numerous countries, with Syria at 63% and Lebanon at a staggering 167% . Further regional actors, such as Iran, Turkey, Egypt, and Yemen, face economic hardship while also having to tackle political challenges, civil unrest, and violent conflicts. Overall, domestic and international factors - such as the war in Ukraine - are likely to deepen a looming recession and the energy crisis. While it is likely that wealthy GCC countries will continue to support struggling regional allies, countries such as Yemen, Libya and Lebanon will continue to be used as arenas for proxy wars, further deepening their economic troubles.

January 23, 2023 — No Comments

Liberté, fraternité ou renvoyer: France -Italy feud highlights EU’s incompetence in harmonizing shared responsibility

Author: Isabel Dekker and Federico Alistair D'Alessio.

Between the 22^nd and 26^th of October 2022, 234 migrants (including over 40 minors) were rescued by the Ocean Viking, a rescue boat managed by SOS Méditerranée, a humanitarian organization that rescues people in distress at sea. Before being allowed to dock in Toulon (France) on the 11^th of November, the boat was stranded at sea for almost three weeks leading to a rapid decline in the passengers’ health. The vessel landed in France after Italy refused to allow the ship to dock on their shores, intensifying their bitter dispute over migration. Since 2015, the EU has forwarded numerous initiatives to improve the coordination and handling of the arrival of migrants. Nevertheless, EU’s migration policies are often executed in an ad hoc fashion resulting in diplomatic tensions across the European continent.

FRANCE’S POINT OF VIEW

The French government condemned Italy’s refusal to welcome the vessel carrying over 200 migrants: the French Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin referred to Italy’s actions as ’incomprehensible’ and ’unacceptable’, in addition to emphasizing on ‘strong consequences’ for the relations between the two countries.

France has also adjourned its collaboration in the relocation mechanism which was proposed last June. This plan concerned a dozen European Union member states, including France, The Netherlands and Germany, which voluntarily decided to welcome 8,000 migrants arriving in countries of first entry to Europe, such as Italy. The Interior Ministry announced that the planned relocation of 3,500 people to France in support of Italy between the summer of 2022 and 2023 is suspended, while also inviting other EU member states to do so. Moreover, France has also strengthened its border controls with Italy.

‘’It’s the Italian government that’s losing out’’ – Mr. Darmanin (Minister of Interior)

Nevertheless, France has had its own political rows over accepting the ship, as far-right opposition leader Marine Le Pen called Macron ‘dramatically’ soft on migration and justified and praised the decisions taken by the Italian government.

ITALY’S STANCE

By denying the Ocean Viking to dock in Catania, the Italian government has reiterated a message often emphasized by the countries most affected by migration: the responsibility of receiving and integrating migrants must be shared equally by all EU member states. Italian PM Giorgia Meloni strongly criticizes the Dublin III Regulation, according to which each asylum application must be examined only by the first country where the migrants disembark in. This represents a significant disadvantage for Mediterranean countries as they are always considered the nearest place of safety when dealing with boats coming from Africa.

Criticism also concerns the lack of a clear and effective European framework regarding the relocation of migrants. The most recent plan was arranged last summer, but it did not lead to the expected outcome. A voluntary redistribution of 8000 migrants was agreed, but just 117 of them have been resettled so far, of which only 38 to France. As a result of this perceived failure, a joint statement issued in November by Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Malta laments the little support shown by other member states to share the burden of asylum applications, as well as the absence of a common strategy to adequately support frontline countries.

Meloni criticizes what she referred to as an ‘incomprehensible and unjustified’ reaction of the French government, which decided to freeze the abovementioned plan and suggested the rest of the EU to act accordingly. France also chose to strengthen its control over borders with Italy, even though similar measures in the past have brought to light to questionable tactics used by French authorities to pushback migrants.

Moreover, the Italian government underlines that the country has dealt with more than 100 thousand arrivals by sea in 2022, which represents a sharp increase in comparison to previous years. Considering this evidence and given that the Italian government allowed three ships out of four to disembark, the Ministry of Interior deemed reasonable for France to accommodate the last migrant rescue boat.

