Mat Youkee speaks about the role of the US and China in shaping Panama’s current security situation. He is a freelance journalist and independent consultant based in Panama.
In this session, Mat Youkee discusses how Panama’s security situation has been affected by recent statements by US President Donald Trump. He looks at what is currently shaping Panama’s strategic decision making in the international arena, including US and Chinese political and business interests. He also considers what is next for the nation in light of these competing geopolitical interests.
Interviewers: Sarah Toubman & Dr. Rabiah Ryklief - Central & South America Desk
Increased geopolitical tensions caused by a war on the European continent and the re-election of Donald Trump, a NATO sceptic, as president of the United States have brought the question of the EU's military capabilities back to the agenda. America has been a well-recognised backbone of European security through NATO; however, recent discussions concerning the need for a “stronger Europe” with more capabilities have arisen. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the umbrella that covers EU defence matters, and the European Defence Agency (EDA) is a body under the CSDP aiming to improve the defence capabilities of the EU by coordinating efforts with member states. This blog article will examine some structural bottlenecks that the EU needs to face on their way to the strategic autonomy it has longed for.
Challenges and opportunities for further EU defence cooperation.
The EDA's work coordinating efforts between member states has numerous positive effects for member states and the EU. Firstly, this joint procurement will make spending more effective and, hence, more targeted, enabling member states to spend better. This can further lead to more specialised military equipment and innovation. Initiatives the EDA has launched, such as permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the new project on hybrid drive trains for military vehicles launched on December 11th 2024, show a positive trend towards cooperation on EDA projects with positive outcomes.
The EDA assists member states' militaries in collaborating effectively, maintaining “open doors” for cooperation among two or more states. This can help prevent the emergence of different systems that create bottlenecks for efficient collaboration in areas such as information sharing and the ability to manage one another's weapon systems when it is necessary to coordinate actions, either through CSDP or NATO missions where EU states are to take the lead.Although efforts and initiatives through the EDA, such as PESCO, have been launched to help EU member states coordinate efforts more effectively to increase the capabilities of the CSDP, some structural bottlenecks need to be addressed. Integrating defence projects and industries can be tricky due to the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP in the EDA. Projects depend on member states’ initiatives and willingness to cooperate on these matters, as defence and military are core interests to sovereign states due to the anarchic nature of the international system. States may be cautious about further integrating within these areas because of security implications.
Building on the above, the diverging national interests of member states based on various aspects such as geography, resources, threat perception and strategic culture create differences among states' willingness to enter EDA projects. Another aspect that needs to be considered is the EU’s reliance on the United States. As long as many EU states see the US as a security guarantor, it does not incentivise member states to increase the military capabilities of the EU. However, with Donald Trump's recent election as President of the United States, the EU should re-evaluate this idea and strive for more autonomy, especially after the Munich security conference where tensions with the US developed further, and now, as discussions arise about negotiating a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, and the EU does not have a seat at the table.
The EDA has numerous opportunities if member states align and integrate properly and effectively through joint projects. The EU has a strong political will, and increasing its capabilities through the EDA will make it a more credible actor in the international system and make it more autonomous in its neighbourhood, which is precisely what the EU needs in these critical times. With a more “capable” CSDP through EDA projects, the EU could finally get the strategic autonomy it has longed for and cut reliance on the US as a security guarantor while balancing them, which would reverse the security implications of the US threatening to leave NATO. Improving the EU´s crisis response could be a massive opportunity for the EU, further building on the credibility of the EU in the international system. Looking at when EU states, France and the UK (the UK left the EU in 2020) were to take the lead in the 2011 NATO-led operation in Libya, it clearly showed the weaknesses of the EU to act autonomously in its neighbourhood due to a divergence in systems and a lack of capabilities. If EU member states coordinate efforts through EDA initiatives, this could provide great opportunities for the EU’s actorness.
Potential threats that successful EDA cooperations could face include friction with NATO. Further defence integration between EU states and increasing the capabilities of the EU could be seen as undermining NATO, which could further affect the EU’s relationship with the US. Therefore, the EU needs to have close dialogues with the US as they are improving its capabilities. Divergence in member states' economies in the EU could lead to budgetary constraints and inequitable burden-sharing between member states. This could create fragmentation between EU member states since the EDA projects are “volunteer” and create inefficiency and potential new problems for the EU to face internally.
Conclusion
Concluding this blog article, a recommendation is for the EU to cooperate closely with NATO, especially the US, through the processes of EDA projects. Keeping NATO and the US in the loop could prevent friction with crucial powers and security guarantors on Europe´s way to gaining more autonomy. As mentioned earlier in this article, a structural bottleneck for successful projects is the intergovernmental nature of the CSDP and the EDA. A recommendation is, therefore, to make more projects mandatory for all EU member states and have a set percentage of GDP that each country should contribute to prevent friction over burden-sharing internally.
Over the past century, the Gulf states have built their economy through the exploitation of their natural resources, mainly oil and gas. As a result, their GDP per capita has been second-to-none: Qatar $119K, the UAE $82K, Bahrain $67K, and Saudi Arabia $66K. However, in the future, their economies could be jeopardised by factors such as the reduction of crude oil prices (due to the development of fracking and shale gas), the global shift toward renewable energy (as concerns over climate change increase), and, ultimately, the depletion of their natural resources. Although powerful relative to their size and population, the Gulf states are rentier states, and represent the most oil-dependent countries in the world. Their investment in the space sector is an important part of their ongoing economic transition to address these factors.
A Comparative Analysis of the Cases of ISWAP and ASWJ in Nigeria and Mozambique
By Massimiliano Dosmo and Leonardo Pesci - Africa Team
Since its inception in 2014, the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) has become a transnational Jihadist movement whose ideology and practices inform insurgents’ strategies and objectives across the world. One after another, movements pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, elevating ISIS as a structuring force for many religious-based factions in Africa. This article investigates the proliferation of ISIS-affiliated groups on the continent, comparing how the Islamic State operates in Nigeria and Mozambique. Specifically, the article seeks to understand how the strategic, operational, governance, and ideological practices of ISIS affiliates converge - or diverge - from the ones of ISIS’s core group.
Origins and formation of the groups
Starting with the origins and group formation, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) originated as a splinter faction of the Jihadist group Boko Haram, which was established in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria, in 2002 by Muhammad Yusuf. AfterMohammed Yusuf was killed in an unsuccessful uprising in 2009, the movement, under the new leadership of Abubakar Shekau, began an insurgency against the Nigerian government to create a Caliphate in the Lake Chad Basin area. In 2016, Boko Haram split intotwo groups: Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'adati wal-Jihad (JAS), commanded by Abubakar Shekau, and ISWAP, led by Abu Musab al Barnawi. The separation was the outcome of internal disputes within Boko Haram that were brought on by some skepticism shown by ISIS's higher authority following Shekau's decision to break with Al-Qaeda and joinISIS. This skepticism was given by the fact that, although Shekau had been designated as Waly (leader) of ISWAP and had pledged his loyalty to ISIS, his leadership skills and doctrinal beliefs were amajor source of worry for Al-Baghdadi. These worries were subsequently confirmed when Al-Baghdadi received grievance letters from Shekau's subordinates. Specifically, Shekau was accused of being too violent against the Muslim population, using indiscriminate violence against them, which represented an ideological clash with the ISIS view. This resulted in Al-Baghdadi's decision to not trust Shekau as the legitimate leader of ISWAP. From ISWAP’s inception, it is evident how ISIS actively influenced the group’s leadership due to an ideological clash with the previous leader.
On the other hand, Ansar al-Sunna, also known as al-Sunna wal-Jamaat’s (ASWJ), history in Mozambique can be traced to 2015, when the group started as areligious organisation in Mocimboa da Pria, one of the districts of Cabo Delgado Province in northern Mozambique. It emerged as an armed group in 2017, taking advantage of socio-economic issues such as widespread poverty, the exclusion of Muslim populations, and official indifference. In 2019, it started operating under the umbrella of theIslamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), which also included the Islamic State’s affiliate in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and joined ISIS, having previously adhered to Salafi-jihadist theology. The primary connections between ASWJ and ISIS are the ideological foundation, based on Salafi-jihadism, and promotional backing. However, it has much autonomy compared to more disciplined ISIS branches. Despite adopting ISIS's rhetoric on the establishment of anIslamic caliphate, its operational framework and governance are representative of the local reality. While ASWJ employs ISIS-style recruitment tactics, such as appealing to local concerns, it does not adopt the organisational rigor that ISIS has previously enforced on its branches.
Territoriality, governance and engagement with the population
A crucial element of this analysis is the territoriality, governance, and engagement strategies that the two groups employ. ISWAP takes on a methodical approach to administration, drawing inspiration from the administrative framework of ISIS. The organization manages commercial activity, collects taxes, and offers a few social services, including food distribution and disputeresolution. In contrast to Boko Haram's previous indiscriminate cruelty, ISWAP has immediately tried to gain local support by presenting itself as an alternative to the Nigerian government. Its governance model, aimed at winning thehearts and minds of the local population, has allowed ISWAP to sustain its insurgency and maintain control over key territory surrounding Lake Chad. ISWAP'sgovernance structure is one area where ISIS has a direct influence. Similar to ISIS, ISWAP uses a structured governance model, establishing a Sharia-law-based judicial hierarchy, designating governors for captured areas, and implementingfinancial measures to support its operations. ISWAP’s success in controlling the area demonstrates ISIS's preference for long-term administration as opposed to just gaining territory. Its capacity to offer services, including agricultural help and medical assistance, stands in stark contrast to the Nigerian government's neglect ofrural communities.
In contrast, ASWJ’s governance approach is less structured. Although it has exercisedauthority over certain parts of Cabo Delgado, it lacks a strong administrative framework. While they struggle to deliver basic services, the organisation enforces Sharia rule in conquered territory. Instead of using organised taxation, it engages in extortion and looting, and it frequently has coercive relationships with thelocal population. This lack of structured governance has hindered its ability to maintain sustained legitimacy among people. For these reasons, ASWJ’s governance is severely hampered by its excessive reliance on external funding and illicit activities, such as drugs and rubies smuggling. Consequently, unlike ASWJ, ISWAP has developed a more structured logistical network, securing a steady supply of weapons, food, and fuel directly from ISIS. It has also integrated foreign fighters into its ranks, benefiting from training provided by ISIS operatives in the region. ASWJ’s patchy and fluctuating implementation of Islamic governance initiatives, combined with its leadership’s short-term strategic objectives, has made long-term territorial control more challenging. This has prevented ISIS from fully sustaining the group’s operations, unlike in the case of ISWAP.
Funding Activities and Financial Revenues
The current analysis cannot overlook the financial and fundraising practices of ISWAP and ASWJ within their respective contexts. Despite the notorious difficulty in pinpointing direct financial connections, there are nonetheless converging similarities between ISIS, ISWAP, and ASWJ’s fundraising practices. ISIS’s core group in Syria and Iraq has largely benefitted from a different range of revenue sources. These included oil extraction and trade, taxation, lootings, robberies, kidnapping for ransom, extortion of local communities, and tariffs on import/export within their territories. Additionally, private donors and international fundraising networks generated a substantial part of ISIS's financial revenues.
While tracing direct financial links between ISIS’s core leadership and its Mozambican affiliate remains speculative due to limited evidence, the same cannot be said for ISWAP. During the first years of activities, ISIS's financial support was instrumental to the group's territorial and logistic affirmation. Evidence demonstrates ties between ISIS and ISWAP consisting of regular triangulations of money - up to USD 782.000 between 2015 and 2016. On the other hand, the closer engagement with local communities allowed the group to impose Zakat, a taxation system representing one of the primary sources of financial entrances. Leveraging the Quranic obligation, the group legitimises its authority in collecting taxes from private and business communities including farmers, traders, and fishermen. The practice avoided predatory actions characterising other Nigerian groups such as Boko Haram and JAS, creating patterns of predictability within communities. Despite this, ISWAP’s financial system is anyway reliant on the ransoms of local elites and international workers.
On the other hand, ASWJ's economic sustainment seems primarily reliant on illegal local trade and local and external donations. The region has historically represented a notorious hotspot of illicit trafficking and smuggling routes. The centrality of the port of Mocímboa da Praia elevates Cabo Delgado as a central hub for insurgents to trade and contraband goods, including timber, charcoal, rubies, and ivory. Notably, drug trafficking of heroin and methamphetamines from South Asia has become one of their main sources of income. A substantial part of ASWJ's financial entrances arises from local entrepreneurs demanding protections, as well as taxed loans borrowed to small businesses. While the above-mentioned appeared as the main financial revenues of the group, alternative fundraising activities confirm the tendency to rely on kidnapping for ransoms and the participation in human and organ trafficking routes of the Horn of Africa. Finally, although financial connections between ASWJ and ISIS are not sustained by verifiable evidence, it is nonetheless conceivable that links between the group and external funders from smaller ISIS cells in South Africa around the continent exist.