EU REACTION

The Vice President of the European Commission, Margaritis Schinas, criticized Italy for its ambiguous approach: the government requested more European solidarity, but at the same time did not allow the docking of the Ocean Viking ship, which was carrying people in deteriorating sanitary conditions. Schinas claims that migrants must be first allowed to disembark in the closest location before any resettlement operations can be carried out. In fact, a 2002 annex to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea states that people rescued at sea must be promptly taken to the nearest place of safety.

On the 25^th of November, EU officials met at an extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting and reiterated the immediate necessity of a common resolution that would increase the support to all countries and organizations most involved in searching and rescuing migrants, in such a way as to avoid further deaths in the Mediterranean. In addition, home affairs ministers stressed the need to focus on human smuggling and the roots of migration in order to prevent departures. The meeting also highlighted the urgency to reinforce the existing migration pact, which allows frontline countries to either relocate a share of the migrants in other states or request funds from those EU members that reject any sort of responsibility.

CONCLUSION

A French-Italian dispute has the potential to become a full-blown European issue: this bilateral crisis reflects the state of the EU on the management of migration flows, which has not been successfully addressed since the refugee crisis of 2015-16. The union has not been able to unanimously reform its rules of asylum which currently put the burden of applications solely on the arrival country. Moreover, the state deemed competent to examine the application often ends up being also the place in which refugees remain once protection has been obtained. It could be thus discussed that this mechanism undermines the concept of shared responsibility among EU members. Arguably, it also does not take into account the aspirations of displaced people, nor their concrete prospects of finding a job in other European countries.

As a result, aside from a revision of the Dublin accords, there is the necessity to make the resettlement scheme compulsory because of its inefficiency when dealing with governments who have a harder stance against migration and thus refuse to comply with voluntary accords. A comprehensive agreement that would deal with the migrant flux on an ongoing basis is also needed, rather than relying on ad-hoc resolutions: for instance, the EU may benefit from a pact in which each member state is assigned a specific set of responsibilities and a quota of migrants according to its economic and demographic availability.

Furthermore, the European Union requires alternative solutions for migrants that are not eligible for international protection (e.g. economic migrants), who currently represent the majority of people reaching Europe through the central Mediterranean route – as stated by Ylva Johansson, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs. Focus should also be put on the Balkan situation, as it is the second most used route by migrants in order to reach Europe.

In conclusion, these are some of the challenges that the EU must face as whole, although the reality shows several obstacles when trying to reach collective decisions that would benefit all the parties involved.

*Featured image: via Flickr

January 23, 2023 — No Comments

New Year, New Debt Distress in Africa

Author: Alessandra Gramolini.

The year that has just begun does not seem to be rosy for the African continent. At the beginning of 2022, Africa suffered from the pandemic and its effects on the economy. 2023 opens with many nations facing another crisis: unsustainable debt.

The crisis has been underway for years, long-term loans have more than doubled reaching 636 billion dollars in the decade 2011-2021, a figure that exceeds the gross domestic product of more than 40 African countries taken together. The pandemic has worsened the economic situation and the war in Ukraine has pushed many countries to the brink, cutting off access to finance, depleting foreign exchange reserves and sending national budgets into a tailspin.

Living on the razor’s edge

Debt is the biggest problem they will face even though the ratings agency, Fitch, expects average debt in sub-Saharan Africa to improve and be below 65% in 2023, after reaching 72% in 2020, helped from the economic recovery after the pandemic, rising commodity prices and efforts to reduce budget deficits, but this level compares with an average of 57% in 2019, before the pandemic, and with less than 30% between 2007 and 2013.

According to the analysis of the public debt of sub-Saharan African countries, almost half of the countries (42%) have a debt-to-GDP ratio above 70%, while the average debt-to-income ratio will continue to be above 300%, double the value of 2013. This would prove the deterioration of the economic bases of these countries and their evolution prospects.