Source: Think Tank Experts Warn of Growing Islamist Financing Network in South Africa; Photo by ZUMA Press, Inc.
Group’s Objectives and Evolutions
Despite initial analogies, Nigerian and Mozambican territorial dynamics, logistical capacities, and counter-insurgency strategies have not only differentiated the evolutions of the groups but also their ideological and practical closeness to ISIS.
Both groups started with low-profile activities. Between 2015 and 2017, ASWJ was mainly composed of religious leaders, managing religious spaces and spreading Salafist doctrines, delegitimising secular institutions and state law. Similarly, ISWAP’s first steps in 2016-2018 are defined as the “consolidation” phase, characterised by a few activities and attempts of the group to define themselves from Boko Haram.
Between 2019 and 2021, both groups pledged allegiance and received formal recognition from the Islamic State’s core group, simultaneously intensifying the violence and frequency of attacks. ASWJ expanded its territorial presence to the four main coastal districts of Cabo Delgado. Approximately 16–20 monthly attacks targeted cargo transports, contractors, and security forces, spreading in neighboring Tanzania. ISWAP structured its internal composition, expanded its territorial control, and improved its engagement with the population acquiring notable legitimacy. The incursions remained targeted towards Nigerian security forces and military bases expanding to international workers and organisations in rural areas around the Lake Chad Basin.
With opposed outcomes, 2021 represented a turning tide for two groups, directly reflected in their relation and closeness to ISIS. Mozambican counter-insurgency strategy included contractors and international interventions to recapture major urban centers. Militants were forced to change their strategies, the number of attacks decreased, and tactics shifted to guerrilla actions, targeting civilians in smaller and rural villages. Meanwhile, ISWAP reinforced its bureaucratic organisation, and expanded its numerical basis, and territorial control, benefitting from the Sambisa offensive and the killing of JAS leader Shekau. Its territorial presence spilled over the Lake Chad Region, and at least 10 other Nigerian states.
Therefore, while pledging allegiance to ISIS brought both groups under the broader Islamic State umbrella, they did not necessarily adopt ISIS’s ideological and strategic framework. While ISWAP followed ISIS’s structured governance and military strategy, ASWJ opted for a more localised approach adapted to the Mozambican context. Its affiliation with ISIS provided it with branding, logistical, and financial support, but it did not transform ASWJ into a fully ISIS-controlled entity.
Conclusion
All in all, the overall structure and actions of the two ASWJ and SWAP reflect a varying degree of convergence from ISIS's core ideology. While the closer relationship between ISIS and ISWAP has informed the evolution of the latter, the looser approach toward ASWJ is enshrined in the group's relatively independent actions. However, it is important to notice how in both cases the groups still showed, even if in a different manner, a high degree of independence in the choice of their local strategy due to the different nature of the socio-political context of their territories, toward the application of ISIS core ideology.
In this session, Dr. Teodorescu delves into the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, exploring approaches to advancing women’s rights in international conflict and the critical role of women’s integration in achieving sustainable solutions. She highlights the importance of holding countries accountable through international frameworks like the WPS agenda and shares insights on how empowering women is essential for building long-term peace and security.
Dr. Teodorescu is a distinguished expert in European policies, migration, and gender issues. She serves as the Head of European and International Affairs at Istituto Luigi Sturzo in Rome and is the President of the Italian chapter of Women in International Security. She also leads the Mediterranean Women Mediators Network, focusing on women's roles in peace and security.
Interviewers: Hanorah Hardy and Sofia Sutera - Human Rights Team
by Wesley Issey Romain & Giulia Saccone - AI, Cyber Security & Space Team
Introduction
The emergence of the “smart city” as a concept in the 1980s and a reality in the mid-2000s coincided with the rapid development of technology and internet worldwide. Two decades later, in 2024, growing urbanisation, environmental concerns, social and governance issues, shifting lifestyles, and economic and residential attractiveness contribute to deeper reliance on digital tools and emergent technologies, such as Internet of Things (IoT) devices and artificial intelligence (AI). Consequently, protecting smart cities’ infrastructures, networks and IoT devices against data theft, sabotage, surveillance, ransomware, terrorism, and other cybercrimes – whether from state-sponsored hacker groups or non-state actors – is crucial for government, private businesses, and civil society stakeholders.
This paper argues that despite the constant and multifaceted cybersecurity threats smart cities encounter, holistic and long-term solutions exist to maintain and enhance the security of their infrastructures and prevent any potential massive disruption. Our article mainly uses qualitative and quantitative data from secondary sources. It will be organised into five parts in the subsequent order:
Firstly, it will provide a brief understanding of the concept of a “smart city” and a presentation of its interpretations, strengths, opportunities, and primary stakeholders. The second part (II) will discuss the leading cyber security challenges smart cities face and demonstrate how the advent of emerging technologies and new threat actors will continue to impact smart cities’ overall safety and integrity. Finally, the third, fourth, and last parts (III, IV, and V) will each present an existing and potential solution to strengthen the security of intelligent cities’ IT infrastructures against cyber threats and disruptions.
A brief presentation of the concept of the smart city
The concept of “smart city” started appearing in academia around the 1990s; however, the notion has been popularised through IBM’s Smart Cities Challenges. Although nowadays there is not a univocal definition of a smart city, for this article, we may define them as an urban area where ICT and IoT occupy a pivotal role in data collection, anonymisation and analysis for the improvement of citizens’ quality of life, addressing contemporary challenges on a multi-stakeholder partnership. It is hence characterised by the use of diverse IoT-based systems (from smart grids to garments with sensors), which change from city to city–which implies the diverse definition of smart cities. Therefore, connectivity is the indispensable trait that every IoT device should have to join the smart city’s network, and scalability is what ensures that every project can be initially implemented on a small scale and then expanded in the wide urban landscape. Furthermore, users’ participation is vital for concretising the effects of a smart city and spotting new challenges1.