The risks these countries will face are related to high inflation, difficult financial conditions, the general indebtedness of the economies caused by the pandemic and now also by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Fitch also forecasts that average inflation in the region will fall from about 8% in 2022 to 5.5% this year and that GDP growth will be around 4%, close to the average of 3.8% in the five years up to 2019, but well below the growth recorded up to 2014. In some countries, however, inflation is well above the regional average. Add to this that there are eight sub-Saharan African countries with government debt payments, in 2023, accounting for a quarter of foreign reserves.

Election year

On the political front, many countries will be called to vote during 2023. The results of these elections could increase the discontent of the populations already strongly suffering from the increase in the prices of basic necessities.

Election time can be very volatile in Africa and the 2023-24 cycle will be no different, with a high risk of political protests, mass demonstrations and strikes in a number of countries. Upcoming elections in countries such as Algeria, Madagascar, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe could prove hotbeds of disruptive civil unrest in 2023. Worsening socioeconomic conditions in some of these countries, driven by subdued wage growth, rising costs of living and food security concerns, could also prove problematic for incumbent or new government administrations.

What’s next?

While African policy makers can’t influence the global headwinds, they can take steps to build resilience. Rising prices of commodities in a continent endowed with everything from diamonds, iron ore, bauxite, cobalt, copper to platinum offer a chance to create stabilization or sovereign wealth funds to insulate against future shocks. The key to building savings is to have proper governance, by some estimates Africa has 20 such funds already, but not all have delivered.

Recent research says that China and the West should work together to find solutions for African debt distress. The report says that although China’s lending to Africa did not cause the current debt in the continent, it must cooperate with the international community and African nations, to support Africa’s investment needs, after a year of recession for most economies on the continent.

The G7, led by the incoming Japanese presidency for 2023, could develop and build support for a new plan to be eventually embedded at the G20 level on debt relief and investments in Africa. The plan could include a broad-based dialogue led by the G7, African nations, and China on:

Africa’s medium- to long-term external financing needs;
a high-level political understanding between the West and China on the mutual benefit of strengthened cooperation to address African debt distress;
and a detailed action agenda, led by the G7 and G20 Finance Tracks, to address obstacles for debt treatments.

A way out of this situation could be strong reforms to find long-term solutions that can meet African economies’ financial needs and avoid a similar scenario in the future.

January 2, 2023 — No Comments

Securing Communications: what to expect from IRISS (Infrastructure for Resilience Interconnectivity Security by Satellite)

Authors: Giovanni Tricco, Giorgia Zaghi and Maria Makurat.

The challenges of secure communications today and the launch of IRISS

Secure communications and connectivity are today more important than ever. Ensuring a safe, fast and reliable channel for such strategic activities is not just a matter of digital transformation and competitive advantage, it is a matter of establishing one’s autonomy in a world where space power has become a critical component of international politics. On October 13th, the European Union took a significant step forward in order to achieve such autonomy. That is, the adoption of the report on the secure connectivity programme for 2023-2027, also known as Infrastructure for Resilience Interconnectivy Security by Satellite (IRISS). The aim of the program is to detach from third-country dependencies on infrastructure by securing the Union’s communications and to provide high-speed broadband connectivity to areas that are now considered “dead-zones”. Such goals will be met thanks to the nature of IRISS. That is, a multi-orbit constellation capable of creating synergies with the already existing satellites Galileo and Copernico. The constellation will be situated in Low-Earth Orbit (LEO), the closest feasible latitude to the planet's surface spanning from 300 to 1600 km, ensuring rapid broadband connectivity. That means, data will flow faster from terminals on the ground to satellites in orbit and back.

While the necessity to establish the EU’s position in the space realm is certainly a strategic priority, the recent happenings of the war in Ukraine have highlighted some structural fragilities and vacuums which ultimately called for a concrete push in securing the Union’s communications.