The main sectors involved are the ones of mobility, where IoT devices, AI and 5G optimise citizens’ transportation both on private vehicles and public transportation; energy, where smart grids allocate energy efficiently based on demand; and health, where IoT timely communicates through 5G the physiological state of individuals to provide timely responses and targeted therapies. IoT implementation in housing is important not only for this latter aim but also for improving lifestyle, with a house capable of responding to our daily necessities in a timely manner. IoT paired with AI can be functional for improving surveillance and predicting crime. Recently, smart cities’ R&D has also focused on public administration and citizenship participation, boosting the efficiency of public administration and creating smart communities for boosting citizens' engagement in local politics2.
Smart cities aim to improve citizens’ quality of life by addressing urbanisation challenges through energy efficiency and responsive systems enabled by IoT devices. However, only 16% of cities can independently afford these projects due to high costs and diverse program requirements. To attract investors and drive innovation, cities use their smart city mission as a branding strategy, fostering advancements in underdeveloped but essential areas and consequentially creating long-term investments and competitiveness on the international stage. Partnerships with international bodies, research institutions, and other smart cities have proven effective for acquiring cutting-edge technology and best practices, mainly through city-to-city collaborations that bypass traditional bureaucratic channels.
The success of a project in a smart city resides in the coordination of the multiple stakeholders, which play simultaneous roles as planners, developers, implementation agents and follow-up responsible. The main actors involved are public stakeholders - namely national and local governments, administration and political institutions – that enable the coordination, monitoring and compliance of other players through policy formulation. Following, we have the private sector – composed of companies and start-ups primarily focused on the ICT field, investors, and in specific contexts, energy suppliers and property developers – that, in the case of cybersecurity, provide ICT infrastructures and investments in cutting-edge technology to boost the system readiness for cyberattacks. The Academic group has emerged as knowledge brokers, concurring with private counterparts in offering solutions in the implementation stage. Civil stakeholders – namely press, NGOs, and private citizens - play a dual role as recipients and contributors of projects, dispensing continuous feedback to the abovementioned categories thanks to advocacy and data sharing.
The digital challenges of smart cities with emerging technologies.
Due to its incorporation of mixed technologies, software, and hardware, a smart city would inevitably be exposed to multiple cyber attacks by various threat actors. Experts have suggested that smart cities necessitate novel and inventive approaches to safeguard devices and applications, taking into account factors such as resource limitations, the nature of distributed architecture and geographic dispersion while confronting issues such as unreliable communication, insufficient data, and privilege safeguarding. Regardless of whether the cyber attack is conducted on the perception layer (sensor, actuators, RFID or GPS), on the network layer (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and LAN), or on the application layer (Smart Home, Health, and Grid), most common cybersecurity risks associated with smart cities can be summarised into four types.
First, the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is perhaps the most documented practice of cyber attacks against a service or a network. DDoS is a malicious attack restricting digital traffic by inundating a target with excessive internet traffic, utilising compromised computer systems and IoT devices as sources. A cybercriminal could, for example, launch a DDoS attack to gain a smart city’s charging station, traffic light, or public transportation network, which could become a component of a botnet employed to disable another system. In 2018, CISCO indicated that the number of DDoS attacks worldwide was 7.9 million and had forecasted a substantial rise to 15.4 million in 2023. Additionally, most recent statistics data showed that DDoS attacks increased by 46% in the first half of 2024 in comparison to 2023, with peak attack power jumping from 1.6 Tbps to 1.7 Tbps, in which online gaming, technology, financial services, and telecommunications were the most targeted industries with 49%, 15%, 12%, and 10% respectively.
Secondly, data exfiltration from devices such as traffic lights, CCTV cameras, parking meters, or public services servers is another significant challenge for smart cities as they gather extensive data from citizens. Public data theft violates the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of public data, as cybercriminals can use compromised information to perpetrate ransomware or other fraudulent transactions with third parties on the dark web. Privacy violations, financial loss, legal problems, and loss of trust from citizens are just a few of the damaging effects of data leaks from a city’s IoT devices. Such incidents have happened and are more frequent than one may think. For example, in July 2024, a large-scale data theft conducted by a cybercriminal group was reported in the United States in Columbus, Ohio. After the breach of private data stolen from over a hundred thousand ordinary people stored in public IT infrastructures and municipal agencies, a ransomware operation was launched, and sensitive information was divulged on the dark web. This type of incident will likely occur again as cities rely more and more on technology.
Thirdly, device hijacking is another threat associated with smart cities. Hacker groups often seek to control a device to influence the myriad of technological equipment constituting a smart city infrastructure and network. IT experts argue that IoT devices frequently possess default credentials that malicious actors can use, and weak data encryption, absence of periodic software updates, and interconnectedness render them easily compromised by hackers.
Fourth, Permanent Denial of Service (PDoS) is documented as a devastating cyber risk to any technologically advanced and dynamic city. IT experts have noted that, in contrast to sporadic DDoS, which results in ephemeral cyber disruptions, PDoS causes permanent hardware damage and substantial economic consequences, potentially endangering human life in healthcare and critical infrastructure sectors.
Urban areas are projected to accommodate 68% of the global population by 2050, propelled by urbanisation and demographic expansion. Consequently, such prevision, coupled with the advancement and availability of devices and digital tools, the participation of state-sponsored and non-state actors groups in malign cyber-attacks is undoubtedly a source of concern for developed and emerging countries, global cities and their inhabitants. At the same time, it should be observed thatcities worldwide do not share the same level of cyber threat. As Cesar Cerrudo mentioned, while most cities possess technology, the effectiveness of smart cities varies based on the extent of technological advancements implemented. Some cities have implemented more technology while others have less.
Smart cities are expected to face several digital challenges with the availability and advent of new technologies; nevertheless, solutions and measures exist to enhance security and prevent disruptions.
Source: Illustration generated by AI
Threat detection and investments in advanced technology
Existing measures are primarily concerned with ensuring data and privacy protection based on trust, integrity, and confidentiality to prevent leaks from sensors, cameras, other IoT devices, and critical infrastructures. To support them and address the main concerns raised by industry and academia on privacy and data protection, the cybersecurity sector has focused on the mitigation of breaches in IoT for privacy protection, improving device authentication, access control, and firmware updates to provide better data anonymisation, secure data sharing and analytics for safe decision-making. A smart city is a goldmine of personal data due to its pivotal role in enhancing the quality of life of citizens and the interconnectedness through IoT. This provides criminals with a myriad of access points on devices with limited.