War in Ukraine and satellite security

The Ukraine war has shown how a solid cyber strategy that includes satellites is vital also in face of war. In May, BBC News and other outlets reported of Russia hacking the Ukraine satellite communication KA-SAT system which was also attributed by the European Council to Russia in May 2022 in this statement. This attack had an impact on the communications as well as the government and the military. At the beginning of the war, there was also significant concerns by analysts whether Russia would launch several cyber attacks against satellites and communications systems in Ukraine and the West. As a reaction to this cyber attack on Ukraine, the European Space Policy Institute has released a report, to analyze said cyber attack on KA-SAT and how space cyber security plays a role for the war in Ukraine. An interesting take from the report is, that there also seems to be a question around which countries and which company are exactly responsible for the security of the communications system in another country: “The attack did not target the KA-SAT satellite itself, but one single “consumer-oriented partition of the KA-SAT network”, which is owned by the U.S. company Viasat but operated by Eutelsat’s subsidiary Skylogic. This raises questions on the responsibilities and liabilities of each company for ensuring proper cybersecurity.” This would be one significant challenge when it comes to developing new frameworks for the launch of constellations to ensure better connections between countries in terms of space security. This is also similarly discussed by academics such as Johann Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello calling the consequence of technologies at the crossroad of outer space and cyberspace “fragmentation” - meaning that governance becomes increasingly difficult since “The growth of states with space program has gone from the original 2 to around 70 today, and the simultaneous growth of private corporations (and NGOs) in space contributes to an increasingly fragmented field of stakeholders.”

Furthermore, the US and other countries have been supporting Ukraine during the war with not only physical military equipment but also funds and technological development to keep the communications system intact. This support is part of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) and shows how space and cyber are an integral part of the war. Ukraine has also been using AI during this war which was already analyzed by our members in another blog article which can be read here. Therefore, we can grasp why the EU is working on launching its sovereign constellation.

Now let’s get down to the nitty gritty of the matter. IRISS focuses on several goals which range from strategic positioning, creation of synergies and environmental concerns. More specifically, we can expect these objectives from the deployment of the constellation:

Top-notch technologies for secure communications: the constellation will integrate quantum computing features that will provide a higher level of encryption on the data that will flow on the new infrastructure. These technologies are part of the EruopeQCI (Quantum Communication Infrastructure) initiative and are aimed at improving the overall Cybersecurity and Resilience of the European Union along with improving its digital sovereignty and competitiveness. The program’s goal is to “safeguard sensitive data and critical infrastructures by integrating quantum-based systems into existing communication infrastructures, providing an additional security layer based on quantum physics”.
Synergies with already existing assets in the EU space programme: creating synergies with the already existing assets - Galileo and Copernico - IRISS will be offering new services such as addressing natural or maritime disasters.
High-speed broadband connectivity everywhere: The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) pointed outthat just 63% of the world’s population was connected in 2021, amounting to 2.9 billion unconnected people. IRISS will be an important player in the fight of the digital divide, bridging the gap between urban and rural areas, eliminating “dead-zones”.
Reducing space congestion: Considering the increasing volume of debris and satellites in space, IRISS sets new objectives for Space-Traffic Management, trying to keep space a safe environment. Additionally, the EU will use IRISS - a key enabler for Air-Traffic Management - to reduce air traffic congestion and avoid an excess in fuel consumption, with the ultimate goal of reducing CO2 emissions.

Moreover, as a spillover effect of the new communication system the EU will have the capability to reinforce its stance in cyberspace. The EU's new "status" will enable for the seamless operation of key infrastructure and the continuous cooperation of citizens and public agencies in the event of emergencies and disasters. Furthermore, it would serve as a backup infrastructure for terrestrial networks as well as a stable infrastructure for places that are currently disconnected but may need communication in the event of crises and catastrophes.

Additionally, satellite communication, integrated with the data-imagery service of Copernicus, would improve early-warning systems by monitoring the environment and delivering the latest data to public authorities, allowing them to respond rapidly to environmental hazards such as floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, or radioactive releases.

Therefore, several opportunities will arise for the EU following the constitution of an operational European Constellation. The new space infrastructure would be a significant step forward for the EU on its journey to digital sovereignty, as it would allow the EU to flow in outer space data and information that are considered sensitive and strategic for its autonomy. As a result, such data will be secured from unlawful third-party access, as may occur under extraterritorial law such as the US Cloud Act. In addition, the new constellation could be used as a ‘geopolitical tool’, offering fast broadband internet connection to neighboring countries, such as north africa, where internet access lacks. Indeed, of the 2.9 billion unconnected people the 96% reside in developing countries.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, IRISS holds an enormous potential in different areas, however, it is not free of challenges that must be addressed as quickly as possible. Indeed, a fine balance between public private and partnership in the construction of the constellation should be institutionalized, as well as shedding light on who should be responsible for the security and functioning of the constellation. Moreover, the EU will have to develop an attentive Space Traffic Management strategy to ensure a safe, secure and sustainable use of Space. Furthermore, how should AI be regulated in the constellation and, more broadly, in outer space? How much autonomy should a space object be granted? In particular, experts suggest that appropriate frameworks to offer legal certainty should be developed in the near future to offer appropriate guidelines on the use of AI and new technologies in outer space, such as to ensure coordination among satellites to avoid collisions or assessing an appropriate fair balance of Human-Robot Interaction for in-orbit services.

The initial phase of IRISS development is critical for the time being to foster public debate about the relevance that the new constellation will detain and its future benefits and challenges. Indeed, in the upcoming years space will be a significant playground for the European Union as its digital sovereignty and autonomy will be put at test in front of issues related to both infrastructure dependency and strategic advantage.

December 26, 2022 — No Comments

The Microchip War

Author: Francesco Cirillo.

The geostrategic rivalry between China and the US is affecting the semiconductor and integrated circuit industry.

In recent months, Washington has implemented a clear strategy to contain Chinese geo-economic expansionism, to prevent Beijing from gaining access to semiconductor manufacturing technologies. The technology war between Washington and Beijing has now reached the WTO. A few days ago, Beijing filed a request with the World Trade Organisation, asking it to analyse the restrictive policies imposed by the United States on the export of hi-tech products. This has not stopped companies operating in the sector from moving to protect themselves. First of all, Amazon started to design a new microchip aimed at PCs, with the aim of integrating semiconductor production in-house. In this technology war, other companies are also moving. Nvidia and TSMC have started to design new products for the industry.

Nvidia, as reported by Reuters, has presented a project for a new advanced microchip (called A800), capable of overcoming security controls concerning restrictive rules on the export of high technology to the People's Republic of China. The strategy pursued by TSMC is different. The Taiwanese company, after opening a production plant in the United States, is planning to design new advanced chips to meet Apple's needs. But the companies' business strategies have to cope with the technology war between China and the US. The Biden administration, following in the footsteps of Donald J. Trump's administration, has implemented tools to contain China's geo-economic expansion and prevent it from gaining access to advanced technologies in semiconductor manufacturing. In this scenario, Beijing has started to move. According to the Reuters agency, Beijing has decided to inject some 143 billion dollars into the industrial sector to support its companies. According to rumours, the five-year plan should cover the entire production chain process (from design to production).

For the Chinese government, this economic aid package is part of its strategy to decouple its economic sector from that of the US, reducing its dependence on Washington in technology sectors. While China is one of the largest exporters of rare earths, it has a strong dependence on the US for hi-tech products, which are essential for its military modernisation project. In this context, Beijing aims to break free from its technological dependence on the US within the next three years, with the target of meeting 70% of its domestic needs.

However, this status in the semiconductor industry would risk putting it under great pressure as many companies, anticipating commercial retaliation from the US, might self-impose to stop doing business with China or cut off contact with Chinese companies. Beijing meanwhile has started its plans to support its companies and help them in the China-US competition. Despite the dialogues and communication channels between Beijing and Washington, the two superpowers maintain a certain distance and mutual distrust between them. The Semiconductor War of this millennium has entered its most delicate phase.

December 19, 2022 — No Comments

Misogynistic influencers and the dark side of social media: The fine line between hate speech and free speech

Author: Camilla Cormegna.