Blockchain technology has demonstrated a high potential solution thanks to its capacity to transmit information securely and directly. Specifically, this technology can be applied to cybersecurity to protect personal data. In the case of e-governance, it enables individuals to manage their credentials independently, bypassing centralised controlling authorities. Seoul is a fitting example: in 2018, the city started applying blockchain in its public administration, and during the same year, it developed a metaverse secured by blockchain for document issuance and citizen participation.
AI application is another game-changing technology that can boost smart cities’ cybersecurity thanks to their high computational and predictive qualities, which, applied to the fog computing layer, could protect them from cyberattacks despite their resource constraints – i.e. limited storage and RAM3. In particular, the fog layer managing the data transfer between the IoT devices and the Cloud layer provides a higher amount of computing load than those two extremes, lower latency in the communications between the IDS and the IoT, and lower energy consumption. This enables the operators to isolate the attack, repel it, and avoid its spread throughout the network, allowing an interrupted flow of smart city services. In particular, ML can be applied to both SDIS and AIDS. On the other hand, it can ease the time-consuming characteristics of updating the signature database. Regarding the latter, it can enhance the precision of attack detection, lowering the rate of false positives.
Biometrics is already used to facilitate authentication thanks to the uniqueness of individual features, addressing the constant concern for privacy and security. They have already found wide applications in the smart economy field, like the fingerprint and face recognition used by Apple Pay, face recognition for video surveillance devices of Amazon Web Services, and voice recognition employed by Amazon Alexa for telemedicine in the UK.
Strengthening and facilitating public-private partnerships
It is already visible from these few examples how private and public sectors coexist in the development of smart cities’ security, acting in synergy for optimising the outcomes of their projects thanks to risk and resource sharing and the relative reduction of costs; access to the private’s technical and management skills and the innovation enhancement for effective, creative and real-time solutions. An example is the collaboration between Barcelona’s Municipal Institute of Informatics and CISCO to implement a communication protocol for CERT and CSIRT to detect, share, respond and recover from cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities in IoT devices.
Indeed, Barcelona is a perfect example of a smart city where public and private partnerships (PPP) can thrive thanks to companies with a sound knowledge of the local market, the involvement of all the stakeholders – citizenship included – to commit them towards the same type of projects and ease the tensions through transparency and responsibility, and trust-building practices, which are paramount in the initial phases. The cruciality of trust building is visible in the failure of the PPP of Sidewalk Labs and Waterfront Toronto, where the lack of involvement of the citizens led to tensions that resulted in boycott protests of the project.
However, it must be pointed out that this factor is crucial in democracies, where citizenship plays an active role in shaping smart cities. Nevertheless, transparency is a value that benefits all smart cities regardless of the ongoing regime since it communicates the reliability of the projects and the worth of investing in this transformation.
Strengthening and facilitating regional and international cooperation, information sharing and dialogue among experts
PPPs are not the only method to transform and strengthen the security of smart cities; international fora, capacity-building projects, and collaboration among cities play fundamental roles. At the international level, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the UN-HABITAT coordinate the global platform "United for Smart Sustainable Cities" (U4SSC) to encourage the transition from traditional to smart cities, which has also developed a set of key performance indicators (KPIs) for sustainable cities, a valuable instrument for agenda setting and performance evaluation adopted by more than 50 cities worldwide.
The ITU, thanks to the Smart Sustainable Cities program, supports the development of stable, secure, reliable and interoperable ICT devices for sustainable cities. The Smart Cities Council is a network of experts providing capacity building and investment programs, which, among all the objectives, aim to ensure cyber, privacy, and data protection. At the regional level, for instance, the EU provides the Smart Cities Marketplace: a platform for the various stakeholders involved in the field to improve citizens’ quality of life and increase the competitiveness of European cities and industry with respect to EU climate targets.
While at the level of bilateral agreements, Singapore has exploited its expertise to catalyse agreements from distant poles, such as China and the US, for mutual cyber capacity-building projects. Those multilevel initiatives have a common effect that addresses one of the biggest challenges of smart cities intra and interoperability: the normative and standard differences between cities, which makes PPP challenging and prevents effective data protection, the biggest concern in the research field.
Conclusion
In conclusion, despite the persistent, increasing, and diverse cybersecurity risks faced by smart cities, comprehensive and sustainable solutions are available to safeguard their infrastructures and avert significant disruptions. Firstly, it has been shown that the notion of a smart city originated in academic circles throughout the nineties. The concept emphasises mobility, energy, and health, with research and development concentrating on public administration and citizen participation. It was argued that successful projects necessitate the collaboration of several stakeholders, including planners, developers, implementation agents, and follow-up measures, to enhance the quality of life for citizens.
The second part of the article sought to demonstrate that smart cities incorporate various technologies, including software and hardware, making them vulnerable to multiple cyber-attacks from a wide range of threat actors. DDoS and PDoS attacks, data exfiltration, and device hijacking attacks are common cybersecurity dangers. The involvement of both state-sponsored and non-state actors in malicious cyber-attacks is a cause for concern for both developed and emerging nations, as well as capital cities around the globe and their populations.
Thirdly, it has been observed that investments in cutting-edge technologies to prevent cyber threats are deemed pertinent and practical. For instance, tools such as blockchain technology provide a safe and direct method for information transmission, positioning it as a viable option for cybersecurity. Besides, artificial intelligence applications can improve cybersecurity in smart cities through their computational and predictive abilities. Lastly, biometrics, characterised by its distinctive attributes, is employed for authentication, mitigating privacy and security issues.
The successful example of the city of Barcelona, introduced in the fourth part of the paper, confirmed that public-private collaborations improve security and optimise project results via risk and resource sharing, cost reduction, access to private technical and managerial expertise, and innovation. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that transparency is essential for smart cities.
Lastly, multilateral forums are part of the solution. International forums and initiatives to increase capacity building are essential to strengthening the safety of smart cities. Developing reliable, secure, and stable information and communication technology devices must be encouraged within forums such as the ITU’s Smart Sustainable Cities. Only through the listed solutions can government, public, and private stakeholders ensure that smart cities remain safe.
References
Houichi, Mehdi. “Cyber Security within Smart Cities: A Comprehensive Study and a Novel Intrusion Detection-Based Approach.” p.394. ↩︎
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Having illustrated the region’s history and political structure, this second part of the article will look at the solutions to the Kashmir conflict proposed throughout the last decades, and the underlying motivations behind their failure to be adopted.