Developments in the digital communication have changed human interactions and influencers are at the forefront of this advancement, leveraging on social media outlets to spread information and influence behaviours and opinions. Because of their large following, influencers are considered credible and trustworthy digital opinion leaders. However, some influencers can disseminate deceitfully subversive and powerful narratives to promote an alternative to mainstream views, convey a message and generate revenue from their content. Sometimes, this may result in the dissemination of extremist beliefs and conspiracy theories, a worrying issue when it is advertised by influencers with a large following thus able to attract engagement. By analysing the recent scandal of Andrew Tate, this article argues that the promotion of extremist online messages by influencers can pose a serious harm to society, making misogynistic attitudes and toxic masculinity traits mainstream while leveraging on young men’s identity crises. At the same time, the content moderation practice of deplatforming reopens the debate between free speech and hate speech and how far social media companies (SMC) should go to allow free speech while also being accountable for making extremist content go viral.

Andrew Tate and mainstreaming misogyny

Andrew Tate, a self-described misogynist and hypermasculine kickboxer, has gone viral this year over his misogynist comments, reaching 11 billion views on TikTok and 8 million followers on Instagram and Twitter combined. Tate has a long history of misogyny, both online and offline, starting in 2016 when he was kicked out from the Big Brother following a video of him hitting a woman. His content is centred on dispensing self-motivating tips for aspiring alpha males– posing with fast cars, guns, and smoking cigars- while denigrating women. Allegations of abuse, rape, and human trafficking have accompanied statements blaming women for being raped, portraying them as deceitful and lazy if suffering from mental illnesses.

By showing ‘a woman her place’, teaching men their value is from wealth and being womanisers, Tate’s content furthers an agenda underpinned by misogyny, heteropatriarchy and hegemonic masculinity. Misogyny has been defined as a system put in place “within a patriarchal social order to police and enforce women’s subordination to uphold male dominance”. Misogynistic ideology is rooted in male dominance and in a return to a patriarchal social order where women’s subordination is essential to maintain society’s hierarchy and men’s empowerment. Above all, misogyny is part of gender inequalities and structural discriminations against women that have always permeated society and that are now amplified and exploited by the online world. The reasons for showing misogynistic instances online are the same reasons underpinning harassment and anti-women sentiment in the offline world.

Tate’s content is highly concerning because his following is mainly comprised of young men and teenagers and there is the risk of exacerbating misogyny and encouraging gendered hate and violence both online and offline. By framing men as suffering economically and socially, blaming feminism for their condition, Tate employs a narrative and conspiracy theories often used by extremists and he emerges as a hypermasculine hero. Tate is not the only one to voice men’s victimisation online. Many believe that the ‘gynocentric dictatorship’ of feminism, gender equality, and women’s empowerment is responsible for men’s emasculation in the public and private life. The white men’s struggle is often based on society’s changes and their consequences such as unemployment, civil liberation, immigration. As a response, some men display hegemonic masculinity features such as power and dominance to reinforce gender norms established on a hierarchy in which women are belittled and equal rights are scrapped. Some may even turn to violence to make women comply with cisheteropatriarchal standards and to avenge their frustration with the current social order. Therefore, by combining misogyny with conspiracy theories to justify hate and violence over women, Tate’s content could be a gateway to other extreme ideologies. In turn, misogyny can also be the driver of and warning sign for violent extremist acts, as well as the starting point for the hatred of other categories such as racism and homophobia.

Tate’s misogyny, the portrayal of women as deceitful and his comments associating the #MeToo issue to a societal threat put him close to the alt-right worldview of the manosphere, a heterogeneous group of online misogynistic communities worried about oppressed masculinity and misandry. These online spaces started as a place for men to express their grievance about everyday issues such as sexual or domestic abuse, but the new communities have become more toxic and misogynist, using a sexually explicit, racist, and violent language. Manosphere communities play on the masculinity crisis to promote toxic and hegemonic conceptions of masculinity, sharing the belief that all women are a threat and rejecting the inclusive approach of masculinity, or an anti-feminist stance, fighting against feminism progress and anti-rape policies. By giving voice to men’s aggrieved entitlement about their lost social status and by offering young men hypermasculine alternatives, Tate’s message is a call to restore and reassert a lost masculinity over women. Worryingly, younger audiences, disaffected and unsatisfied with their livers, are flocking the manosphere in search for belonging and Tate becomes a hero for his self-help advice.

Free speech vs hate speech

Tate is only an example of how the dissemination of extremist and vitriolic online comments by influencers with a large following can pose a threat to society, but it also raises concerns about regulating hate speech. Tate has been banned from social media, as his content has broken platforms’ rules for appropriate behaviour. Deplatforming is an extreme step that raises ethical and legal concerns, but research has shown that it reduces the spread of offensive ideas and the impact the influencers have on the platform, thus improving the quality on the social media. However, deplatforming does not eliminate all misogynist or anti-Semitic rhetoric from the internet, it only addresses one individual by removing the spotlight from them. Instead, it produces a migration of users to other less regulated platforms which promise not to suppress any type of political rhetoric or views. The Streisand effect of banning profiles – increased publicity over a censored information- must also be considered when examining the role of deplatforming in limiting extremist content.

More importantly, this practice could also make people like Tate a martyr, with his followers accusing cancel culture and violation of free speech and reigniting the debate between free speech, hate speech and SMC. The controversy first emerged in January 2021, when Trump’s account was suspended from social media. Many Republicans accused SMC of censorship and expressed suspicion about the arbitrary power of social media against free speech while others supported the decisions to hold hate speech accountable. Free speech is a double-edged sword, as it encourages people to freely express their opinions, but it can also be exploited to spread hate and misinformation, thus requiring drawing a line between freedom of expression and hate speech. While SMC state they are not actively censoring political views, they have discretionary powers in the US when it comes to free speech because of Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act 1996, which prevents them from being liable about their users’ content. Section 230, however, causes dispute among conservative policymakers for censoring political opinions while Democrats call for platform accountability when it comes to misinformation and child abuse. Moreover, banning and censorship by social media platforms perpetuates cancel culture, a threat to pluralism and discursive democracy which, according to critics, violates the First Amendment’s freedom of speech. Opposers believe Big Techs should not have the discretion of deciding how to regulate free speech but SMC are private companies and thus not regulated by the First Amendment. At the same time, difficulties in addressing hate speech concern its lack of an internationally accepted definition, as hate is a vague term and even SMC’s CEO such as Zuckerberg struggle to define it. To curb hate speech, SMC have adopted several moderation practices, but they may result in inconsistencies and double standards, as Kanye West is banned for anti-Semitism, but the Iranian government’s Twitter account is still running.

At the same time, social media platforms share the blame in promoting extremist content because of their algorithms and they need to take accountability. This is how Tate’s content went viral, as TikTok reacted too late to limit his content - although it was clearly breaking the platform’s rule- allowing him to become mainstream. Other far-right and alt-right influencers are taking advantage of this loophole to promote their content and grow audience, as the recommender system prioritises extreme content because it is always associated with higher engagement, creating radicalisation pathways. TheYouTube algorithm is believed to recommend extreme content to those who already consume materials belonging to fringe ideologies, but it is also a gateway for teenagers who cannot distinguish between mainstream and fringe content, as they use the platform daily. YouTube and other platforms monetise on everyone’s content regardless of their nature and beliefs, allowing for extremist content to thrive, generate revenue, and possibly contribute to the radicalisation of young people.

Conclusion

Andrew Tate is an example of how social media platforms are leveraged to promote hateful content. Online misogyny is a reflection of the gender inequalities of society, and the hatred towards women has managed to become amplificated thanks to online misogynistic communities. The risk of mainstreaming anti-feminist stances is worrying, especially when figures like Tate can represent a hypermasculine hero to young and disillusioned youth. There is a fine line between hate speech and free speech and SMC are caught in a difficult situation: they want to create a safe space for users but also uphold free speech. Hate speech needs to be better defined legally to respect freedom of expression to allow a correct policing that does not results in censorship. At the same time, SMC appear to be reluctant to deplatform sources of hate because they are a lucrative business. Still, they must create a review system that allows a proper regulation of free speech although now, legally, they are not forced to do anything.

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