Solutions to the Kashmir Conflict
The debate around Kashmir has offered three major solutions to the current stalemate:
Political Independence
A strand of the academic debate around Kashmir has argued that granting the region independence would lift the burden off the shoulders of India and Kashmir (thus the international community) while simultaneously allowing the Kashmiri people to best safeguard their own unique identity. This approach presents two problems:
Fractured Kashmiri Identity: as mentioned in the first paragraph of this paper, the seven decades of war characterizing Kashmir have greatly consumed the Kashmiriyat and the regional identity resulting from it, polarizing communities and fueling division. Within this context, it is hard - if not impossible - to imagine the Kashmiri people being able to agree on independence and on what country to build afterwards.
Indo-Pakistani opposition: given Kashmir’s importance to both New Delhi and Islamabad (more of this in the next paragraph), it is even harder to believe that either of the two countries would ever grant its part of the region independence.
2. Formal Partition
Several authors such as Wolpert argue that a formal partition of Kashmir based on the Line of Control between India and Pakistan would be the “most realistic solution”; however, this policy would face two problems:
Conflicting views regarding partition: while some of India and Kashmir’s major political actors have accepted the current Line of Control as the new Indo-Pakistani border, Pakistan has several times categorically opposed it without providing feasible alternatives, thereby leaving no margin of political dialogue.
Prerequisites for peace are treated as consequences of future peace: the transformation of the LoC into a soft border, and Kashmir’s demilitarization have for decades been seen as the two fundamental initial steps to be taken towards a conflict resolution in Kashmir. However, despite pressures from the international community, both India and Pakistan refuse to take significant measures in that direction, each waiting for the other to make the first move. Within this strategy adopted by both sides in the conflict, it seems unlikely that a common agreement on Kashmir’s formal partition will be achieved any time soon.
3. Autonomy
The debate on Kashmir’s autonomy has rotated around two kinds of autonomy:
Separate autonomy: this approach advocates for the establishment of five different autonomous provinces (Kashmir; Jammu; Ladakh; Azad Kashmir; Gilgit-Baltistan) with the following characteristics:
free access to one another and to/from India and Pakistan;
individual democratic constitution(s) and legislature for all local issues;
defense and financial treaties between India and Pakistan for regional defense and foreign affairs;
a high-level governing body (comprising India; Pakistan and the 5 Autonomous Provinces) for cross-regional issues and demilitarization;
Joint autonomy: another frequently discussed option, it envisages the creation of a no-borders Kashmir Economic Union with India and Pakistan jointly managing defense and foreign affairs, and the current Line of Control separating the two parts of Kashmir being a mere formality.
Despite this third solution being the most popular and feasible (for it would be the one to best balance Kashmiri desire for autonomy and Indo-Pakistani interests), it nonetheless presents - similarly to the other two solutions previously discussed - two major issues:
Prerequisites for peace treated as consequences of future peace: (same as in the “formal partition” solution.)
Indian repression of Kashmiris’ attempts to engage in “political building processes”: the 2019 abrogation (discussed in the previous paragraph) of articles 370 and 35a of the Indian Constitution led to a centralization of power in the hands of New Delhi; this move hindered local forms of political engagement that would have helped India and Pakistan develop solutions to the conflict accepted by the very people living the conflict. The consequent de-legitimacion and de-responsabilisation of Kashmiri civil society drew locals away from official political processes and pushed them towards underground organizations that provided fertile ground to the Islamization and radicalization of society.
As shown in this paragraph, all three major solutions to the Kashmir conflict offered by the international academic debate present problems that make them unfeasible in the short run. These issues are largely the product of Indian and Pakistani unwillingness to compromise, much to the disadvantage of the region’s population. It is by now clear that the limbo in which Kashmir finds itself is nothing but a reflection of the critical nature of Indo-Pakistani relations worsened by their respective national interests. The paper will now turn to this.
Map 1: Erstwhile Princely State of Jammu & Kashmir. Currently, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir are administered by Pakistan, UT of Jammu & Kashmir and UT of Ladakh by India, and Aksai Chin by China. Source and link: Wikimedia Commons.
Indo-Pakistani motivations behind the Kashmir conflict
The inability - or unwillingness - to take significant steps towards the resolution of Kashmir’s current state of affairs by both New Delhi and Islamabad conceals deep-rooted interests and discourses on both sides of the conflict: Kashmir’s resource-rich nature and important role as a water supplier make it vital for both countries’ economy. From a geopolitical point of view, the region serves as a bridge connecting South Asia to Central Asia and China, constituting a major economic corridor for both India and Pakistan. Apart from these obvious reasons, Kashmir plays a bigger role in both countries’s identity; let us analyze each of the two nations’ point of view:
India’s discourses and interests in Kashmir: there are three major motivations behind New Delhi’s desire to control Kashmir:
Muslim Kashmir as a confirmation of India’s pluralist and secular federalism: Kashmir gradually became the symbol of India’s secular side of the political debate, which saw the region’s internal and external diversity as the alternative to hindu-nationalism.
Avoid the Balkanisation of the country: granting Kashmir independence would in turn foment nationalisms all over the diverse Indian nation, posing a serious threat to the country’s stability and unity.
Avoid the radicalisation of the subcontinent: as many analysts claim, an independent (even more Pakistani) Kashmir would likely become a safe haven for islamic fundamentalism, which would then easily spill into India fomenting religious radicalism (islamic in action, hindu in reaction).
Pakistan’sdiscourses and interests in Kashmir: similarly to India, we find three main reasons for the country’s claims on Kashmir:
Muslim Kashmir as the last piece in the national unification process: Pakistan gradually came to perceive itself as the homeland in which all muslims of South Asia could unite under one common Islamic Republic; given this self-bestowed identity and role, Kashmir - being the only muslim region of the subcontinent not under Pakistani control - represents the ultimate confirmation of the country’s identity.
Religious sentiment as a means to ensure national unity: given the complex internal problems currently faced by the country, promoting the narration of a jihad in Kashmir against foreign oppressors could unite the people of Pakistan and distract them from bigger looming problems.
The Pakistan Army’s major role in the country: the historical importance of the army in Pakistan has given it a great amount of political power; any (quasi) conflict increases the army’s power and legitimacy within society, whereas any stability has the opposite effect. Given the army’s weight in the decisions of Islamabad, it is no wonder that the government has so far promoted a policy of destabilization across Kashmir.
Conclusion
As this paper has shown, Kashmir is a complex region with a unique history and identity. Despite the erosion of Kashmiriyat tolerance and the rise of religious fundamentalism caused by seven decades of war, this identity still exists and should not be ignored by Indo-Pakistani processes of national homogenisation; it should rather be given voice to by official political channels, so as to avoid the proliferation of alternative violent forms of civic engagement - namely terrorism. Granting the region autonomy (as mentioned in the third solution of the third section of this paper) could be a mean to avoid this; however, given Kashmir’s complex political division and the clashing interests and discourses of India and Pakistan, a joint or separate autonomy for the region seems highly unlikely in the short run. While India perceives protests in Kashmir as the product of a Pakistani-backed radical minority, Pakistan sees the turmoils as a natural expression of the popular religious and nationalistic sentiment; consequently, each country believes the other to be the main reason behind the continuation of the conflict, and itself as the only solution to it. Given its position, a prolonged destabilization and radicalisation of Kashmir could bear consequences on the larger Asian region; given the nuclear-power status of both India and Pakistan, a worsening of their relations could have repercussions on the larger international community. It is therefore of utmost importance to avoid the crystallization of the conflict. Three important steps could have positive effects in this direction:
Promote local forms of civic and political engagement (as opposed to India’s abrogation of article 370 and the consequent disruptive effect that it had on Kashmiri society).
Take concrete actions tackling regional fundamentalism and terrorism (as opposed to Pakistan’s current ambiguity and past sponsorship of major radical islamist groups).
Promote Indo-Pakistani confidence-building measures to reduce fear and mutual mistrust, thereby creating a channel for communication and ultimately cooperation (as opposed to the historically poor Indo-Pakistani relations characterized by 4 major wars and several clashes).
While the international community has since the failed UN mediation of 1947 always regarded Kashmir as a private issue between the two countries, it is by now clear that India and Pakistan alone are unable - or unwilling - to come to realistic solutions. The international community should then change its approach to Kashmir and act as a mediator between New Delhi and Islamabad in order to ensure the fulfillment of the three policies just mentioned, able to constitute a solid basis from which to later achieve a more ambitious regional autonomy; major actors directly affected by the region’s instability - such as China or Russia - could start working in this direction, consequently dragging the US and the EU (both afraid of leaving the region in the hands of Moscow and Beijing) into the region with the UN supervising cooperation among great powers. The need to change our approach to the Kashmir conflict is drastic and urgent, for it affects not only the region’s stability and security, but that of the international community as a whole.
by Ilas Touazi, Andrea Sau, & Mira Benucci- Africa Team
Introduction
In a highly multipolar world, Türkiye has broken with its traditional cautious, inward-looking approach to foreign policy. Indeed, a ‘Turkish model’ of post-Cold War foreign policy has been conceptualised with a view to the ‘rebirth of a great Türkiye’ in terms of ‘anti-imperialism,’ ‘regional protection,’ ‘regional leadership,’ and ‘defence of the faith.’ Thus, a long-term, multi-faceted strategy, including political, economic, military, cultural, and humanitarian aspects aimed at extending Türkiye's influence as a key and undeniable player in the court of emerging powers, is indisputably linked to its growing presence in Africa. This will promote Türkiye's emergence as a global power through proactive, multidirectional, and multidimensional diplomacy, combining hard and soft power. Accordingly, at the 2023 Türkiye-Africa Economic and Trade Forum in Istanbul, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that he would do his utmost to ensure that the African continent took its rightful place in the global system, within the framework of cooperation based on an equal and win-win partnership.
The Turkish influence in Africa: A triptych regional strategy between Anti-Westernism, neo-Ottomanism and the Erdogan Doctrine
Türkiye's military and security strategy: a new projection of domination under the yoke of “hard power
Türkiye's growing involvement in Africa's security sector demonstrates its strategy to expand geopolitical influence and establish itself as a key global power through military means. In the last 10 years, it has marked its involvement in Africa with a multifaceted approach to security, using multilateral missions, joint training, bilateral agreements, and army bases to consolidate influence and counter rival powers in key regions. Additionally, the country has enhanced its military footprint through its weapon exports. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2016 and 2023 Türkiye increased its annual weapons exports to Africa by about 284%. This export surge highlights Türkiyes growing defence industry and its efforts to strengthen political and economic ties with African nations, emphasizing lower costs and a flexible policy as key selling points. Additionally, Türkiye's involvement is exemplified by SADAT, a Turkish private military and security contractor (PMSC). Since its establishment, SADAT has played a significant role in Türkiye's broader strategic interests - hard power - including its operations through Syrian mercenaries in countries such as Libya, Niger, and Mali. This activity aligns with Ankara’s goals of increasing its influence in the region while maintaining a degree of operational discretion. Türkiye's use of private military contractors like SADAT forms part of a broader strategy focused on expanding its presence in key African regions, namely North Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa, all of which hold strategic importance for the country.
While Türkiye’s ties to North Africa are rooted in history, its modern focus is driven by maritime security concerns and its Western Mediterranean strategy. During the Libyan civil war, from 2014 to 2020, Turkey supported the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA). This alliance aimed to gather support for Turkish policies in the Eastern Mediterranean. Assistance to the GNA included the provision of weapons, drones, and military coordination on the field. The Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia, is a critical region for Türkiye’s strategy. Mogadishu has a fundamental geo-strategical role as one of the countries facing the Gulf of Aden, a key point in the juncture of world trade. Türkiye-Somalia cooperation highlights Africa’s role in the Turkish grand strategy, showcasing its focus on both military partnerships and geopolitical objectives. In 2011, Erdogan was the first non-African leader to visit Somalia since the beginning of the civil war. The partnership expanded to military cooperation on the 13th of April 2012, when Turkey and the Somali government signed an army training cooperation agreement. The agreement was considered by the parties a sizeable success, and as a result, in 2017, Türkiye opened its largest military base outside its territory, TURKSOM. The principal objective of the cooperation has been to fight the Islamist group Al-Shabab, aligning with Türkiye’s broader goal of stabilizing key regions to enhance its influence. However, the officers trained by Turkey, in Turkish, and with the Turkish army philosophy are increasingly meddling with internal affairs and with the equilibrium of the Somali army.
The Turkish-African cooperation: prioritizing “soft power” approach
After the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, Türkiye emerged as an increasingly prominent actor on the international stage, leveraging an array of soft power instruments to bolster its influence. This is particularly evident in Africa, where Ankara’s multifaceted engagement includes economic partnerships, cultural and religious diplomacy, and humanitarian initiatives. Economic cooperation is a key feature of Türkiye’s African policy, with bilateral trade surging from $5.4 billion in 2003 to over $40 billion in 2022, highlighting Ankara’s strategic priority on deepening economic ties. Turkish companies have undertaken significant infrastructure projects, such as the Awash-Woldia railway project, part of the Djibouti-Ethiopia railway, and the Blaise Diagne International Airport in Senegal. Additionally, Türkiye’s ambition to become a primary energy hub is observable in its cooperation agreement signed in 2024, which grants Türkiye the right to explore and develop offshore hydrocarbons in Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the 2022 Memorandum of Understanding Between Türkiye and Libya on Cooperation in the Field of Hydrocarbons. Through the Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum, Türkiye seeks to promote bilateral partnerships, encourage investments, and facilitate technology transfer. These initiatives underscore Ankara’s long-term commitment to Africa’s development and signal its intent to establish mutually beneficial partnerships.
Equally important to Türkiye's African strategy is its focus on cultural and religious diplomacy alongside its well-orchestrated humanitarian efforts. The shared Sunni Muslim identity between Ankara and many African nations represents a valuable foundation for building trust and enhancing the perception of Ankara’s projects as legitimate, authentic, and mutually beneficial. Institutions such as the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and the Yunus Emre Institute have promoted cultural exchanges and religious services, further strengthening religious relations with African countries. The Diyanet, for example, has supported mosque-building initiatives in Djibouti, Ghana, and Sudan. Similarly, the Yunus Emre Institute has established aTurkish language and culture centre and facilitated cultural exchange in Senegal. Meanwhile, humanitarian diplomacy remains central to Türkiye’s engagement in Africa. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) has been active in over 30 African countries, implementing initiatives tailored to local needs in healthcare, education, and capacity-building. For example, the Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Training and Research Hospital in Somalia serves as a vital healthcare facility and a training centre for Somali medical professionals, while TIKA’s efforts in Mozambique focus on Sustainable Agricultural Development. Through these efforts, Türkiye aims to consolidate its geopolitical footprint, elevate its international reputation, and cultivate partnerships rooted in solidarity, pragmatism, and mutual benefit. By emphasizing a historical and religious proximity narrative, Ankara aims to present itself as a dynamic and trusted actor, presenting an alternative to Western powers, often associated with political conditionality or perceived paternalism.
Conclusion
Since the end of EU accession negotiations and the rise of the AKP, Türkiye has shifted to a more multidimensional and assertive global strategy, with Africa as a key symbol of this transformation. Ankara's approach combines neo-Ottomanism and non-interference, positioning Turkey as a third way between Western powers and Russia-China. Türkiye’s support for the GNA in Libya and its multifaceted engagement in Somalia—combining military training and facilities with economic, cultural, and religious initiatives—highlights its interest in two points of geostrategic juncture, the eastern Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa along with their strategic maritime and trade routes.
Türkiye’s African strategy demonstrates how the country aspires to operate on the international arena. On the one hand, through the pragmatic use of hard and soft power, building a narrative, and, on the other, by positioning itself as a non-Western alternative. In this way, Türkiye has extended its influence effectively, slowly but surely. However, this strategy faces major challenges. Türkiye's limited resources risk exaggerating its ambitions and the use of tools such as SADAT or unbalanced alliances can damage its credibility. These factors highlight the delicate balance between Ankara's aspirations and its capabilities.
With Donald Trump's victory, the US Big Tech, with the second Trump administration, could significantly influence and consolidate the strong interconnection between the federal government and American technology companies.
In recent years, the relationship between the military industrial complex and the US tech companies (Amazon, Microsoft and Google in the lead) has strengthened, especially on technology renewal issues coming from the Pentagon in the political-military sphere. This connects the relationship between Silicon Valley and the military-industrial complex in national security matters.
In the context of the future Trump administration, which will take office on 20 January 2025, the latter could grant Big Tech ample room to manoeuvres in exchange for support in national security matters.
The strong concern is the partnership that could emerge in a public-private collaboration. According to a recent 2024 paper by Costs of War/Brown University's WATSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, entitled ‘How Big Tech and Silicon Valley are Transforming the Military-Industrial Complex’, the link between the Department of Defence and the tech company sector is gradually influencing and directing the Pentagon's investments and the Defence Budget ($886 billion for the year 2024). In the current context, the role of Tech companies such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft is increasing dramatically, competing with traditional US defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin.
Besides the classic Big Tech companies, other companies such as Palantir Technologies also carve out important spaces for themselves. Founded in 2003 by Peter Thiel and Alex Karp to develop software for analyzing large amounts of data, this company is one of the best known cases of start-ups backed by military and intelligence funds that have become key players in providing services and technologies to the Department of Defence (DoD) and other federal agencies.
During its early stages, Palantir received around $2 million in funding from In-Q-Tel, the CIA's venture capital fund, which enabled the start-up to grow rapidly and acquire contracts with various government agencies. This helped Palantir to be able to grow, giving it important resources to be able to strengthen its relationships with major government agencies.
For several insiders, Palantir's role, linked to its potential, would grant it the cards to transform itself into a figure similar to Raytheon or Lockheed Martin, historically dominant companies in the defense sector. Indeed, it is theorized that Palantir and other technology companies, such as Microsoft and Amazon, may soon get to acquire traditional defence contractors, blurring the distinction between the technology industry and the US defence sector.
Image Source: Generated with ChatGPT/DALL·E
The role of tech companies has started to strengthen since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine of growing tensions with China. Linked to these geopolitical tensions, several start-ups operating in the tech sector are receiving significant investments. Among these is Anduril, a company operating in the production of military systems and drones with a focus on AI integration, which recently completed a $1.5 billion funding round, bringing its valuation to $14 billion.
As a matter of fact, the role of Big Tech in the coming years could be consolidated also in view of the geopolitical competition with Beijing.
Elina Beketova discusses if Washington D.C. should support Zelensky's 'Victory Plan,’ where Trump may support the plan, and what can be expected from Biden in these last few weeks of his administration.
Ms. Beketova is a democracy fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis in Washington D.C., where she researches temporarily Russian occupied territories in Ukraine. She also has extensive experience as a journalist where she reported in Crimea, Kharkiv, and Kyiv, which included prominent international high profile interviews.
